REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4104 OF 2004

State of Kerala                                              .....        Appellant

Versus

B. Renjith Kumar & Ors.                          .....     Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.

1. This  appeal  by  the  State  of  Kerala,  arises  out  of  the

judgment and order dated 5th December, 2003, passed by the

High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in O.P. No, 8947/03(M).

By the impugned order, while allowing the writ petition of the

respondents herein, directions have been issued that order at

Exhibit P8 shall be modified so as to treat the writ petitioners

at par with the District Judges in the matter of time scale as

well  as the selection grade and the needful should be done

within three months from the date of the certified copy of the

judgment.   

2. Facts, in brief leading to the filing of the present appeal

are as follows:-

The respondents herein were the members of the Bar.  In

the year  1993,  respondent  Nos.  1 and 2 were  selected and

appointed  as  Presiding  Officers  of  the  Industrial  Tribunals

whereas  respondent  No.  3  was  selected  and  appointed  as

Presiding Officer in the year 1996 in the State of Kerala.  They

continued to work as such.  The claim of the respondents in

the writ  petition was that prior to the year 1998,  the State

Government had granted to them pay scales at par with the

District Judges.  However, when Judicial Officers were granted

benefit  of  revision  of  pay  scales  in  December,  2001  with

retrospective  effect  from  March,  1996,  similar  benefit  was

denied to them.  The respondents submitted a representation

to the State Government seeking extension of the benefit  of

interim  relief  in  terms  of  order  vide G.O.  dated  30.5.1998

granting interim relief at the rate of 35% of pay as on 1.7.1996

to the members of the Subordinate Judiciary in the State.  The

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said representation was decided and rejected vide order dated

15.5.1999.   On  25.11.1999,  the  respondents  filed  O.P.  No.

20490 of 1999 in the High Court seeking direction to the State

Government  to  grant  interim  relief  at  par  with  the  District

Judges.  The said writ petition was allowed, with a direction to

the State Government to issue necessary orders in this regard

by extending the benefit  of interim relief  at the rate of 35%

(basic  pay  +  D.A.)  with  effect  from 1.1.1996  as  directed  in

Exhibit  P4 to  the  Judicial  Officers.   It  was the  case  of  the

respondents before the High Court that the State Government

on 18.4.2000 in pursuance of the directions of the High Court

sanctioned  interim  relief  to  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the

Industrial  Tribunals as well.   On 12.1.2001, Government of

Kerala  vide G.O.(MS) No. 231/2001/Home dated 12.12.2001

decided  to  grant  the  scales  of  pay  to  the  members  of

Subordinate  Judiciary  as  recommended  by  the  National

Judicial Commission (Shetty Commission).  The respondents

were  denied  the  said  benefits  of  the  scales  of  pay  and,

accordingly, they submitted representation on 7.1.2002 to the

Secretary  to  the  Government,  (Labour  and  Rehabilitation

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Department) requesting for the grant of same scales of pay as

that of the District Judges in the State.  A copy of the order

dated 4.2.2003 by which revision of pay was allowed to the

District Judges was placed on the record of the High Court as

Exhibit  P8.   By  the  impugned  order,  the  Presiding  Officers

(Industrial  Tribunals)  were  granted  the  pay  scale  of  Rs.

16,300-400-18,300/-  with  effect  from  March  1,  1997.

However, the District Judges had been placed in the scale of

Rs.  16,750-400-19,150-420-20,500/-.   They  also  had  been

granted  a  selection  grade  of  Rs.  18,750-400-19,150-450-

20,500-500-23,850/-.  The respondents complained that the

action  in  treating  them differently  from the  District  Judges

suffers  from  the  vice  of  discrimination  and  arbitrariness.

Thus, they sought the intervention of the High Court to quash

order  -  Exhibit  P8  of  the  State  Government  and  further

direction to grant same scale of pay as has been sanctioned in

the case of District Judges.

3. The  writ  petition  was  contested  by  the  State.   In  the

counter  affidavit  filed on its  behalf  by  the Under  Secretary,

Department  of  Finance,  it  was  inter alia stated  that  in  the

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State  of  Kerala  while  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the  Labour

Court are appointed under the provisions of Article 234 of the

Constitution  of  India,  the  Presiding  Officers  of  Industrial

Tribunals  are  not  so  appointed  under  Article  234  of  the

Constitution  of  India.   Thus,  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the

Industrial Tribunals are not entitled to the same scales of pay

as  recommended  by  the  National  Judicial  Pay  Commission

(Shetty Commission) for the members of the Higher Judiciary.

On these premises, it was claimed that the action of the State

Government was legal and valid.   

4. Taking note of the contentions and claims and counter

claims of the respective parties, the High Court has felt that

the  mere  fact  that  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the  Industrial

Tribunals  are  not  appointed  on the  recommendation of  the

High Court or that they are not under the control of the High

Court cannot, by itself, be a good reason and adequate ground

for  treating  them  differently  over  a  period  of  30  years.

Consequently,  the  High  Court  issued  the  afore-noted

directions  which  are  in  question  in  this  appeal  by  special

leave.

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5. Mr.  G.  Prakash,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the

appellant-State of Kerala, contended that the High Court erred

in  holding  that  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the  Industrial

Tribunals  are  entitled to the  same revised  scales  of  pay as

recommended  by  the  National  Judicial  Commission  (Shetty

Commission) for the members of the Higher Judicial Services

merely  on  the  assumption  that  prior  to  the  year  1998  the

Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals were getting the

same scale at par with the District Judges.  He also contended

that  the  services  of  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the  Industrial

Tribunals cannot be equated with that of the Judicial Officers

who  are  appointed  under  Articles  233  and  234  of  the

Constitution of India.   

6. Ms. Malini Poduval, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and Mr. C.N. Sreekumar, appearing

for C.N. Sasidharan and K. Kanakachandran, who have filed

I.A. No. 2 for their impleadment as additional respondents in

this appeal in support of the judgment of the High Court, have

contended  that  the  claim  of  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the

Industrial Tribunals before the High Court was that they be

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granted scale of pay fixed for District Judges as the duties,

functions and volume of work of the Industrial Tribunals are

equal to that of District Judges and earlier they were placed in

identical pay scales till the revision of pay scale of the Judicial

Officers in the year 1998.  According to the learned counsel,

the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunal do not claim

that they belong to the category of  District  Judges who are

appointed under Article 233 of the Constitution of India.  The

learned counsel then contended that the well-reasoned order

of  the  High  Court  does  not  suffer  from  any  infirmity  or

perversity and this Court normally should not interfere in the

well-merited  order  impugned  by  the  appellant-State  before

this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 of

the Constitution of India.

7. The  Labour  Courts  and  the  Industrial  Tribunals  have

been constituted in the State of Kerala under Sections 7 and

7A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to

as “the ID Act, 1947”).  In the present case,  we are concerned

with the appointments of Presiding Officers of the Industrial

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Tribunals constituted under Section 7A of the ID Act,  1947

which reads as under:-

“7A.  Tribunals  –  (1)  The  appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,  constitute  one  or  more  Industrial Tribunals  for  the  adjudication  of  industrial disputes  relating  to  any  matter,  whether specified in the Second Schedule  or the Third Schedule,  [and  for  performing  such  other functions  as  may  be  assigned  to  them under this Act]. (2) A Tribunal shall consist of one person only

to  be  appointed  by  the  appropriate Government.

(3) A  person  shall  not  be  qualified  for appointment  as the  presiding officer of  a Tribunal unless- (a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High

Court; or (aa) he has, for a period of not less than

three yeas, been a District Judge or an Additional Judge

(b) *  *  *  *  *  * (c) he  has  for  not  less  than  five  years

been a presiding officer  of  a Labour Court, constituted under any law for the time being in force;

(d) he  holds  a  degree  in  law  of  a University established by law in any part  of  India  and is  holding  or  has held an office not lower in rank than that  of  Assistant  Commissioner  of Labour under the State Government for not les than ten years.

(4) The appropriate Government may, if it so thinks  fit,  appoint  two  persons  as

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assessors  to  advise  the  Tribunal  in  the proceeding before it.”

8. By the Industrial Disputes (Kerala Amendment) Act, [Act

No. 28 of 1961], in its application to the State of Kerala under

sub-Section (3) of Section 7A of the ID Act, 1947 for Clause (a)

the following clause  has been substituted.   The substituted

clause (a) in sub-Section (3) reads as under:-

“(a) He is or has been a Judicial Officer not below the rank of a District  Judge,  or is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court; or”

9. Thus,  in  the  State  of  Kerala,  in  terms  of  the  above

substituted clause (a) in sub-Section (3) of Section 7A of the

ID Act, 1947, a judicial officer not below the rank of District

Judge is qualified to be appointed as Presiding Officer of the

Industrial Tribunal.  Indisputably,  prior to 1.7.1988 the pay

scale of the Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals and

District  Judges  was  Rs.2600-3800/-.   The  District  Judges

were granted selection grade in the scale of Rs. 3700-4200/-.

All the three Industrial  Tribunals Services at that time were

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also   placed   in  the  selection  grade  of  Rs.  3700-4200/-.

Government of Kerala appointed Pay Commission chaired by

Justice T.Chandrashekhara Menon to make recommendations

in  the  matter  of  revision  of  pay  scales  in  the  case  of

Government  employees.   The  Commission  recommended

revised scale of Rs. 3175 – 4605/- to the Industrial Tribunals

(Entry  Cadre)  and  Rs.  4435-5285/-  to  the  three  Industrial

Tribunals who were granted selection grade.  The Commission

recommended the same scale  of pay to the District Judges,

Sessions  Judges  and  selection  grade  District  Judges.   The

Government  of  Kerala  accepted the above  recommendations

and revised the pay scales of Industrial Tribunals and District

and Sessions Judges as recommended by the Pay Commission

with  effect  from 1.7.1988.   In  the  year,  1993,  Government

issued G.O. (P) No. 600/93/Fin. dated 08.12.1993 revising the

pay scales of State Government employees w.e.f. 01.03.1992.

By the said order, the scale of pay of Industrial Tribunals were

revised to Rs. 5100-5700/-.  In the above pay revision order in

respect  of  District  Judges  and  members  of  Subordinate

Judiciary,  it  was noted that revised scale  will  be  separately

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ordered.  It  was the admitted case of the State Government

that later on the Government issued separate order revising

the pay scales of District Judges to Rs. 5100-5700/- which is

the  same  scale  of  pay  granted  to  the  Industrial  Tribunals.

Indisputably,  the  Government  of  India  based  on  the

recommendations of this Court by resolution dated 21.3.1994

constituted the First National Judicial Pay Commission to go

into the question of the pay scales and to recommend uniform

scale of pay for the Subordinate Judiciary in the States and

Union  Territories.   Accordingly,  National  Judicial  Pay

Commission (Shetty Commission) recommended pay revision

to the District Judges and other members of the Subordinate

Judiciary  in  the  year  1998.   It  is  not  in  dispute  that  the

officers  who  presided  over  the  Labour  Courts  and  those

appointed as Presiding Officers of the Industrial Tribunals do

decide  disputes  under  the  ID  Act,  1947.   There  is  no

qualitative  difference  in  the  nature  of  functions  or  duties

attached to the categories of posts.  This parity having been

recognised and accepted by the State  Government  for more

than  30  years,  the  High  Court,  in  our  view,  has  rightly

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observed that the mere fact that the Constitution refers to the

appointment of District Judges alone cannot, by itself,  be a

good  ground  for  treating  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the

Industrial  Tribunal and the District Judges differently.  The

High  Court  held  that  even  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the

Industrial  Tribunals  are  not  outside  the  ambit  of  the

Constitution as the protection of rules framed under Article

309 as also under Article 311 is available to them.  The State

Government  had  granted  pay  scale  at  par  with  that  of  the

District Judges before the recommendations of the pay scales

of  the  District  Judges  by  the  Shetty  Commission  by  which

District Judges were placed in higher scales which benefit has

been denied to the Presiding Officers of Industrial Tribunals

merely  on  the  ground  that  the  Presiding  Officers  of  the

Industrial Tribunal are not appointed under Article 233 of the

Constitution of India nor they are appointed to the Judicial

Services  of a State under Article 234 of the Constitution.  The

action  of  the  State  Government  in  treating  the  officers

presiding  over  the  Industrial  Tribunal  differently  from  the

District Judges in the matter of pay scales on its face is in

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violation  of  Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   The

essential  educational  and  professional  qualifications  for

appointment  of  the  Presiding  Officer  of  the  Industrial

Tribunals are identical to that of the appointment of District

Judge.   The High Court in its order dated 25.11.1999 passed

in O.P.  No.  20490/1999-C filed  by the respondents  noticed

that in the counter affidavit filed by the State Government in

the said writ petition, it was stated: “that the duties, functions

and scales  of pay of  the Presiding Officers of  the Industrial

Tribunals are equal to that of the District Judges.  The request

for granting 35% of the interim relief was taken up with the

Pay Revision Committee and on the basis of the remarks of

the  Pay Revision Committee  the respondents have  informed

the Industrial Tribunals that they would continue to get two

instalments to interim relief and they need not be allowed 35%

of  the  interim relief.”   On  this  premise,  the  High  Court  in

paragraph 6 of its order observed as under:-

“When the  Government  admits  that  the duties,  functions  and  scales  of  pay  of  the Industrial  Tribunals  are  equal  to  that  of District Judges, I do not find any justification for  not  granting  the  interim  relief  of  15%

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granted to the Judicial Officers as per Exhibit P4  to  the  Petitioners.    Anyway,  the Government  has  promised  that  they  will implement  the  report  of  the  First  National Judicial Pay Commission.  In Exhibit P4 also it has been stated that the interim relief of 35% granted  will  be  fully  adjusted  against  and included  in  the  package  on  the  final recommendation of the First National Judicial Pay  Commission.   Therefore,  there  was  no justifiable reason not to apply these principles to the petitioners.”

10. The ratio of the judgment in  Chandra Mohan v. State

of  U.P.  &  Ors. AIR  (1966)  SC  1987,  relied  upon  by  the

appellant-State has no bearing upon the legal proposition and

factual situation involved in the case on hand.  In  the said

case,  the  question  before  this  Court  was  in  regard  to  the

interpretation of the expression, “the service” in Clause (2) of

Article  233  of  the  Constitution.   This  Court  held  that  the

Chapter  dealing  with  “subordinate  courts”  in  which  the

expression  “the  service”  appears  indicates  that  the  service

mentioned therein is the service  pertaining to courts.   That

apart, Article 236(2) defines the expression “judicial service” to

mean a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to

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fill  the  post  of  District  Judge  and other  civil  judicial  posts

inferior  to  the  post  of  District  Judge.  The  expressions

“exclusively”  and  “intended”  emphasise  the  fact  that  the

judicial service consists only of persons intended to fill up the

posts of District Judges and other civil judicial posts and that

is the exclusive service of judicial officers.  In the present case,

the respondents’ claim before the High Court was confined to

equal scale of pay to that of the District Judges.   This was

based on the fact that the respondents are discharging similar

duties and functions in the administration of justice and their

scale of pay was equal to that of District Judges till revision of

pay  scales  of  the  Judicial  Officers  in  the  year  1998.   The

Industrial  Tribunals  are  indisputably  judicial  tribunals

manned by legal professionals who are eligible to be appointed

as  District  Judges  or  Judges  of  the  High  Courts.   The

Presiding  Officers  are  exercising  judicial  powers  and  duties

under the ID Act, 1947 and their decisions are subject matter

of challenge before the High Court by way of writ petition.  The

only difference is their source of recruitment.

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11. Looking to the nature of duties and functions of these

respondents, we are of the opinion that there is no reason to

treat them differently. Once these persons are already working

for more than three decades discharging the same functions

and duties, we see no reason why the same benefit should not

be  given  to  the  respondents  and  other  similarly  situated

Presiding  Officers  of  the  Tribunal  who  are  the  applicants

before us in IA No. 2/2004.

12. In  State  of  Maharashtra  v.  Labour  Law

Practitioners’ Association [(1998) 2 SCC 688],  the question

before  the  High  Court  was  whether notification  dated

8.3.1979 issued by the State of Maharashtra under the ID Act,

1947  and  the  Bombay  Industrial  Relations  Act  and  the

amended  Section  7  of  the  ID  Act,  1947  insofar  as  these

provisions  authorised  the  appointment  of  Assistant

Commissioners  of  Labour  working  as Judges  of  the  Labour

Court were void and illegal and contrary to Article 234 of the

Constitution.  There was also a prayer in the writ petition for a

direction  to  the  State  of  Maharashtra  to  comply  with  the

provisions  of  Article  234  of  the  Constitution  while  making

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appointments of judges of the Labour Court.  A learned Single

Judge of the High Court set aside the notification of 8.3.1997

and  also  gave  a  direction  to  the  State  of  Maharashtra  to

comply with the provisions of Article 234 of the Constitution

while appointing Judges of the Labour Court.  Being aggrieved

by  this  judgment  and  order,  the  appellant–State  of

Maharashtra preferred an appeal before Division Bench of the

High Court which appeal has been dismissed.  Thus the State

of Maharashtra filed an appeal before this Court.  This Court

while dealing with and interpreting the provisions of Articles

233,  234,  235,  236(a)  and (b)  and Section 3(17)  of  General

Clauses  Act,  Bombay  Industrial  Relations  Act,  1946  and

Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of

Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, held: (Para 5 SCC p. 692)  

“5. There is not much difficulty in holding that the Labour Court  performs judicial functions  and  is  a  Court.  The  Labour Court  adjudicates  upon  disputes  that, had  it  not  been  for  the  Industrial Disputes  Act,  the  Bombay  Industrial Relations  Act  and  the  Maharashtra Recognition  of  Trade  Unions  and Prevention  of  Unfair  Labour  Practices Act,  would  have  been  within  the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts to

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decide, although the ordinary civil courts may not  be  able  to grant  all  the  reliefs that are contemplated by these Acts.  The Labour Courts are, therefore, courts and decide disputes that are civil in nature.”

In paragraph 6 (see  pp. 692-693), it was held:-

“6.  In  the  case  of  Bharat  Bank  Ltd.  v. Employees  AIR [1950] SC 459, this Court considered whether an Industrial Tribunal was a court. It said that one cannot go by mere  nomenclature.  One  has to  examine the  functions  of  a  Tribunal  and  how  it proceeds  to  discharge  those  functions.  It held  that  an  Industrial  Tribunal  had  all the  trappings  of  a  court  and  performed functions which cannot but be regarded as judicial. The Court referred to the Rules by which  proceedings  before  the  Tribunal were  regulated.  The  Court  dwelt  on  the fact that the powers vested in it are similar to those exercised by civil courts under the code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit. It  had  the  power  of  ordering  discovery, inspection etc. and forcing the attendance of  witnesses,  compelling  production  of documents and so on. It gave its decision on the basis of evidence and in accordance with law.  Applying  the  test  laid  down in the case of Cooper v. Wilson, [1937] 2 K.B. 309 at p. 340, this Court said that "a true judicial decision presupposes an existence of  dispute  between  two  or  more  parties and then involves four requisites :- (1) the presentation of  their  case  by the parties; (2)  ascertainment  of  facts  by  means  of

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evidence adduced by the parties often with the  assistance  of  argument;  (3)  if  the dispute  relates  to  a  question  of  law, submission  of  legal,  arguments  by  the parties; and (4) by decision which disposes of the whole matter by findings on fact and application  of  law  to  facts  so  found, Judged by the same tests, a Labour Court would undoubtedly be a court in the true sense of the term. The question, however, is whether such a court and the presiding officer of such a court can be said to hold a post in the judicial service of the State as defined in Article 236 of the Constitution.”

Further paras 10, 11 and 12(see pp694-695:

“10.  The District Judge, therefore, covers a  judge  of  any  Principal  Civil  Court  of Original Jurisdiction. With an increase in the  numbers  of  a  specialised  courts  and tribunals  which are  being  set  up to  deal with specific kinds of civil litigation which would otherwise have been dealt  with by the  ordinary civil  courts,  we  now have  a number  of  specialised  courts  exercising different  categories  of  civil  original jurisdiction.  It  can  be  specialised  civil original  jurisdiction  pertaining  to  Labour and  Industrial  disputes  specified  in  the relevant Acts as in the case of Labour and Industrial Courts, or it could be pertaining to recovery of bank debts and so on. The structure of civil courts exercising original jurisdiction  is  no  longer  monolithic.  The judge of the Principal Civil Court heading

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the concerned set of courts under him and exercising that jurisdiction can also fall in the  category  of  a  "District  Judge"  by whatever  name  called.  Learned  single judge and learned Judges of the Division Bench  have,  therefore,  held  that  and Industrial Court is a civil court exercising civil  original  jurisdiction;  and the  person presiding over it could well be termed as a District  Judge.  The term "District  Judge" should not be a confined only to the judge of the Principal Civil Court in the hierarchy of general civil courts. The term would now have  to  include  also  the  hierarchy  of specialised  civil  courts,  such  as  a hierarchy of Labour Courts and Industrial Courts. The fact that the Chief Presidency Magistrate  and  the  Sessions  Judge  were also included in the definition of "District" Judge indicates that a wide interpretation is  to  be  given to  the  expression "District Judge".  The  extensive  definition  of  a District  Judge  under  Article  236  is indicative of the same.

11.  Under  Article  236(b)  the  expression "judicial  service"  is  defined  to  mean  "a service  consisting  exclusively  of  persons intended  to  fill  the  post  of  district  judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post  of  district  judge."  Judicial  service thus postulates a hierarchy of courts with the District Judge as the head and other judicial  officers  under  him  discharging only judicial functions.

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12.  In  the  case  of  Chandra  Mohan  v. State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  and  Ors.,  AIR (1966) SC 1987 this Court was required to consider  the  question  of  eligibility  of "judicial  officers"  for  appointment  as District  Judges  under  Article  233  of  the Constitution.  Under  the  U.P.  Higher Judicial  Service  Rules  "Judicial  Officers" were  eligible  for  appointment  as  District Judges and the expression was meant to cover  members  of  the  executive department who discharged some revenue and  magisterial  duties  also.  When selection of such persons was challenged, this  Court  was  required  to  consider  and interpret the provisions of Articles 233 to 236 of the Constitution. The procedure for selection  under  the  said  Rules  was  also challenged as violative of Article 233.  The Court  said  that  the  Governor  could  not appoint  as  District  Judge  persons  from services other than the judicial services. A person  who  is  in  the  police,  excise, revenue  or  such other  service  cannot  be appointed  as  a  District  Judge.  Dealing with the  definition of  "judicial  service"  in Article  236,  this  Court  said  that  the judicial  service  consists  only  of  persons intended  to  fill  up  the  posts  of  District Judges and other civil  judicial  posts and that is an exclusive service only consisting of  judicial  officers.  In  so  interpreting judicial  service  in  contradistinction  to executive  service  where  some  executive officers may also be performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions, this Court was at pains  to  emphasis  the  Constitutional scheme for independence of the judiciary. It  said  that  the  acceptance  of  this  (i.e.

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Government's)  position  would  take  us back to pre-independence days and would also cut across the well-knit scheme of the Constitution providing for independence of the  judiciary.  This  Court,  therefore, defined judicial service in exclusive terms as  consisting  only  of  judicial  officers discharging entirely judicial duties. It said that having provided for appointments to that  service  and  having  entrusted  the control of the said service to the care of the High Court, the makers of the Constitution would not have conferred a blanket power on  the  Governor  to  appoint  any  person from any service as a District Judge.”

13. The  principle  of  “equal  pay  for  equal  work”  has  been

considered, explained and applied in a catena of decisions of

this Court.  The doctrine of “equal pay for equal  work” was

originally  propounded  as  part  of  the  Directive  Principles  of

State Policy in Article 39(d) of the Constitution.  Thus, having

regard  to  the  Constitutional  mandate  of  equality  and

inhibition  against  discrimination  in  Articles  14  and  16,  in

service  jurisprudence,  the  doctrine  of  “equal  pay  for  equal

work”  has  assumed  the  status  of  fundamental  right.   (see

Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618 and D.S.

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Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305].  In the latest

judgment, a two-Judge Bench this Court in the case of Union

of India v. Dineshan K.K. (2008) 1 SCC 586 held that if the

necessary material on the basis whereof the claim for parity of

pay scale is made is available on record with necessary proof

and that there  is  equal  work of  equal  quality  and all  other

relevant  factors  are  fulfilled  the  decision  of  the  Central

Government  denying  the  benefits  of  same  rank  and  pay

structure to a Radio Mechanic in Assam Rifle as was given to

other  Central  Paramilitary  Forces  was  held  to  be  clearly

irrational and arbitrary and thus, violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution.   

14. Having  regard  to  the  well-reasoned  judgment  of  the

Division  Bench,  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  impugned

judgment warrants no interference inasmuch as no illegality,

infirmity or error of jurisdiction could be shown before us by

the appellant-State.   

15. In the result,  for the reasons stated above,  we find no

merit  in  this  appeal.   The  appeal  is  dismissed  accordingly.

The parties, however, are left to bear their own costs.

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16. In view of the above, no orders on the I.A. Nos. 2 & 3 of

2004.

........................................J.                                                 (C. K. Thakker)

........................................J.                                                 (Lokeshwar Singh Panta)

New Delhi, June 5, 2008.

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