http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M. V. NARASIMHAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/07/1975

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1835            1976 SCR  (1)   6  1975 SCC  (2) 377  CITATOR INFO :  R          1982 SC 697  (15)  APL        1989 SC 222  (3,8)  APL        1989 SC 516  (50)

ACT:      Prevention  of   Corruption  Act,   1947,  Section   2- Incorporation of  provisions of  s. 21  of Penal Code in the definition of  public servant-Amendment  to s.  21 including employee of  Government company-Definition of public servant in s. 2 of the Act, if unaffected.

HEADNOTE:      Section 2  of the  Prevention of  Corruption Act, 1947, provides  that,  for  the  purposes  of  this  Act,  "Public servant" means  a public  servant as defined in s. 21 of the Indian Penal  Code. Before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Act  No. 11  of 1958)  was passed  adding clause 12 to this section,  s. 21  of the  Penal Code  consisted only  of eleven clauses  and an  employee under  the Corporation or a Government Company did no. fall within the purview of any of the clauses  of s.  21 of  the Penal  Code.  Clause  12  was further amended by the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act  No. XL  of  1964)  enlarging  the  definition  of "public servant".      The  respondent  who  was  an  employee  in  the  Heavy Electricals (India)  Ltd.  Bhopal,  which  is  a  Government Company, was convected by the Special Judge Indore, under s. 420 I.P.C.  and s.  5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Act and was sentenced  to one  year rigorous  imprisonment  on  each count. The  appeal filed  by the  respondent before the High Court of  Madhya Pradesh  was allowed  mainly on  the ground that  as   the  respondent  was  not  a  public  servant  as contemplated by  the provisions  of the Act, his trial under the Act  was without  jurisdiction. The  High Court took the view that  as the Act had incorporated the definition of the Penal Code prior to its amendment, it became an integral and independent part  of the  Act and would remain unaffected by any repeal  or change in the previous Act, namely, the Penal Code. This  appeal has  been preferred  on the basis of  the certificate granted by the High Court. .      Allowing the appeal, ^

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

    HELD: (i)  It is well-settled that, after the provision of the  previous Act  is incorporated in the subsequent Act, the  off-spring,   namely,  the   incorporated   provisions, survives even  if the  previous Act  is  repealed,  amended, declared a  nullity or erased from the statute book. But the Act being  a  social  legislation  its  provisions  must  be construed liberally  so as to advance the object of the Act. Though the  Act and  the Penal Code are not statutes in pari materia there  can be no doubt that the evidence Act and the Prevention of  Corruption  Act  form  part  of  one  system, because the  rules of  Evidence Act,  with minor exceptions, apply to  trials of offences created under the Act. The Act, no doubt,  contains a  penal flavour  but it  is in effect a piece of  social legislation directed towards eradication of the evil  of corruption amongst the services alone. In other words, the public servants alone fall within the mischief of the Act and no one else. [11E; 12A-C]      Clarke v.  Bradlaugh, [1881]  8 Q.B.D. 63,69, Ram Sarup v. Munshi  and other  [1963] 3  S.C.R. 858,  868-869, In  re Wood’s Estate, Ex parte Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Works and Buildings,  [18861 31  Ch. D. 607, 615-616, Secretary of State  for   India  in  Council  v.  Hindustan  Co-operative Insurance Society  Ltd. L.R.  58 I.A. 259. 266-267. referred to.      State of  Madras v.  Vaidyanath Aiyar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 61, relied on.      (ii) The  object of  the Act is to eradicate corruption from various  levels either  in Government  services  or  in service under  the Corporation  or Government Companies. The Penal Code no doubt creates offences like those mentioned in ss. 161  and 165  of  the  Code  but  they  were  not  found sufficient to  cope  with  the  present  situation  and  the expending needs of the nation. In these circumstances, 7 it was  considered necessary  to evolve a quick, expeditious and effective  machinery to  destroy the  evil of corruption existing in any form. If, therefore, the Penal Code with the same object  enlarged the  definition of s. 21 by adding the twelfth clause  by virtue,  of the  Criminal law (Amendment) Act, 1958  and the  Anti-corruption  Laws  (Amendment)  Act, 1964, there  is no  reason why  the extended  meaning to the provision of  s. 2  of the Act ns borrowed from s. 21 of the Penal Code  be not  given lo that section. Otherwise the Act would become wholly unworkable. [12D-F]      Secretary of  State for  India in  Council v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance  Society Ltd.  L.R. 58 I.A. 259, 266- 267. S.  Gangoli v.  The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1960] 1 S. C. R. 290 and M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, [1963 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 724. referred to.      (iii) Even  if s.  2 of  the Act  had not  applied  the provisions of  the Penal  Code and  had not  defined  public servant, then  the provisions  of the  Penal Code would have come into operation by implied reference because the Act was a supplemental  Act to the Penal Code. It was only by way of abundant caution  that s.  2 of  the  Act  incorporated  the definition of  "public servant" as mentioned in s. 21 of the Penal Code and in that sense alone the Act can be treated as being pari meteria with the Penal Code. [15A-B]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 284 of 1974.      From the  judgment and order dated the 12th April, 1973

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

of the  Madhya Pradesh  High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 1971.      F. S.  Nariman, Addl. Solicitor General of India, P. P. Rao and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.      The respondent appeared in person.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J. This  is an  appeal by  State of M.P. by certificate granted  by the  High Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh under  Art.   134(1)(c)  of  the  Constitution  against  its judgment and  order  dated  April  12,  1973  by  which  the respondent who  was convicted  by the Special Judge, Indore, under s.  220 I.P.C.  and s.5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment  on each  count, was  acquitted by the High Court.  Briefly put,  the prosecution  case against the respondent  was  that  he  was  an  employee  in  the  Heavy Electricals  (India)  Ltd,  Bhopal  which  is  a  Government company and  was working  at the  relevant time  as Personal Assistant to  Shri C. Rae, Manager, Purchasing & Main Stores of the  Company. Mr.  Rae was  allotted a  new Fiat  Car  at Bombay on  priority basis and the respondent and Mr. Rae had arrived at  Bombay to  take delivery of the car on March 14, 1965 and  they stayed  there till  March 13.  1965. Mr. Rae, however, left on the morning of March 13, 1965 directing the respondent to  obtain delivery  of the Fiat Car on March 14, 1965 and  then proceed  to Indore.  Ultimately the  car  was brought to  Bhopal on  March 16,  1965 at about 2-30 P.M. On March 23,  1965 the  respondent submitted his T.A. bill Ext. P-21 showing  his departure from Bombay on March 16, 1965 by car at 2-00 P.M. 8 and arrival  at Bhopal  on March  17, 1965 at 6-30 P.M.  and claimed daily  allowance at the rate of Rs. 12/- per day for halt at Bombay. The respondent accordingly received the full amount of  the T.A.  Bill on  April 3,  1965. The allegation against the respondent was that he had prepared a false T.A. Bill and  had cheated  the Government Company and was guilty of  serious   criminal  misconduct   as  envisaged   by  the Prevention of  Corruption Act.  The learned  Special  Judge, Indore, accepted  the prosecution  case  and  convicted  the respondent as  indicated above. The respondent then filed an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which allowed appeal, mainly  on the ground that as the respondent was not a public  servant as  contemplated by  the provisions of the Prevention of  Corruption Act,  his trial under the said Act was without  jurisdiction. The  High Court, however, left it open to the Government to prosecute the respondent under the relevant law,  if necessary. It is against this order of the High Court  that the  State of  M.P. has  filed this  appeal before us  after obtaining  certificate of  fitness from the High Court.      The short point taken by the respondent before the High Court was  that as  the word  "public servant"  has not been expressive defined  in the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act, 1947, it  has borrowed  the definition  from s.  21  of  the Indian Penal  Code, such a definition amounts to legislation by incorporation,  and therefore  any subsequent  amendment, addition or alteration in the Indian Penal Code would not at all affect  the incorporated  provision in the Prevention of Corruption  Act.  The  High  Court  seems  to  have  readily accepted this  contention and  has accordingly  held that as the various  amendments to  s. 21  of the  Indian Penal Code cannot  apply   to  the  provisions  of  the  Prevention  of Corruption Act,  and therefore  the respondent being only an employee of  the Government Company does not fall within the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

ambit of  public servant  as defined  in s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code  prior to  the amendment.  In order of appreciate this point, it may be necessary to set out the scheme of the Prevention of Corruption Act-hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’-with particular  reference to s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code-hereinafter referred  to as  ’the Penal Code’-which has been incorporated  in the   Act. To begin with, the preamble to the  Act clearly  shows that  the Act has been passed for more effective prevention of bribery and corruption, bribery being a form of corruption. Section 2 of the Act runs thus:           "For the  purpose of  this Act,  "Public  servant"      means a  public servant as defined in section 21 of the      Indian Penal Code."      It would  be seen  that s.  2  of  the  Act  completely incorporates the  provision of  s. 21  of the  Penal Code in order to  define a  "public servant". The Legislature in its wisdom did  not  think  it  necessary  to  give  a  separate definition of  "public servant"  in the Act, but in order to achieve brevity in legislation incorporated the provision of s. 21  of the  Penal Code  into it.  before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,  1958 (Act No. 11 of 1958) was passed s. 21 of the  Penal Code  consisted only  of eleven clauses and an employee under the 9 Corporation or  a Government Company did not fall within the purview of  any of  the clauses  of s. 21 of the Penal Code. Thus when  the Legislature incorporated the provisions of s. 21 of the Penal Code in the Act in the year 1947, cl. 12 was not there  at all on the statute book of the Penal Code. The High Court  took the  view that  as the Act had incorporated the definition  of the  Penal Code  prior to  its amendment, therefore, it became an integral and independent part of the Act and  would remain  unaffected by any repeal or change in the  previous  Act,  namely  the  Penal  Code.  It  appears, however, that by virtue of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958, twelfth  clause was  inserted in  s. 21  of the  Penal Code, which runs as follows:           "Twelfth.-Every officer in the service or pay of a      local authority  or of  a corporation  engaged  in  any      trade or  industry which  is established  by a Central,      Provincial or  State Act  or of a Government company as      define in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956."      This  Act   also  amended  certain  provisions  of  the Prevention of  Corruption Act, 1947 in enlarging the concept of criminal  misconduct but  it did  not at  all  amend  any portion of s. 2 of the Act, perhaps the reason being that in view  of  the  enlargement  of  the  definition  of  "public servant" in  s. 21 of the Penal Code express amendment of s. 2 of the Act was not necessary.      By virtue  of the Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act  No. XL  of 1964),  clause 12 of s 21 of the Penal Code was substituted as follows:           "Twelfth.-Every person-           (a) in  the service  or pay  of the  Government or      remunerated by  fees or  commission for the performance      of any public duty by the Government;           (b) in  the service or pay of a local authority, a      corporation  established   by  or   under  a   Central,      Provincial or  State Act  or a  Government  company  as      defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956,"      It would  thus appear  that  by  virtue  of  these  two amendments the  Parliament sought  to enlarge the definition of "public  servant" so  as to include even an employee of a Government company  or a  corporation with the avowed object of stamping  out corruption  at various levels prevailing in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

the country.      The question  that arises  for consideration is whether the sub  sequent amendments to s. 21 of the Penal Code after its incorporation  in the Act would have to be read into the Act or  not. It  is true that if the doctrine of legislation by incorporation is strictly applied in this 10 case, then  the definition  of s. 21 of the Penal Code prior to its  amendment by Act 11 of 1958 and Act XL of 1964 would alone stand  and, if this is so, the respondent would not be a public  servant within  the meaning  of s. 21 of the Penal Code. It  is well  settled that  where  the  subsequent  Act incorporates a  provision of  the previous Act, the position is that  the borrowed  provision is  bodily lifted  from the previous Act and placed in the subsequent Act and becomes an integral  and  independent  part  of  it  so  as  to  remain unaffected  by  any  repeal,  change  or  amendment  in  the previous  Act.  In  Clarke  v.  Bradlaugh,(1)  Brett,  L.J., observed as follows:           "..... but  there is  a rule of construction that,      where a  statute is  incorporated by  reference into  a      second statute  the repeal  of the  first statute  by a      third does not affect the second."      These observations  were noticed  and approved  by this Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi and others(1), where this Court made the following observations:           "Where the provision of an Act are incorporated by      reference in  a later Act the repeal of the earlier Act      has, in  general, no  effect upon  the construction  or      effect of  the Act  in which  its provisions  have been      incorporated. The  effect of incorporation is stated by      Brett, L.J., in Clarke v. Bradiaugh:           "Where a  statute is  incorporated,  by  reference      into a  Second statute  the repeal of the first statute      by a third does not affect the second."      In the  circumstances, therefore,  the  repeal  of  the Punjab Alienation  of Land  Act of 1900 has no effect on the continued  operation   of  the   Pre-emption  Act   and  the expression ’agricultural  land’ in  the later  Act has to be read as  if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act had been bodily transposed into it." F      The doctrine  of incorporation  by reference to earlier legislation has  been very aptly described by Lord Esher, M. R.,  in   In  re  Wood’s  Estate,  Ex  parte  Her  Majesty’s Commissioners of  Works and Building(3) where he observed as follows:           "If  a   subsequent  Act  brings  into  itself  by      reference some  of the  clauses of  a former  Act,  the      legal effect  of that,  as has  often been  held, is to      write those  sections into  the new Act just as if they      had been  actually written  in  it  with  the  pen,  or      printed in  it, and,  the moment you have those clauses      in the  later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the      former  Act   at  all   For  all   practical  purposes,      therefore, those  sections of the Act of 1840 are to be      dealt with  as if  they were  actually in  the  Act  of      1855." 11      Craies on  Statute Law,  (7th Edition), while referring to the  observations of  Brett, L.J.,  observed at p. 361 as follows           "There is  a rule  of construction  that  where  a      statute is  incorporated by  reference  into  a  second      statute, the  repeal of  the first  statute by  a third      does  not   affect  the  second,  as  the  incorporated

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

    provisions have become part of the  second statute."      The Privy  Council in  Secretary of  State for India in Council v.  Hindustan Co-operative  Insurance  Society  Ltd. (1), while amplifying this doctrine, observed as follows:           "Their Lordship  regard the  local  Act  as  doing      nothing more than incorporating certain provisions from      an existing  Act, and for convenience of drafting doing      so by reference to that Act, instead of setting out for      itself at length the provisions which it was desired to      adopt.. The  independent existence  of the  two Acts is      therefore recognized;  despite the  death of the parent      Act, its  offspring survives  in the incorporating Act.      Though no  such saving  clause appears  in the  General      Clauses Act,  their Lordships  think that the principle      involved is  as applicable  in India  as it  is in this      country."      Thus, the  position is  that after the provision of the previous Act is incorporated in the subsequent Act, the off- spring, namely the incorporated provisions, survives even if the previous Act is repealed, amended, declared a nullity or erased from the statute book. The High Court appears to have relied on  all these  decisions in  order  to  come  to  its conclusion that  as the  Act has incorporated the provisions of s. 21 of the Penal Code in s. 2 thereof, any amendment in the previous Act, namely the Penal Code, will not affect the subsequent Act, namely the Prevention of Corruption Act.      It was  argued before  the High Court as also before us that the Act and the Penal Code are statutes in pari materia and form  part of  one system and they should, therefore, be interpreted as  enforcing each other. Thus any change in the definition of  s. 21  of the  Penal Code  would have  to  be implicitly  read   into  s.2  of  the  Act.  The  Additional Solicitor General  Mr.  Nariman  appearing  for  the  State, however, conceded later on, and in our opinion rightly. that it may  not be  possible to  hold that the Act and the Penal Code were statutes in pari materia. It would appear that the Act is  a completely  self contained  statute with  its  own provisions and  has created  a specific  offence of criminal misconduct which  is quite  different from  the  offence  of bribery as defined in the Penal Code.      Both these  statutes have  different objects and create offences with  separate ingredients.  No authority  has been cited before  us in support of the proposition that the Act, namely, the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the Penal Code are statutes in pari materia so as to form one system. 12      In the  State of  Madras v.  Vaidyanath Aiyar, (1) this Court while   construing the meaning of the phrase ’it shall be presumed’  appearing in  s. 4  of the  Act  utilised  the construction placed  on the  phrase shall  presume’  in  the Evidence Act  by holding that the Evidence Act was a statute in pari materia with the Prevention of Corruption Act. There can be  no doubt that the Evidence Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act form part of one system, because the rules of the Evidence  Act, with minor exceptions, apply to trials of offences created  under the  Act. This  principle,  however, cannot apply  to the present case, where, as we have already stated the areas of the two statutes, namely the Act and the Penal Code  are  entirely  different.  Secondly,  while  the Indian Penal  Code is  essentially a penal statute of a much wider scope  than the Act, the Act no doubt contains a penal flavour but  it is  in effect  a piece of social legislation directed towards  eradication  of  the  evil  of  corruption amongst the  services alone  In other words, public servants alone  fall  within  the  mischief  of  the  Act  i.e..  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

Prevention of Corruption Act, and no one else.      Mr. Nariman  then argued  that  having  regard  to  the preamble and  the object of the Act and the Penal Code there can be  no doubt  that the  Act was  undoubtedly  a  statute supplemental to  the Penal  Code and that being the position any amendment  in the  definition of s. 21 of the Penal Code would have to be read into s. 2 of the Act, because once the definition of s.21 of the Penal Code was incorporated in the Act it  had to be imported into the other Act and considered pari passu  the Penal Code. In our opinion, this argument is well founded  and must  prevail. We  have already  indicated that the  object of the Act was to eradicate corruption from various levels  either in Government services or in services under the  Corporations or  Government companies.  The Penal Code no  doubt creates  offences like those mentioned in ss. 161 and  165 of  the Code but they were not found sufficient to cope  with the  present situation and the expanding needs of the  nation. In  these circumstances,  it was  considered necessary to  evolve  a  quick,  expeditious  and  effective machinery to  destroy the evil of corruption existing in any from. If,  therefore, the  Penal Code  with the  same object enlarged the definition of s.21 by adding the twelfth clause by virtue  of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1958 and the Anti-corruption Laws  (Amendment) Act,  1964,  there  is  no reason why  the extended  meaning to the provision of s.2 of the Act  as borrowed  from s.  21 of  the Penal  Code be not given to that section.      This  Court  in  S.  Gangoli  v.  The  State  of  Uttar Pradesh(2) while  interpreting s.  2 of  the  Prevention  of Corruption Act, that the accused were public servants within the meaning  of the  Act, being employees of the East Indian Railway, which  was managed  and owned  by the Government of India, observed as follows:           "The East  Indian Railway  which has  employed the      appellants was  at  the  material  time  owned  by  the      Government of  India and  managed and run by it, and so      if the status of the appellants had to be judged at the      material date solely 13      by reference  to s.21  of the  Code there  would be  no      difficulty in  holding that they are public servants as      defined by the said section."      Even while  discussing the exact ambit and scope of the Prevention of  Corruption Act,  this Court  observed  in  M. Narayanan Nambiar v. Slate of Kerala(1) as follows:           "The preamble indicates that the Act was passed as      it was  expedient to  make more effective provision for      the prevention  of bribery  and  corruption.  The  long      title as well as the preamble indicate that the Act was      passed to  put down  the said  social evil i.e. bribery      and corruption by public servant....... It also aims to      protect  honest  public  servants  from  harassment  by      prescribing that  the investigation  against them could      be made  only by  police officials of particular status      and by  making the  sanction of the Government or other      appropriate   officer   a   pre-condition   for   their      prosecution.  As   it  is  a  socially  useful  measure      conceived in  public interest,  it should  be liberally      construed so as to bring about the desired object, i.e.      to prevent  corruption among  public  servants  and  to      prevent harassment of the honest among them."      These observations  regarding the  object  of  the  Act obviously were  based on  the footing  that the  Act must be read as  supplemental to  the Penal  Code, and therefore the definition borrowed from the Penal Code must be read into s.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

2 of  the Act  not only at the time when it was borrowed but even at  the material  date when  the offence  is committed. This being the position it is manifest that by virtue of the amendments  referred  to  above  in  the  Penal  Code  which inserted twelfth  clause to  s.21  of  the  Penal  Code  the respondent clearly  comes  within  the  meaning  of  "public servant" and the High Court was in error in taking a view to the contrary. Further the Prevention of Corruption Act being a  social  legislation  its  provisions  must  be  liberally construed so  as to  advance the object of the Act. This can only be done if we give extended meaning to the term "public servant" as  referred to  in s. 2 of the Act by applying the enlarged definition  contained in  clause 12 inserted in the Penal Code by the two amendments referred to above.      There is  yet another  aspect of  the matter  which  is spelt out  from the  decision of  the Privy  Council in  the Hindustan  Co-operative  Insurance  Society’s  case  (supra) which has  been relied  upon by the High Court itself. While reiterating the principle that after certain provisions from an existing  Act have  been incorporated  into a  subsequent Act, no  addition to  the former  Act  can  be  made,  their Lordships of  the Privy  Council made  it  clear  that  this principle would  not  apply  where  the  subsequent  Act  is rendered unworkable  or is not able to function effectually. In this connection their Lordships observed. as follows: 14           "It seems to be no less logical to hold that where      certain   provisions from  an existing  Act  have  been      incorporated into  a subsequent Act, no addition to the      former Act,  which is  not expressly made applicable to      the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in      it, at  all events if it is possible for the subsequent      Act to function effectually without the  addition "      On a  consideration of these authorities, therefore, it seems that the following proposition emerges:           Where a  subsequent Act incorporates provisions of      a previous  Act then  the borrowed provisions become an      integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and      are to  tally unaffected  by any repeal or amendment in      the previous  Act. This  principle, however,  will  not      apply in the following cases:      (a)  where the  subsequent Act and the previous Act are           supplemental to each other;      (b)  where the two Acts are in pari materia;      (c)  where the  amendment in  the previous  Act, if not           imported  into  the  subsequent  Act  also,  would           render the  subsequent Act  wholly unworkable  and           ineffectual; and      (d)  where the  amendment of  the previous  Act, either           expressly or  by necessary intendment, applies the           said provisions to the subsequent Act.      The Additional  Solicitor General  vehemently contended that if  the enlarged  definition by the insertion of clause 12 in  s. 21 of the Penal Code is not imported into s. 21 of the Act,  then the  Act would  become wholly unworkable. For instance, if  two persons  are serving  under  a  Government company and  have committed  an offence of accepting illegal gratification, and  if one is prosecuted under s. 161 of the Penal Code  and the  other under the Act, it is obvious that the prosecution  against the  employee under  the Penal Code would succeed on proof of facts, whereas the employee of the same company  who is  prosecuted under  the  Act  will  fail because such  an employee  will not  be  a  public  servant, according to the extended meaning given by the amendments to s. 21  of the  Penal Code.  This will, therefore, defeat and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

frustrate not  only the object of the Act but will render it absolutely  unworkable.  In  view  of  these  circumstances, therefore, we  are inclined  to hold  that in  the facts and circumstances of  the present  case and having regard to the nature and  scope or  the Prevention  of Corruption Act, the extended definition  of s.21 of the Penal Code would have to be imported  into s.  2 of  the Act. That being the position there can  be no  doubt that  the respondent  was  a  public servant within  the meaning  of s.  2 of  the  Act  and  his conviction by  the learned  Special Judge,  Indore, did  not suffer from any legal infirmity.      There is  yet another aspect of the matter. lt seems to us that  even if  s. 2  of  the  Act  had  not  applied  the provisions of  the Penal  Code and  had not  defined  public servant, then the provisions of the 15 Penal  Code  would  have  come  into  operation  by  implied reference because  the. Act  was a  supplemental Act  to the Penal Code. It was only by way of abundant caution that s. 2 of the Act incorporated the definition of public servant" as mentioned in s. 21 of the Penal Code and in that sense alone the Act  can be treated as being pari materia with the Penal Code. For  these reasons  therefore for  are clearly  of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court holding that the respondent was not a public servant is legally erroneous and cannot be allowed to stand.      The other  point is regarding the question of sentence. The High  Court has  itself pointed  out that the respondent had been  forced under  duress  exercised  by  his  superior officer in  drawing the  inflated travelling  allowance. The High Court has also expressed the view that having regard to the fact  that as  the accused  had to  face a  trial for  a numher  of   years,  the   Government  will   consider   the desirability of  not prosecuting him again. In view of these circumstances,  therefore,   we  feel   the  respondent  has committed only  a technical  offence and a token sentence is called for      We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the  High Court  dated April  12,  1973,  acquitting  the respondent. We  convict the  respondent under  s. 420 I.P.C. and s.  5(2) read  with s.  5(1)(d)  of  the  Prevention  of Corruption Act  but reduce  his sentence to the imprisonment already served. V.M.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 16