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PETITIONER: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COL.  LAL RAMPAL SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/10/1965

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR MUDHOLKAR, J.R. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  820            1966 SCR  (2)  53  CITATOR INFO :  R          1971 SC 846  (9)  R          1987 SC  82  (7)

ACT: Indian State-Retirement pension fixed by Ruler in relaxation of Rewa State Pension and Gratuity Rules-Ruler’s act whether ’law’  or  ’grant’--Succeeding Government whether  bound  to continue payment.

HEADNOTE: The respondent held various offices under the Government  of the  erstwhile  Rewa State.  By an Order made  on  April  3, 1948;, the Ruler allowed him to, retire on a full pension of Rs. 350/- per month as a special case, and the breaks in his service  were  also condoned.  The State of Rewa  was  later merged with the State of Vindhya Pradesh and the appropriate authority  passed orders reducing the respondent’s  pension. Vindhya  Pradesh later became a part of the State of  Madhya Pradesh.  The respondent moved a petition in the High  Court of  Madhya  Pradesh  for a writ of certiorari  in  which  he prayed that the orders reducing his pension be quashed.  The High  Court  decided in his favour whereupon  the  State  of Madhya Pradesh appealed- to this Court. The questions that fell for determination in the appeal were whether  the Order of the Ruler of Rewa amounted  to  ’law’, and  whether,  if  not  ’law’, it  was  a  grant  which  the succeeding Government must be deemed to have accepted  since it made payments in terms of it for several years. HELD  : (i) From the terms of the Order in question  it  was clear  that the Ruler purported to act under the Rewa  State Rules.   This  would  appear from  the  reference  to  ’full pension’,  condonation  of  the  ’breaks  in  service’   and ’special  case, in the said order.  This would  also  appear from the fact that the Order granted the respondent  certain advance  increments  which  could only  have  been  done  to justify  the full pension of Rs. 350/- per month  under  the rules.  Obviously under the rules the respondent would  have been entitled to a smaller pension in view of the breaks and if the increments had not been granted.  The Ruler was not’.

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therefore, acting in exercise of his sovereign power and  in disregard of the rules; on the contrary he was purporting to act in terms of the rules.  That being so it had to be  held that  the Order in question was not a law but  an  executive order  passed  in terms of the rules.  It was  open  to  the succeeding  Government  to set aside that order  by  another executive order. [54 G-H; 55 B] (ii) what  the Ruler did by his Order of April 3, 1948  does not  appear to have been to make a grant but to have  passed an  Order purporting to act under the Rules.  If that  Order was not justified by the rules it was liable to be set aside by   another  order  duly  made  under  them.   Pension   is furthermore  normally  always  a matter  of  grace.   It  is implicit  in  the  grant  of  a  pension  that  it  may   be subsequently  reviewed.   The  succeeding  State  was  hence competent  to  review  the order even if  it  had  paid  the pension for sometime in terms of it. [55 D-F]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  Civil Appeal No. 736 of 1963. 54 Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and Order,  dated November 12, 1960, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 265 of 1958. B.   Sen,   M.   N.  Shroff  and  I.  N.  Shroff,  for   the appellants. A. P. Singh Chohan and A. D. Mathur, for respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sarkar,  J.  This  is the third case in the  series  and  it arises  out of a petition for a writ of certiorari moved  in the  High Court of Madhya Pradesh to quash  -certain  orders reducing  the  pension granted to the respondent  Col.   Lal Rampal  Singh by an order of the Ruler of Rewa  before  that State  had  merged in the United State of  Vindhya  Pradesh. The  High Court of Madhya Pradesh took the same view  as  in the  Nagod  case  (Civil Appeal No. 738 of  1963)  in  which judgment  has  been  delivered  earlier  in  the  day.   The subsequent fortunes of the United State have been  described in  that  judgment.  Here also the question is  whether  the order of the Ruler of Rewa was law. The  respondent  held various offices in the  Government  of Rewa.  By an order made on April 3, 1948 and published in an extraordinary issue of the Rewa Raj Gazette the Ruler stated that  "Col.  Lal Rampal Singh entered State service-on  21st November, 1922 and he is now anxious to retire.  I find that he  has. put in a service of more than 25 years up to  date, and,  as such, he is allowed to retire on a full pension  of Rs. 350 per month of his last grade, as a special case  with effect from the date of this order, and the so-called breaks in his service, if there be any, are hereby condoned." The respondent in his petition stated that in Rewa the Ruler had  made  a  set of rules, which  was  called  "Rewa  State Pension  and  Gratuity Rules" for grant of pension  to  Rewa State  Civil Servants.  He however added that the Ruler  was not  bound by those Rules as he was a sovereign  Ruler.   It seems to us quite clear from the terms of the order that the Ruler  purported  to act under the Rewa State  Rules.   This appears  from the reference in the order to "full  pension", condonation  of  the "breaks in his  service’  and  "special case".   This  also  appears from the fact  that  the  Order granted  the  respondent certain  advance  increments  which could only have been done to justify the full pension of Rs.

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350  per month under the Rules.  Obviously, under the  Rules the respondent would have been entitled to a smaller pension in view of the breaks and if the                              55 increments  had  not  been  granted.   The  Ruler  was  not, therefore, acting in the exercise of his sovereign power and in  disregard  of  the  Rules;  on  the  contrary,  he   was purporting to act in terms of the Rules.  That being so,  it has to be held that the Order of April 3, 1948 is not a  law but an executive order passed in terms of the Rules.  It  is open to the succeeding Government to set aside that order by another  executive  order.  What appropriate  order  can  be passed  by the Government of India is not a,  question  that arises it the present moment.  The respondent’s rights under the  Rewa State Rules, accepting it as a law binding on  the Indian  Union,  are  not  in the  least  affected.   He  is, however,  not entitled to any rights except those which  the Rules  justify.   The first contention  of  the  respondent, therefore,  that the order of April 3, 1948 is a  law  which can only be altered by another law duly passed by the  Union or other competent legislature must fail. Another  point raised was, that if the order was not a  law, it  was  a grant and that as the Indian Union had  paid  the respondent  in terms of the order up, to March 27, 1953,  it must be deemed to have accepted that grant and it cannot now deprive  the respondent of his right of property  under  the grant.  It seems to, us that this contention is ill-founded. What  the Ruler did by his order of April 3, 1948  does  not appear  to have been to make a grant but to have  passed  an order purporting to act under the Rules.  If that order  was not justified by the Rules, it was illegal and is liable  to be set aside by another order duly made under them.  Pension is furthermore -normally always a matter of grace when there is  no  law  governing.  It is implicit in the  grant  of  a pension that it may be subsequently reviewed.  Therefore the grant of the pension-assuming that to be the correct view to take-must  always  have  been subject  to  alteration.   The succeeding  State  was hence competent to review  the  order even if it had paid the pension for sometime in terms of it. In  the result, in our view, the appeal must be allowed  and we order accordingly.  There will be no order for costs. Appeal   allowed. 56