http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 24  

PETITIONER: STATE OF MADHYA  PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AJAY SINGH AND ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/11/1992

BENCH: [J.S. VERMA AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.]

ACT: COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY ACT, 1952: Sections 3, 7 and 8-A One-man commission- Replacement of the initial appointee  with another  person-Whether  permissible under the  scheme of  the Act-Whether  Permissible under the scheme of  the Act-whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 could be invoked to read such power into the Act.

HEADNOTE: General Clauses Act, 1897: Section 21-Power  to add  to amend  or vary  or rescind  any notification-Whether could  be invoked  to reconstitute  the Commission of  Inquiry by replacement of substitution of the existing members,  though not  provided in the scheme of the Act. Pursuant to  the direction  given  by  the  State  High Court,  the   appellant-State  by   a   Notification   dated 24.2.1989, constituted  a Commission  of   Inquiry under the (Commission of  Inquiry) Act,  1952, to investigate into the affairs  of   the  children’s   Welfare  Society,  of  which Respondent No.1 was an office bearer and appointed a sitting Judge of  the High Court of another State as the sole member of the  Commission. The inquiry was to be completed within a period of  six months, but the period was extended from time to time.  Meanwhile, the sole member became due to retire as a  Judge   of  the  High  Court  on  attaining  the  age  of superannuation and,  therefore, he  wrote a  letter dated 19 3.1991 to the Chief Secretary of the appellant-State drawing attention to  this fact  and requesting  that the  necessary modalities be worked out well in time for his continuance as Commission of Inquiry, in the light of the guidelines issued by the  Government of  India for the benefits and emoluments payable to  a Judge  on his  retirement in such a situation. The Judge also mentioned some of the facilities he expected, to which  be would not be entitled from the State Government on his  retirement. The  Chief Secretary  sent a reply dated 9.4.1991 to  the Judge  promising to give an early reply and requesting him to continue with the inquiry so that the same could be completed early. However, without further reference to the  Judge, the  State Government  issued a  notification dated 10.7.1991, replacing him by a retired Chief Justice of another High  Court. This  appointment was challenged before the High  Court, which,  by an interim order dated 30.7.1991 stayed  the   operation  of  the  notification.  During  the pendency of  the writ  petition, the new member tendered his resignation. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as  infructuous on  5.9.1991. Thereafter, the Chief

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 24  

Secretary to the Government sent a letter dated 12.9.1991 to the original  appointee expressing  the  State  Government’s inability to  accept the  terms and conditions of the Judge, and informing  him  of  the  appointment  of  retired  Chief Justice of another High Court, who had since resigned. Thereafter  the   State   Government   issued   another notification dated  9.1.1992 appointing  a retired  Judge of another High  Court as  a single  member of  the Commission. This was challenged before the High Court on the ground that during  the   continuance  as   the  single  member  of  the Commission of  Inquiry of  the original appointee, there was no power  in the  State Government to replace him, and there being no vacancy in the office, the power under Section 3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, which was available only to fill any vacancy, could not be invoked and there was no other  source of  power available  to the  State for  the purpose and, therefore, the appointment first of the retired Chief Justice   and then, on his refusal, of another retired Judge, being without any authority, was invalid. The High  Court allowed  the writ petitions and quashed the notification  dated 9.1.1992.  It held that there was no vacancy in the office of the single member of the Commission to empower  the State  Government to  fill the vacancy under Section 3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. It also held there was  neither any  valid reason or ground nor any power available in  the State  Government to  replace the original member by  another person  as was  purported to  be done  by first appointing one member and then another member, both of whom were also retired Judges . In the  appeals, by  special leave,  on behalf  of  the State Government, it was contended that aid of Section 21 of the  General   Clauses  Act   was  available  to  the  State Government for  exercising its powers under the  Commissions of Inquiry  Act ’to  add, to amend or vary’ the notification issued initially  appointing the  sitting Judge  as the sole member of the Commission which enabled  the State Government to reconstitute  the Commission by replacing that Judge with any other  person in  the circumstances  of the case, though the power  to rescind  any notification  was not  available, since this  was provided  in Section 7 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.  Reference was  also made to Section 8-A of the Commissions of  Inquiry Act  to support  the Contention that Government’s  power  to  reconstitute  the  Commission  even during the  availability of  the person  so  appointed  even though it  was submitted that Section 8-A was not the source of power  for reconstitution  of the Commission. It was also contended that  the Government’s  power to  extend the  time specified in  the   initial notification for  Completing the work of  the Commission  was not  to be found in any express provision  in  the  Commissions  of  Inquiry  Act.  but  was exercised by  amendment of  the  initial  notification  only under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. and that though there was no express provision in the Commissions of Inquiry Act empowering  the Government  to replace or substitute the sole member  of a  Commission with another person during the continuance of  the Commission.  this was  implicit  in  the power to  appoint a  Commission and  designate its personnel under  Sub  sections  (1)  and  (2)  of  Section  3  of  the Commissions of  Inquiry Act read  the power to amend or Vary any notification  available under  Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. It Was  submitted on  behalf of  the petitioner  in the Public Interest  Petition that  Sections 14  and 16  of  the General Clauses  Act were  also  available  to  support  the notifications  under   challenge   issued   by   the   State

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 24  

Government. On behalf  of respondent No.1 it was submitted that the scheme of  the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act did  not  permit invoking Section  21 of  the General  Clauses Act except for enlargement of  the period  for completion of the inquiry by amendment of  the notification only to that extent since the only situations  in which  reconstitution of the Commissions could be  made were  provided in  the Commissions of Inquiry Act itself,  that Section  8-A of the Commissions of Inquiry Act was  enacted for an entirely different purpose namely to ensure continuity  of the  Commission’s work and had nothing to do  with its  reconstitutions  that  the  scheme  of  the enactment showed  that the  appropriate Government could not interfere     provide  expressly  in  the  statute  for  the Government’s power  to fill  any vacancy  after the  initial constitution After its insertion the scheme of the enactment excludes the  power of reconstitution of the Commission in a manner not  expressly provided  therein.  In  view  of  sub- section (3),  it is not permissible to construe sub-sections (1) and  (2) of Section 3 in any other manner. If the scheme of the  enactment gave  such wide  power to  reconstitute  a Commission after  its  initial  constitution  and  permitted replacement or  substitution of  the existing  member  of  a Commission with  another  person  sans  sub-section  (3)  of Section 3  the power to fill any vacancy was not required to be provided separately and expressly. It is also significant that in  the amendment  so made the power is limited only to filling  any   vacancy  without   conferring  any  power  to reconstitute the  Commission by  replacement or substitution of the existing member which indicates that no such power of replacement or  substitution  of  the  existing  member  was contemplated in  the scheme  of the  Act or  intended to  be conferred on the Government even after the amendment. [298-H: 299-A-C; 300-A] 2  7.   Section  8-A  was  simultaneously  inserted  by amendment to  provide that  the procedure  does not  require interruption of  the inquiry  by reason  of  change  in  the constitution of the Commission due to filling any vacancy or decrease in the number of members. The expression ’or by any other reason’  in sub-section  (2) of  Section 8-A cannot be widened to  include the  reason  of  reconstitution  of  the Commission by  replacement or  substitution of  the existing member since  that power  is not available to the Government in the  scheme of the Act and, therefore. this expression in Section 8-A(2)  cannot be  read as conferring any additional power or  giving any  such indication.  The expression or by any other  reason following  ‘vacancy having been filled’ in Section 8-A(2) must therefore. mean any other reason such as decrease in the number of members when the initial number is more than  one and  the vacancy  remains unfilled. It cannot mean  substitution  of  the  existing  member  with  another person, since  no such  power exists.  Section 8-A(2) is not the source of an additional power, but merely an indication of the  power to reconstitute the Commission. The indication is of  the power  of reconstitution  being available only in the manner  indicated.  The  only  situation  in  which  the Government can rescind the notification issued under Section 3 constituting  the Commission is laid down in Section 7 the Act, which provides that the Commission would cease to exist when the  appropriate Government  by notification  with  the working of  the Commission  after its constitution except in the manner expressly provided in the Act and Section 7 was a clear indication  that interference  with the functioning of the Commission was not permissible in any other manner, and, therefore, Section  21 of  the General  Clauses Act  was not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 24  

available to  support the Government’s action in the instant case. Dismissing the appeal, this court, HELD:  1.   The  power   under  Section   3(3)  of  the Commissions of  the Inquiry  Act, 1952, was not available to the State  Government in  the facts  of the  instant case to appoint any  other person  replacing the  original member as the sole  member of  the Commission  of Inquiry.  The  power under sub-sections (1) of (2) of Section 3 read with Section 21 of  the General Clauses Act or even Section 14 or Section 16  thereof   was  also   not  available  for  the  purpose. Accordingly, the  notifications dated 10.7.1991 and 9.1.1992 issued by  the State Government appointing the retired Chief justice and  another retired  Judge were  both invalid.  The high  Court   was,  therefore,   right   in   quashing   the notifications dated  10.7.1991 and  9.1.1992. The appellant- state should,  in view  of the  retirement of  the  original member as  a judge  of the High Court in the meanwhile, take necessary action  to finalise  his terms  and conditions  in accordance with  the guidelines  issued by the Government of India in  this behalf.  Such action should be taken promptly to avoid  any undue  delay in completion of the commission’s task. [304-C-F] 2.1.  The   power  of   the  Government  to  appoint  a Commission  of  Inquiry  and  name  the  person  or  persons constituting it  is in  sub-section (1)  of Section 3. It is not as if sub-section (1) deals with the mere appointment of the Commission  of Inquiry  without  clothing  it  with  its personnel  and  the  power  to  appoint  the  member/members thereof is  to be  found only in sub-section (20 That apart, there is  nothing in any of these provisions to suggest that the Government  has the power to reconstitute the commission after its  appointment by replacing the existing sole member with another  person. Sub-Section (3) of Section 3, inserted by the  Amendment Act  of 1971,  deals  expressly  with  the Government’s power to fill any vacancy which may have arisen since the  constitution of  the Commission.  The question of replacement of  a member  appointed initially  is beyond its scope. The  insertion of sub-section (3) became necessary to declares that ’the continued existence of’ the Commission is unnecessary’. 2.3.  The   scheme  of   the  enactment   is  that  the appropriate Government  should  have  no  control  over  the Commission after its constitution under Section 3 of the Act except for the purpose of filling any vacancy which may have arisen in  the office  of a  member of  the Commission apart from winding up the Commission by issuance of a notification under section 7 of the Act if the continued existence of the Commission is  considered unnecessary.  The vacancy  in  the office of  a member  of the Commission may arise for several reasons, including  resignation  by  the  member,  when  the Government power  to fill the  vacancy under Section 3(3) of the Act can be exercised. [300-A-E & G] 2.4.  The  context  as  well  as  the  scheme  of  the Commissions  of  Inquiry  Act  1952  clearly  indicate  that Section 21  of the  General clauses  Act  1897    cannot  be invoked to  enlarge the  Government’s. power to reconstitute the Commission  constituted under  Section 3 of the Act in a manner other that that expressly provided in the Commissions of Inquiry  Act. There  being no  express power given by the Commissions of  inquiry Act to the appropriate Government to reconstitute the  Commission of  Inquiry  constituted  under Section 3  of the  Act by replacement or substitution of its sole member  and the  existence   of any  such  power  being negatived  by  clear  implication,  no  such  power  can  be

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 24  

exercised by the appropriate Government. [302-C-F] 2.5. Section  21 of  the General  Clauses  Act  can  be invoked only  if, and  to the extent. if any the context and the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act so permits. The general power  in Section  21 of  the General Clauses Act is ’to add, to amend vary or rescind any notifications’ etc. In the context of reconstitution of the Commission the power to fill any vacancy in the office of a manner of the Commission is expressly provided in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Commissions  of   Inquiry  Act   Similarly  the   power   to discontinue the  existence of the Commission when it becomes unnecessary can  be exercised  by issue of a notification in accordance with  Section 7  of  the  Act  which  results  in rescinding  the   notification  issued   under   Section   3 constituting the  Commission. Thus  the power to rescind any notification  conferred  generally  in  Section  21  of  the General Clauses Act is Clearly inapplicable in the scheme of the Commissions  of inquiry Act which expressly provides for the exercise  of  his  power  in    relation  to  Commission constituted under  Section 3  of the  Act.  The  only  other material general powers in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act are  the power  to ’amend’ or vary any notification. The extent to  which the  constitution of  the Commission can be amended or  varied by filling any vacancy in the office of a member as  provided in  the Commissions  of   Inquiry Act is also obviously  excluded from  the purview  of Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act  which cannot  be invoked  for this purpose. In  a case like the instant one where the scheme of the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act does  provide for amendment and variation of the notification issued under Section 3 for the purpose  of reconstitution  of  the  Commission  in  the manner indicated  even that  power  to  amend  or  vary  any notification  by virtue of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act must  be taken  as excluded  by clear implication in the sphere of  reconstitution of  the Commission.  Moreover, the power to  amend or  vary cannot include the power to replace or substitute  the existing  Composition of  the  Commission with an  entirely new  composition. The aid of Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act  for enlargement  of time  does not conflict with  the context  or scheme  of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.[301-A-E] 2.6. The rule of Construction embodied in Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act  cannot apply  to the provisions of the  Commissions   of   Inquiry   Act   1952   relating   to reconstitution of a Commission constituted there under since the Subject-matter.  context and  effect  of such provisions are  inconsistent  with  such  application.  Moreover.  this construction  best   harmonises  with  the  subject  of  the enactment and  the  object  of  the  legislation.  Restoring public Confidence by constituting a Commission of Inquiry to investigate into a ’definite matter of public importance’ is the purpose  of such an exercise. It is therefore, the prime need that  the Commission functions as an independent agency free from  any govern-mental control after its constitution. It follows  that after  appointment the tenure of members of the commission  should not  be dependent  on the will of the Government to  secure their  independence.  A  body  not  so independent is  not likely  to enjoy  the  requisite  public confidence and  may not  attract men   of  quality and self- respect. In  such a  situation the  object of  the enactment would be frustrated. [302-H. 303-A-C] Minerva Mills  Ltd. v,  There  Workers,  [1954]  S.C.R.  465 distinguished. The State  of Bihar  v. D.  N. Ganguly.,[1959]  S.C.R. 1191, relied on.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 24  

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal Nos. 4734-35 of 1992.      From the  Judgment and  Order  dated  8.5.1992  of  the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition Nos. 48] and 533 of 1992.      Shanti Bhushan,  N.C. Jain, S.K. Agnihotri and Ashok K. Singh for the Appellant.      Kapil  Sibal,  N.S.  Kale,  A.P.  Dhamija,  S.K.  Jain, Manmohan, S.  Atreya, Pradeep  Agarwal, Basant  Bhai  Mehta, Ravindra Srivastava,  R.N. Srivastava,  B.V. Desai  and S.V. Deshpande for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VERMA, J.  The petitioner  State of  Madhya Pradesh  in both these petitions seeks leave to appeal under Article 136 of the  Constitution against  the common  judgment and order dated 8.5.1992  of the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh  in Miscellaneous Petition  Nos. 481  of 1992  and 533  of  1992 under Article  226 of  the Constitution.  The High Court has allowed both these writ petitions.      The material facts are these. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 3909  of 1987 tiled in public interest by Kailash Joshi, then Leader of the Opposition in Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha and now  a Cabinet  Minister in  Madhya Pradesh, relating to the affairs  of the  Churhat Children’s  Welfare Society and the lottery  conducted by  it, the  M.P. High  Court by  its judgment dated  20.1.1989 issued  a direction for setting up an independent high power agency to bold an inquiry into the affairs of the said Society of which respondent 1 Ajay Singh was one  of  the  office  bearers.  In  compliance  of  that direction, the  State  Government  passed  a  resolution  on 24.2.1989 and  also issued  notification of  the  same  date having the  effect of  setting up  a Commission  of  Inquiry consisting of Justice S.T. Ramalingam, a Judge of the Madras High Court  to investigate  into the  affairs  of  the  said Society and  the lottery conducted by it. The resolution and notification are as under :-      "Bhopal, the 24th February, 1989      No. F.  1-3-89-l(i)-E.C. -  Whereas      the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in      its order  dated the  20th  January      1989 in  M.P. No.  3909/87  Kailash      Joshi  versus   State   of   Madhya      Pradesh  and  others  has  directed      that  an  inquiry  be  made  by  an      independent high  power agency into      the   affairs    of   the   Churhat      Children’s Welfare  Society and how      the share  of its  profits  derived      from all  or any  other draws  have      been  utilized  and  to  take  such      action as may be required under the      law against  the said  Society  and      its organizing  agent and  that the      State Government  is  of  the  view      that the  said order  of  the  High      Court  should  be  implemented  and      carried out  and whereas  the State      Government is  also satisfied  that      this is a definite matter of public      importance  which   calls  for   an      inquiry  to   be  made,  the  State

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 24  

    Government   hereby   appoints   an      independent   high   power   agency      presided over  by Shri Justice S.T.      Ramalingam,  Judge  of  the  Madras      High Court.      2. The  Headquarters of  the Agency      shall  be   at   Jabalpur,   Madhya      Pradesh.      3.  The   terms  of  reference  for      inquiry  by  the  aforesaid  Agency      shall be as under:-      (1) How  the affairs of the Churhat      Children  s   Welfare  Society  are      conducted and  how the share of the      profit  derived   and   the   money      collected through  lottery has been      utilised ?      (2) What  is the  amount  collected      draw-wise, by  the  agent  and  the      Society  and   what  is   the   tax      liability as per the Madhya Pradesh      lottery   (Niyantran   Tatha   Kar)      Adhiniyam, 1973 ?      (3)  Whether   any  irregularities,      illegalities  and   offences   were      committed   in    organizing    the      lottery,  holding   of   draws   of      lottery,  distribution  of  prizes,      and  in   that  event,  the  person      responsible for the same;      (4) Any  other matter incidental or      connected with  the above  subject-      matter of enquiry.      (4) The  Agency  may  complete  its      enquiry and  submit its  report  to      the  State   Government  within   a      period of  six months from the date      of issue of this Notification.      By order  and in  the name  of  the      Governor of Madhya Pradesh,         R.C. Shrivastava, Secy"      "Bhopal, the 24th February, 1989      No. F.1-3-89-I(i)  -E.C. -  Whereas      by  Government  of  Madhya  Pradesh      Resolution dated  the 24th February      1989 and Notification No. F.1-3-89-      I(i) -E.C.,  dated the 24thFebruary      1989 an    independent  High  Power      Agency   presided over by Shri S.T.      Ramalingam,  Judge  of  the  Madras      High Court  has been set up to hold      an inquiry  into the affairs of the      Churhat Children’s Welfare Society;      And whereas  the  State  Government      having regard  to the nature of the      inquiry  to   be  made   and  other      circumstances of the case is of the      opinion that  provisions  contained      in  sub-sections   (2)  to  (5)  of      Section 5  of  the  Commissions  of      Inquiry Act,  1952, should  be made      applicable to the aforesaid Agency;      Now,therefore, in  exercise of  the      powers conferred by sub-section (1)      of Section  5 of the Commissions of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 24  

    Inquiry  Act,   1952,   the   State      Government hereby  directs that the      provisions of  sub-sections (2)  to      (5) of  Section 5  of the  said Act      shall apply  to the above described      Agency.      By order  and in  the name  of  the      Governor of Madhya Pradesh,         R.C. Shrivastava, Secy".      According to  the terms  of the above notification, the inquiry was  to be  completed within  a period of six months from the  date of  issue of the notification. As the inquiry could not be completed within that period, by a notification dated 1.8.1990  the period  for completing  the inquiry  was extended upto  22.8.1991; then by another notification dated 16.8.1991 the  period was  extended upto 31.3.1992; and then by another  notification  dated  27.3.1992  the  period  for completing the inquiry stands extended upto 31.3.1993.      In the  meantime, Justice S.T. Ramalingam became due to retire as  a Judge  of the Madras High Court on 30.6.1991 on attaining the age of superannuation and, therefore, he wrote a letter dated 19.3.1991 to the Chief Secretary of the State drawing attention to this fact and requesting that necessary modalities be worked out well in time for his continuance as Commission of  Inquiry in the light of the guidelines issued by the  Government of  India for the benefits and emoluments payable to  a Judge  on his  retirement in such a situation. Just  Ramalingam  mentioned  in  that  letter  some  of  the facilities he  expected, to  which he  would not be entitled from the  Government of  Tamil Nadu  on his  retirement. The Chief  Secretary   R.P.  Kapoor  sent  a  reply  to  Justice Ramalingam by DO No. 504/CS/91 dated 9.4.1991 as under:-      "My    dear     Hon’ble     Justice      Ramalingam,      Thank  your   very  much  for  your      letter No.  53 of 19th March, 1991.      The issues  raised in  your  letter      regarding   the   tenure   of   the      Commission  and   the   terms   and      conditions        after        your      superannuation  are   under  active      consideration of the Government and      I will  be in  a position to inform      your after a final view is taken in      this case.  In the  meanwhile may I      request that the proceedings may be      continued so  that the  inquiry can      be  completed   at   the   earliest      possible.      With very kind regards,             Yours sincerely,                   Sd/-              (R.P. Kapoor)"      ‘This  letter   of  the   Chief  Secretary  apart  from promising to  give an  early reply  also  requested  Justice Ramalingam to  continue with  the inquiry  so that  the same could be  completed early. While the promised reply from the State Government  Justice Ramalingam  was awaited, the State Government, without further reference to Justice Ramalingam, issued a notification dated 10.7.1991 as under:-      "Bhopal, the 10th July, 1991      No. F.1-6-91-I-(8-Ka).  -  Whereas,      an independent  high  power  agency      comprising  of   a  single   member      namely  Justice   S.T.  Ramalingam,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 24  

    Judge of  the Madras High Court was      appointed  under   this  Department      Notification   No.    F.1-3-89-I(i)      E.C., dated the 24th February 1989;      And whereas Justice S.T. Ramalingam      has retired  as Judge of the Madras      High Court, on 30th of June 1991;      And whereas  for continuing  in the      said   agency    after   retirement      Justice Shri  S.T.  Ramalingam  has      placed certain terms and conditions      which have  not been found possible      for the Government to accept.      Now, therefore,  in exercise of the      powers conferred by sub-section (3)      of Section  3 of the Commissions of      Inquiry Act, 1952 (No. LX of 1952),      the State Government hereby appoint      Justice Shri  G.G. Sohani,  retired      Chief Justice,  High Court of Patna      (Bihar) as  single  member  of  the      said agency  in  place  of  Justice      Shri S.T. Ramalingam.      Accordingly     this     Department      Notification Nos. (I)F.1-3- 89-I(i)      -  E.C.  dated  the  24th  February      1989, (2)  F.1-3  89-1(i)  -  E.C.,      dated the  24th February  1989  and      (3) F.1-3-89-I(i)  - E.C. dated the      24th  February  1989,  shall  stand      amended to this extent.      By order  and in  the name  of  the      Governor of Madhya Pradesh            S.K. Misra, Secy.      Accordingly, by this notification, the State Government replaced Justice  S.T. Ramalingam  with Justice G.G. Sohani, retired Chief Justice of Patna High Court as the sole member of the  Commission of  Inquiry. The  appointment of  Justice G.G.  Sohani   in  place  of  Justice  S.T.  Ramalingam  was challenged in  the M.P. High Court by a writ petition - M.P. No. 2359  of 1991-  by respondent  No. 1  Ajay Singh.  By an interim order  dated 30.7.1991 passed by the High Court, the operation of  the above  notification  dated  10.7.1991  was stayed. During  the pendency  of that writ petition, Justice G.G.  Sohani   conveyed  to   the   State   Government   his disinclination to  continue with the assignment and tendered his resignation. Consequently, the High Court dismissed that writ petition  as  infructuous  on  5.9.1991.  It  was  only thereafter that  the Chief Secretary of the State Government sent a letter dated 12.9.1991 in continuation of his earlier letter dated  9.4.1991 to  Justice Ramalingam  which  is  as under :      "This  is  in  continuation  to  my      earlier letter  No. 504/CS/91 dated      9th  April,   1991  regarding   the      arrangement for  the Commission  of      Enquiry (Churhat  Children  Welfare      Society and Lottery), consequent to      your superannuation  as a  Judge of      the Madras High Court.      2.  The   State   Government   have      considered   your    communications      about the  inconveniences you  were      facing in  coming to  Jabalpur  for      want of Air-link between Madras and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 24  

    Jabalpur. The State Government have      also  considered   the  terms   and      conditions mentioned in your letter      of 19th  March,  1991.  On  careful      consideration   of    all   aspects      mentioned in your communications it      has not been possible for the State      Government to  accept the terms and      conditions set  out in  your letter      of 19th  March for  taking  up  the      work of the above mentioned Enquiry      Commission        after        your      superannuation.      The      State      Government     had      accordingly      appointed Justice  Mr. G.G. Sohani,      retired Chief  Justice of the Patna      High Court  to be the single Member      of the  Commission. I  am, however,      happy   to    convey    the    deep      appreciation    of     the    State      Government   for    the    services      rendered by  you in  the Commission      in  spite   of  all   the  personal      inconvenience it  has  caused.  The      Hon’ble Chief  Minister had  made a      general mention of it in the Vidhan      Sabha on the 4th July, 1991.      3. Delay in reply to your letter is      regretted. It was caused because of      the litigation  arising out  of the      appointment of Justice Sohani which      was since been decided.      Wishing you  and your family a very      happy     life      after      your      superannuation.               Yours sincerely,               R.P. Kapoor"      The  State   Government   thereafter   issued   another notification dated 9.1.1992 as under:-      "Bhopal, the 9th January 1992      No. F.1-6-91-I (8 Ka). - Whereas in      exercise of the powers conferred by      sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the      Commissions of  Enquiry  Act,  1952      (No. LX  of 1952) Justice Shri G.G.      Sohani, retired Chief Justice, High      Court   of    Patna   (Bihar)   was      appointed as  single member  of  an      independent   high   power   agency      constituted under  this  department      notification   No.   F.1-3-89-I(i)-      E.C., dated  24th February  1998 in      place   of    Justice   Shri   S.T.      Ramalingam  vide   this  department      Notification No.  F.1-6-91-I(8 Ka),      dated the 10th July 1991;      And  whereas   Justice  Shri   G.G.      Sohani, retired Chief Justice, High      Court of  Patna (Bihar)  has  since      withdrawn his  consent to  work  as      single member of the said agency;      Now, therefore,  in exercise of the      powers conferred by sub-section (3)      of Section  3 of the Commissions of      Enquiry Act,  1952 (No.LX of 1952),

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 24  

    read with Section 21 of the General      Clause Act,  1987 (No. 10 of 1897),      the State Government hereby appoint      Justice  Shri   Kamlakar   Choubey,      retired Judge of the Allahabad High      Court as  a single  member  of  the      said agency  in place  of Shri G.G.      Sohani.      Accordingly     this     department      Notification  Nos.  (1)  F.1  3-89-      l(i)-E.C.,  dated   24th  February,      1989,  (2)   F.1-3-89-I  (i)  E.C.,      dated 24th  February, 1989, and (3)      F.1-3-89-I (i) E.C., dated the 24th      February, 1989, shall stand amended      to this extent.      By order  and in  the make  of  the      Governor of Madhya Pradesh      In this  manner, the  State Government  after replacing Justice  S.T.  Ramalingam  first  by  Justice  G.G.  Sohani, thereafter replaced  him  by  Justice  Kamlakar  Choubey,  a retired Judge  of the  Allahabad High  Court,  as  the  sole member of  the Commission. It is unnecessary to refer to the terms and  conditions of  appointment  of  Justice  Kamlakar Choubey which  were detailed  in the  General Administration Department Memo.  dated 23.3.1991  and are  referred in  the High Court  judgment, which  include the  facility of a Camp Office for  him at Varanasi and other facilities of vehicle, telephone and staff etc.      The appointment of Justice Kamlakar Choubey as the sole member constituting the Commission of Inquiry in this manner resulting in  the replacement  of  Justice  S.T.  Ramalingam initially appointed  for the purpose and to writ petitions - M.P. Nos.  481 of  1992 and  533 of  1992 - for quashing the notification  dated  9.1.1992  appointing  Justice  Kamlakar Choubey.  Challenge  to  the  notification  dated  10.7.1991 issued earlier  appointing, Justice  G.G. Sohani is academic in view  of Justice  Sohani  having  resigned  as  indicated earlier. The  remaining significance  of the validity of the notification dated  10.7.1991 appointing Justice G.G. Sohani relates only  to the  State Government’s  power  to  appoint another person  in place  of Justice  S.T. Ramalingam in the above circumstances.      The challenge  of the  writ petitioners before the High Court was  that during  the continuance as the single member of the  Commission of  Inquiry of  Justice S.T.  Ramalingam, there was no power in the State Government to replace him as the member of the Commission and, therefore, the appointment first of  Justice G.G. Sohani and on his refusal, of Justice Kamlakar Choubey,  being without any authority, was invalid. On this basis, the relief of quashing the notification dated 9.1.1992 appointing  Justice Kamlakar Choubey was sought. In substance, the  argument was  that there being no vacancy in the office,  the power under Section 3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry  Act, 1952,  which is  available only to fill any vacancy could  not be  invoked and there was no other source of power available to the State Government for this purpose. The argument  of the  learned Advocate  General on behalf of the State  Government was  that a  vacancy had arisen in the membership  of   the  Commission   on  account   of  Justice Ramalinga’s retirement  from Madras  High Court  on 30.6.91, and there  being his  implied resignation  indicated by  his inclination  to   continue  on   the  terms  and  conditions suggested by  him,  which  the  State  (Government  did  not consider feasible,  the power  of the State Government under

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 24  

Section 3(3)  of the  Commissions of Inquiry Act to fill the implied vacancy  was available.  It was  also urged  by  the learned Advocate  General that  vacancy in the office of the single member  of the  Commission was  also implied from the fact that  the appointment of Justice S.T. Ramalingam as the Commission of Inquiry was also his status as a sitting Judge of the Madras High Court and, therefore, his retirement as a Judge resulted  in creation  of  the  vacancy.  The  learned Advocate General  also placed  reliance on Section 16 of the General Clauses  Act, 1897, in aid of the State Government’s power under  Section 3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. Another submission  of the learned Advocate General was that the State  Government was  the sole judge in this matter and was, therefore, competent to choose the person for making or continuing the  inquiry in view of the power available under Section 3  of the  Commissions  of  Inquiry  Act  lead  with Section 16  of the  General Clauses Act. The learned counsel appearing on  behalf of  Kailash Joshi  placed  reliance  on Section 3(2)  of the  Commission of  Inquiry Act  read  with Section 14  of the  General Clauses Act to support the State Government’s  action  appointing  Justice  Kamlakar  Choubey contending  that   the  State   Government  had   power   to reconstitute   the   Commission   replacing   Justice   S.T. Ramalingam by  another person.  An argument  challenging the locus standi  of the  writ petitioner was also faintly urged by  counsel for Kailash Joshi.      The High  Court allowed  the writ petitions and quashed the notification  dated 9.1.1992 appointing Justice Kamlakar Choubey. It  held that there was no vacancy in the office of the single  member of  the Commission  to empower  the State Government to  fill the  vacancy under  Section 3(3)  of the Commissions  of  Inquiry  Act.  On  a  construction  of  the provisions of  the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act and those of the General  Clauses Act  relied on  in support of the rival contentions, the  High Court  came to  the  conclusion  that there was  neither any  valid reason or ground nor any power available in  the State  Government to  replace Justice S.T. Ramalingam by  another person as was purported to be done by First  appointing  Justice  G.G.  Sohani  and  then  Justice Kamlakar Choubey, both of whom were also retired Judges. The objection to  locus standi for the writ petitioners was also rejected. The  relevant part  of the  directions made by the High Court is as under:-      42. As  a result  of the  aforesaid      discussion, the  petition  succeeds      and   is    hereby   allowed.   The      notification    dated     10.7.1991      (Annexure-H)  and   the  consequent      notification  based  thereon  dated      9.1.1992  (Annexure-M)  are  hereby      quashed. It  is open  to the  State      Government to  propose  to  Hon’ble      Shri Justice  S.T.  Ramalingam  the      terms   and   conditions   or   his      continuance  as  a  member  of  the      Commission equivalent  to, loss  or      more favourable  than those offered      and fixed  for Hon’ble Shri Justice      Kamlakar    Choubey.     Thereafter      depending on  his reply  the  State      Government    may    continue    or      discontinue  his   appointment   or      substitute another  member  in  his      place. It  is also  made clear that      it  would   be  open   to   Justice

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 24  

    Ramalingam to  accept the terms and      conditions  offered  by  the  State      Government of  Madhya Pradesh or to      resign from the office, by taking a      decision in  that behalf  early, so      that the  work of the Commission is      not  unduly   hampered  and  it  is      completed well  within the extended      period i.e. before 31st March, 1993      ....... "      Hence, these petitions for grant of special leave.      Leave granted.      Shri Shanti  Bhushan, learned  senior counsel  for  the State of  Madhya Pradesh,  expressly gave  up  the  argument advanced before the High Court of the implied resignation of Justice S.T.  Ramalingam giving  rise to  a vacancy  or  any implied vacancy  on retirement  of Justice  Ramalingam as  a Judge of  the Madras  High Court to enable exercise of power under Section  3(3) of  the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act for first  appointing  Justice  G.G.  Sohani  and  then  Justice Kamlakar Choubey  in place  of Justice  S.T. Ramalingam  The case of  the State  of Madhya  Pradesh  in  this  Court  was confined by  Shri Shanti Bhushan to only one point. The only contention of Shri Shanti Bhushan is that the aid of Section 21 of  the General  Clauses Act  is available  to the  State Government for  exercising its  powers under the Commissions of Inquiry  Act ‘to  add to, amend or vary’ the notification issued initially  appointing Justice  S.T. Ramalingam as the sole member  of  the  Commission  which  enables  the  State Government  to  reconstitute  the  Commission  by  replacing Justice  S.T.  Ramalingam  with  any  other  person  in  the circumstances of  the case. He argued that it is in exercise of this power that the period fixed initially for completion of the  inquiry could  be amended  since, to  the extent the provisions in  the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act are  silent, recourse can be had to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act for making  a suitable  addition, amendment  or variation of the initial  notification. According to learned counsel, the power to  rescind any notification being provided in Section 7 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, such a power in Section 21 of  the General Clauses Act was not available, but not so the power  given by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to add to,  amend or vary any notification. Shri Shanti Bhushan also referred  to Section  8-A of the Commissions of Inquiry Act as  an indication  to  support  his  submission  of  the Government’s  power  to  reconstitute  the  Commission  even during the  availability of  the person  so  appointed  even though, he  stated, Section  8-A is  not the source of power for reconstitution of the Commission.      In reply,  Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for respondent  No.1,   submitted  that   the  scheme   of   the Commissions of  Inquiry Act does not permit invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act except for enlarge ment of the period for  completion of  the inquiry  by amendment  of the notification only  to that  extent since the only situations in which  reconstitution of  the Commission  can be made are provided in  the Commissions  of  Inquiry  Act  itself  and, therefore,  the  context  rules  out  the  applicability  of Section 21  of the General Clauses Act for any such purpose. Shri Sibal also submitted that the construction suggested by Shri  Shanti   Bhushan  is   alien  to  the  scheme  of  the Commissions of Inquiry Act. Shri Sibal added that Section 8- A of  the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act was  enacted  for  an entirely different  purpose, to  ensure  continuity  of  the Commission’s  work   and  has   nothing  to   do  with   its

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 24  

reconstitution. Shri  N.S. Kale, learned counsel for Kailash Joshi,  while  supporting  the  submission  of  Shri  Shanti Bhushan added that Sections 14 and 16 of the General Clauses Act are also available to support the impugned notifications issued by the State Government.      In the  ultimate analysis,  the  controversy  surviving before us on the rival contentions is considerably narrowed. In substance,  the only surviving controversy now is whether in the  scheme of  the Commissions of Inquiry Act, the power ‘to add to, amend or vary’ any notification given by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is available to reconstitute a Commission of  Inquiry constituted  under Section  3 of  the Commissions of  Inquiry Act  by replacing  the  sole  member appointed  initially   with  another   person  during    the availability of  the sole  member initially  appointed.  The validity  of  the  aforesaid  impugned  notifications  dated 10.7.1991 appointing  Justice G.G. Sohani and dated 9.1.1992 appointing Justice  Kamlakar Choubey to replace Justice S.T. Ramalingam depends  on the  answer to  this  question  which alone now survives for decision.      A reference  to the  object and purpose of an enactment in the  nature of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 would be worthwhile  before proceeding  to examine  its scheme and the provisions  therein. The object of the enactment, to the extent it  is relevant,  while construing the meaning of its provisions may be of assistance.      The Commissions  of Inquiry Act, 1955 is similar to and is  modelled   on  the  corresponding  English  statute  and provides this historical back ground for the Indian statute. The purpose  of such an enactment is aptly summarised in the speech of  Lord Salmon on ‘Tribunals of Inquiry’ as under :-      "In  all  countries,  certainly  in      those which enjoy freedom of speech      and a  free  Press,  moments  occur      when   allegations    and   rumours      circulate  causing   a  nation-wide      crisis   of   confidence   in   the      integrity of  public life  or about      other  matters   of  vital   public      importance. No  doubt  this  rarely      happens, but  when it  does  it  is      essential  that  public  confidence      should be  restored, for without it      no democracy can long survive. This      confidence   can   be   effectively      restored   only    by    thoroughly      investigating   and   probing   the      rumours and  allegations so  as  to      search out and establish the truth.      The truth  may show  that the  evil      exists,  thus  enabling  it  to  he      rooted out,  or that  there  is  no      foundation  is   the  rumours   and      allegations by which the public has      been  disturbed.  In  either  case,      confidence  is  restored.  How,  in      such circumstances,  can the  truth      best be established ?"      It is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth in such circumstances that  the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 has been  enacted.   While  construing  the  provisions  of  the enactment, it  would be useful to bear in mind its object if occasion arises  for illumination  of any  grey  areas  with reference to  the object  of the  enactment as a permissible aid to  construction. The  Commissions of  Inquiry Act, 1952

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 24  

was enacted to provide for the appointment of Commissions of Inquiry  and  for  vesting  such  Commissions  with  certain powers. Section 2 of the Act contains definitions. Section 3 provides for  appointment of  a Commission  of Inquiry. Sub- section (1)  of Section  3 lays  down that  a Commission  of Inquiry for  the purpose  of  making  an  inquiry  into  any definite matter of public importance may be appointed by the appropriate  Government  it    is  of  opinion  that  it  is necessary so  to do  and shall make such an appointment if a resolution in  this  behalf  is  passed  by  each  House  of Parliament or,  as the  case may  be, the Legislature of the State, by  notification in the Official Gazette. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 says that the Commission may consist of one or more members appointed by the appropriate Government, and where the  number is  more than  one, one  of  them  may  be appointed as  the Chairman.  Sub-section (3)  of  Section  3 enables the appropriate Government to fill any vacancy which may arise  in the  office of  a  member  of  the  Commission whether consisting  of one  or more  than one member, at any stage of  an inquiry.  Sub-section (4) of Section 3 requires the appropriate  Government to  cause to be laid before each House of  Parliament or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the  State, the  report, if  any, of  the  Commission  of Inquiry together  with a  memorandum  of  the  action  taken thereon, within  a period  of six months from the submission of  the   report  by   the  Commission  to  the  appropriate Government. Section  4 prescribes  that the Commission shall have the  powers or  a civil court while trying a suit under the Code  of Civil  Procedure  in  respect  of  the  matters mentioned therein.  Section  5  deals  with  the  additional powers of  the Commission.  Section 5-A relates to the power of the Commission for conducting investigation pertaining to inquiry. Section  5-B deals with the power of the Commission to appoint  assessors. Section  6 provides for the manner of use of  the statements  made by  persons to  the Commission. Section 6-A  provides that  some persons  are not obliged to disclose certain  facts. Section  7 deals with the manner in which a  Commission of Inquiry appointed Section 3 ceases to exist in  case its  continuance is  unnecessary. It provides for  a   notification  in   the  Official   Gazette  by  the appropriate Government  specifying the  date from  which the Commission shall cease to exist if it is of the opinion that the continued  existence of  the Commission  is unnecessary. Where a Commission is appointed in pursuance of a resolution passed by  the  Parliament  or  as  the  case  may  be,  the Legislature  of   the  State,  then  a  resolution  for  the discontinuance of the Commission is also to be passed by it. Section   8-A  provides  that  the  inquiry  is  not  to  be interrupted  by   reason  of   vacancy  or   change  in  the constitution of the Commission and it shall not be necessary for the  Commission to  commence the  inquiry afresh and the inquiry may  be continued from the stage at which the change took place. Section 8-B prescribes that persons likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry must be heard. Section 8-C  deals   with  the   right  of   cross-examination   and representation by  legal  practitioner  of  the  appropriate Government, every  person referred  to in  Section 8-B  and, with the  permission of  the Commission,  any  other  person whose evidence is recorded by the Commission. Sections 9, 10 and 10-A  relate  to  ancillary  matters  while  Section  12 contains  the   rule  making   power  of   the   appropriate Government. Section  11 provides that the Act is to apply to other inquirying  authorities in certain cases and where the Government directs  that the  said provisions  of  this  Act shall  apply   to  that   authority  and   issues   such   a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 24  

notification,  that  authority  shall  be  deemed  to  be  a Commission appointed  under Section  3 for  the purposes  of this Act. Admittedly, it is by virtue of Section 11 that the Commission of  Inquiry appointed  in  the  present  case  is deemed to  be a Commission appointed under Section 3 for the purposes of  this Act because the Commission was constituted by a  resolution of the Government pursuant to the direction of the  M.P. High Court in the writ petition filed in public interest by  Kailash Joshi  as indicated  earlier.  For  the purposes of  this  case,  the  material  provisions  of  the enactment are Sections 3, 7 and 8-A apart from Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act,  1897 with  reference to which the rival contentions were made.      These provisions are as under :-      The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952      "3. Appointment of Commission.- (1)      The appropriate  Government may, if      it  is   of  opinion   that  it  is      necessary so  to  do, and shall, if      a  resolution  in  this  behalf  is      passed by  each House of Parliament      or,  as   the  case   may  be,  the      Legislature  of   the   State,   by      notification   in    the   Official      Gazette, appoint  a  Commission  of      Inquiry for  the purpose  of making      an  inquiry   into  any    definite      matter of  public   importance  and      performing   such   functions   and      within  such   time   as   may   he      specified in  the notifications and      the commission  so  appointed shall      make the  inquiry and  perform  the      functions accordingly:      Provided  that   where   any   such      Commission has  been  appointed  to      inquire into any matter-      (a) by  the Central  Government, no      State Government shall, except with      the   approval   of   the   Central      Government,     appoint     another      Commission to inquire into the same      matter   for   so   long   as   the      Commission appointed by the Central      Government is functioning;      (b)  by  a  State  Government,  the      Central   Government    shall   not      appoint   another   Commission   to      inquire into the same matter for so      long as the Commission appointed by      the     State     Government     is      functioning,  unless   the  Central      Government is  of opinion  that the      scope  of  the  inquiry  should  be      extended to two or more States.      (2) The  Commission may  consist of      one or  more members  appointed  by      the  appropriate   Government,  and      where the  Commission  consists  of      more than  one member  one of  them      may be  appointed as  the  Chairman      thereof.      (3) The appropriate Government may,      at any  stage of  an inquiry by the      Commission fill  any vacancy  which

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 24  

    may have  arisen in the office of a      member of  the Commission  (whether      consisting of  one or more than one      member).      (4)  The   appropriate   Government      shall cause to be laid  before each      House of Parliament or, as the case      may  be,  the  Legislature  of  the      State, the  report, if  any, of the      Commission on  the inquiry  made by      the  Commission  under  sub-section      (1) together  with a  memorandum of      the action  taken thereon, within a      period  of   six  months   of   the      submission of  the  report  by  the      Commission   to   the   appropriate      Government.’      "7. Commission  to cease  to  exist      when   so    notified.-   (1)   The      appropriate  Government   may,   by      notification   in    the   Official      Gazette, declare that-      (a)a  Commission   (other  than   a      Commission appointed  in  pursuance      of  a  resolution  passed  by  each      House of Parliament or, as the case      may  be,  the  Legislature  of  the      State) shall  cease to exist, if it      is of  opinion that  the  continued      existence  of   the  Commission  is      unnecesary;      (b)  a   Commission  appointed   in      pursuance of  a resolution   passed      by each  House of  Parliament or as      the case may he, the Legislature of      the State,  shall cease to exist if      a resolution for the discontinuance      of the Commission is passed by each      House of Parliament or, as the case      may  be,  the  Legislature  of  the      State.      (2) Every notification issued under      sub-section (1)  shall specify  the      date  from   which  the  Commission      shall cease  to exist  and  on  the      issue  of  such  notification,  the      Commission  shall  cease  to  exist      with effect from the date specified      therein."      "8-A. Inquiry not to be interrupted      by reason  of vacancy  or change in      the     constitution     of     the      Commission.-    (1)    Where    the      Commission consists  of two or more      members, it may act notwithstanding      the absence  of the Chairman or any      other member  or any  vacancy among      its members. (2)  Where   during  the  course  of  an      inquiry  before   a  Commission,  a      change  has   taken  place  in  the      constitution of  the Commission  by      reason of  any vacancy  having been      filed or  by any  other reason,  it      shall  not  be  necessary  for  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 24  

    Commission to  commence the inquiry      afresh  and   the  inquiry  may  be      continued from  the stage  at which      the change took place."      The General Clauses Act, 1897      "21. Power  to  issue,  to  include      power to  add to,  amend,  vary  or      rescind,   notifications,   orders,      rules or  bye-laws. Where,  by  any      Central Act  or Regulation, a power      to  issue   notifications,  orders,      rules  or  bye-laws  is  conferred,      then that  power includes  a power,      exercisably in  the like manner and      subject to  the like  sanction  and      conditions  (if  any)  to  and  to,      amend,   vary    or   rescind   any      notifications, orders, rule or bye-      laws so issued."      It may  be mentioned  that sub-sections  (3) and (4) of Section 3  and Section 8-A were inserted while Section 7 was substituted in  the Commissions  of Inquiry Act, 1952 by the Commissions of Inquiry (Amendment) Act, 1971 (No.79 of 1971) as a  result of the recommendations of the Law Commission of India made  in paras  26 and  34 of its 24th Report. In para 26, the  recommendation made  was to  amend Section 3 of the Act ‘to  provide expressly  for the filling up of vacancy or for an  increase in  the  number  of  members  whenever  the Government thinks  it necessary  or expedient  to do so’. In para 34  of the  Report, the  recommendation was to insert a new section  8-A in  the light  of the proposed amendment in Section 3  to clarify  that ‘it  is not  necessary  for  the Commission to recommence its inquiry if a change takes place in the constitution of the Commission during the pendency of an inquiry’.  The legislative  history of sub-section (3) of Section  3   and  Section  8-A  inserted  simultaneously  by amendment of  the Act  shows  their  interrelation  and  the object of  enacting Section  8-A  is  to  clarity  that  the inquiry is not required to recommence or be interrupted by reason of  the filling  of any  vacancy or  decrease in  the number of  members of the Commission. Section 8-A along with Sections 8-B and 8-C inserted simultaneously by amendment in the principal  Act relate to the procedure of the Commission and were  inserted to  provide for specific situations while Section 8  contains the  general power  of the Commission to regulate its own procedure.      The real  question for decision in the present case is: Whether the  appropriate Government  after constituting  the Commission under  Section 3  of  the  Act  is  empowered  to reconstitute the  Commission substituting  another person as the sole  member in  place  of  the  initial  appointee?  In substance, it is this power that the State Government claims to have exercised in the present case and is attempted to be justified by the argument advanced by Shri Shanti Bhushan to support the  appointment first  of Justice  G.G. Sohani  and then of  Justice Kamlakar  Choubey in  place of Justice S.T. Ramalingam. To  recapitulate, the  argument of  Shri  Shanti Bhushan is  that the  power of reconstituting the Commission in this  manner is  available to  the State Government under Section 21  of the  General Clauses Act which can be invoked in aid of the power of the Government under Section 3 of the Commissions of  Inquiry Act.  Section 8-A of the Commissions of Inquiry  Act is  referred to by Shri Shanti Bhushan as an indication of  the existence  of this  power  in  the  State Government even though he does not rely on it as a source of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 24  

this power.  Shri Kapil  Sibal, on  the other hand, contends that the  scheme of the enactment shows that the appropriate Government  cannot   interfere  with   the  working  of  the Commission after  its  constitution  except  in  the  manner expressly provided  in the  Act and  Section 7  is  a  clear indication that  interference with  the functioning  of  the Commission is  not permissible  in any  other  manner.  Shri Sibal contends that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not available  to support  the Government’s  action  in  the present case.      Shri Shanti  Bhushan concedes  that there is no express provision in the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 empowering the Government to replace or substitute the sole member of a Commission with another person during the continuance of the Commission, but  he submits  that this  is implicit  in  the power to  appoint a  Commission and  designate its personnel under  sub-sections   (1)  and  (2)  of  Section  3  of  the Commissions of  Inquiry Act  read with the power to amend or vary any  notification available  under Section  21  of  the General Clauses  Act. Shri Shanti Bhushan also conceded that the aid  of  Section  21  of  the  General  Clauses  Act  is available  only  if  the  context  and  the  scheme  of  the Commissions of Inquiry Act so permits. He submitted that the Government’s power  to extend  the  time  specified  in  the initial  notification   for  completing   the  work  of  the Commission is  not to  be found  in any express provision in the  Commissions   of  Inquiry  Act,  but  is  exercised  by amendment of the initial notification only  under Section 21 of  the  General  Clauses  Act.  According  to  Shri  Shanti Bhushan, the  appointment of  a  Commission  is  under  sub- section (1)  and it  is under  sub-section (2)  of Section 3 that the  person constituting  the Commission  is  appointed even  though   it  may   be  a   simultaneous  process.  The replacement of  the member initially appointed to constitute the Commission,  according to  learned counsel,  is  by  re- exercise of  the power  under sub-section  (2) of Section 3. The submission  is that  the Commission appointed under sub- section  (1)   of  Section  3  continues  while  it  may  be reconstituted by  replacement of  the member  which is  done under sub-section (2).      In our  opinion, the power of the Government to appoint a Commission  of Inquiry  and name  the  person  or  persons constituting it  is in  sub-section (1)  of Section 3 and is not an  exercise divided  between subsections (1) and (2) of Section 3  as suggested  by Shri Shanti Bhushan. Sub-section (2) merely  confers the power in the Government to appoint a Commission consisting  of one  or more  members and provides that if  there be  more than  one member  of the Commission, then  one   of  them   may  be  appointed  Chairman  of  the Commission. lt  is not as if sub-section (1) deals with mere appointment of  a Commission  of Inquiry without clothing it with  its   personnel  and   the  power   to   appoint   the member/members thereof  is to  be found  only in sub-section (2). That apart, there is nothing in any of these provisions to suggest that the Government has the power to reconstitute the  Commission  after  its  appointment  by  replacing  the existing sole  member with  another person,  Sub-section (3) deals expressly  with the  Government’s power  to  fill  any vacancy which  may have arisen since the constitution of the Commission.  The   question  of   replacement  of  a  member appointed initially  is obviously  beyond  its  scope.  Sub- section (3)  inserted by  amendment  in  Section  3  of  the Commissions  of   Inquiry  Act,  1952  is  a  clear  contra- indication to  the construction  suggested  by  Shri  Shanti Bhushan of  sub-sections (1)  and (2)  of Section  3 in  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 24  

scheme of  the Act.  If the  construction suggested  by Shri Shanti Bhushan  be correct,  there was  no need to make this amendment and  insert  sub-section  (3)  which  is  a  clear indication of  the limit  and extent  to which  the power of reconstitution of  the Commission  can be  exercised by  the Government after the Commission has been constituted. As the Law Commission’s  Report itself  indicates,  this  amendment became necessary to provide expressly in the statute for the Government’s power  to till  any vacancy  after the  initial constitution Whatever  may have  been the  position prior to insertion of  sub-section (3)  in Section 3, there can be no doubt that  after its insertion, the scheme of the enactment excludes the  power of reconstitution of the Commission in a manner not  expressly provided  therein.  In  view  of  sub- section (3),  it is not permissible to construe sub-sections (1) and  (2) of Section 3 in any other manner. If the scheme of the  enactment gave  such wide  power to  reconstitute  a Commission after  its  initial  constitution  and  permitted replacement or  substitution of  the existing  member  of  a Commission with  another  person  sans  sub-section  (3)  of Section 3, the power to fill any vacancy was not required to be provided  separately ahat  the Commission functions as an independent a gency free from  any govern-mental control after its constitution. It follows  that after  appointment the tenure of members of the commission  should not  be dependent  on the will of the Government to  secure their  independence.  A  body  not  so independent is  not likely  to enjoy  the  requisite  public confidence and  may not  attract men   of  quality and self- respect. In  such a  situation the  object of  the enactment would be frustrated. [302-H. 303-A-C] Minerva Mills  Ltd. v,  There  Workers,  [1954]  S.C.R.  465 distinguished. The State  of Bihar  v. D.  N. Ganguly.,[1959]  S.C.R. 1191, relied on.  in  Rangachari  and  Soshit  Karamchari  respectively reiterated in State of Punjab v. Hira Lal, [1971] 3 SCR 267, and Comptroller  and Auditor  General of India, Gian Prakash v. K.S.  Jagannathan &  Anr., [1986] 2 SCR 17. In Rangachari it was  held, ’The  condition precedent  may refer either to numerical inadequacy  of representation  in the  services or even to  the qualitative  inadequacy of representation’.3 In the context  the expression, ’adequately represented imports consideration of  size as well as values, numbers as well as the nature of appointments’.4      But,  inadequacy   of  representation  is  creative  of jurisdiction only.  It is  not measure of backwardness. That is why  less rigorous  test or  lesser marks and competition amongst the class of unequals at the point of entry has been approved both  this Court and American courts. But a student admitted to  a medical or engineering college is further not granted relaxation in passing the examinations. In fact this has been  explained as  valid basis  in  American  decisions furnishing justification  for  racial  admissions  on  lower percentage.     Rationale  appears   to  be  that  every-one irrespective of  the source of entry being subjected to same test neither  efficiency is  effected nor  the  equality  is disturbed. After  entry in  service the class is one that of employees. If  the social  scar of  backwardness is  carried even, thereafter  the entire  object of  equalisation stands frustrated.  No  further  classification  amongst  employees would be justified as is not done amongst students.      Constitutional, legal  or moral  basis  for  protective discrimination is redressing identifiable backward class for historical injustice.  That is  they are  today,  what  they

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 24  

would not  have been  but for  the victimisation.  Remedytuting  the  Comm ission.  The enactment, therefore,  also provides  in Section  7 the only situation  in   which  the   Government  can   rescind   the notification  issued   under  Section   3  constituting  the Commission. To the extent to which express provision is made in the  enactment, it  is common  ground, Section  21 of the General Clauses  Act, 1897  cannot be invoked. These aspects have to be borne in mind while considering the tenability of the submission made by Shri Shanti Bhushan with  the aid  of Section  21 of the General Clauses Act.      It is  common ground  before us  that Section 21 of the General Clauses  Act can  be invoked  only if,  and  to  the extent,  if   any,  the   context  and  the  scheme  of  the Commissions of  Inquiry Act so permits. The general power in Section 21  of the  General Clauses Act is to add to, amend, vary or  rescind any  notification etc.  In the  context  of reconstitution of  the Commission,  the power  to  fill  any vacancy in  the office  of a  member of  the  Commission  is expressly provided  in sub-section  (3) of  Section 3 of the Commission  of   Inquiry  Act.   Similarly,  the   power  to discontinue the  existence of the Commission when it becomes unnecessary can  be exercised  by issue of a notification in accordance with  Section 7  of the  Act which  results    in rescinding  the   notification  issued   under   Section   3 constituting the  Commission. Thus, the power to rescind any notification  conferred  generally  in  Section  21  of  the General Clauses Act is clearly inapplicable in the scheme to the Commissions  of Inquiry Act which expressly provides for the exercise  of this  power in  relation  to  a  Commission constituted under  Section of  the Act.  The  only  material remaining general  powers  in  Section  21  of  the  General Clauses Act  are  the  power  to  ‘amend  ’  or  ‘vary’  any notification. The  extent to  which the  constitution of the Commission can  be amended  or varied by filling any vacancy in the  office of a member as provided in the Commissions of Inquiry Act  is also  obviously excluded from the purview of Section 21  of the  General  Clauses  Act  which  cannot  be invoked for this purpose.      The surviving question, therefore, is: Whether there is power to  reconstitute  the  Commission  by  replacement  or substitution of  the existing member, though not provided in the Commissions  of Inquiry  Act by  invoking the  residuary power to  amend or vary any notification under Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act? In the first place, in a case like the present  where the  scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act  does   provide  for  amendment  and  variation  of  the notification issued  under Section  3  for  the  purpose  of reconstitution of  the Commission  in the  manner indicated, even that  power to amend or vary any notification by virtue of Section  21 of  the General  Clauses Act must be taken as excluded   by   clear   implication   in   the   sphere   of reconstitution of  the Commission.  Moreover, the  power  to amend or  vary  cannot  include  the  power  to  replace  or substitute the  existing composition  of the Commission with an entirely  new composition.  Shri Shanti Bhushan submitted that the  time specified  in the  initial  notification  for completing  the  task  of  the  Commission  is  enlarged  by subsequent notification  and this is done in exercise of the general power  available under  the General  Clauses Act  to extend time. This submission does not support the argumentof learned counsel  that the  general power under Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act  is also  available to reconstitute the Commission  by replacement  or substitution  of its sole

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 22 of 24  

member. The aid of Section 21 of the general Clauses Act for enlargement of  time does  not conflict  with the context or scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.      The context as well as the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act,  1952 clearly  indicate that  Section 21 of the General Clauses  Act, 1897  cannot be invoked to enlarge the Government’s   power    to   reconstitute   the   Commission constituted under  Section 3  of the  Act in  a manner other than that  expressly provided  in the Commissions of Inquiry Act. There  being no  express power given by the Commissions of Inquiry Act to the appropriate Government to reconstitute the Commission of Inquiry constituted under Section 3 of the Act by  replacement or  substitution of  its sole member and the existence  of any  such power  being negatived  by clear implication,  no   such  power   can  be  exercised  by  the appropriate Government.  The scheme of the enactment is that the appropriate  Government should  have no control over the Commission after its constitution under Section 3 of the Act except for the purpose of filling any vacancy which may have arisen in   the  office of  a member of the Commission apart from winding up the Commission by issuance of a notification under Section 7 of the Act if the continued existence of the Commission is  considered unnecessary.  The vacancy  in  the office of  a member  of the Commission may arise for several reasons, including  resignation  by  the  member,  when  the Government’s power to fill the vacancy under Section 3(3) of the Act  can be  exercised. Even  though a  case of  implied resignation creating  an implied  vacancy was  set up by the State of  Madhya Pradesh  before the  High Court, that stand was rightly abandoned before us by Shri Shanti Bhushan.      We have no doubt that the rule of construction embodied in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot apply to the provisions of  the Commissions  of Inquiry Act 1952 relating to reconstitution  of a  Commission  constituted  thereunder since  the   subject-matter,  context  and  effect  of  such provisions are inconsistent with such application. Moreover, the construction made by us best harmonises with the subject of  the   enactment  and  the  object  of  the  legislation. Restoring public  confidence by constituting a Commission of Inquiry to  investigate into  a ’definite  matter of  public importance’ is  the purpose  of such  an  exercise.  It  is, therefore, the  prime need  that the Commission functions as an independent  agency free  from any  governmental  control after its  constitution. It  follows that after appointment, the tenure  of members  of  the  commission  should  not  be dependent on  the will  of the  Government, to  secure their independence. A  body not  so independent  is not  likely to enjoy the  requisite public  confidence any  may not attract men of  quality and  self-respect. In  such a situation, the object of  the enactment  would be  frustrated. This  aspect suggests that  the  construction  made  by  us,  apart  from harmonising the provisions of the statute, also promotes the object of  the enactment while the construction suggested by the appellant frustrates both.       Shri Shanti Bhushan placed reliance on the decision in Minerva Mills  Ltd. v. Their Workers, 1-19541 S.C.R. 465. In that decision, the power of the appropriate Government under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to constitute an industrial  tribunal for  a fixed  period of  time and to constitute a  new tribunal  on the  expiry of that period to hear and dispose of references made to the previous tribunal which had  not been disposed of by that tribunal was upheld. Shri Shanti  Bhushan contended that the observations made in that decision are not confined to the exercise of that power on  the   expiry  of   the  tenure  of  the  tribunal  first

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 24  

constituted. It  was clearly indicated in that decision that ’when the  life of  the first tribunal automatically came to end by  efflux of time, no question of vacancy in the office really arose and, therefore, it was not a case falling under sub-clause (2)  of Section  8 but  the situation  that arose fell within  the ambit  of Section 7’. The observations made in that decision have to be read in the context of the facts of that case. That decision is clearly distinguishable.      On the  other hand, Shri Kapil Sibal placed reliance on The State  of Bihar  v. D.N. Ganguly & Others, [1959] S.C.R. 1191. This  decision also  related to  the  reference  of  a dispute under  the Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947.  It  was pointed out  that ’it  was well  settled that  the  rule  of construction embodied  in Section  21 of the General Clauses Act can  apply to  the G  provisions of a statute only where the subject-matter,  context, and  effect of such provisions are in  no way  inconsistent with such application . On this basis it  was held that it did not apply to Section 10(1) of the Industrial  Disputes Act.  On a  construction of Section 10(1 )  of the  Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947,  it was held that it  does not  confer on  the appropriate Government the power to  cancel or supersede a reference made thereunder in respect of an industrial dispute pending adjudication by the tribunal constituted  for that  purpose. Reliance  placed on Section 21  of the  General Clauses  Act on  behalf  of  the Government to  invoke such  a power by necessary implication was clearly negatived. The decision of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd.  (supra) was  distinguished as  we  have  already indicated. In our opinion, the ratio in D.N. Ganguly (supra) supports the  view taken  by us  in the  present  case  that Section 21  of the  General Clauses Act cannot be invoked to support the  impugned action  of the State of Madhya Pradesh as  contended  by  Shri  Shanti  Bhushan.  The  construction suggested by  Sri Shanti  Bhushan is  inconsistent with  the provisions and  the scheme  of the   Commissions  of Inquiry Act, 1952 and must, therefore, be rejected.      Admittedly,  the   power  under  Section  3(3)  of  the Commissions of  Inquiry Act,  1952 was  not available to the State of  Madhya Pradesh in the facts of the present case to appoint any  other person  replacing Justice S.T. Ramalingam as the  sole member  of the Commission of Inquiry. The power under sub-sections  (1) and  (2)  of  Section  3  read  with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act or even Sections 14 or 16 thereof  was also not available for this purpose, for the reasons given  earlier. Accordingly,  the notification dated 10.7.1991   appointing   Justice   G.G.   Sohani   and   the notification  dated  9.1.1992  appointing  Justice  Kamlakar Choubey were  both invalid.  It is not unlikely that Justice G.G. Sohani  may have resigned forming the same opinion when his appointment was challenged. However, the State of Madhya Pradesh  did  not  choose  to  reflect  and  reconsider  the legality of  its action  in  spite  of  the  resignation  of Justice G.G.  Sohani and  it continued  to move in the wrong direction by  making another  invalid appointment of Justice Kamlakar Choubey.      Consequently,  these  appeals  are  dismissed  and  the impugned  judgment   of  the   High   Court   quashing   the notifications dated  10.7.1991 and 9.1.1992 is sustained for the aforesaid  reasons given  by us.  The  State  of  Madhya Pradesh shall,  in view  of the  retirement of  Justice S.T. Ramalingam as  a Judge  of the  Madras  High  Court  in  the meanwhile, take  necessary action  to finalise his terms and conditions in  accordance with  the guidelines issued by the Government of  India in  this behalf.  Such action  be taken promptly to  avoid any  undue delay  in  completion  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 24 of 24  

Commission’s task. No costs.  N.P.V.                              Appeal dismissed.