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PETITIONER: VINOD KUMAR SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/11/1987

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH RANGNATHAN, S.

CITATION:  1988 AIR  371            1988 SCR  (1) 941  1988 SCC  (1)  80        JT 1987 (4)   304  1987 SCALE  (2)1046

ACT:      Provisions  of   the  Civil  Procedure  Code-Whether  a judgment once  pronounced in  open Court  becomes  operative even without the signatures of the Judges and any alteration therein whether permissible.

HEADNOTE: %      The appellant  passed the Bachelor’s examination in law with 54.5  per cent  marks. He  applied for admission to the Master’s Course  in law.  The university  had  prescribed  a minimum of  55 per  cent marks  for admission to the course. The appellant  claimed weightage  on certain  grounds on the strength  of   a  precedent.  The  admission  was,  however, refused. The  appellant filed  a writ  petition. A  Division Bench of the High Court heard the writ petition and dictated the judgment  in the  open court,  allowing the petition and directing the  university to  admit the  appellant, but soon thereafter, before  the judgment was signed, the appellant’s matter was again put in the hearing list to be heard afresh. The Division  Bench, which  had allowed  the writ  petition, released the  case from its list and directed the same to be listed before another Division Bench. On the matter being so listed, the  Second Division  Bench dismissed  the petition. The appellant  appealed  to  this  Court  by  special  leave against the order of dismissal passed by the High Court.      Allowing the  appeal and  directing the  university  to admit the appellant, the Court, ^      HELD: The provisions of Order 20, rule 3 of the Code of Civil  Procedure   give  power   to  the   Court   to   make alterations/additions in  a judgment so long as the judgment has not  been signed,  but that  power should  be  exercised judicially, sparingly  and  for  adequate  reasons.  When  a judgment is  pronounced in  the open  court, the parties act upon it and conduct their affairs on the basis that it is in judgment of  the court  and that the signing of the judgment is a  formality to  follow. A  judgment to be operative does not await  the signing  thereof by  the court.  If  what  is pronounced in  the court  is not  acted upon,  the litigants would  be  prejudiced;  their  confidence  in  the  judicial

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process would  be shaken.  A judgment pronounced in the open court should  be acted upon unless there be some exceptional feature, like, soon after the judgment 942      is declared  in the  open court,  a feature, not placed for consideration  before the  court earlier,  is brought to its notice  by either  party to  the  cause,  or  the  court discovers some  new facts  from  the  record  or  the  court notices a  feature, which should be taken into account, or a review is  asked for,  which is granted. In such a situation the  court   may  take  up  the  matter  again  for  further consideration, and  it has  to  give  good  reasons  if  the judgment delivered by it is not to be operative. [946B, D-H; 947A]      Since the writ petition of the appellant had first been allowed by  pronouncement of the judgment in the open court, and there  is nothing  on record  to justify  why it was not acted upon, the appeal succeeds. [947E-F]      Surender  Singh  and  others  v.  The  State  of  Uttar Pradesh, [1954] 5 S.C.R. 330, relied upon.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2976 of 1987.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  23.3.1987  of  the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 4397 of 1986.      S.N. Singh and T.N. Singh for the Appellant.      L.N. Sinha and L.R. Singh for the Respondents.      The following Order of the Court was delivered:                               O R R      Special leave granted.      Appellant passed Bachelor’s examination in law from the Banaras Hindu University securing 54.4% marks and was placed in the  second division.  He applied  for admission  in  the Master’s Course  in Law in the academic session 1979/80. The University had  prescribed a  minimum of  55% marks  on  the average  of   three  years  of  the  degree  course  as  the qualifying requirement.  Appellant claimed  weightage on the basis that  members of  his family  had  donated  lands  and houses to  the University  and cited  the case of Shri Anant Narain  Singh  as  a  precedent.  As  he  failed  to  secure admission, he  again applied  for taking  admission  in  the academic session  1983-84 but  was  not  granted  admission. Ultimately he filed a writ petition before the Allahabad 943 High Court. On 28.7.1986 the said writ petition was taken up for hearing  by  a  Division  Bench  and  when  hearing  was concluded, judgment  was dictated in open Court allowing the writ petition  and direction  to the University to admit the petitioner was  ordered. The appellant applied for certified copy of  the judgment but was told that the matter was again in the  hearing list  and would  be heard afresh. The matter continued to  appear in the hearing list from September 1986 till 5.2.1987  when the  particular Division Bench which had heard the matter released the case to be taken up by another Bench. On  23rd  of  March,  1987,  the  writ  petition  was dismissed by the new Division Bench.      Two contentions  have been  raised  before  us.  It  is maintained that  once the  judgment was  delivered  in  open Court it  became operative  and could  not be  changed.  The dismissal of  the writ  petition  after  it  had  been  once allowed was,  therefore, without  jurisdiction; it  was also contended that on the facts of the case the appellant should

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have been given admission.      There is no dispute that on 28.7.1986, a Division Bench heard the  writ petition and disposed it of. The order sheet of that day reads thus:           "Sri  Aditya   Narain  for   the  petitioner   Sri           Siddheshwar Pd. for the respondents Petition heard           finally. Writ Petition disposed of". Subsequently  there  is  an  endorsement  without  anybody’s signature to the following effect:           Under signature  (illegible)  Listed  for  further           hearing". On February 5, 1987, the same learned Judges who had allowed the writ petition gave the following directions:-           "We release this case but we direct that this case           be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for           getting it  listed before the appropriate bench as           the matter  was once  heard  by  us  and  judgment           dictated but  later on  was  not  signed  and  was           ordered to be listed for further hearing."           "As prayed by counsel for University the petition.           may be  listed,  if  possible  on  25th  February,           1987". 944      There is  no dispute  that the  writ petition  had been allowed by  judgment pronounced  in open  Court on 28.7.1986 after hearing  was concluded. According to the appellant the judgment once pronounced in open Court became operative even without signature  of the  learned Judges  and could  not be altered. Reliance  is placed  on a judgment of this Court in the case  of Surendra  Singh &  Ors. v.  The State  of Uttar Pradesh, [1954]  5 SCR 330. The facts of that case show that a Division  Bench of  the Allahabad  High Court  sitting  at Lucknow consisting  of  Kidwai  and  Bhargava  JJ.  heard  a criminal appeal  and on 11th of December, 1952, judgment was reserved. Before  it could  be  delivered  Bhargava  J.  was shifted to  Allahabad. While  there, he  dictated a judgment treating it  to be  a judgment of both. He signed every page of the  judgment as  well as  at the end but did not put the date. He  sent it  to Kidwai  J. at  Lucknow. On the 24th of December, 1962,  before the  judgment was delivered Bhargava J. passed  away. On  the 5th  of January,  1953,  Kidwai  J. delivered the  judgment of the Court. He signed it had dated it. The  question as to whether the judgment was a valid one came  up  for  consideration.  While  dealing  with  such  a question, Bose J. spoke for the Court thus:-           "In our  opinion, a judgment within the meaning of           these sections  is the final decision of the court           intimated to the parties and to the world at large           by formal  "pronouncement" or  "delivery"  in  the           open court.  It is  a judicial  act which  must be           performed in  a judicial way. Small irregularities           in the  manner of  pronouncement or  the  mode  of           delivery do  not matter  but the  substance of the           thing must  be there:  that can neither be blurred           nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it be           vague. All  the rest-the  manner in which it is to           be  recorded,  the  way  in  which  it  is  to  be           authenticated the signing and the sealing, all the           rules designed  to  secure  certainity  about  its           content and matter- can be cured; but not the hard           core, namely the formal intimation of the decision           and its content formely declared in a judicial way           in open court. The exact way in which this is done           does not  matter. In  some courts  the judgment is           delivered orally  or read  out, in  some only  the

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         operative  portion  is  pronounced,  in  some  the           judgment is  merely signed  after giving notice to           the parties  and laying the draft on the table for           a given number of days for inspection."           "An important  point,  therefore,  arises.  It  is           evident that  the decision  which is so pronounced           or intimated must be a 945           declaration of  the mind  of the court as it is at           the time of pronouncement. We lay no stress on the           mode or  manner of delivery, as that is not of the           essence, except  to say  that it must be done in a           judicial way  in open  court. But,  however, it is           done, it  must be an expression of the mind of the           court at the time of delivery. We say this because           that  is  the  first  judicial  act  touching  the           judgment  which   the  court  performs  after  the           hearing. Everything else uptil then is done out of           court and  is not intended to be the operative act           which sets  all the  consequences which  follow on           the judgment  in motion. Judges may, not often do,           discuss the  matter among  themselves and  reach a           tentative conclusion.  That is not their judgment.           They may  write and exchange drafts. Those are not           the judgment  either, however,  heavily and  often           they may have been signed. The final operative act           is that  which is  formally declared in open court           with the  intention of  making  it  the  operative           decision of  the court.  That is  what constitutes           the judgment.........." Bose J. continued to say:           "As soon as the judgment is delivered that becomes           the operative  pronouncement of the court. The law           then provides  for the manner in which it is to be           authtenticated  and   made  certain.   The   rules           regarding this  differ but  they do  not form  the           essence of the matter and if there is irregularity           in carrying  them out  it is  curable. Thus  if  a           judgment  happens   not  to   be  signed   and  is           inadvertently   acted   on   and   executed,   the           proceedings  consequent   on  it  would  be  valid           because the  judgment, if  it can be shown to have           been validly  delivered, would  stand good despite           defects   in    the   mode   of   its   subsequent           authentication".           "After the  judgment has  been delivered provision           is made  for review.  One provision is that it can           be freely  altered  or  amended  or  even  changed           completely  without   further  formality,   except           notice to the parties and a rehearing on the point           of change  should that  be necessary,  provided it           has  not   been  signed.  Another  is  that  after           signature a review properly so-called would lie in           civil cases  but none in criminal; but the review,           when it  lies, is  only permitted  on very  narrow           grounds........." 946      The above observations were made, as already mentioned, in a  case where  the  judgment  had  been  signed  but  not pronounced in  the open  court. In  the present case, we are concerned with  a judgment  that had been pronounced but not signed. The  provision in  order 20,  rule 3  of the Code of Civil Procedure  indicates the  position in  such cases.  It permits alterations or additions to a judgment so long as it is not  signed.  This  is  also  apparently  what  has  been

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referred to  in the  last paragraph  of the extract from the judgment of Bose, J. quoted above, where it has been pointed out that  a judgment which has been delivered "can be freely altered  or  amended  or  even  changed  completely  without further formality,  except notice  to the  parties  and  re- hearing on  the point  of change,  should that be necessary, provided it  has not  been signed."  It is  only  after  the judgment is  both pronounced  and signed that alterations or additions are  not permissible,  except under the provisions of section 152 or section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure or, in  very exceptional,  cases, under  section 151  of the Code of Civil Procedure.      But, while  the Court  has undoubted  power to alter or modify a  judgment, delivered  but not  signed,  such  power should be  exercised judicially,  sparingly and for adequate reasons. When  a  judgment  is  pronounced  in  open  court, parties act  on the  basis that  it is  the judgment  of the Court and that the signing is a formality to follow.      We have  extensively extracted  from what Bose J. spoke in  this   judgment   to   impresss   upon   everyone   that pronouncement of  a judgment  in court  whether  immediately after  the  hearing  or  after  reserving  the  same  to  be delivered later should ordinarily be considered as the final act of  the court  with  reference  to  the  case.  Bose  J. emphasised the  feature that  as soon  as  the  judgment  is delivered that  becomes the  operative pronouncement  of the court. That  would mean  that the  judgment to  be operative does not  await signing  thereof by  the court. There may be exceptions  to  the  rule,  for  instance,  soon  after  the judgment is  dictated in open court, a feature which had not been placed for consideration of the court is brought to its notice by  counsel of  any  of  the  parties  or  the  court discovers some new facts from the record. In such a case the court may  give direction  that the  judgment which has just been delivered  would not be effective and the case shall be further heard.  There may  also be cases-though their number would be  few and  far between-where  when the  judgment  is placed for  signature the  court  notices  a  feature  which should have been taken into account. In such a situation the matter may  be placed  for further consideration upon notice to the parties. If the judgment delivered is intended not to 947 be operative, good reasons should be given.      Ordinarily judgment  is not  delivered till the hearing is complete  by listening  to  submissions  of  counsel  and perusal of  records and  a definite  view is  reached by the court in  regard to  the  conclusion.  Once  that  stage  is reached and  the court  pronounces the  judgment,  the  same should not  be reopened  unless there  be  some  exceptional circumstance or  a review  is asked for and is granted. When the judgment  is pronounced,  parties present  in the  court know the  conclusion in the matter and often on the basis of such pronouncement,  they proceed  to conduct their affairs. If what  is pronounced in court is not acted upon, certainly litigants would  be prejudiced.  Confidence of the litigants in  the   judicial  process  would  be  shaken.  A  judgment pronounced in  open court  should be acted upon unless there be some  exceptional feature  and if  there be any such, the same should  apear from  the record  of  the  case.  in  the instant matter,  we find that there is no material at all to show as  to what let the Division Bench which had pronounced the judgment  in open  court not to authenticate the same by signing it.  In such  a situation the judgment delivered has to be  taken as  final and the writ petition should not have been  placed   for  fresh   hearing.  The  subsequent  order

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dismissing the  writ petition  was not  available to be made once it  is held that the writ petition stood disposed of by the judgment of the Division Bench on 28.7.1986.      The record  of the  proceedings of the High Court which is before  us does  not contain  the judgment  delivered  in court on  28.7.1986 but  there is  no dispute  that the writ petition had been allowed. On the conceded position that the appellant’s writ petition was allowed by the High Court, the University  is  directed  to  admit  the  appellant  to  the Master’s Course in Law in the current session.      We understand  that the  University’s courses  of study have now  been changed. The University shall take such steps as are practicable to give effect to this decision.      The appeal  is accordingly  allowed. There  will be  no order for costs. S.L                                          Appeal allowed. 948