27 September 1955
Supreme Court


Case number: Appeal (civil) 203 of 1954






DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/09/1955


CITATION:  1955 AIR  817            1955 SCR  (2) 541

ACT:    Indian  Independence  Act, 1947 (10 and 11 Geo.   VI,  C. 30)s.  10(2)(a)-The India (Provisional Constitution)  Order, 1947--Article 7(1)-Independence, Conferral of-Automatic  and legal termination of service-Persons holding civil posts  in India-Previous  to Independence-Whether deemed to have  been appointed  and  continue  in  service  after   Independence- Government of India Act, 1935, ss. 240 (2) and 247.

HEADNOTE:    The respondent was recruited to the Indian Civil  Service by open competition in 1936 and joined duty in the  Province of Madras in October 1937.  Since then he was serving  under the  Government  of Madras in various capacities,  his  last office being Sub-Collector of Dindigal.  He went on leave in June  1947.   While on leave he received a letter  from  the Government  of  India asking him whether he was  willing  to continue  in  the service of the Government after  the  then contemplated  transfer of power from the British  Government to the Dominion of India on the 16th August, 1947.  He  sent a  reply expressing his willingness to continue in  service. On  9th  August,  1947  ’he  received  a  letter  from   the Government  of Madras dated 7th August, 1947 signed  by  the Chief  Secretary thereof stating that it was decided not  to retain  his services from and after the 15th  August,  1947, and  that his services would be terminated with effect  from the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947. The respondent filed a suit against the State of Madras  and the  Union of India for a declaration that the order  issued by  the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras  on  the 7th  August, 1947 purporting to terminate his  services  was null,  void and inoperative and that he should be deemed  to continue in service.  The High Court granted the declaration prayed  for accepting the respondent’s contention  that  the order terminating his service was in violation of the statutory guarantee relating to his service under s. 240  of the  Government of India Act, 1935 which remained  in  force till the midnight of the 14th August, 1947, Held,  1.  The conferral of Independence on  India,  brought



about  an automatic and legal termination of service on  the date of Independence. Reilly v. The King ([1934] A.C. 176) and Nokes v.  Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Lid., ([1940] A.C. 1014), followed. 2.   But all persons previously holding civil posts in India are  deemed to have been appointed and hence to continue  in service, except those governed by "general or special orders or  arrangements’  affecting their  respective  cases:  vide Article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution)  Order, 1947  read with section 10(2)(a) of the Indian  Independence Act  and sections 240(2) and 247 of the Government of  India Act as adapted. 3.   The guarantee about prior conditions of service and the previous  statutory  safeguards  relating  to   disciplinary action  continue  to apply to those who are thus  deemed  to continue in service but not to others. 4.   Those  previously holding civil posts in India bad  the right,  and were in fact given the option, of  declining  to "continue in service" under the now regime and in the  event of their exercising that option they ceased to serve on  and from the date of the passing of the Constitution. 5.   Equally  the new Government had the right to refuse  to continue  them in service and intimation of this fact  given to  persons ahead of time came into operation and had  legal effect from the moment the new Government assumed office  on 16-8-1947. 6.   As the petitioner was informed that his services  would not  be required after 14-8-1947 his services terminated  on that  date  because  this was a  special  order  within  the meaning   of   Article  7(1)  of  the   India   (Provisional Constitution)   Order,  1947.   Accordingly  there  was   no continuance of service in his case after 14-8-1947 under the deeming provisions of that Order. Lall’s  case (1948) F.C.R 44, West Band Central Gold  Mining Co.   Ltd. v. The King (1905) 2 K.B. 391, Virendra Singh  v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1955) 1 S.C.R. 415, Baj Bajendra Malojirao  Shitole  v.  The State of  Madhya  Bharat  (1954) S.C.R.  748, Ladore v. Bennett (1939) A.C. 468 and  Govindan Sellappah  Nayar Kodakan Pillai v. Punchi  Banda  Mudanayake (1953) A.C. 514, referred to.

JUDGMENT:   CIVIL APPELLATE JUrISDICTION: Civil Appeal NO.203 of 1954. On  appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 30th  March 1954 of the Madras High Court in  C.    S. No. 216 of 1952.                             543 M.   C.  Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, V.K. T.  Chari Advocate-General  of  Madras (R. Ganapathy  Iyer,  Porus  A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the appellant. M.   K.  Nambiar  (C.   V. L. Narayan, with  him),  for  the respondent. 1955.   September  27.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by JAGANNADHADAS  J.-This is an appeal by the State  of  Madras and  the Union of India against the judgment and  decree  of the High Court on a certificate granted by that Court  under article 133 of the Constitution.  The appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent herein, who was a member of the Indian  Civil  Service,, for a declaration  that  the  order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras on the  7th August, 1947, purporting to terminate his  services as  from  the afternoon of the 14th August, 1947,  is  null,



void and inoperative and that he must be deemed to  continue in  the Indian Civil Service as a Member thereof.  The  suit was  filed on the original side of the High Court of  Madras and  after  having been partly tried by a Single  Judge  who recorded  the evidence, was thereafter heard by a  Bench  of two Judges in view of the important constitutional  question that  arose for consideration in the case.  The Bench  found in  favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit  and  hence the appeal by the State to this Court.  The  case  for the plaintiff is short and simple.   He  was recruited  to the Indian Civil Service by  open  competitive examination in 1936 and joined duty in the then Province  of Madras  in October, 1937.  Since then he was  serving  under the  Government of Madras in various situations.   The  last office he held was as Sub-Collector and Joint Magistrate  at Dindigal.   On the 2nd June, 1947, he went on leave.   While on leave, he received a letter from the Government of  India dated  the 19th June, 1947, wherein he was asked whether  he was willing to continue in the service of 69 544 the Government after the then contemplated transfer of power from the British Government to the Dominion of India on  the 15th  August, 1947.  The plaintiff sent a  reply  expressing his  willingness.   On  the 9th August,  1947,  however,  he received a communication from the Government of Madras dated the  7th  August, 1947, and signed by  the  Chief  Secretary thereof,  stating that it was decided not to retain  him  in service  from and after the 15th August, 1947, and that  his services  would therefore be terminated as on the  afternoon of  the  14th August, 1947.  He was directed,  therefore  to apply for extension of leave for which he was then  eligible so as to avail himself of the full period of leave which was to his credit.  On receiving the order of termination of his services,   he  made  attempts  to  get  it  cancelled,   by interviewing  the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister  of the  Madras  State  at the time.  But  the  attempts  proved futile.   In the course of these interviews, he says he  was given the impression that the order of termination.,  though issued  under  the signature of the Chief Secretary  to  the Government  of  Madras  was  in fact  so  issued  under  the sanction  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  which, according to him, subsequently turned out not to be a  fact. Being  then  under that mistaken impression,  he  reconciled himself  to  the situation and availed himself of  the  full period  of  leave and accepted the  compensation  which  was awarded for premature termination of services and also began drawing his pension.     Later on he came to know from one Shri Seshadri, another young Civilian, who was in a  similar plight    and who had also filed a similar suit that certain documents  produced in the course of that suit  showed  that these  orders  were  passed  without  the  sanction  of  the Secretary of State for India.  He accordingly brought  these matters  again  to  the notice of the  Government  and  made further  attempts  to get the order in  his  case  reversed. These   again   proved  futile.   He  thereupon   filed   an application  for  a  writ  in the  High  Court  on  the  7th November, 1951, to quash this alleged illegal order  against him.  But the High Court rejected it on the ground of  there having been                             545 long  delay  since the passing of the orders  sought  to  be quashed.  The plaintiff thereafter gave the requisite notice to  the Government under section 80 of the  Civil  Procedure Code  and  filed this suit on the 15th July, 1952.   In  the



plaint   he  made  the  offer  to  refund  the   amount   of compensation  paid to him after making such  adjustments  as may  be  called  for towards his claim for  salary  for  the intervening period.  The  plaintiff’s claim is based on the contention that  the termination  of  his  services by the order  dated  the  7th August,  1947,  is in violation of the  statutory  guarantee relating to his service under section 240 of the  Government of India Act 1935, which continued to be operative till  the midnight  of the 14th August, 1947, and he relies on  Lall’s case  (1).   To this suit both the State of Madras  and  the Union  of  India  were impleaded  as  defendants  and  their defence  was substantially the same.  It is to be  found  in paragraph  6 of the written statement filed by the State  of Madras which is as follows:   "This  defendant states that on the transfer of  power  to the newly constituted Dominion of India in pursuance of  the Indian Independence Act as and from the appointed day, viz., 15th  August,  1947,  the  tenure  of  the  service  of  the plaintiff  came  to  an end and he had  no  legal  claim  to continue in service thereafter.   The plaintiff was holding office only during His Majesty’s pleasure.  When His Majesty’s Government decided to transfer its power to the Dominion of India as and from the 15th  day of August, 1947, the career of the plaintiff under  covenant with  the Secretary of State came to a legal termination  as and  from the 15th day of August, 1947.  It  is,  therefore, not  correct to state that there was any termination by  the Government  of Madras and that there has been utter lack  of legality in the order passed by the said Government.  It  is further  submitted  that  the  alleged  termination  of  the plaintiff’s  services was only from the 15th  August,  1947, and that on such date the (1)  [1948] F.C.R. 44. 546 Province  of Madras acting under the instructions  from  the Government of India were competent to decline to accept  the offer to continue in service made by the plaintiff".   There were other minor pleas such as estoppel, etc. which, it  is unnecessary to notice at this stage.  The High  Court negatived  the  defence  of  the  State  and  accepted   the contention of the plaintiff and granted him the  declaration prayed for. The main contention of the learned AttorneyGeneral before us appearing   for  the  State  is  that  the   plaintiff   has misconceived the legal position, that what happened in  this case  was not a wilful order of termination of the  services of the plaintiff which fell within the scope of section  240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and whose validity was liable  to be tested with reference thereto.   According  to him  the  political changes which came into force  from  the 15th August, 1947, operated in law to terminate the services of all persons in the position of the plaintiff as and  from the 15th August, 1947, that in that situation it was open to the  new Dominion Government of India or the Governments  of the  various  Provinces, either to invite  such  persons  to continue  to be in their respective services or to  intimate that  they were no longer required, and that it was  in  the exercise  of this option that the Government of Madras  com- municated to the plaintiff an advance intimation on the  7th August,  1947, that he would not be retained in  service  as and  from the 15th August, 1947.  The substantial  question, therefore,  for our decision is whether this contention  put forward by the learned Attorney-General is correct.  It  may be  mentioned  that, as appears from  their  judgments,  the



learned  Judges of the High Court appear to have been  under the impression that this defence of automatic termination of the  services  was  abandoned  during  the  course  of   the arguments  before  them by the learned  Advocate-General  of Madras.  This impression seems to be erroneous.  In any case there  is nothing to preclude the question which  is  purely one  of law being reopened before us with our leave in  view of its being                             547 one of considerable importance. The learned Attorney-General has based his contention as regards automatic termination of such services on three grounds:   (1)The  political change which came into operation on  the 15th  August,  1947, resulted in creating  a  new  Sovereign State of India and on the creation of such Sovereign  State, the  pre-existing  contracts of service under  the  previous Government became automatically terminated. (2)The contract between the Secretary of State for India and the plaintiff being one of service became terminated on  the Secretary of State ceasing to have control in respect of the services contemplated under the contract.  (3)The statutory changes which came into operation as  from the  15th  August,  1947,  by  themselves  brought  about  a termination  of such services and the protection of  section 240  of  the Government of India Act) 1935,  was  no  longer available to a, person in the situation of the respondent.  For the purpose of appreciating the above arguments, it  is necessary  to notice the various events that lead up to  the political  changes,  and the statutory provisions  by  which they  were  brought about, in so far as they relate  to  the class of services with which we are concerned in this  case. The starting point of these changes was the announcement  of his Majesty’s Government dated the 20th February, 1947, that power would be transferred to Indian hands by His  Majesty’s Government  by  June, 1948, in accordance with  the  Cabinet Mission Plan of May, 1946.  Since then the attention of  the Government  was engaged in the various steps to be taken  to bring about the transition as smoothly as possible.  One  of the steps taken in this direction, in so far as it  concerns this  case,  was  the announcement by  His  Excellence  they Viceroy  on  the  30th,  April,  1947.   That   announcement purported to relate to "grant of compensation for  premature termination  of their service ill India to Members of  Civil Services appointed by the Secretary of State and to  regular officers and British Warrant 548 Officers  of the Indian Naval and Military Forces", and  was inter alia as follows:  "1. His Majesty’s Government have announced their intention that  the  British Government’s authority in India  will  be finally  transferred to Indian hands by June, 1948.   It  is the  aim  of His Majesty’s Government that the  transfer  of power should be effected in an orderly and regulated  manner so    that   the   new   authorities   may   assume    their responsibilities   in  conditions  conducive  to  the   best interests  of India and maintenance of good  relations  with Great Britain.  His Majesty’s Government are confident  that during this period of transition the Services and all  those who man them, whether British or Indian will respond to this call.     2.    To those serving under covenant or other -form  of agreement with the Secretary of State for India or who  hold commissions from His Majesty the King, the transfer of power will  mean  premature termination on that date of  a  career under the ultimate authority of His Majesty’s Government and



the  British Parliament; and for many there is added to  the heavy  call of present duty the burden of anxiety for  their own future and that of those who depend on them.   3. The Government of India are naturally and rightly  most anxious  and  His Majesty’s Government share  their  anxiety that the administration shall not be weakened by the loss of experienced  officers.   To this end,  Government  of  India undertake  that  those members of the Secretary  of  State’s Services who continue to serve under the Government of India after  the  transfer of power shall do so on  their  present terms  as  to scales of pay, leave, pensionary  rights,  and safeguards  in matters of discipline and that provisions  to this  effect  should  be made in the  Treaty  to  deal  with matters   arising  out  of  the  transfer  of  power.    The Government   of  India  will  now  propose   to   Provincial Governments  that  they should give  similar  assurances  to members  of  the Secretary of State’s service who  agree  to join Provincial services.    4.     The Government of India recognise that some Indian members of the Secretary of State’s services                             549 may  be  genuinely anxious about their prospects  under  the Provincial   administrations  where  they  are  at   present employed, and every effort will be made to arrange  suitable transfers in such cases. 5.The Government of India agree that compensation should  be payable to such Indian Officers of these services as-   (1)are  not  invited  to  continue  to  serve  under   the Government of India after transfer of power; or  (2)can  satisfy the Governor-General that their actions  in the  course  of  duty  during their  service  prior  to  the transfer of power have damaged their prospects, or that  the appointments offered to them are such as cannot be  regarded as satisfactory in the altered circumstances; or   (3)can  show  to the satisfaction of  the  GovernorGeneral that  they  have legitimate cause for  anxiety  about  their future in the Province where they are now serving, and  that no suitable transfer can be arranged. But  the  Government  of  India  feel  that  sentiments   of patriotism will naturally impel Indian Officers to  continue to  serve  their  country  and that, in  the  light  of  the undertaking that they have given, and the consideration that in  fact  Indian members of the Service will  have  improved prospects, there is no ground, save in these special  cases, for payment of compensation to Indian officers on account of the transfer of power.   6.His  Majesty’s Government have been reviewing the  whole position.   They  have  noted  the  undertaking  which   the Government  of India have given in regard to  officers  whom they  desire, should continue to serve under the  Government of  India.   They recognise the force of the  Government  of India’s  arguments, and they agree that to  Indian  Officers compensation  should not be admissible except in  the  cases which  I  have just mentioned.’ Many Indian members  of  the Secretary of State’s services will however become members of provincial  services  and  in  their  cases  His   Majesty’s Government’s agreement that they need not be compensated  is conditional upon the Provincial Governments guaranteeing the existing terms of ser- 550 vice’.   If  they are not prepared to do  so  His  Majesty’s Government reserve the right to reconsider the matter. 7.With  these  reservations  I  am  now  authorised  by  His Majesty’s  Government to inform members of the Secretary  of State’s services that they accept the obligation to see that



they  are  duly  compensated for the  termination  of  their careers      consequent     on     the      transfer      of power............................ " After   this   announcement  was   issued,   His   Majesty’s Government,  for  various  political  reasons,  decided   to advance   the  date  of  transfer  of  power  and  made   an announcement on the 3rd June, 1947, detailing various  steps which  were  proposed to be taken to bring  about  an  early transfer of power.  Paragraph 20 of that announcement ran as follows:   "The  major political parties have  repeatedly  emphasized their  desire  that there should be  the  earliest  possible transfer of power in India.  With this desire His  Majesty’s Government  are  in full sympathy, and they are  willing  to anticipate  the date of June, 1948, for the handing over  of power by the setting up of an independent Indian  Government or Governments at an even earlier date.  Accordingly, as the most  expeditious,  and indeed the only practicable  way  of meeting  this  desire, His Majesty’s Government  propose  to introduce  legislation  during the current session  for  the transfer  of power this year on a Dominion Status  basis  to one or two successor authorities according to the  decisions taken  as  a  result of this  announcement.   This  will  be without  prejudice  to the right of the  Indian  Constituent Assemblies  to decide in due course whether or not the  part of India in respect of which they have authority will remain within the British Commonwealth".   In  pursuance  of what was indicated  herein,  the  Indian Independence  Act  was passed on the 18th  July,  1947.   In pursuance  of  the  power  vested  in  the   GovernorGeneral thereunder  a  number of legislative orders were  passed  by him.  The relevant provisions of the Indian Independence Act as  well  as  of  some of the  legislative  orders  will  be presently noticed.  But it                             551 will be convenient at this stage to state the further  steps taken by the Government relating to the services of the kind we are concerned with., in pursuance of their plan announced on  the 3rd June, 1947, to speed up the transfer  of  power. Within  about  two  weeks  after  the  announcement  of  His Majesty’s  Government dated the 3rd June, 1947,  a  circular letter  was issued, by the Government of India to the  Chief Secretaries  of all the Provincial Governments on  the  18th June, 1947, which inter alia stated as follows:   "That in view of the latest announcement of His  Majesty’s Government  (dated the 3rd June, 1947), it is  essential  to ascertain  with  the  least possible delay,  the  wishes  of individual  officers  to whom His Excellency  the  Viceroy’s announcement  of  the 30th April 1947 applies in  regard  to continuance  in service after the transfer of  power.   This will enable Government to decide which officers they  should continue  to retain in service after the transfer  of  power and  to make arrangements to replace officers who desire  to quit service, of their own accord or whom Government may not wish to continue in service".   The  Chief  Secretaries  were accordingly  asked  to  make arrangements "to send immediately to every officer belonging to any service specified in the schedule, and serving  under the  Provincial  Government, a copy of the  enclosed  letter from  the  Government of India to  the  officers  concerned, whereby the officer was asked to communicate within ten days of  the receipt of the letter whether he wishes to  continue in  the service of the Government or whether he  desires  to retire from service".  The circular letter of the Government of India to the Chief Secretaries further asked them that in



forwarding the replies received thereto from the  individual officers, they may inform them, in case of persons who  have decided  to  quit service, the earliest date  on  which  the Government will be in a position to release the officer  and in case of persons who offer to continue in service, whether for any reason, they would prefer him not to continue in the service,  notwithstanding the officer’s desire to remain  in the 70 552 service  and  pointed  out  that  in  the  latter  case  the Provincial  Government  will be incurring liability  to  pay compensation.   In  pursuance  of  these  instructions   the individual letters to the officers concerned were presumably sent  and  replies were obtained, and the  necessary  orders were passed in respect, at any rate, of such of the officers whom  the  various Governments were not prepared  to  retain service after the transfer of power.  Pausing here, it  will be seen that the announcement of the Viceroy dated the  30th April,  1947, and the circular letter issued by the  Govern- ment  of  India to the Chief Secretaries on the  18th  June, 1947, as well as the individual letters issued by and  under the  authority of the Government of India to those  officers on  the  same date asking for information from  them  as  to their  desire to continue in service or not, were all  based on the assumptions clearly stated or indicated therein,  (1) that  transfer of power brings about an automatic  premature termination  of  the services, (2) on such  termination,  it would be open to the servant concerned either to decline  to continue in the service of the new Government or to offer to continue  his services, and (3) that in case the  individual servant intimated his desire to continue in service, it  was open  to the Government either to, accept the offer or  not. Thus  the  continuance of service was contemplated  only  in respect of such of the previous servants who intimated their desire for the continuance of their services and whose offer in   this   respect   was   accepted.    While,   therefore, discontinuance  of  service was to be brought about  by  the option  of either of the parties and on such  discontinuance the  servant  was to become entitled  to  compensation,  the continuance  of the service was a matter which would  depend upon  the  mutual  consent of  both,  viz.,  the  individual servant and the Government concerned.  That the position  so taken  up must have been perfectly within the  knowledge  of every one of the persons to whom these circular letters were sent  is virtually admitted by the plaintiff himself in  his evidence and also appears clearly from the fact that a  copy of the Viceroy’s announcement dated the 30th April,                             553 1947,  appears  to have been enclosed  with  the  individual letters  dated  the  18th June, 1947, sent to  each  of  the officers by the Government of India.  The plaintiff  himself in  his  letter  dated  the 2nd July,  1947,  to  the  Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras, wrote as follows:   "I  am in receipt of your Memorandum No. 2738  of  1947-4, Public (Special) Department, dated 5th June, 1947, enclosing the  announcement of His Excellency the Viceroy.  I wish  to state  that  I  desire  to  continue  to  serve  the  Madras Government  and  that  I desire no  transfer  to  any  other Province".  (The  reference to the date 5th June,  1947,  is probably  a  mistake  since it is clearly  admitted  in  the plaint  that the plaintiff intimated his desire to  continue in service in reply to the leter dated the 18th June, 1947.)   To complete the course of events as regards the individual case  of  the plaintiff, the further facts  may  be  stated.



After receiving this reply from the plaintiff dated the  2nd July, 1947, the Chief Secretary to the Government of  Madras wrote  to  him  a  letter dated the  7th  August,  1947,  as follows:   "I  am  to say that with reference to your  reply  to  the letter  cited  electing  to continue in  service  after  the transfer of power, the Government have decided not to retain you in service after 15th August, 1947.  Your services  will be  terminated on the afternoon of 14th August 1947 and  you may   proceed   on  leave  (your  present  leave   will   be automatically   converted   into   leave)   preparatory   to retirement  as  from 15th August 1947.   You  may  therefore apply  for the leave (extension of leave) for which you  are eligible  direct to Government.  The  Accountant-General  is being asked to certify the amount of leave for which you are eligible.   A formal communication will issue to you shortly from  the Government  of India terminating your services as from  14th August, 1947 A.N.   I am to express regret that the decisions in your case has been delayed so long". This  is clearly an advance intimation that the  termination of the services of the plaintiff would become 554 operative  at  the very moment when the  transfer  of  power comes  into  force,  i.e., on the  midnight  of  14th/  15th August,  1947.   The  mention  of  the  termination  on  the afternoon  of the 14th August, 1947, was clearly because  of the official practice that a person who hands over charge of his  office in the afternoon of a particular day,  continues in  service and draws the salary for that day.  (Vide  Audit Instruction  (1) at page 163 of the Fundamental  Rules,  3rd Edition).   A letter was immediately addressed by the  Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras under date 8th August, 1947,  to  the  Under Secretary of State  for  India,  India Office,  London,  and  a  copy  thereof  was  sent  to   the plaintiff.  The letter runs thus:   "I  am directed to say that Mr. K. M. Rajagopalan   I.C.S. proceeded on three months’ leave on the 3rd June, 1947,  and that as he will not continue in the service of Government in India,  after the transfer of power, he will be entitled  to compensation  or  settlement grant, as the case may  be,  as from the 15th August, 1947".   On the 8th August, 1947, a formal Government Order No. 377 was passed which is as follows-  "Mr.  K. M. Rajagopalan I.C.S proceed on three  months’ leave on the 3rd June, 1947, and that  as  he will  not  continue in the service of  Government  of  India after  the  transfer  of  power,  he  will  be  entitled  to compensation  or resettlement grant, as the case may be,  as from the 15th August, 1947".  This  order  was published in the Fort St.  George  Gazette dated  the 19th August, 1947.  Presumably this order  (along with  other  similar  orders)  was  also  intimated  to  the Government  of  India  and the Government of  India  sent  a telegram  to  the Government of Madras on the  14th  August, 1947, as follows: services of........ Rajagopalan". On the 29th September, 1947, the Government of Madras passed a G. 0. sanctioning payment of pound 4,500/- as compensation for  the plaintiff and ordered disbursement thereof  by  the Accountant-General.   This  compensation was  drawn  by  the plaintiff in April,                             555 1950.   In the light of this background it is now  necessary



to  notice  the various statutory provisions  which  brought about  the  political change and  particularly  those  which relate to the services.   The  instrument which brought about the transfer of  power from  the British Government to the Dominion  Government  of India in accordance with the announcements of His  Majesty’s Government  dated the 20th February, 1947 and the 3rd  June, 1947,  is the Indian Independence Act, 1947, (10 & 1.1  Geo. 6, Ch. 30) passed by the British Parliament and which became law  on  the 18th July, 1947.  The preamble  thereto  is  as follows:   "An  Act to make provision for the setting up in India  of two  independent Dominions, to substitute  other  provisions for certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, which  apply  outside those Dominions, and  to  provide  for other matters consequential on or connected with the setting up of those Dominions".   By section I of the said Act two independent Dominions  to be known respectively, India and Pakistan, were to be set up in  India  as  from  the 15th  day  of  August,  1947,  with territories  assigned  to  each ’of  them  as  indicated  in sections  2,3 and 4 thereof.  Under section 5, there was  to be  a  Governor-General  for each of  the  Dominions  to  be appointed  by His Majesty who was to represent  His  Majesty for  the  purposes of the government of  the  Dominion.   By section  6 it was provided that Legislature of each  of  the new  Dominions was to have full power to make laws for  that Dominion  including laws having extra-territorial  operation and laws which would be valid notwithstanding any repugnancy to  the law of England or to the provisions of any  existing or future Act of the Parliament.  It was also provided  that the  assent to the laws as made by the Legislatures, was  to be given by the Governor-General in the name of His  Majesty without any power of disallowance by His Majesty and without any power of reservation of laws for the significance of His Majesty’s  pleasure.   By  section 7,  it  was  speciflcally provided that as from the 15th 556 August, 1947, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom was to have no responsibility as respects the government  of any  of the territories which, immediately before that  day, were included in British India.  Temporary provisions as  to the government of each of the new Dominions as from the 15th August, 1947, until such time that each of the two Dominions evolves  its  own  independent  Constitution  were  made  by sections 8 and 9. By section 8(1) the respective Constituent Assemblies  of  India, and Pakistan which had  already  come into  existence  and  were functioning for  the  purpose  of evolving  a new Constitution for each of the Dominions,  the first  by virtue of the Cabinet Mission Plan of  May,  1946, and  the  second  by  reason  of  the  announcement  of  His Majesty’s   Government  dated  the  3rd  June,  1947,   were recognised   as  interim  Legislatures  for  each   of   the Dominions.   By section 8(2) the pre-existing Government  of India  Act, 1935, with modifications and adaptations  to  be made  by  the  Governor-General and  subject  to  any  other provision  or  alteration  to be  made  by  the  Constituent Assembly  functioning  as the interim  Legislature,  was  to continue  in force.  By section 9 of the Act, the  Governor- General  was  given  various and extensive  powers  to  make provisions  in order to bring the provisions of  the  Indian Independence   Act   into   operation   and   for   removing difficulties  arising in connection with the  transition  of power  from the British Government to the Dominions  and  to carry on the business of the Governor-General in Council  in



the  interim period.  It was specifically provided that  the Governor-General’s   power   in  this  behalf  was   to   be retrospective as from the 3rd June, 1947.   It will be seen that by virtue of the Indian -Independence Act  a completely independent Dominion of India was  set  up with a wholly independent Legislature and with a  completely independent  Government  free from any kind  of  fetters  as regards   their   functioning,  either  from   the   British Parliament  or from the British Government.  The  Government of the Dominion, however, was still to be carried on in the                             557 name  of  His  Majesty the King of  Great  Britain,  by  the Governor-General  of India to be appointed by  His  Majesty. The  learned  Attorney-General  strenuously  contended  that these  changes  resulted  in the emergence of  India  as  an independent Sovereign State and that it followed  therefrom, on  well-recognised  principles of international  law,  that this brought about automatic termination of the contracts of service  between the prior Government and its servants.   In support of this principle of international law, the  learned Attorney-General  cited a number of authorities as also  the case  in  West  Rand Central Gold Mining Co.   Ltd.  v.  The King(1), which was quoted by this.  Court in Virendra  Singh v.  The State of Uttar Pradesh(2).  On the  otherhand,  Shri Nambiar  for the respondent stressed the fact  that  however independent  the new Dominion Government may be  as  regards the  functioning  of its Legislature and  of  its  executive Government, the new Government was still to function in  the name  of  His Majesty the King of Great  Britain  and  that, therefore,  the  Dominion is not on the same footing  as  an independent sovereign State, which obtains sovereignty  over a  new country by virtue of conquest or cession.   He  urged that  the principle of international law relied  upon  would not  apply to such a case.  In support of his contention  he drew our attention to various other provisions in the Indian Independence  Act  and  to the  various  legislative  orders passed by the Governor-General by virtue of powers vested in him  under section 9 of the Indian Independence Act as  also to  adaptations  made in respect of various  existing  laws. The  question  as  to whether the  Indian  Independence  Act brought  about  a full sovereign State for  each  and  every purpose  is one of considerable importance and is  not  free from difficulty.  We do not wish to decide that question  on the  present  occasion.  It appears to us that  the  present case has to be decided with reference to the question as  to what   exactly  has  been  brought  about  by   the   Indian Independence  Act  and  the  subsidiary  legislation   which followed thereupon, in so far as they relate (1) [1905] 2 K. B. 391. (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 415, 427. 558 to the tenure of persons in the position of the plain- tiff.   For this purpose it is necessary in the first instance  to have  a clear idea as to what was the tenure of  service  of the  plaintiff prior to the 15th August, 1947.   Persons  in the position of the plaintiff were recruited directly by the Secretary  of  State  for  India by  virtue  of  the  powers conferred  on him under section 244(1) of the Government  of India  Act, 1935 (or under the corresponding  provisions  in the  prior  Government  of  India  Acts).   The  persons  so recruited,  were appointed to the service called the  Indian Civil Service.  Each person so recruited had to enter into a covenant  by means of an indenture between himself  and  the Secretary  of  State.  The indenture (whose form  is  to  be



found  as  Appendix I of the Indian  Civil  Service  Manual) recited  that the person was appointed by the  Secretary  of State to serve His Majesty as a Member of the Civil  Service of  India and that such service was to continue  during  the pleasure  of His Majesty, to be signified under the hand  of the  Secretary  of  State for India  with  liberty  for  the covenanter  to  resign the said service  with  the  previous permission  of the Secretary of State or of  the  Government under  which  he  was, for the  time  being,  serving.   The indenture  incorporated various covenants by  the  appointee with  reference to the exercise of his functions during  the period  of  his service such as (1)  general  fidelity,  (2) obedience  to  orders  of general  nature,  (3)  keeping  of regular   accounts,  preservation  and  due   delivery   and production  of  private  accounts, (4) not  to  misapply  or employ  for improper purposes the property entrusted to  his care, (5) not to divulge secrets, (6) not to accept  corrupt presents  or  to  make corrupt bargains, (7)  not  to  trade contrary  to  law  or regulations, (8)  not  to  quit  India without  leave and to satisfy all debts due to  His  Majesty before  departure,  and  (9)  to  make  prescribed  payments towards  pension,  etc.   Apart from  these  covenants,  his tenure  was regulated by a number -of  statutory  provisions under  the  Government  of India Act.   Section  240,  while affirming that the service was at the pleasure                             559 of His Majesty provided that dismissal or reduction in  rank should  be preceded by a reasonable opportunity for  showing cause  against  the action proposed and that  dismissal  (or removal)  from  service could only be by  an  authority  not subordinate to the appointing authority-which in the present case meant that the appellant could be dismissed or  removed only by the Secretary of State.  The Government of India Act contained  also a number of provisions specially  applicable to  a  person  recruited by the  Secretary  of  State.   The conditions of his service as regards pay, leave, pension and other  matters were to be such as may be, prescribed by  the rules  to  be  made by the Secretary of State  and  (in  the absence of any specific rules by the Secretary of State)  by the rules to be made by the Governor-General or the Governor of  a Province in accordance as he was in service under  the Government  of India or the Provincial Government  [section, 247(1)].   In  the matter of promotions or  leave  exceeding three months or in the matter of an order of suspension,  he was  to  be directly under the authority  of  the  Governor- General  or  the Governor, as the case  may  be,  exercising their  respective individual judgments [sections 247(2)  and (3)].   No  award of pension less than the  maximum  pension under the rules could be made except with the consent of the Secretary  of, State [section 247(6)].  He had the right  to approach  the  Governor-General  or  the  Governor  in   the exercise  of  their  individual  judgment  if  he  had   any grievance or complaint in respect of his service and a right of appeal to the Secretary of State as against the order. of any  authority  which punished or formally censured  him  or interpreted any rule to his disadvantage (section 248).  The Secretary of State had to make rules; specifying the  number and character of the civil posts under the Crown which  were to be reserved for and to; be filled by persons belonging to the Indian Civil Service recruited by him (section 246).  If the  conditions  of the service were adversely  affected  by reason  of  anything  done under the Act or  for  any  other reason  which might have appeared to the Secretary of  State to justify payment of compensation, he was entitled 71



560 thereto,  the  compensation being such as the  Secretary  of State might fix.  The said sum was payable from the revenues of  the Government of India or the Provincial Government  as the  case  may be (section 249).  It will be seen  from  the above  that  the  tenure  of an  Indian  Civil  Servant  was basically  contractual but with conditions and prospects  of such  service regulated by statute.  A person  recruited  to such  service was in a very special position, in  comparison with persons holding other civil posts of the Government  of India or the Provincial Government.  He enjoyed a number  of rights and privileges attached to him by virtue of the  fact that  he  belonged  to a specially  recruited  service  with certain high posts reserved for him and having the right  of appeal  to  the  Secretary of State in  respect  of  matters relating   to   his   service,   by   virtue   of   sections 244,246,247,248 and 249.  Thus the Indian Civil Service  was a specially privileged class of service under the Crown with the   essential  characteristic  of  direct   and   ultimate protection  by  the  Secretary  of  State  representing  His Majesty’s Government.  Now  it  is  necessary to notice  the  fundamental  changes brought  about  in this behalf by the’  Indian  Independence Act.  In the first instance the Secretary of State who, as a Member  of British Cabinet, acting in the name of the  Crown and  responsible to the British Parliament,  was  exercising such control as was vested in him in respect of the  affairs of  India  and  in particular  as  regards  these  services, completely  disappeared.   It was specifically  provided  by section 7 (1)(a) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947,  that as  a consequence of the setting up of the new Dominions  as from  the appointed day (15th August, 1947)  "His  Majesty’s Government  in the United Kingdom have no responsibility  as respects  the  government of any of the  territories  which, immediately  before  that  day,  were  included  in  British India".   There was a further specific provision by  way  of section  10  in the Indian Independence Act as  regards  the Secretary of State services which was as follows:  "10.  Secretary of State’s services etc.                             561  (1) The provisions of this Act keeping in force  provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, shall not continue  in force the provisions of that Act relating to appointments to the  civil services of, and civil posts under, the Crown  in India  by the Secretary of State, or the provisions of  that Act relating to the reservation of posts". Now the India (Provisional Constitution) Order of 1947 which was issued by the Governor-General on the 14th August, 1947, under  the power of adaptation vested in him  under  section 9(1)(c) of the Indian Independence Act and which was to come into  operation simultaneously with it, gave effect  to  the above  two  provisions, viz., section  7(1)(a)  and  section 10(1) of the Indian Independence Act, by specifically delet- ing  from  the Government of India AcT ,  1935  the  various sections  relating  to  the  Secretary  of  State  and   his services,  i.e., sections 244, 246, 248 arid 249 and 278  to 284-A (vide schedule to the India (Provisional Constitution) Order,  1947).  Changes were also made by the same order  in sections 240 and 247 relating to conditions of service which will  be  noticed  presently, whose  chief  purpose  was  to withdraw the responsibiof the Secretary of State as  regards matters  covered by these sections.  The resultant  position was clearly this. (1) There was no further recruitment to  a special  covenanted service by the Secretary of  State.  (2) There was to be no statutory reservation of posts to be made



by the Secretary of State. (3.) The conditions of service as made  by  the  Secretary of State  no  longer  continued  in operation.  (4)  No  right  of appeal  or  approach  to  the Secretary  of State for redress of any  personal  grievances relating  to such servants, or right of  compensation,  etc. for any adverse action to be determined by the Secretary  of State,  continued to subsist.  True, some of the  conditions of service previously governing these persons were continued by  section  10(2) of the Indian Independence  Act  and  the adaptations made thereunder which will be noticed presently. But  apart  from the question whether  such  continuance  is available  to  all  the previous members of  the  service  a matter which will be 562 dealt  with presently-the ultimate -responsibility  for  the framing and maintenance of the conditions of service was  no longer with the Secretary of State.. It is also true that in -respect of such of these civil servants whose services were retained   by  the  new  Dominion  Government  the   service continued to be under the Crown (as shown by the  adaptation of  section 240 of the Government of India Act).   But  this was  only because in theory the new Government of India  was still to be carried on in the name of His Majesty.  This was no  more  than a symbol of the continued allegiance  to  the Crown.  The substance of the matter, however, was that while previously the Secretary of State’s services were under  the Crown   in  the  sense  that  the  ultimate  authority   and responsibility  for  these  services  was  in  the   British Parliament  and the British Government, this  responsibility and authority completely vanished from and after the 15th Au ’gust,  1947, as envisaged in the Viceroy’s announcement  of the  30th  April,  1947, and  as  specifically  affirmed  by section 7 (1) (a) of the Indian Independence Act.  Thus  the essential  structure of the Secretary of State services  was altered  and  the basic foundation of  the  contractual-cum- statutory  tenure  of the service disappeared.   It  follows that  the  contracts  as well as  the  statutory  protection attached thereto came to an automatic and legal  termination as  held  by  the Privy Council and the House  of  Lords  in somewhat  analogous situations in Reilly v. The King(1)  and Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd.(2).   To repel the above view of the change brought about by the Indian Independence Act, learned counsel for the  respondent relied on certain other provisions which may now be noticed. These  provisions far from supporting the contention of  the respondent,  clearly confirm the above view.  The  first  of these is section 10(2) of the Indian Independence Act, which is as follows:  "10. (2) Every person who- (a)  having  been appointed by the Secretary of   State,  or Secretary of State in Council, to a civil (1) [1984] A.C. 176. (2) [1940] A.C. 1014,                             563 service  of  the Crown-in India continues on and  after  the appointed  day to serve under, the Government of  either  of the new Dominions or of any Province or part thereof, shall  be  entitled to receive from the Governments  of  the Dominions  and Provinces or parts which he is from  time  to time  serving  the same conditions of  service  as  respects remuneration, leave and pension, and the same rights as res. pects  disciplinary  matters  or, as the  case  may  be,  as respects  the  tenure of his officee or  rights  as  similar thereto as changed circumstances may permit, as that  person was entitled to immediately before the appointed day".



 The  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  is  that  this provision   clearly   indicates  that   persons   previously appointed  by  the Secretary of State to  the  Indian  Civil Service continue under the new Government and that they  are entitled  to  similar  conditions of  service  as  they  had before.   According  to  him the  order  of  termination  of plaintiff’s  service  being invalid, he must  be  deemed  to continue  in  service.  But, it is to be  noticed  that  the above  provision  does not say that all  persons  previously appointed  shall  he  continued  in  service.   It  is  very carefully  worded and merely guarantees the same  conditions of  service, etc. to persons who "having been  appointed  by the Secretary of State  continue on and after the  appointed day  to serve under the Government This section has  nothing to say as to who are the persons who continue in service and receive the benefit.  That was obviously left to be provided by  delegated  legislation  in the shape of  orders  of  the GovernorGeneral  by virtue of section 9(1)(a) of the  Indian Independence  Act.   The  India  (Provisional  Constitution) Order,  1947,  referred to above deals with this  matter  in article 7(1) thereof which runs as follows:   "Subject to any general or special orders or  arrangements affecting  his case, any person who immediately  before  the appointed  day is holding any civil post under the Crown  in connection with the 564 affairs  of  the  Governor-General  or  Governor-General  in Council  or  of a Province other than Bengal or  the  Punjab shall,  as  from  that  day, be deemed  to  have  been  duly appointed  to  the  corresponding post under  the  Crown  in connection  with the affairs of the Dominion of India or  as the  case  may be, of the Province".  The Schedule  to  this Order also shows the adaptations made in respect of sections 240 and 247 of the Government of India Act to give effect to section  10(2) of the Indian Independence Act above  quoted. Now section 247 of the Government of India Act as adapted is as follows:   "The conditions of service of all persons who, having been appointed  by  the Secretary of State or  the  Secretary  of State  in Council to a civil service of the Crown in  India, continue  on and after the date of the establishment of  the Dominion to serve under the Government of the Dominion or of any Province, shall-  (a)  as  respects persons serving in  connection  with  the affairs  of  the Dominion, be such as may be  prescribed  by rules made by the Governor-General; (b) as respects persons serving in connection with the  affairs of a Province- (i)in regard to their pay, leave, pension, general rights as medical  attendance and any other matter  which  immediately before  the establishment of the Dominion was  regulated  by rules  made  by the Secretary of State, be such  as  may  be prescribed by rules made by the Governor-General; and    (ii)  in  regard to any other matter, be such as  may  be prescribed by rules made by the Governor of the Province". Section 240(2) as modified is as follows:   "No  such  person as aforesaid (referring to  the  persons mentioned in section 240(1) which includes persons appointed by the Secretary of State) who having been appointed by  the Secretary  of  State or the Secretary of  State  in  Council continues  after the establishment of the Dominion to  serve under the Crown in India shall be dismissed from the service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to the                             565 Governor-General or the Governor according as that person is



serving in connection with the affairs of the Dominion or of a  Province, and no other such person as aforesaid shall  be dismissed  from the service of His Majesty by any  authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed".   Taking  these  various provisions together, it  is  clear’ that  the guarantee of the prior conditions of  service  and the   previous   statatory  safeguards   relating   to   the disciplinary action are now confined to such as continue  In service  on and after the establishment of the  Dominion  to serve  under  the  Crown, i.e., of  the  Government  of  the Dominion  or  of a Province, as the case may  be.   Who  the persons  are  who  fall within the category  of  persons  so continuing is clearly indicated by implication in article  7 (1)  of  the India (Provisional Constitution)  Order,  1947, already  quoted, which says that any person who  immediately before the appointed day is holding any civil post under the Crown  in  connection,  with the affairs  of  the  Governor- General  or  Governor-General in Council or of  a  Province, shall,  as  from that day, be deemed to have been  duly  ap- pointed  to  the  corresponding  post  under  the  Crown  in connection with the affairs of the Dominion of India, or, as the  case  may be, of the Province.  It is  clear  that  the continuance contemplated by section 10(2) (a) of the  Indian Independence  Act and by section 240(2) and section  247  of the  Government of India Act as adapted, is the  continuance impliedly brought about by this deeming provision in article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order.  But  it has to be noted that this provision is specifically preceded by the qualifying phrase "subject to any general or  special orders  or  arrangements  affecting  his  case".   Thus  all persons  who were previously holding civil posts are  deemed to  have  been appointed and hence to continue  in  service, excepting  those  whose  case is  governed  by  "general  or special  orders or arrangements affecting his  case".   Now, omitting  "general orders" which has no application in  this case,  there  can be no reasonable doubt  that  the  special orders or arrangements contemplated herein, in so far as the 566 members of the Secretary of State’s services are  concerned, are the special orders or arrangements which followed on the Viceroy’s  announcement  dated  the  30th  April,  1947,  in pursuance  of which the individual civil servants  had  been circularised   and   their  wishes  ascertained,   and   the Governments concerned had finally intimated their option not to  invite  the  continuance of the  service  of  particular individuals  as  has  happened in the case  of  the  present plaintiff.   To repel this conclusion, the  learned  counsel for  the  respondent urges (1) that the "special  orders  or arrangements"  contemplated  by article 7(1) of  the  India, (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, must be valid orders or  bilateral  valid arrangements made  by  the  appropriate authority,  amongst  which category, according to  him,  the order  of  termination  of the  service  of  the  plaintiff- respondent, issued by the Chief Secretary to the  Government of  Madras on the 8th August, 1947, does not fall,  and  (2) that  the previous history commencing from the  announcement by the Viceroy is not admissible to construe the meaning and effect  of the Indian Independence Act and  the  legislative orders made by the Governor-General thereunder.  As  regards the first objection above, there is no reason to think  that the words "special orders or arrangements" indicate either a valid  order or a bilateral and valid arrangement.  In  view of  the  history as set out ’above and the  extreme  urgency with  which all these steps had necessarily to be taken  be- fore  the  appointed  day in order to  facilitate  a  smooth



transition,  the legislative authorities concerned  must  be taken  to  have proceeded on a recognition  of  the  factual situation  as it then existed.  For a similar approach in  a similar  situation see for instance Raj  Rajendra  Malojirao Shitole  v. The State of Madhya Bharat(1) where  this  Court held  that  article 385 of the Constitution proceeded  on  a recognition of the factual situation, at the time,  relating to the matter involved.  Even apart from this answer to  the objection,  the  objection itself appears to be based  on  a misapprehension.   It is true there is no clear evidence  in the (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 748, 757.                             567 case  that  the order of termination of the service  of  the plaintiff  was one made with the sanction of then  Secretary of  State.  It may also be that the decision not  to  retain his  services as and from the 15th August., 1947, was  based on his past record as admitted in the written-statement  and works  serious  hardship in view of his not  having  had  an opportunity to show cause.  But it was an order to come into operation at the precise moment when the Indian Independence Act came into force. At that moment the Secretary of State’s concern with this matter was at an end.  There is no  reason to think that an order of this kind with the sanction of the Central  Government, not purporting to exercise a  power  of termination  of  services,  but  acting  on  the  assumption implicit  in  the Viceroy’s announcement that  the  services would  come to an automatic termination and  intimating  the decision  of  the appropriate Government not to  retain  the services of the plaintiff as and from the 15th August, 1947, is  not within the competence of the very  Government  under whose  service,  the plaintiff wanted to  serve.   The  very nature  of  the  situation  demanded  the  taking  of   such anticipatory decisions and the communication of the same  to the  person concerned, in order to become operative  at  the crucial  moment of the transition of power.  As regards  the second  objection, it appears to us that the  contention  as regards   the   in  admissibility  of   reference   to   the announcement  of the Viceroy and the action taken  thereupon by  the Central and the Provincial Governments, both in  its general  aspect as also with reference to  individual  cases like that of the plaintiff, is without, any substance,.  The phrase  "special orders or arrangements affecting his  case" in  article  7(1) of the  India  (Provisional  Constitution) Order,  1947,  can  only refer to  this  and  similar  other material culminating in the orders and arrangements relating to  the  concerned individuals.  That there were  any  other kind of special orders or arrangements contemplated by  this provision  concerning the Secretary of State’s services  has not  been suggested and it is clear there were  none.   That such  previous  material  which led  up  to  the  particular legislative provision is 72 568 admissible  in  evidence  has  been so  held  in  Ladore  v. Bennett(1) which was held valid in Govindan Sellappah  Nayar kodakan  Pillai v. Punchi Banda Mudanayake(2).   As  pointed out  by  Lord Atkin in the case in Ladore v.  Bennett(3)  at page 477, such documents indicate the materials which can be taken  to  have  been before the  Governor-General  when  he passed  the  relevant  legislative  order.   This   material indicates  quite  clearly that while the initial  option  to continue  or not in service was with the servant  concerned, the final option. to continue him or not to continue him was with the appropriate Government and that the special  orders



or  arrangements  contemplated  were  the  action  taken  in pursuance of that final option.   It  was faintly suggested that the Viceroy’s  announcement of the 30th April, 1947, was before His Majesty’s Government decided to advance the date of transfer of power by nearly a year  and  that  the original  announcement  contemplated  a treaty  between  the  British  Government  and  the   future Dominion  Government to regulate all these matters and  that since  no  such treaty has in fact been  entered  into,  the announcement was not admissible in evidence.  The fact  that the transition of power took the form of legislation by  the British  Parliament and not of a regular treaty between  the two Governments in view of the changed circumstances is  not a matter which can in any way effect the situation so far as it  relates to the particular matter with which we are  con- cerned.   It is that very announcement that has  been  acted upon  after the further announcement of the 3rd June,  1947. This appears clearly from the fact that the circular  letter of  the Government of India to the various provincial  Chief Secretaries referred to this very announcement and from  the further  fact  that the letter which was sent  to  each  and every individual civil servant was accompanied by a copy  of the said announcement.   It  is  clear, therefore, from the above  discussion  that apart from the fact that the Secretary of State (1)  [1939] A.C. 468. (2)  [1953] A.C. 514, 528. 569 and  his services disappeared as from the 15th August  1947, section  10(2)  of the Indian Independence Act  and  article 7(1) of the India (Provisional Constitution) Order proceeded on  a clear and unequivocal recognition of the  validity  of the  various special orders and the individual  arrangements made and amount to an implicit statutory recognition of  the principle  of automatic termination of the services  brought about  by the political change.  In our opinion,  therefore, the  services of the plaintiff came to an  automatic  termi- nation  on  the emergence of Indian Dominion.   The  special order and arrangement affecting his case that ,%,as made  in pursuance  of  the Viceroy’s announcement  resulted  in  his service not being continued from and after the 15th  August, 1947,  and the plaintiff is not entitled to the  declaration prayed for.    The  learned  Judges of the High Court in coming  to  the conclusion   they  did,  have,  with  respect,  missed   the significance  of the phrase "special orders or  arrangements affecting  his  case"  used in article  7(1)  of  the  India (Provisional  Constitution)  Order,  1947,  and  failed   to appreciate that this was to be construed in the light of all the  relevant  events that proceeded,  commencing  from  and following  upon  the announcement of the Viceroy  dated  the 30th April, 1947.   The  result  is  that the appeal is allowed,  but  in  the circumstances without costs. 570