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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DR. YASHWANT TRIMBAK

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/12/1995

BENCH: G.B. PATTANAIK (J) BENCH: G.B. PATTANAIK (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  765            1996 SCC  (2) 305  JT 1995 (9)   430        1995 SCALE  (7)131

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T PATTANAIK, J.      Leave granted.      This appeal  is directed  against the  order dated 30th April, 1993  of the  Madhya Pradesh  Administrative Tribunal (Indore Bench) in the Transfer Application No. 3551 of 1988. By the  impugned  order  the  Tribunal  has  held  that  the departmental enquiry  against the  respondent was instituted without a  proper and valid sanction as contemplated by Rule 9(2)(b)(i) &  (ii) of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Civil  Services Pension Rules,  1976 (hereinafter as ’Pension Rules’) and as such it is not sustainable and deserves to be quashed. Being aggrieved by  the aforesaid  order of the Tribunal the State of Madhya Pradesh has approached this Court.      The respondent  had retired  from the post of Director, Institute of Animal Health & Veterinary Biological Products, Mhow on  31st July,  1983. His  retiral  benefits  had  been sanctioned by  the appropriate  authority. At  that point of time gross  financial  irregularities  having  come  to  the notice of the Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Department of  Animal and  Cattle Wealth  during the  period while the respondent was continuing in the post of Director, Institute of  Animal Health & Veterinary Biological Products from  1977   onwards,  a  letter  was  issued  to  the  said respondent proposing  an enquiry  against him  on 6th April, 1985.  Thereafter,  a  charge  sheet  was  served  upon  the respondent on 2nd April, 1986 and a departmental enquiry was ordered  against  him.  The  appropriate  authority  further withheld 50  per cent  of his  pension and  a  part  of  the gratuity amount  of the  respondent.  The  respondent  being aggrieved by  the said  order moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for  quashing the  aforesaid enquiry  as well as for quashing the  order of withholding a part of the pension and gratuity, inter alia on the ground that without the sanction of the Governor as contemplated under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the

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Pension Rules,  the proceeding  is  vitiated  and  also  the consequential order  withholding a  part of  the pension and gratuity. During  the pendency of the application before the Madhya Pradesh  High Court,  the State  Tribunal having been constituted,  the   proceeding  was   transferred   to   the Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal finally disposed of the matter.      In the  return filed  by the  State and its officers it was  contended  that  the  respondent  had  committed  grave financial  irregularities  during  his  tenure  relating  to period of  1977 onwards.  The said  financial irregularities came to  the  notice  of  appropriate  authority  after  the pension case of the respondent was forwarded by the Director of Veterinary  Services. In  fact the  respondent before his superannuation got  the no demand and no enquiry certificate issued in his favour on misrepresentation of facts. When the financial irregularities  and embgzzlement  committed by the respondent came  to the notice of the appropriate authority, as a result of investigation started by the Economic Wing of the Police,  the appropriate  authority took the decision to initiate the  departmental proceeding.  Before initiation of the departmental  proceedings against  the respondent  under the provision  of Pension Rules of 1976, dur sanction of the Council of  Ministers had  been obtained  and the  order  in question was  communicated  to  the  respondent  by  a  duly authenticated order  purported to  have been passed by order of the  Governor of  Madhya Pradesh.  The order  in question though had  been  signed  by  the  Under  Secretary  to  the Government  of   Madhya  Pradesh,   Department   of   Animal Husbandry, but it has been clearly stated :                  "IN THE NAME AND BY ORDERS                       OF THE GOVERNOR OF                         MADHYA PRADESH"      The Tribunal  on examining  the provisions  of  Pension Rules  more   particularly  Rule  9(2)(b)(i),  came  to  the conclusion that  the sanction  of the  Governor  himself  is necessary and  therefore departmental  proceedings could not be initiated  under the  orders of the Council of Ministers. Accordingly,   the   Tribunal   quashed   the   departmental proceedings initiated  against the  respondent and  also the order withholding  a part of the pension and gratuity of the respondent.      Mr. Chitale,  learned senior  counsel appearing for the appellant raised  two contensions  assailing the legality of the order of the Tribunal : 1)The order  initiating the  departmental enquiry proceeding      which was  served on  the respondent having been passed      in the  name and  by order  of the Governor in terms of      Article  166(2)  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  the      validity of  the order  cannot be called in question on      the ground  that it  is not  an order  executed by  the      Governor and Tribunal, therefore, committed gross error      of law  in quashing  the departmental  proceedings on a      finding  that   there  has  been  no  sanction  of  the      Governor. 2)The power  to accord sanction under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the      Pension Rules  being an  executive power  of the  State      Government  and   the  Governor  having  allocated  the      Business of  the State  Government to  be transacted by      the different Ministers under the Rule of Business made      under  sub   Article  (3)   of  Article   166  of   the      Constitution and  admittedly the  Council of  Ministers      having accorded  sanction, there  is no  infirmity with      the same  and further  the  sanction  of  the  Governor      himself is not necessary.

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    Mr. Jain,  learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the  other hand  contended that the Pension Rules being a Rule framed  under Article  309 of  the Constitution and the said  Rule   having  conferred  power  of  sanction  on  the Governor, it  is the  Governor  alone  who  is  entitled  to sanction  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  could  not  have exercised that  power. He  further contended  that when  the sanction has  not been accorded by the Governor himself, the bar under  Article 166(2)  of  the  Constitution  cannot  be attracted, and  therefore, the  Tribunal was fully justified in  quashing   the   order   initiating   the   departmental proceeding. In view  of the  rival submission  at the  Bar two questions really arise for consideration : 1) On  the admitted  position that  the order initiating the      departmental proceeding  was served upon the respondent      by a duly authenticated order passed in the name of the      Governor, is  it open  to  the  Court  to  examine  the      validity  of   the  same  in  view  of  the  provisions      contained in Article 166(2) of the Constitution ? 2) Whether  the power  to sanction conferred on the Governor      under Rule  9(2)(b)(i) of  the Pension Rules can at all      be conferred  on the  Council of  Ministers  by  making      rules for convenient transaction of the Business of the      Government  of   State  under  Article  166(3)  of  the      Constitution ?      Before embarking  upon an  enquiry to the aforesaid two questions, it  will be appropriate to extract the provisions of Rule 9(2)(b) of the Pension Rules :      "9(2)(b) :  The departmental proceeding,      if not  instituted while  the Government      servant was  in service  whether  before      his  retirement   or  during   his   re-      employment :      (i) shall  not be  instituted save  with      the sanction of the Governor ;      (ii) shall  not be  in  respect  of  any      event which  took place  more than  four      years before such institution; and      (iii)  shall   be  conducted   by   such      authority  and  in  such  place  as  the      Government may  direct and in accordance      with   the   procedure   applicable   to      departmental proceedings -           (a) in  which an order of dismissal           from  service   could  be  made  in           relation to  the Government servant           during his  service in  case it  is           proposed to  withhold or withdraw a           pension  or  part  thereof  whether           permanently  or   for  a  specified           period; or           (b) in  which an  order of recovery           from his  pay or  the whole or part           of pay pecuniary loss caused by him           to the  Government by negligence or           breach of  orders could  be made in           relation to  the Government servant           during his  service it  is proposed           to order  recovery from his pension           of  the   whole  or   part  of  any           pecuniary  loss   caused   to   the           Government."      Coming to  the first  question, from a bare look at the order which  was served  on the respondent, it is implicitly

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clear that  the said  order has been executed in the name of the  Governor   and  has  been  duly  authenticated  by  the signature of  the Under  Secretary  to  the  Government  and therefore the  bar to  judicial enquiry  with regard  to the validity of  such order  engrafted in  Article 166(2) of the Constitution will be attracted. The order which is expressed in the name of the Governor and is duly authenticated cannot be questioned in any court on the ground that it is not made or executed  by the Governor. The signature of the concerned Secretary or  Under Secretary  who is  authorised under  the authentication rules  to sign  the  document  signifies  the consent of  the Governor  as well  as the  acceptance of the advice rendered  by the  concerned Minister.  It is  not the case of  the respondent  and  Mr.  Jain  appearing  for  the respondent in  this Court  did not  urge that  the order  in question is  not an  order within  the  meaning  of  Article 166(2) of  the Constitution. But according to Mr. Jain under the Rules  the Governor  being the authority to sanction and the  Governor   not  having   sanctioned,  the   prohibition contained  in   sub  Article  (2)  of  Article  166  of  the Constitution cannot  be attracted  and the  courts power  to examine is  not taken  away. We  are unable  to accept  this contension of Mr. Jain, appearing for the respondent.      This Court  in the  case of The State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, 1961(1) S.C.R. 728 considered this question with reference  to a  notification issued under Section 3(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and held :      The order  of Government  in the present      case is  expressed to  be made  "in  the      name   of    the   Governor"    and   is      authenticated  as   prescribed  by  Art.      166(2), and consequently the validity of      "the  order   or  instrument  cannot  be      called in question on the ground that it      is not  an order  or instrument  made or      executed by the Governor".      Even where  an order  is issued  by  Secretary  of  the Government without  indicating that  it is  by order  of the Central Government  by order  of the  President, this  Court came to  the conclusion  that the immunity in Article 166(2) would be available if it appears from other material that in fact the  decision had  been taken  by  the  Government.  In Municipal Corporation  of Delhi  Vs. Birla  Cotton, Spinning and Weaving  Mills, Delhi  and Another,  1960 (9) S.C.R. 251 this Court  came to the conclusion that in fact sanction had been given  by the  Central Government as required under the Act though the order did not indicate to be so.      This being  the position  and the  order initiating the departmental proceeding  having been  signed  by  the  Under Secretary to  the Government  by Order  of the Governor, the same is  immune from  attack on the ground that it is not an order executed  by the  Governor as  provided under  Article 166(2) of  the Constitution. As such the Tribunal was wholly incompetent to  examine the  legality of  the same.  In fact Article 166(2)  of the Constitution has not been looked into at all  by the  Tribunal. In  our opinion  the Tribunal  was wholly in error in quashing the order on the ground that the Governor  has   not  executed  the  same.  In  view  of  our conclusion on  the first question though the appeal is bound to succeed,  but we  think it  proper to  examine the second question also.      The  Rule   in  question   no   doubt   provides   that departmental  proceedings   if  not   instituted  while  the Government  servant   was  in  service  whether  before  his retirement  or   during  his   re-employment  shall  not  be

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instituted save  with the  sanction  of  the  Governor.  The question  that   arises  for  consideration  is  whether  it requires the sanction of the Governor himself or the Council of Ministers in whose favour the Governor under the Rules of Business has  allocated the matter, can also sanction. It is undisputed that under Article 166(3) of the Constitution the Governor has  made rule  for convenient  transaction of  the business of  the Government  and the question of sanction to prosecute in  the case in hand was dealt with by the Council of Ministers  in accordance with the Rule of Business. Under Article 154  of the  Constitution the executive power of the State vests  in the  Governor and is exercised by him either directly  or   through  officers   subordinate  to   him  in accordance with  the Constitution. The expression ’executive power’  is  wide  enough  to  connote  the  residue  of  the governmental function  that remain after the legislative and judicial functions are taken away.      Under Article  163(1) of  the  Constitution,  excepting functions required  by the  Constitution to  be exercised by the Governor in his discretion, the Governor acts on the aid and advice  of the  Council of  Ministers. This Court in the case of  Samsher Singh  Vs. State  of Punjab and another had indicated that  any function vested in the Governor, whether executive, legislative  or  quasi  judicial  in  nature  and whether vested  by  the  Constitution  or  by  a  statue  be delegated by Rules of Business unless the contray is clearly provided for  by such constitutional or statutory provision. The Court further held :      "The President  as well  as the Governor      is the  Constitutional or  formal  head.      The President  as well  as the  Governor      exercises  his   powers  and   functions      conferred  on   him  by   or  under  the      Constitution on  the aid  and advice  of      his  Council   of  Ministers,   save  in      spheres where  the Governor  is required      by or under the Constitution to exercise      his   functions   in   his   discretion.      Whenever the  Constitution requires  the      satisfaction of  the  President  or  the      Governor but  the  satisfaction  of  the      President    or    Governor    in    the      Constitutional  sense   in  the  Cabinet      system   of    Government,   that    is,      satisfaction of his Council of Ministers      on whose aid and advice the President or      the Governor generally exercises all his      powers and  functions. The  decision  of      any Minister  or officer  under rules of      business made  under any  of  these  two      Articles  77(3)   and  166(3)   is   the      decision  of   the  President   or   the      Governor  respectively.  These  articles      did  not  provide  for  any  delegation.      Therefore, the  decision of  Minister or      officer under  the rules  of business is      the decision  of the  President  or  the      Governor."      After referring  to the  several  previous  authorities this Court further held :      "For the  foregoing reasons we hold that      the President  or the  Governor acts  on      the aid  and advice  of the  Council  of      Ministers with the Prime Minister at the

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    head in  the case of Union and the Chief      Minister at  the head  in  the  case  of      State in  all matters  which vest in the      executive whether  those  functions  are      executive or  legislative in  character.      Neither the  President nor  the Governor      is to  exercise the  executive functions      personally."      The order  of sanction  for prosecution  of  a  retired Government servant is undoubtedly an executive action of the Government. A  Governor in  exercise  of  his  powers  under Article 166(3)  of the  Constitution may  allocate  all  his functions  to   different  Ministers  by  framing  rules  of business execpt  those which the Governor is required by the Constitution to  exercise his own discretion. The expression "business of  the Government of the State" in Article 166(3) of  the  Constitution,  comprises  of  functions  which  the Governor is  to exercise  with the  aid and  advice  of  the Council of  Ministers including  those which he is empowered to exercise  on his  subjective satisfaction  and  including statutory functions  of the  State Government. The Court has held in  Shamrao Vs.  State of  Maharashtra, 1964 (6) S.C.R. 446 that even the functions and duties which are vested in a State Government  by a statute may be allocated to Ministers by the  Rule of  Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. In  State of  Bihar Vs.  Rani Sonabati Kumari, 1961(1) S.C.R.  788, where  power  of  issuing  notification under Section  3(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 have been conferred on the Governor of Bihar, this Court held :      "Section 3(1)  of the  Act  confers  the      power of issuing notifications under it,      not on  any officer  but  on  the  State      Government as  such though  the exercise      of that  power would  be governed by the      rule of  business framed by the Governor      under Art. 166(3) of the Constitution".      Therefore, excepting  the matters with respect to which the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to act in his discretion, the personal satisfaction of the Governor is not  required  and  any  function  may  be  allocated  to Ministers.      Mr. Jain’s  contention is  solely based  on the  ground that in  the Rule itself both the expressions ’Governor’ and ’Government’ have  been used  and therefore  the  expression ’sanction of the Governor’ in Rule 9(2)(b)(i) would mean the personal sanction  of the  Governor. We are unable to accept this contention.  The power  to sanction  is nothing  but an executive action of the Government provided under the Rules. This is  not a  matter with respect to which the Governor is required under the Constitution to act in his discretion. In this view  of the  matter when the Governor has framed rules of  business   under  Article  166(3)  of  the  Constitution allocating his  functions and it is the Council of Ministers which has  taken the decision to sanction prosecution of the respondent, we  see no  legal infirmity  in  the  same.  The Tribunal erred  in law  in coming to the conclusion that the sanction required  under the  rule  is  a  sanction  of  the Governor.      In  our   considered  opinion,   in   the   facts   and circumstances of  the present  case the  power  of  Governor under Rule  9(2)(b)(i) has  been duly allocated in favour of the  Council  of  Ministers  under  Article  166(3)  of  the Constitution and the said Council of Ministers has taken the decision  to   grant  sanction   for  prosecution   of   the respondent.

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    In view of our aforesaid conclusion, the impugned order of the  Tribunal is  wholly  unsustainable  in  law  and  we accordingly quash  the same.  The Transfer  Application  No. 3551 of  1988 filed  by the Respondent before Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal  stands dismissed.  The  appropriate authority may  now proceed  with the departmental proceeding which has been initiated against the respondent.      This appeal  is allowed,  there will  be no order as to costs.