http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6  

PETITIONER: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LAL BHARGAVENDRA SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/10/1965

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR MUDHOLKAR, J.R. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  704            1966 SCR  (2)  56  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1966 SC 820  (1)  R          1971 SC 846  (9)  RF         1972 SC1004  (82)  F          1987 SC  82  (7)

ACT: Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 372-Order of former Indian Ruler granting allowance to member of family out, of bounty- If "law".

HEADNOTE: On  7th March 1948, the Ruler of a former Indian State,  out of  his  bounty and in discharge of  his  moral  obligation, passed  an order providing for an allowance to his  brother- respondent  herein.  He directed the Chief Minister  of  the State  to do, certain things, and the various parts  of  the order  were sent to the different departments of  the  State Administration  for  carrying  them  out.   The  order  also granted to the respondent a house, conveyance etc.  On  18th March  1948,  the State along with other States  formed  the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, the component States losing their  sovereign status.  Later, the United State merged  in India,  and  on the promulgation of  the  Constitution,  the State became a Part of the Indian Union.  On 24th September, 1951,  the  President of India, in  his  executive  capacity reduced  the amount of allowance.  The respondent  thereupon filed  a  suit  for a declaration, against  ’the  State  and Central Governments, that the allowance could not be reduced Because it was granted to him by a law passed by the  former Ruler,  which  law was continued in force  by  the  covenant constituting  the United State, by certain statutory  orders made  from  time  to  time and lastly by  Art.  372  of  the Constitution.   The trial court dismissed the suit, but  the High Court, on appeal, decreed it. In  the  appeal  to  this Court by  the  State  and  Central Governments,  the  question  was whether the  order  of  the former Ruler was a law. HELD : It wag not a law and was not continued in force after the State lost its sovereignty.  The order was an  executive

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6  

act  of the Ruler and it was competent to the President,  in his executive capacity., to reduce the amount. [66 H] The  nature of the order shows it cannot be a law  according to notions of  modern   jurisprudence.    It  was   a   mere directive  or grant, and even if the  money was paid out  of the State Exchequer, that fact would not turn the order into a law. [60 C; F] Narsing Pratap Deo v.State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1793, referred to. Promod  Chandra  Dev  v. State of Orissa,  [1962]  Supp.   1 S.C.R. 405, explained.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 738 of 1963. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree,  dated December 16, 1960 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in  First Appeal No. 105 of 1957.                              57 B.   Sen. M. N. Shroff and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants. G.   S. Pathak and C. P. Lal, for respondents 1 (a) 1(c). K. L. Hathi and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sarkar, J. This appeal arises out of a suit filed on  August 10, 1956 by Shri Lal Saheb Bhargavendra Singh, now  deceased and  represented by his legal representatives,  against  the Union of India, the State of Vindhya Pradesh, now merged  in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and the Collector of Satna, for a  declaration that he was entitled to receive an  allowance of  Rs.  650 per month from the Union of India.   There  was another  claim but that depended on the  declaratory  relief claimed  and  need not, therefore, be referred  to  further. Shri  Lal Saheb was the brother of the Ruler of  the  former Indian State of Nagod and he contended that the Ruler had by a law passed on March 7, 1948 provided for an allowance  for him  at  the  rate of Rs. 650 per month  and  that  law  was binding  on  the defendants who had by  an  executive  order illegally altered the amount of the maintenance.  It was  on this basis that the claim was made.  The suit was  dismissed by  the  trial Court but was decreed by the  High  Court  of Madhya  Pradesh  on  appeal by the  plaintiff.   Hence  this appeal. Certain events that took place after March 7, 1948 when  the allowance  was  fixed have now to be stated.  On  March  18, 1948,  the Ruler of Nagod along with the Rulers  of  various neighbouring  ruling  States formed a new State  called  the United  State  of Vindhya Pradesh into which  the  component States  were merged thereby losing their  sovereign  status. Thereafter the United State merged in India by an  agreement and  pursuant thereto the Government of India took over  its administration  on  January 1, 1950.  Its  territories  then became  the  Indian province of Vindhya Pradesh  The  United State   ceased  to  exist.   On  the  promulgation  of   the Constitution  on  January 26, 1950 the Province  of  Vindhya Pradesh became a Part C State of Independent India and later from November 1, 1956 it was merged with the State of Madhya Pradesh. By  the agreement constituting the United State all laws  in force in the constituent States were continued in force  and likewise,  the laws of the United State were by a  statutory order  continued in force when it merged in India.   Article 372  of the Constitution continued in force all  laws  which were in force in the territories of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6  

58 Each succeeding State could, of course, alter the laws which were  so  continued  in  force in spite  of  the  change  of sovereignty,  by a law duly made by it.  Neither the  United State  nor the Indian Province or States which  successively administered the territories of the State of Nagod had  made any  law  concerning any allowance to be paid  to  Shri  Lal Saheb.   The Rajpramukh (the head) of the United  State  and the President of India had passed orders ’from time to  time fixing his allowance at amounts lower than that at which  it had  been  fixed  by the Ruler of Nagod on  March  7,  1948. These  were,  however, executive orders and not  laws.  They could  not reduce the amount of allowance to Shri Lal  Saheb fixed by the Ruler of Nagod on March 7, 1948, if he had done so by a law.  All this is not in controversy.  The  only question in this appeal is whether the  order  of the --Ruler of Nagod of March 7, 1948 was a law.  If it was, it is not in dispute that the claim made in the suit must be upheld.   The  -High Court observed that this Court  had  in various  cases ending with the case of Madhaorao  Phalka  v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1) ’.held that the line between the legislative,  executive and judicial functions  of  absolute Rulers like the Ruler of Nagod was not at all clear-cut  and an  attempt to place an order of such a Ruler in -one  class or  the other was of no practical importance.  In this  view of the judgments of this Court, the High Court said that  it was futile to contend that the order of March 7, 1948 was an executive  act  of the Ruler and had not the force  of  law. The High Court, therefore, held that the allowance had  been fixed by law and decreed the suit. The  question  whether, an order of a Ruler is  law  or  not arises  because  an absolute Ruler combined in  himself  the capacities   of   the  supreme   executive,   judicial   and legislative authorities in the State; any particular  action of his might have been in one or other of these  capacities. Therefore, it becomes necessary to decide, when the question arises as it has done. in the present case, in what capacity the Ruler acted when he made a particular order.  At  times, the question has presented some difficulty.  This Court  had -to  discuss this question in many cases but, with  respect, we think the High Court was under a misconception about  the effect  of  the  decisions  in those  cases.   It  would  be unprofitable to discuss these cases for their result may  be quoted  from  the  judgment in the recent  case  of  Narsing Pratap Deo v. State of Orissa (2) : "The true legal position is  that whenever a dispute arises as to whether  an  Orders passed by an absolute monarch represents a legislative (1) [1961] 1 S. C. R. 957. (2) A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 1793,1798.                              59 act........  all relevant factors must be considered  before the question is answered; the nature of the order, the scope and  effect  of  its provisions,  its  general  setting  and context,  the  method adopted by the Ruler  in  promulgating legislative  as distinguished from executive  orders,  these and other allied matters win have to be examined before  the character  of  the order is judicially determined."  It  is, therefore,  not correct to say as the High Court  did,  that this  Court has held that every order of the Ruler is a  law made  by him.  The question whether it is so or not, has  to be determined in each case independently. We then proceed to discuss whether the order of the Ruler of Nagod  was  law.  The question arises  because,  as  earlier stated, the covenant constituting the United State,  certain statutory orders made from time to time and lastly Art.  372

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6  

of the Constitution said that the existing laws would be  so continued.    Now,  these  are  instruments   dealing   with sovereign States and rights.  They are instruments based  on legal ideas and notions founded on modern jurisprudence.  It would, therefore, be legitimate to hold that the word  "law" was   used  in  them  in  a  sense  acceptable,  to   modern jurisprudence.   The contention that the order of  March  7, 1947  being  a  law could be set aside only by  a  law  duly passed  by the succeeding States, emphasises this  view.   A law  made by these succeeding States, the last of  which  is the  Union of India, is fully a law as understood  in  modem jurisprudence.  A law which is to be set aside by such a law must, therefore, have been contemplated as a law of the same kind.   This aspect of the matter has to be kept in mind  in approaching the question. Many tests may be suggested for determining whether a parti- cular thing would be considered law in modem  jurisprudence. In the decisions of this Court on the point, several of them have  been  referred to.  It may be that they  are  not  all applicable,  to every case.  It may also be that it  is  not possible  to  give an exhaustive list of  all  these  tests. None the less however the question is capable of decision in each case. The  order of the Ruler of Nagod which is said to be a  law, is addressed to the Chief Minister of the State and  directs him  to do certain things.  It starts by reciting that  Shri Lal Saheb’s financial position was deplorable and the  Ruler felt  it to be his duty to see that Shri Lal Saheb  did  not experience  difficulties  in his advancing years and  as  no permanent  arrangement had been made for him till then,  the ruler was making the order.  Then follows the operative part of the order which is in these terms SUP.  C.I/66-5 60 "Hence, I order that (the Kothi) (in which he is at  present residing)  be  given  to Shri Lal Saheb  for  generation  to generation  and an allowance of Rs’ 650 (Rupees six  hundred and fifty), per month be granted, in addition to the same  a tonga and a horse be given, the expenses for which shall  be borne  by himself and Rs. 5,000 (Rupees five  thousand),  be granted  to him so that he may be able to make  improvements in agriculture and satisfy his debts (partly)." We  think  it quite impossible that this order  was  a  law. First,  it is a direction to the Chief Minister.  It  is  an order  by which the Ruler required the Chief Minister to  do certain  things.   It  has  not been shown  to  us,  that  a direction  to an officer to be carried out by him, has  ever been  held  to  be a law or can be such.  It  cannot  be  so according  to notions of modem jurisprudence.  Then we  find that  a copy of the order was sent under the,  direction  of the Revenue Minister to Shri Lal Saheb and various parts  of it, to the different departments of the Nagod Administration respectively concerned with them, obviously with the  object that  they might be carried out.  This would  indicate  that even  the Administration was not treating it as law  for  it would be difficult to imagine different parts of a law being communicated  to different branches of  the  Administration. Further,  it appears that the Revenue Minister directed  the Accounts Officer to make a report regarding the provision to be  made  for the sum of Rs. 5,000 mentioned in  the  order. This is not how a law is carried out. The order was also an instrument granting something to  Shri Lal Saheb.  Under it a kothi (house), a tonga (carriage) and horse  and Rs. 5,000 in a lump were to be made available  to Shri  Lal  Saheb.  In regard to these the order was  only  a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6  

grant; it gave him these things.  A grant is, of course, not a  law.  That would follow from the decisions of this  Court in Narsing Pratap Deo’s case(1) and State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali(2).   Now if the rest of the order was a  grant,  it would be strange that one part of it only, namely, the  part providing  for  the  monthly  allowance  only,  was  a  law. Obviously  this  was also intended to be a grant;  the  fact that the order provided for future payments cannot make it a law.  The context is overwhelmingly against the view that it was a law. Again,  the recitals in the order put it beyond  doubt  that the Ruler was only discharging what he considered his  moral obligation.  After referring to Shri Lal Saheb’s  deplorable financial (1) A.T.R. 1964 S. C. 1793. (2) [1964] 6 S. C. R. 461. 61 position,  he  said, "I take it to be my duty to,  see  that Shri  Lal  should  not experience difficulties  in  his  old days".   The Ruler was, therefore, providing  for  something out of his bounty and in discharge of his moral  obligation. A law is never made for these reasons. It  was said that the money was to be paid out of the  State Exchequer.   There is nothing to show, however, that it  was so  or  that in Nagod the private funds of  the  Ruler  were separate  from  the State Exchequer.  But  assume  that  the payment  was to come from the State Exchequer.  That  cannot turn a directive or a grant into a law. Our  attention  was drawn to the decision of this  Court  in Promod  Chandra Dev v. The State of Orissa(1) where a  grant of  an allowance was held to be law.  That case  is  clearly distinguishable.    There  the  nature  and   condition   of allowances  to be granted to persons entitled to  them  from the  State  had  been laid down in Order 31  of  the  Rules, Regulations  and Privileges of Khanjadars and  Khorposhdars. It  was held that "those rules, regulations of Talcher  etc. (1937)" were the laws of the State and that the grants  made by  the  Ruler  in accordance with  those  laws  became  the absolute  property of the grantee.  What bad happened  there was  that  earlier  lands  had been  granted  to  a  certain Khorposhdar  (maintenance holder) under Order  31  aforesaid and  Subsequently  these  were  commuted  into  payments  of monthly amounts.  It was in those circumstances that it  was held that the maintenance was payable under a law.  No  such circumstances exist in the present case. We should *fore concluding state that the Ruler of Nagod who made  the  order  of March 7,  1948  himself  gave  evidence stating that lie had passed the order "under his legislative powers".   This  statement obviously does not  conclude  the matter.  It was not relied upon in any of the Courts  below. The  internal  evidence to which we  have  earlier  referred shows that the order was not a Legislative act. For  all these reasons we have come to the  conclusion  that the  order of the Ruler of Nagod of March 7, 1948 was not  a law.  It was not continued in force after the State of Nagod lost its sovereignty in the circumstances earlier mentioned. The  order was an executive act of the Ruler  providing  for certain  allowance  to Shri Lal Saheb.  It  was,  therefore, competent to the President (1)  (1962] Supp.  1 S. C. R. 405 62 acting  in his executive capacity to reduce it to a  sum  of Rs.  530 per month as he did by his order of  September  24, 1951 which was challenged in the, suit. In  the result, we hold that the appeal must be allowed  and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6  

we direct accordingly.  There will be no ’order as to costs. Appeal allowed. 63