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PETITIONER: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LOK SHIKSHAN SANSATHA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/07/1971

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) MITTER, G.K. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN DUA, I.D.

CITATION:  1973 AIR  588            1971 SCR  879  1971 SCC  (2) 410

ACT: Education-Grant-in-aid  System, r. 3(1) and (2)-If vague  or ambiguous-Executive  instructions.  Constitution  of  India, 1950,  Arts. 14, 226 and 358-Jurisdiction of High  Court  in relation   to  policy  of  giving  grants   to   educational institutions. Grant-in-aid  Code  if  violative of  Art.  14.   Period  of Emergency-Article  358  if protects  Executive  instructions from attack under Art. 19.

HEADNOTE: The grant-in-aid system was introduced in 1859 and its  main object was to permit voluntary effort and reliance on  local resources  in  the  field  ,of  education  apart  from  such contributions  as  may be available from the  funds  of  the State.   After the re-organisation of the State of Bombay  a unified  code  of grant-in-aid to  non-government  secondary schools  throughout  the State was introduced by  the  State from  the  year 1963-64.  Under r. 2(1) an  application  for permission to start a secondary school has to be made in the prescribed  form  and  such application  has  to  reach  the prescribed  authorities  by the end of October in  the  year preceding  the year in which the school was proposed  to  be started.   Under r. 2(2) the management which was  permitted to open a school has so apply for recognition of the  school and  under r. 3, a school seeking recognition shall  satisfy the  Department that the school was actually needed  in  the locality  that it did not involve any unhealthy  competition with  any existing institution and that the  management  was competent,  reliable  and  was in the hands  of  a  properly constituted  authority or committee.  Under r. 3(3)  one  of the  conditions which has to be satisfied is  regarding  the financial   stability   of  the  proposed   school.    Other conditions  which had to be satisfied by a  proposed  school are  enumerated  in the remaining 13, clauses of  the  rule. Rule  86(2) provides that schools which are  not  registered under the Societies Registration Act, would not be  eligible for grant. On  October 6, 1965, the State issued a  press-note  calling

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attention  of  all the managements intending  to  start  new secondary  schools to the relevant provisions of  the  Code. It  was also stated that applications received for  starting new  schools  would  be scrutinised and  considered  by  the District  Committee  comprising  of  the  Chairman  of   the Education   Committee,  Zila  Parishad  Parishad   Education Officer  and  a member of the Secondary  School  Certificate Examination  Board,  Poona, or Vidarbha Board  of  Secondary Education,  Nagpur,  that is, by persons who  were  familiar with the conditions prevailing in the particular areas,  and the requirements in the area for a new or additional school, and  that  permission  to  start  a  new  school  would   be communicated  to  the  applicants concerned  by  the  Deputy Director of Education of the region by the end of  February. The  applicants were also informed that the appeals  to  the Government  against  the orders of the  Deputy  Director  of Education  could be filed up to end of March, 1966.  On  the same  date, Government sent communications for taking  steps for  constituting the District Committees. The  State  also sent a circular on the same :date to the various educational authorities stating that the Disrict Committees 880 should bear in mind, when considering the applications,  the various  matters, enumerated in items 1 to 14 Which  related to the requirement of a school or an additional school in  a particular  area,  its financial stability, the  nature  and competency of the management and several allied matters.  It was  obligatory  on  the District Committee  to  record  its reasons  in writing for recommending or not  recommending  a particular  application,  which would be considered  by  the Deputy Director of Education of the concerned region  before granting or refusing permission to start a new school.  The  applications  of the three  applicants-societies  were scrutinised by the concerned District Committees along  with the applications and objections of rival applicants.  In the case  of the first applicant-society the District  Committee recommended  the  rival applicant on the  grounds  that  the applicant society had no funds but that the rival  applicant was  of good financial position and experience.  The  Deputy Director  of  Education  accepted  the  recommendation   and rejected the first applicants’ application stating that  the need of the place had been fulfilled by permitting the rival society to open a school at the place. In  the case of the second applicant the Deputy Director  of Education  rejected the application on two grounds,  namely: (a) that the application was made after the prescribed date, and (b) that the society was not registered.  The appeals of these  applicants to the State Government were rejected  and they  filed  writ petitions in the High Court  for  striking down r. 3 of the Grant-in-aid Code. In  the case of the third applicant, in spite of  objections by a rival who was already conducting a school in that  area the  District Committee recommended the grant of  permission to  the applicant on the grounds that the applicant  society was a good, experienced and popular society and it was  also financially  sound  and  that the population  of  the  areas demanded as an absolute necessity an additional school  from standard VIII onwards, The society which was already running a  school  filed  a writ petition to  quash  the  permission granted to the third applicant. The High Court struck down cls. 1 and 2 of r. 3 of the  Code as  violative  of Arts. 14 and 19 of  the  Constitution  and directed the educational authorities to grant permission  to the  first  two applicants to start schools, as  desired  by them.  It dismissed the writ petition filed for quashing the

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permission  granted to the third applicant.  The High  Court also  made  certain observations regarding the  policy  that should  be  adopted by the educational  authorities  in  the matter  of  permitting the starting of a new  school  or  an additional school in a particular area. In appeals to this Court, HELD:(1) The High Court had misunderstood the nature of  its jurisdiction  when dealing with the claims of the first  two applicants.   It was not for the High Court to lay down  the policy that should be adopted by the educational authorities in  the matter of granting permission for starting  schools. The question of policy is essentially for the State and such policy  will  depend  upon  an  overall  assessment  of  the requirements  of the residents of a particular locality  and other  categories  of persons for whom it  is  essential  to provide for education.  If the overall assessment is arrived at after proper classification on a reasonable basis, it  is not  for courts to interfere with the policy leading  up  to such assessment. [887E-H] (2)Clauses (1) and (2) of r. 3 are not vague or ambiguous in any  respect.  They should not be considered  in  isolation. If  they  are interpreted having due regard to  the  various other matters contained in other clauses of the rule and the detailed instructions contained. 881 of  the rule and the detailed instructions contained in  the circular  letter, the District Committee had ample  guidance for  deciding  the need of a particular locality to  have  a school  or  an  additional  school,  as  also  the   further questions  regarding the competency and reliability  of  the management. [895D-E; F-H] (3)The provisions of the Code are executive instructions and are in the nature of administrative instructions without any constitutional force.  The State Government was competent to issue  those executive instructions for the guidance of  the educational  authorities dealing with the  applications  for grant of permission to start schools, and they are perfectly valid.  The applications in the present case were considered during the period when the Proclamation of Emergency was  in operation.  Article 19 could not therefore be invoked by the first  two  applicants and the view of the High  Court  that Art.  358  did  not  save  the  two  clauses  of  r.  3  was erroneouse. [888A-B; 892C-E] (4)(a) The High Court erred in striking down the two clauses on the ground that unless a school was started in accordance with  the  rules  contained in the Code they  would  not  be recognised  by  the  Secondary School  Boards  and  students studying in such schools would not be able to appear for the examinations  held  by  the Board and  the  University,  and therefore,  were  violative  of  Art.  14.   The  provisions regarding  grant  of permission and recognition  of  schools under  the  Code  are merely intended  for  the  purpose  of receiving  grant from the Government, and are not  concerned with the effect of starting a school without complying  with the  requirements  of the provisions of the Code or  in  the face   of   refusal  of  permission   by   the   educational authorities.   So  far as the distribution of grant  to  the schools  recognised under the Code was concerned it was  not the  case  of any of the applicants that  such  grants  were being  made arbitrarily or any discrimination was  shown  in that  regard.   It was also not the case of  the  applicants that the District Committees had acted arbitrarily, nor  was it their case that the Deputy Director of Education had  not based  his decision on the recommendations of  the  District Committees.  There was thus no violation of Art. 14.  [892G-

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H; 893B-C, D-I] (b)The  mere fact that there was no right provided  for  the applicant  being heard before the application  was  rejected could  not be a ground for holding that there was  violation of the principles of natural justice.  The particulars which had  to be mentioned in the prescribed application form  are very  elaborate  and complete.  The provisions in  the  Code read  along with the instructions given by the State in  its circular  letter  referred  to  various  relevant   material factors that had to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding  whether the application was to be granted or  not. When  all the relevant circumstances, claims and  objections of  the  applicants  and their rivals had  been  taken  into account  by  the  District Committees  and  the  educational authorities  there  was  no violation of  any  principle  of natural justice.  It was not the case of the applicants that the  reasons given for rejection of their applications  were not covered by the provisions contained in the Code.  [893H; 894D-E] (5)The  High Court erred in issuing a mandamus to the  State without considering the Various reasons given by the  Deputy Director  of Education for rejecting the application of  the first two applicants. (a)The  reason given by the Deputy Director  of  Education with  respect  to  the first  applicant  for  rejecting  its application  was  that  the  need  of  the  place  had  been fulfilled  by permitting another society to open the  school at  the  place,  on  the  recommendations  of  the  District Committee.   It  was  open  to  the  authorities  to  refuse permission  if  the  school is not in  a  financially  sound position. [896B-D, G] 56-1 S.C.India/71                             882 (b)In  the case of the second applicant the reasons  given were that the application was sent after the prescribed date and  that  the society was not  registered.   Therefore  the rejection was on valid grounds. [897D-E] (6)In the case of the third applicant, from the mere  fact that by giving it permission to open another school some  of the  students  of  the  rival  society’s  school  may   seek admission  in  the  new school, could not be  a  ground  for stating  that the rival society’s legal rights had been  in- fringed.   In  granting  permission to  another  society  no extraneous or irrelevant matters had been taken into account by  the District Committee or the  educational  authorities. The  reasons  given by the District Committee  for  granting permission  were  valid reasons and the High  Court  rightly rejected the petition of the rival society. [898G-H]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 160,  161 and 878 of 1968. Appeals  from the judgment and order dated December 2,  1966 of  the  Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench  in  Special  Civil Applications Nos. 420 and 421 of 1966 and 694 of 1965. Niren  De, Attorney General, B. D. Sharma and S.  P.  Nayar, for the appellants (in C.As. Nos. 160 and 161 of 1968). W.S.  Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the  appellant (in C.A. No. 878 of 1968) and respondents Nos.  1 and 2  (in C.A. No. 160 of 1968). A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondents Nos.  1 and 2 (in C. A. No. 161 of 1968). M.R. K. Pillai, for respondent No. 2 (in C. A. No. 160 of

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1968). Niren  De, Attorney General, B. D. Sharma and S.  P.  Nayar, for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (in C.A. No. 878 of 1968). Bishan Narain, S. K. Bisaria and T. L. Garg, for  respondent No. 3 (in C.A. No. 878 of 1968). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam,  J.-All these three appeals,  on  certificate, are  directed against the common judgement and  order  dated December  2, 1966 of the Bombay High Court in Special  Civil Applications  Nos.  694  of 1965 and 420 and  421  of  1966. Civil  Appeals  Nos. 160 and 161 of 1968 are  filed  by  the State  of Maharashtra and the Deputy Director of  Education, Nagpur  against  that part of the order of  the  High  Court allowing Special Civil Applications Nos. 420 and 421 of 1966 after holding that cls. (1) and (2) of S. 3 of the Grant-in- aid  Code  (hereinafter  to be referred  as  the  Code)  are invalid and directing the State of Maharashtra to grant                             883 the  petitioners  in  the said  Special  Civil  Applications permission  to  start  schools in  the  areas  concerned  as desired  by  them.  Civil Appeal No. 878 of 1968 is  by  the applicant  in  Special  Civil Application No.  694  of  1965 against  the  order of the High Court  dismissing  his  writ petition  and declining to interfere with the order  of  the State and educational authorities granting permission to the third  respondent  in the appeal to open, a  new  school  at Sakharkherda with VIII and IX classes. We  will first deal with Civil Appeals Nos. 160 and  161  of 1968  and  refer to the facts leading up to  those  appeals. Civil Appeal No. 160 of 1968, as mentioned above, arises out of the ,order in Special Civil Application No. 420 of  1966. The applicant in the said application Loka Shikshan  Sanstha Anjansinghi  made an application dated October 30,  1965  to the  Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur for permission  to open  a  school during the year 1966-67  at  Anjansinghi  in Amravati  district.   The-  appli,cation  was  sent  in  the prescribed form.  Therein it was stated that the  Management was not registered and that it will get itself registered by about  the  middle  of January,  1966.   Under  the  heading "Arrangements made for necessary furniture and apparatus" in col.  13, the applicant stated that they proposed  to  spend about Rs. 2,000 in respect of furniture, science, apparatus, teaching  ,Aids, teachers library and pupil’s library.   The break  up of the figures under these heads was  also  given. In  col. 15 under the heading "Funds at the disposal of  the management  in  addition  to those in col.  13  above",  the applicant  stated  Rs. 5,000 only.   The  applicant  further stated under col. 17 that it required only a token grant  in the  first  year of recognition and a regular grant  at  the prescribed  rate from the second year.  The Ashok  Education Society,  Ashoknagar,  the  third  respondent  in  the  writ petition, bad also applied to the educational authorities to start  a  school during the same year at  Anjansinghi.   The writ  petitioner  filed  an objection dated  March  8,  1966 before the Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur objecting to the  grant  of permission asked for by the  Ashok  Education Society,  Ashoknagar on the ground that the said Society  is an  outside  agency.   In the said  petition  the  applicant requested  for favourable consideration of  his  application already  submitted, to the authorities.  The District  Con,’ mitee which scrutinized the applications of both the parties recommended  that  the application of  the  writ  petitioner should be rejected as it had no funds.  Another Society with good  financial position and experience was  recommended  by the  Committee.   The, District Committee  recommended  that

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Ashok  Education Society should be granted permission as  it was a good, experienced and popular society and it was  also financially sound.  The Deputy Director of Education by  his order  dated April 12,1966 rejected the application  of  the writ petitioner on the ground that the need 884 of  the  place  has been  fulfilled  by  Permitting  another society  to open a school at the place.  The petitioner  was further  informed  that in case any school is  started  when permission  has been refused, serious view will be taken  by the  educational authorities.  The writ petitioner filed  an appeal on April 21, 1966 to the State Government wherein  he prayed  for  withdrawing  permission granted  to  the  Ashok Education  Society, the third respondent and also  requested that  permission may be granted to the applicant society  to open  a school.  This appeal was rejected by the  Government by its order dated 10/16th May, 1966.  The applicant society filed writ petition and prayed for striking down r. 3 of the Grant-in-aid  Code  framed by the State  of  Maharashtra  as unconstitutional   and  violative  of   fundamental   rights guaranteed  under Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution  and  to quash the orders of the Deputy Director of Education and the State  Government  refusing  permission  to  the  petitioner Society  to  start a school at Anjansinghi.   The  applicant further   prayed  for  a  direction  being  issued  to   the educational  authorities  to grant permission to  start  the school as requested by it. As  common  contentions  had been raised  by  the  State  of Maharashtra in this writ petition and also in Special  Civil Application  No. 421 of 1966 before the High Court, we  will refer  to those contentions after adverting to the facts  in Special Civil Application No. 421 of 1966. Civil  Appeal  No. 161 of 1968 arises out of  Special  Civil Application No. 421 of 1966.  The applicant therein Sri Nana Guru  Shikshan  Sanstha, Shirkhed sought permission  of  the Deputy  Director of Education to start a school at  Shirkhed from  June  1966.  The request was made by  a  letter  dated October  29,1965  and the application was not  made  in  the prescribed  form.   The  Parishad  Education  Officer,  Zila Parishad,  Amravati by his communication dated November  15, 1965  forwarded  the  prescribed  application  form  to  the applicant  with a request to have the particulars  mentioned therein   properly  filled  in  and  to  submit   the   same immediately.   The  application in the prescribed  form  was sent by the applicant on November 3, 1965.  In Column No.  4 under  the heading ’ whether the management  is  registered" the  answer given was, "no".  Under the same column  to  the further  query  "if not, whether it is intended  to  get  it registered.   If  so when" the answer given  was  "within  a month".   In  column  13, the  expenditure  proposed  to  be incurred regarding furniture etc. the applicant stated  that about  Rs.  800 was intended to be spent.  The break  up  in respect  of the various items was also given.  Under  column 15 regarding funds at the disposal of the management, it was stated  that  a sum of Rs. 5,000 was available.   The  third respondent  therein  Swami Vivekan  and  Shikashan  Sanstha, Lehgaon had also made an 885 application for opening a school at Shirkhed.  The applicant filed  an objection on January 5, 1966 to the grant  of  any permission to the third respondent.  The Deputy Director  of Education  by  his order dated April 11, 1966  rejected  the application  of the writ petitioner on two  grounds  namely, "(1)  the application is after the prescribed date  and  (2) the  Society  is not registered." The  petitioner  was  also

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informed  that  if a school is started when  permission  has been refused, serious view will be taken by the  educational authorities.  The appeal filed by the writ petitioner to the State  Government  was rejected by the latter by  its  order dated May 10/16th, 1966.  The applicant filed Special  Civil Application  No. 421 of 1966 praying for striking down r.  3 of  the Grant-in-aid Code as unconstitutional and  violative of  Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.  The orders  refusing permission to the Society to start a school were also sought to  be  quashed. A further prayer was  made  for  directions being  issued to the authorities to grant permission to  the Society  to start a second school at Shirkhed as desired  by it. The State Government contested both the Special Civil Appli- cations.  It was pointed out that the rules contained in the Grant  in-aid Code were all executive instructions given  by the State to the educational authorities for proper guidance in  the  matter  of considering  applications  for  starting schools which required grants to be made by the  Government. None of the rules contained therein violated any fundamental rights  of the applicants.  Even if Art. 19 can be  invoked, the restrictions regarding the starting of schools were  all reasonable  restrictions in the interest of general  public. No  restriction  has been placed on the  applicants  forming associations  or unions as contemplated under Art.  19(1)(c) and  that  in any event the restrictions were saved  by  Cl. (iv)  of Art. 19.  The reasons given by the Deputy  Director of  Education  for  rejecting the applications  of  the  two petitioners were valid as the District Committee constituted for  the  purpose had considered all  the  relevant  matters before rejecting their applications and granting  permission to the respective third respondents therein. The  High  Court by its common judgment has taken  the  view that  cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3 of the Grant-in-aid Code  are invalid as they are too vague to afford any standard both as to  the need of a school in the locality and also as to  the unhealthy  competition  with an existing school.   The  said clauses  are equally vague as there is no standard  to  find out  the  competency  and  reliability  of  the   management inching  of  the school.  There is further no  provision  in these sub-clauses for hearing a party before the authorities concerned take a decision in the matter of grant or  refusal of permission to start a school.  The High Court is  further of the view that by such executive instructions the State is able  to prevent the two writ petitioners from  carrying  on their legitimate 886 activities of running schools.  The said clauses also do not satisfy the test of being reasonable restrictions in  public interest.  On this reasoning the High.  Court has held  that the two clauses, namely, (1) and (2) of rule 3 are violative of the rights guaranteed to the writ petitioners under  Art. 19(1)  of the Constitution.  Though it was argued on  behalf of the writ petitioners that clauses (1) and (2)  of r. 3 of the Code contravene the provisions of Art. 19(1)(c) (g)  and (f),  there  is no clear indication in the judgment  of  the High Court as to which clause of Art. 19(1) is violated.  It is the further view of the High Court that as the State  has no  power to issue instructions as those contained  in  cls. (1)  and  (2)  of  r. 3, Article 358  will  not  save  those provisions  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  there  was   a Proclamation  of  Emergency  during  the  relevant   period. Though no attack based on Art. 14 was made in either of  the writ  petitions,  it  is  seen that  during  the  course  of arguments,  this article was relied on and it was  contended

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that  the  said two clauses of r. 3 are  arbitrary  as  they enable the State to discriminate between one institution and another.  The High Court in considering this contention  has held that in the matter of distribution of grant, the  State must   comply   with   the   fundamental   requirements   of constitutional  law embodied in Art. 14.  According  to  the High  Court the effect of cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3  is  that apart  from the fact that the such schools are not  eligible for  receiving  the grants, the students  studying  in  such schools cannot appear for examinations held by the Secondary School  Boards  as  the  latter  will  not  recognise   such institutions.As  the students of such schools cannot  take their  university  education,  cls. (1) and  (2)  of  r.  3, according  to the High Court, offend Art. 14 and hence  they are invalid.  After holding that cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3 of the  Code are violative of Arts. 14 and 19, the  High  Court struck  down those provisions and directed  the  educational authorities to grant permission to the two writ  petitioners to start schools as desired by them. The  learned  Attorney-General, appearing on behalf  of  the State  in Civil Appeals Nos. 160 and 161 of 1968 raised  the following  contentions: (1) The High Court has  committed  a very  serious  mistake in invoking Art. 19 in  view  of  the mandatory  provisions of Art. 358 of the  Constitution,  (2) even  assuming that Art. 19 can be invoked,  the  provisions contained  in  cls.  (1)  and  (2)  of  r.3  are  reasonable restrictions  in the interest of general public and as  such those clauses are valid; (3) the view of the High Court that the  said clauses offend Art. 14 is erroneous; (4) that  the clauses  struck down by the High Court. are  mere  executive instructions  given  by the State for the  guidance  of  the educational  authorities when considering  the  applications received for permission to open schools in particular areas. Such  executive  instructions cannot be struck down  on  the ground that they are vague., Alternatively. 887 under  this head it was contended that the two  clauses  are not  vague  in  any  respect; and (5)  the  High  Court  has committed  a serious mistake in striking down the orders  of the educational authorities without considering the  reasons given by such authorities for rejecting the applications  of the two writ petitioners. Dr.  Barlingay, learned counsel for the  contesting  respon- dents  has  supported the view taken by the High  Court  for striking  down -Is. (1) and (2) of r.3 of the  Code.   The counsel  relied on the reasons given by the High  Court  for striking  down the two clauses as violative of Arts. 14  and 19.   The counsel further urged that though the two  clauses of  r.3  in  question may on the face of  it  appear  to  be innocuous, nevertheless the application of those  principles by  the-  educational  authorities  may  lead  to   possible discrimination    between   the   institutions    concerned. According to him no standards have been laid down to  assess the  need of a school in a particular area.  Further,  there is   no  criteria  laid  down  to  enable  the   educational authorities  to  decide the circumstances  under  which  the starting  of  a  new  school  may  result  in  an  unhealthy competition  with an existing school.  The position  is  the same   also  in  regard  to  judging  the   competency   and reliability of a particular management who proposes to start a school.  The more serious ground of levelled against these clauses  (1) and (2) of r.3 by Dr’ Barlingay was that  there was  no right given to an applicant for being  heard  before his application is rejected by the educational authorities. Before we deal with the above contentions advanced before us

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on  behalf of both sides, it is necessary to state that  the High  Court  in the judgment under attack has  made  certain observations  regarding what according to it should  be  the policy adopted by the educational authorities in the  matter of  permitting  the  starting  of a  new  school  or  of  an additional  school in a particular locality or area.  It  is enough   to  state  that  the  High  Court  has   thoroughly misunderstood  the  nature  of  the  jurisdiction  that  was exercised by it when dealing with the claims of the two writ petitioners   that  their  applications  had  been   wrongly rejected  by the educational authorities.  So long as  there is  no  violation  of  any fundamental  rights  and  if  the principles  of natural justice are not offended, it was  not for  the  High Court to lay down the policy that  should  be adopted  by  the educational authorities in  the  matter  of granting  permission for starting schools.  The question  of policy  is  essentially for the State and such  policy  will depend  upon  an  overall  assessment  and  summary  of  the requirements of residents of a particular locality and other categories  of persons for whom it is essential  to  provide facilities  for  education.  If the  overall  assessment  is arrived  at  after a proper classification on  a  reasonable basis, it is not for the courts to interfere with the policy leading up to such assessment. 888 It  should also be made clear that as accepted by the  State in  its  counter-affidavit filed before the High  Court  the provisions of the Code are executive instructions and are in the  nature  of  administrative  instructions  without   any constitutional force.  It is on this. basis that we have  to consider  the correctness of the decision of the High  Court when it struck down cls. (1) and of r. 3 of the Code. It  is necessary to advert to the circumstances under  which the  Code came to be framed as also to certain  instructions given  by  the  State to the  educational  authorities  when considering the applications for the grant of permission  to open schools. The   Grant-in-aid  system  appears  to  have   been   first introduced  in  1859  and its main  object  was  to  promote voluntary  effort  and reliance on local  resources  in  the field  of education apart from such contributions as may  be available from the funds of the State.  After the States re- organisation took place, in order to bring about  uniformity in  the  matter, the State of Bombay appointed  in  1958  an Integration Committee for Secondary Education to examine the different  Education Codes and administrative  practices  in force  at the secondary stage in the various  regions  which were  added  to the State of Bombay under the  states  orga- nisation  and  to  make proposals for a  unified  system  of Secondary Education as well as the assistance to be given to non-government  Secondary schools.’ The Committee  submitted its  report  in 1959.  In December, 1960 the  Government  of Maharashtra appointed a Committee comprised of officials and non-officials  to- suggest a unified code for  consideration of  the Government.  A revised Draft Code was  submitted  by the  Committee to the Government in or about  August,  1961. The Secondary Schools Code, with which we are now  concerned was  framed  by  the Government as a  common  code  for  the recognition of and grant-in-aid to nongovernmental secondary schools throughout the State.  The said Code came into force with  effect from the year 1963-64.  Chapter 11  related  to recognition   and  grant-in-aid.   Rule  1   dealing   with, recognition   provided   that  secondary  schools   may   be recognised  by the Department provided they conform  to  the rules contained in the Code.  Rule 2 dealt with the  matters

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relating to the applications for starting and recognition of schools.   Under  r. 2.1 an application  for  permission  to start a secondary school has to be made in the form given in appendix  1 (1) of the Code to the authorities  referred  to therein   and  such;  applications  have  to   reach   those authorities by the end of October, in the year preceding the year  in  which the school is proposed to be  started.   The said  clause  further  provided that  no  school  should  be started  unless  the  written  previous  permission  of  the Department  had been obtained and that the  schools  started without such permission shall not 889 ordinarily be considered for recognition.  Under r. 2.2, the management which is permitted to open a school has to  apply for re,cognition of the school in the form given in appendix 1(2)  of  the Code within one month of the  opening  of  the school. Rule  3  which  consists  of  16  clauses  deals  with   the conditions of recognition.  The said rule provides that  a school seeking recognition has to satisfy the Department  as regards the conditions enumerated in cls.  1 to 16  therein. Clauses  (1) and (2) of r. 3 which are attacked  as  invalid are as follows:               "Rule 3: Conditions of Recognition:               A school seeking recognition shall satisfy the               Department    as   regards    the    following               conditions:-               (1)   The  school  is actually needed  in  the               locality and it does not involve any unhealthy               competition  with any existing institution  of               the same category in the neighborhood.               (2)   The Management is competent and reliable               and is in the hands of a properly  constituted               authority or managing Committee.                ...     ...      ...     ...    ..." We  may at this stage point out that one of  the  conditions which  has  to  be satisfied under r.  3  is  regarding  the financial stability of the proposed school as stated in cl. (3)  of  r. 3 therein.  This aspect may have  a  bearing  in considering the correctness of the High Court’s decision  in Civil Appeal No. 160 of 1968. Rule 86 deals with "Kinds of Grants".  Rule 86.1  enumerates the  various  types of grants which a recognised  school  is eligible to get from the Government.               Rule 86.2 provides as follows               "Proprietary   schools   (i.e.   schools   not               registered   under   either   the   Societies’               Registration  Act  XXI of 1860 or  the  Bombay               Public  Trust Act, 1950 or any other Act  that               may  be specified by Government  and  communal               schools  will not be eligible for any kind  of               grant from public funds." At  this stage we may mention that the provisions  contained in  r.  2.1  that an application for  starting  a  Secondary School has to be in the form given in appendix 1 (1) of  the Code  and that the application should reach the  educational authorities within n the further provision under 890 r.86.2  that the schools which are not  registered  under the  Societies  Registration Act, will not be  eligible  for grant,  win  have a considerable  bearing  when  considering Civil Appeal ’No. 161 of’ 1968, On October 6, 1965 the State of Maharashtra issued a  press, note,  copies  of  which were sent to  all  the  educational authorities.  The Director of Publicity was also directed to

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give wide publicity to the press note by publishing the same in  all  the Dailies in the cities and districts.   By  that press note the attention of all the managements intending,to start  new  Secondary Schools was drawn  to  the  provisions contained  in  r. 2 of the Code regarding  the  applications being.  made in the prescribed form to the concerned  office and to the applications being made sufficiently early so  as to reach the authorities concerned at the latest by the  end of  October.  in the year preceding the year  in  which  the school is proposed to be started.  It was further stated  in the  press note that the applications received for  starting new  schools  will be considered by the  District  Committee comprising of the Chairman of the Education Committee,  Zila Parishad,  Parishad  Education Officer and a member  of  the Secondary  School  Certificate Examination Board,  Poona  or Vidarbha  Board  of  Secondary Education,  Nagpur  and  that permission to start new schools will be communicated to  the applicants concerned by the Deputy Director of’ Education of the  region  by  the end of February,  1966.   The  proposed applicants were also informed that appeals to the Government against  the orders of the Deputy Director of Education  can be  filed  upto the end of March;, 1966.   This  press  note emphasised:  (a)  that  the  applications  be  made  in  the prescribed  form  and (b) that the  applications  should  be received by the educational authorities at the latest by the end of October.  No doubt some of these aspects are  already contained  in r. 2 of the Code.  Another important point  to be  taken  note  of in this press note is  that  though  the applications   are   made  to  the   concerned   educational authorities,  those  applications  are  scrutinised  by  the District  Committees  concerned, and whose members  must  be familiar  with  the  conditions  prevailing  in   particular localities or areas. On the same date the Government sent a communication to  the Chairman,  Secondary School Certificate  Examination  Board. Poona  and the Chairman Vidarbha Board of  Secondary  Educa- tion,  Nagpur  on  the subject of  appointment  of  District Committees to consider the applications received for opening new  secondary  schools.  The composition  of  the  District Committees  was  also’ mentioned  therein.   The  respective Chairmen  were requested by the State to move the  Board  to nominate  one member for each of the District Committees  in the areas with which the Board was concerned.  The  Chairman was also requested to communicate the names of such  members to the Parishad Education Officer of’                             891 the district concerned, the Deputy Director of Education  of the  region’  and  the Director of  Education,  Poona  under intimation to the Government. The State also sent a circular dated October 5, 1965 to  the various  educational authorities drawing their attention  to r.  2  of  the  Code.  They  were  also  informed  that  the Government  had directed that the applications  for  opening new  secondary schools should be considered by the  District Committee   comprised  of  the  various  persons   mentioned therein.  It was further stated that the District  Committee should  bear in mind when considering the applications,  the various  matters  enumerated  as item Nos. 1  to  14.  Those various  matters  to  be taken into account  relate  to  the requirement  of  a  school  or an  additional  school  in  a particular  area,  its financial stability, the  nature  and competency of the management and several allied matters.  It was  obligatory  on  the District Committee  to  record  its reasons  in writing for recommending or not  recommending  a particular  application.  In paragraph 4 of the circular  it

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was  stated  that permission to start a new  school  may  be granted by the Deputy Director of Education of the concerned region  after taking into consideration the  recommendations of the District Committee and with the prior approval of the Government.  The educational authorities were also  directed to  dispose of the applications within the period  mentioned in the circular. From the relevant provisions of the Code read with the press note  and the circular referred to above, it is  clear  that though   the  applications  are  made  to  the   educational authorities,  they are not disposed of by those  authorities or  their own individual discretion.  On the other hand,  it is  clear  that  the  applications are  dealt  with  by  the District  Committees,  whose members are familiar  with  the conditions prevailing in particular areas or localities  and who also are in the know of things regarding the requirement of  a new or an additional school in the  particular  areas. It  is  really on the basis of the recommendations  made  by such  Committees  that the educational  authorities  take  a decision one way or the other. After  having cleared the grounds, as stated above, we  will now  deal  with  the contentions of  the  learned  Attorney- General.   The learned Attorney-General is  well-founded  in his  contention  that the High Court was  not  justified  in invoking Art. 19 in the circumstances of this case.  We have already given the relevant dates when the applications  were filed  by  the  writ  petitioners  before  the   educational authorities  as well as the dates when they  were  rejected. The  judgment of the High Court is dated December  2,  1966. There  is no controversy that the Proclamation of  Emergency was issued on October 26, 1962 and it was. revoked 892 only on January 10, 1968 The relevant part of Art, 358 is as follows :               "358.  While a Proclamation of Emergency is in               operation,   nothing  in  article   19   shall               restrict the power of the State as defined  in               Part  III  to  make any law  or  to  take  any               executive action which the State would but for               the  provisions  contained  in  that  Part  be               competent to make or to take.............." Therefore,  it  will be seen that during the period  when  a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, Art. 19 will  not operate  as  a bar in respect of any law or  any  executive action  coming  within the terms of Art. 358.   We  will  be showing in the latter part of the judgment that cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3 read with the various instructions issued by the State  cannot  be  considered to be vague  or  ambiguous  as erroneously held by the High Court.  Those instructions,  in so  far  as  they  go, are perfectly  valid  and  the  State Government   was   competent  to   issue   those   executive instructions for the guidance of the educational authorities dealing  with applications for grant of permission to  start schools.  If so, it follows that the view of the High  Court that  Art.  358 does not save cls. (1) and (2) of  r.  3  is erroneous.  In this view Art 19 could not have been  invoked by   the  writ  petitioners  during  the  period  when   the Proclamation  of Emergency was admittedly in operation.   As Art.  19  is thus out of the picture, the  question  whether cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3 impose reasonable restrictions  and are  thus saved, does not arise for consideration.   We  may state  that Dr. Barlingay found considerable  difficulty  in supporting the judgment of the High Court on this aspect  in the face of Art. 358 of the Constitution.  This disposes  of the  first and second contentions of the  learned  Attorney-

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General. Coming to Art. 14, it is accepted by the High Court that the writ petitioners did not make in their petitions any  attack on cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3 based upon the said article.  It was only during the course of arguments that Art. 14 appears to  have been invoked.  The High Court struck down  the  two sub-clauses on the ground that unless a school is started in accordance  with the rules contained in the Code, they  will not  be  recognised by the Secondary School Boards  and  the students  studying  in such schools cannot  appear  for  the examinations  held  by the Board and  the  University.   The approach  made by the High Court in our view in this  regard is erroneous.  The provisions regarding grant of  permission and  recognition  of  schools  under  the  Code  are  mainly intended  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  grant  from  the Government.   We  are  not concerned  in  these  proceedings regardIng the effect of starting a school without  complying with  the requirements of the provisions of the Code  or  in the face of refusal 893 of  permission  by  the educational  authorities  when  such schools so started do not require or receive any grant  from the  State.  That problem does not arise  for  consideration before  us.  Hence we do-not think it necessary to refer  to the provisions of the Maharashtra Secondary Education  Board Regulation, 1966, the effect of which may be that no student having  education in a school for the starting of  which  no permission  has  been  given or  such  permission  has  been refused, may not be able to appear for the examinations held by  the  Boards concerned.  So far as  the  distribution  of grant to the schools recognised under the Code is concerned, it  is  not  the case of any of the  petitioners  that  such grants  are being made arbitrarily or any discrimination  is shown  in that regard.  But Dr. Barlingay pressed before  us the  circumstances that though cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3  may appear  to  be  innocuous, there is a  potential  danger  of discrimination when the said clauses are applied without any guidance by the educational authorities.  He also  contended that there is no right given to the applicant to be heard by the  educational authorities before his application  is  re- fused.   On this ground the counsel urged that cls. (1)  and (2) of r. 3 violate Art. 14. We have already referred to the press note and the  circular letter  issued  by the State Government from  which,  it  is clear  that  the applications are dealt with  in  the  first instance  by  the  District Committees,  whose  members  are familiar  with the requirements of the particular  areas  or localities  and the conditions prevailing therein  regarding the  requirements of a school or an additional school.   The district  Committees  have  to  take  into  account  several material and relevant factors contained not only in the Code but  also specifically emphasised in the circular letter  of the  Government  dated October 5, 1965.  It is only  on  the basis of the recommendations made by those Committees,  that the  educational authorities take a decision  regarding  the grant  or  refusal  of permission to start  a  school.   The District  Committees are also bound to record their  reasons in   writing  for  recommending  or  not  recommending   the application.  An appeal lies against the order passed by the Deputy  Director of Education to the Government.  It is  not the  case of any of the writ petitioners that  the  District Committees  have  acted arbitrarily.  Nor is it  their  case that the Deputy Director of Education of the region has  not based  his decision on the recommendations of  the  District Committees.   We  are  not  satisfied  that  there  is   any

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violation of Art. 14.    From  the mere fact that there is no right  provided  for the   appellant  being  heard  before  his  application   is rejected, it cannot be held that there is a violation of the principles  of  natural justice.  On the other hand,  it  is seen that the District Committees have considered the claims of  the writ petitioners as well as of the respective  third respondents therein and recommended to the 894 educational authorities that the claims of the latter are to be accepted.  The reasons for rejection of the  applications have also been given in the orders passed by the educational authorities. When  all  the relevant circumstances have been  taken  into account by the District Committee and the educational autho- rities,  there is no violation of any principle  of  natural justice  merely for the reason that the applicants were  not given a hearing by the educational authorities before  their applications weren’t ejected.  The particulars which have to be  mentioned  in the prescribed application form  are  very elaborate  and  complete.  The provisions in the  Code  read along  with  the  instructions given by  the  State  in  the circular  letter  dated  October 5, 1965  refer  to  various relevant  and  material factors that had to  be  taken  into account for the purpose of deciding whether the  application is to be granted or not.  As we have already pointed out, it is  not  the case of any of the writ petitioner  that  these relevant  factors have not been considered by  the  District Committees.  Nor is it their case that the reasons given for rejection  of  the  applications  are  not  covered  by  the provisions contained in the Code.  Clauses (1) and (2) of r. 3  are not to be read in isolation as has been done  by  the High Court.  On the other hand they must be read along  with the other various clauses contained in the same rule as well as the detailed instructions given by the Government in  the circular letter dated October 5, 1965.  It follows that  the reasoning  of  the  High Court that  these  two  sub-clauses violate Art. 14 cannot be accepted. Coming to the fourth contention of the learned Attorney,  it is evident from the judgment of the High Court that cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3 have been struck down for they are vague and do not afford any standard or criteria for judging whether a school  or  an  additional school is needed in  an  area  or locality  and  whether  the  management  is  competent   and reliable.   We  have already pointed out that  the  definite stand  taken  by the State in its  counter  affidavit  filed before  the High Court was that the provisions of  the  Code are  executive  instructions  and  are  in  the  nature   of administrative  instructions  without any  statutory  force. When  it  is admitted that the provisions contained  in  the Code,  which include cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3 are  executive instructions,  two questions arise, namely, (1) whether  the High  Court  was justified in striking down  such  executive instructions  even  assuming that  those  instructions  were vague  and  (2)  whether the said clauses  are  vague.   The learned  Attomey-General  invited our attention to  the  two decisions  of  this  Court reported in State  of  Assam  and Another  v.  Ajit Kumar Sharma and others(1)  and  Municipal Committee, Amritsar and another V. State of Punjab and  Ors. (1) (2)  [1969] 3 S. C. R. 447. (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 890. 895 In  the first decision this Court has laid down  that  where conditions for receiving grant-in-aid are laid down by  mere

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executive instructions, it is open to a private  institution to accept those instructions or not to accept them.  That is a  matter  entirely between the Government and  the  private institution  concerned.  In the second decision it was  laid down that "the rule that an Act of a ,competent  legislature may  be  "struck  down"  by the  Courts  on  the  ground  of vagueness is alien to our Constitutional system...... A  law may  be declared invalid by the superior Courts in India  if the  Legislature has no power to enact the law or  that  the law violates any of the fundamental rights  guaranteed  in Part  III of the Constitution or is inconsistent  with,  any constitutional  provision, but not on the ground that it  is vague........  Based upon these two decisions,  the  learned Attomey-General  urged that even on the basis that  the  two sub-clauses in question are vague, they could not have  been struck  down  on that ground.   Alternatively,  his  further contention  is that those clauses are not vague.  We do  not think  it  necessary  to go into the  question  whether  the courts  have  got  powers  to  strike  down  even  executive instructions  on the ground of their being vague  when  such executive   instructions  are  admittedly  issued   by   the authorities  concerned for the guidance and for being  acted upon.   We  express  no  opinion  on  that  point  in  these proceedings.   We  are of the view that the two  clauses  in question  are  not vague or ambiguous in any  respect.   The fallacy committed by the High Court consists in  considering cls.  (1)  and (2) of r. 3 in isolation.   We  have  already pointed out that r. 3 of the Code consists of as many as  16 clauses,   which   are  conditions  to  be   fulfilled   for recognition  being accorded.  We have also referred  to  the circular  letter dated October 5, 1965 issued by  the  State Government enumerating the various matters to be taken  into account  by the District Committees when considering  appli- cations  for  grant of permission to start a school  or  for having  an  additional school in the area or  the  locality. Rule 3 will have to be read along with those instructions as well  as the various particulars which have to be filled  up in  the  prescribed form.  If cls. (1) and (2) of r.  3  are interpreted having due regard to the various other  matters, referred  to  above, the District Committee  has  got  ample guidance to decide the need of a particular locality to have a  school  or  an  additional school  as  also  the  further question  regarding  the competency and reliability  of  the management.   There will be sufficient material  before  the District  Committee  to consider whether the starting  of  a school  or  an additional school into a particular  area  or locality will involve any unhealthy competition.  In view of the  clear and detailed guidance furnished not only by r.  3 but  also  by  the instructions contained  in  the  circular letter dated October 5, 1965, it is clear that there is  no- ambiguity  in.  either.  cls.  (1)  or  (2)  of  r.  3.   In considering the question of vagueness the High Court has not adverted to the various matters. 896 referred to by us earlier.  Therefore. we are of the opinion that  the striking down of cls. (1) and (2) of r. 3  by  the High Court as being vague, is erroneous. The last contention of the learned Attomey-General which  is on  merits is that without considering the reasons given  by the  Deputy  Director  of Education for  rejecting  the  two applications of the two writ petitioners, the High Court has issued a mandamus to the State to grant permission to  those two  applicants.   In our opinion, this contention  is  also well-founded.  The application of the petitioner in  Special Civil  Application  No.  420 of 1966 which  is  the  subject

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matter  of Civil Appeal No. 160 of 1968 was rejected by  the Deputy Director of Education on the ground that the need  of the  place has been fulfilled by permitting another  society to  open the school at the place.  The appeal filed  to  the State Government was unsuccessful.  In the counter-affidavit filed   by  the  State  in  the  writ  petition   they   had categorically   referred  to  the  recommendations  of   the District  Committee  on the applications filed by  the  said writ  petitioner  as  also  the  third  respondent  therein. Regarding  the  writ petitioner the report of  the  District Committee  was  that  it  had  no  funds  and  that  it  was recommending  another society with good  financial  position and experience.  In this view the District Committee  stated that  it  was not recommending the writ petitioner  for  the grant  of  permission.   On the  other  hand,  the  District Committee  recommended  the application of  Ashok  Education Society, Ashoknagar (third respondent) on the ground that it was financially sound and it was a very good and experienced society  and that it was also a popular society. For  these reasons  the application of this society was recommended  to be  granted by the District Committee.  It was on the  basis of  this recommendation of the District Committee  that  the Deputy Director of Education rejected the application of the writ   petitioner  and  granted  permission  to  the   third respondent  therein.   The  applications of  both  the  writ petitioner and the third respondent were before the District Committee.   The High Court has not found fault  with  these recommendations.   On the other hand it has held that it  is open  to the authorities to refuse permission if the  school is not in a financially sound position.  The writ petitioner also was not able to satisfy us that the conclusions arrived at  by  the District Committee, which were accepted  by  the Deputy Director of Education were not based upon particulars furnished in the application. Coming  to  the  application filed by  the  writ  petitioner Special  Civil  Application  No. 421 of 1966  which  is  the subject  matter  of Civil Appeal No. 161 of  1968.  we  have already  referred to the fact that-the said  society  merely made  a  request for opening a school by means of  a  letter dated  October 29. 1965.  Admittedly the applicant  did  not comply with the requirement of r. 2.1 Of 897 the  Code that the application should be in  the  prescribed form.   No  doubt, later on ’ on November 3, 1965  the  said society sent a fresh application in the prescribed form, but this  was not within the period mentioned in r. 2.1  of  the Code.   So the said writ petitioner did not comply  with  r. 2.1 read along with the press note and the circular  letter, referred to above.  That clearly shows that the  application filed  by the writ petitioner was not in the first  instance in  the  prescribed form and that when it was  sent  in  the prescribed  form it was beyond time.  Further, we have  also referred to r. 86.2 which specifically says that the schools which  are not registered under the  Societies  Registration Act,  will  not be eligible for any kind of grant  from  the public  funds.   Even in the application filed by  the  writ petitioner  in the prescribed form on November 3,  1965,  it was  stated  under head No. 4 that the  management  was  not registered and that it intends to get itself referred within a month.  So apart from two infirmities, pointed out  above, there  was  this additional  infirmity  of  nonregistration. Even  on  the date when the appeal was filed  to  the  State Government  on  April 26, 1966, the society was  not  regis- tered.   As  admitted  by  the  said  society  in  its  writ petition, it was registered under the Societies Registration

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Act,  1860, only on April 27, 1966.  The order  dated  April 11, 1966 of the Deputy Directorof  Education   rejecting the  application  was  based on  two  grounds:(a)  that  the application  was sent after the prescribed date and(b)  that the society was not registered.  That these two reasons  are valid  is clear from the facts mentioned above.  The  appeal taken  to the State Government was unsuccessful.   From  the above  circumstances it is clear that the rejection  of  the application was on valid grounds.  The High Court, so far as we could see, has not found that these reasons are not based on  the  materials on record.  No such contention  has  also been taken before us by the said writ petitioner.  If so, it follows that the order of the High Court directing the State Government  to issue permission to the two writ  petitioners ignoring the above circumstances is clearly erroneous. From  what is stated above, the judgment of the  High  Court allowing Special Civil Application Nos. 420 and 421 of  1966 cannot be sustained. Coming  to  appeal No. 878 of 1968, the facts lie  within  a very  narrow  compass.   For the  year  1965-66,  the  third respondent in Special Civil Application No. 694 of 1965, out of  which  the  appeal arises, had made  an  application  on October  29, 1964 for starting a new school at  Sakharkherda during   the  year  1965-66.   The  writ  petitioner   filed objections   to  the  grant  of  permission  to  the   third respondent.    On   the  recommendation  of   the   District Committee.   the  third  respondent  was  allowed  to   open standards VIII and IX 898 with  one division only during the year 1965-66.   The  writ petitioner was filed to quash the permission granted to  the third  respondent.   The State Government  in  its  counter- affidavit  has  very  elaborately referred  to  the  various matters mentioned by the third respondent in his application and  also  to  the  recommendation  made  by  the   District Committee.    The   District   Committee   had   recommended permission  being  granted to the third  respondent  on  the ground  that  the  management had very  good  experience  in running schools and that it was also financially sound.   It was also stated that at the place in question even when  the writ petitioner was conducting a school with standards V  to X,  there was another school run by the Zila  Parishad  with standards  V to VII.  It was pointed out by the  State  that the  population in the area demanded additional school  with standard  VIII  onwards and it was  an  absolute  necessity. They  had also given details regarchng the  long  experience that the third respondent bad in running schools in  several places as also the soundness of its financial position. Before the High Court the attack made by the writ petitioner was  slightly  different  from that of the  other  two  writ petitioners  in Special Civil Applications Nos. 420 and  421 of 1966.  The attack on the grant of permission to the third respondent was made by this writ petitioner really based  on cls.  (1) and (2) of r. 3. According to the writ  petitioner the locality was not in need of any additional school as  it will involve unhealthy competition.  The High Court rejected the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner  therein cannot  make  any grievance of the grant made to  the  third respondent to start a school after a proper consideration of the merits of the claim of the latter. Dr. Barlingay, learned counsel for the writ petitioner,  who is  appellant in this appeal, found considerable  difficulty to satisfy us that any legal rights of the appellant  herein had  been  infringed  by grant of permission  to  the  third respondent.   We have already referred to the fact that  the

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State has pointed out that even when the writ petitioner was running a school with classes V to X, the Zila Parishad  was running  another school in the same area with classes  V  to VII.  The State had also pointed out that the population  of the area demanded an additional school.  From the mere  fact that by the opening of another school, some of the  students of the appellant school may seek admission in the new school it cannot be stated that any of the appellant’s legal rights have  been  infringed.  Dr. Barlingay has not been  able  to satisfy  us  that  in  granting  permission  to  the   third respondent  any extraneous or irrelevant matters  have  been taken  into  account  by  the  District  Committee  or   the educational authorities.  Nor was he able to satisfy us that the reasons given by the District Committee for the grant of permission to. the third respondent on the ground 899 that  it had a long experience in running schools  and  that its financial position is also good, are erroneous.  If  so, it follows that there is no merit in this appeal. In  the  result  the judgment and order of  the  High  Court allowing Special Civil Applications Nos. 420 and 421 of 1966 are set aside and Civil Appeals Nos. 160 and 161 of 1968 are allowed.  The writ petitioners in Special Civil Applications Nos.  420  and  421  of  1966 will  pay  the  costs  of  the appellants  in  both the appeals.  There will  be  only  one hearing fee to be paid by the two writ petitioners in  equal proportion. The judgment and order of the High Court dismissing  Special Civil  Application No. 694 of 1965 are confirmed  and  Civil Appeal No. 878 of 1968 will stand dismissed.  The appellants will pay the costs of the first respondent therein. V.P.S. 900