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PETITIONER: STATE OF KERALA & ORS. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: T.N. PETER & ANR. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/04/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1438            1980 SCR  (3) 290  1980 SCC  (3) 554  CITATOR INFO :  F          1982 SC1214  (7)  RF         1986 SC 468  (34,35)

ACT:      Cochin Town Planning Act-S.34(1) validity of,

HEADNOTE:      The Cochin Town Planning Act in particular contemplates the creation  of a  town planning  trust, the preparation of town planning  schemes (section  12) acquisition of lands in this behalf  (section 32)  compensation for  such compulsory taking (section  34) and  modifications  in  the  manner  of acquisition and  the mode of compensation in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act.      The  petitioners’   writ  petitions   challenging   the validity of  the Town  Planning Act were allowed by the High Court on the ground that the provisions of Section 34(1) and 34(2A) were  unconstitutional being  violative of article 14 of the Constitution.      In appeal  to this  Court it  was contended that by the use of  the provisions for making schemes under section 8 or section 10,  the authority  may indefinitely  immobilize the owner’s ability  to deal  with his  land  since  section  15 clamps restrictions and this is unreasonable. ^      HELD: 1.  City improvement  schemes have  facets  which mark them out from other land acquisition proposals. To miss the massive import of the 15 specialised nature of important schemes is  to expose  one’s innocence  of the  dynamics  of urban development. The statute has left it to the government to  deal   expeditiously  with  the  scheme  and  there  are sufficient guidelines in the Act not to make the gap between the   draft    scheme   and    governmental   sanction   too procrastinatory to be arbitrary. [294 G-H]      2. Section  12(6) imparts  finality to  The scheme  and this corresponds  to the  declaration under section 6 of the Land  Acquisition   Act.  A   conspectus  of   the  relevant provisions of the Act makes it clear that improvement scheme cannot hang  on indefinitely  and an  outside limit  of  two years is given for the preparation and publication- of draft schemes from  the time  the initial  resolution to  make  or adopt  the  scheme  is  passed  by  the  Municipal  Council.

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Conceptwise and strategy-wise development schemes stand on a separate footing and classification of town planning schemes differently from  the routine  projects demanding compulsory acquisition may  certainly be justified as based on rational differentia which  has a  reasonable relation  to the end in view namely  improvement of  towns  and  disciplining  their development. [295 F-G]      3. There  is no  substance in  the argument that if the land is  acquired under the Town Planning Act no solatium is payable while  if  the  land  is  acquired  under  the  Land Acquisition  Act   it  is  a  statutory  obligation  of  the acquiring government  to pay solatium. The Town Planning Act is a  special statute  where lands  have to  be acquired  on large scale  and as early and as quickly as possible so that schemes may  be implemented  with promptitude.  There is  in addition a  specific and purposeful provision excluding some sections of the 291 Kerala Land  Acquisition Act.  In such  circumstances it  is incredible that  the authority  acting under  the  Act  will sabotage chapter VII, in particular section 34, by resorting to the  Kerala Land  Acquisition Act  in derogation  of  the express provision  facilitating acquisition of lands on less onerous terms. [299C-D]      Maganlal v.  Municipal Corporation,  [1975] 1 S.C.R. p. 23, referred to.      4. The amount of compensation payable has no bearing on the distinction  whether the  lands are acquired for housing or hospital,  irrigation schemes or town improvement, school building or police station. 5(a) The exclusion of section 25 of the  Land Acquisition  Act from  section 34 of the Act is unconstitutional. But it is severable. [302G]      (b) The  only discriminatory  factor as between section 34 of  the Act  and section  25 of  the Land Acquisition Act vis-a-vis quantification  of compensation is the non-payment of solatium  in the former case because of the provisions of section 34(1)  and that  section 25  of the Land Acquisition Act shall  have no  application. To  achieve the  virtue  of equality and eliminate the vice of inequality what is needed is the  obliteration of  section 25  of the Land Acquisition Act from  section 34(1)  of the Town Planning Act. The whole of section  34(1) does  not have to be struck down. Once the discriminatory and  void part in section 34(1) of the Act is excised  equality  is  restored.  The  owner  will  then  be entitled to the same compensation including solatium that he may be eligible under the Land Acquisition Act. [303E-F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeals Nos. 848- 850 of 1977.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  16-7-1976  of  the Kerala High Court in W.A. Nos. 910, 194 and 253/75.                             AND      CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 666-669 of 1978.      From the  Judgment and  decree dated  8-6-1977  of  the Kerala High Court in W.A. Nos. 364-365, 472 and 473 of 1975.      P. Govindan  Nair and  K. R. Nambiar for the Appellants in CAs.  848/77 and 666-667/78 and for Respondents 2 to 4 in CA 849/77 and 2-3 in CA 850/77.      M. M.  Abdul Khader and N. Sudhakaran for the Appellant in CAs.  849-850/77 and Respondent 2 in CA 848/77 and RR1 in CA 666/78, 667/78 and RR 2 in CA 668-669/78.      T. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, T.P. Sundara Rajan and P. K.

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Pillai for Respondent No. 1 in 848/77.      T. L.  Vishwanath Iyer,  and S.  Balakrishnan  for  the Respondent No.  1 in  CAs. 668-669/78  and RR 2 in CAs. 666- 667/78.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 292      KRISHNA  IYER,   J.  Law  and  development,  as  yet  a Cinderella of  our corpus  juris, is  a burgeoning branch of creative jurisprudence  which needs  to  be  nourished  with judicious care,  by courts in developing countries. The Town Planning  Act,   a  developmental  legislation  amended  and updated by  the Kerala  Legislature, was designed to draw up plans and  to execute  projects for  the improvement  of the towns  and  cities  of  that  over-crowded  State  with  its populous  multitudes   uncontrollably  spiralling,   defying social hygiene and economic engineering. Although the Act is of 1932 and originally confined to the Travancore portion of the Kerala  State, it  has received amendatory attention and now applies  to the  whole of  Kerala with beneficial impact upon  explosive   cities  like   Cochin.  This  legislation, naturally, has  made some  deviation from  the  Kerala  Land Acquisition Act,  1961,  but  having  received  insufficient attention from  the draftsman  on constitutional provisions, has landed  the Act in litigation through a challenge in the High Court  where it  met with  its judicial Waterloo when a Division Bench  invalidated Section  31(1) and  34(2A) which were the  strategic provisions  whose exit  from the statute would virtually  scotch the  whole  measure.  The  State  of Kerala has  come up in appeal, although the immediate victim is the Cochin Town Planning Trust.      The schematic  projection of the Town Planning Act (the Act, for  short) may  be  a  good  starting  point  for  the discussion of  the sub  missions made  at the  Bar. The Act, with  a   prophetic   touch,   envisions   explosive   urban developments  leading  to  terrific  stresses  and  strains, human, industrial  and societal.  Land is at the base of all development, and  demand for  the limited space available in the cities  may so defile and distort planned progress as to give future shock unless scientific social engineering takes hold of the situation. The State of its specialized agencies must take  preemptive action  and regulate  the  process  of growth.  The  Act  fills  this  need  and  contemplates  the creation of  a Town  Planning  Trust,  preparation  of  town planning schemes,  acquisition  of  lands  in  this  behalf, compensation  for   betterment   by   citizens   and   other miscellaneous provisions, apart from creation of development authorities. While  this is  the sweep  of the  statute, our concern is  limited to  schemes sanctioned  by  Section  12, acquisition of  lands for  such schemes  under  Section  32, compensation for such compulsory taking under Section 34 and the modifications  in the manner of acquisition and the mode of compensation  wrought into  the - Land Acquisition Act by the above  provisions  of  the  Town  Planning  Act.  It  is indisputable that the compensation payable and certain other matters  connected   therewith,  differ   as   between   the provisions in  this Act  and the  Land Acquisition  Act. The latter is more beneficial 293 to the  owner and the challenge, naturally, has stemmed from this allegedly  invidious discrimination.  In  two  separate cases, two  judges upheld  the challenge and, on appeal, the High Court affirmed the holdings that the provisions of Sub- section  34(1)   and  34(2A)  were  unconstitutional,  being violative of Article 14. Hence these appeals.      We will  now proceed  to  scan  the  substance  of  the

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submissions and the reasoning in the High Court’s judgment.      Counsel for the State, Shri P. Govindan Nair, supported by counsel  for the Trust, Shri Abdul Khader, have canvassed the correctness  of the  reasons which  have appealed to the High Court,  and some  decisions of  this  Court  have  been brought to  our notice in this connection. The owners of the lands acquired  have been represented before us by Sri T. C. Raghavan who  has, in  his short  submission, supported  the judgment  under  appeal.  One  of  the  appeals  has  become infructious,  because   the  State,  after  the  High  Court invalidated Section  34 of the Act, proceeded under the Land Acquisition Act,  acquired the  land, paid  compensation and took possession thereof, thus completely satisfying the land owner. Shri  T. S.  Krishnamurthi Iyer,  appearing  for  the owner, pointed  out this  circumstance and  so we  dismissed that appeal  but mention it here because Shri T. C. Raghavan has relied  on this fact in support of one of his arguments, as we  will presently  disclose. Before  entering  into  the merits,  we  may  recall  the  submissions  of  Shri  T.  L. Viswanathan, a  young lawyer  from Kerala,  who made us feel that  orality,   marked  by   pointed  brevity  and  suasive precision, is  more  telling  than  advocacy  with  counter- productive prolixity. Although the responsible scrutiny that a bench  decision  of  the  High  Court  deserves  has  been bestowed, we are unable to support the judgment under appeal or the arguments of counsel in support.      The controversy regarding the vires of Sec. 34 revolved round a  few points. Before us, Art. 14 has loomed large and a submission has been made that by use of the provisions for making schemes  under Sec.  8 or  Sec. 10  the authority may indefinitely immobilize the owner’s ability to deal with his land  since   Sec.  15  clamps  restrictions,  and  this  is unreasonable.      We agree  that it  is a  hardship for  the owner of the land if  his ability  to deal  with his  property is  either restricted or  prevented  by  a  notification,  and  nothing happens, thereafter,  leaving him  guessing as  to what  the State  may  eventually  do.  Indeed,  if  such  a  state  of suspense  continues   for  unlimited   periods,  it  may  be unreasonable restriction  on the right to property, although currently the right to pro- 294 perty itself  has been taken away from Part III. That apart, we must  see whether there is any justifiable classification between common  cases of  compulsory acquisition  under  the Land Acquisition  Act and  the special class of acquisitions covered by  the  Town  Planning  Act  which  may  furnish  a differentia sufficient  to repel  the attack  of Article 14. Section 15  of the Act forbids dealings by the owner in many ways, once  the publication  of a  notification is made. The grievance particularised  by Shri  Raghavan is  that after a draft scheme  has been prepared by the municipal council and published, it  becomes operational  only on  the sanction by Government but  there is  no time  limit fixed  in  Sec.  12 within which  Government shall  sanction. Supposing it takes several years  for Government  to express  its  approval  or disapproval, the owner may suffer.      We regard  this grievance  as mythical,  not real,  for more than  one reason.  The scheme  is for  improvement of a town and,  therefore, has a sense of urgency implicit in it. Government is  aware of  this  import  and  it  is  fanciful apprehension to  imagine that  lazy  insouciance  will  make Government slumber  over the  draft scheme  for long  years. Expeditious despatch  is writ  large on the process and that is an  in-built guideline  in the statute. At the same time,

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taking a  pragmatic view, no precise time scale can be fixed in the  Act because  of the  myriad factors  which are to be considered by  Government  before  granting  sanction  to  a scheme in  its original  form or after modification. Section 12 and  the other  provisions  give  us  some  idea  of  the difficulty of  a rigid  time-frame being  written  into  the statute especially  when schemes may be small or big, simple or complex, demanding enquiries or provoking discontent. The many  exercises,  the  differences  of  scale,  the  diverse consequences,  the  overall  implications  of  developmental schemes and  projects and  the plurality  of considerations, expert techniques  and frequent  consultations, hearings and other factors, precedent to according sanction are such that the many-sided  dimension of  the sanctioning  process makes fixation of  rigid time limits by the statute an impractical prescription.  As  pointed  out  earlier,  city  improvement schemes have  facets which  mark them  out from  other  land acquisition  proposals.  To  miss  the  massive  import  and specialised nature of improvement schemes is to expose one’s innocence  of   the  dynamics  of  urban  development.  Shri Raghavan fairly  pointed out  that, in other stages, the Act provides for  limitation in time (for example, sec. 33 which fixes  a   period  of   three  years  between  the  date  of notification  and  the  actual  acquisition).  Only  in  one minimal area  where time-limit  may not  be workable, it has not been specified. The statute has left it to Government to deal expeditiously  with the  scheme and  we see  sufficient guideline in the Act not to make the gap between the 295 draft scheme  and governmental  sanction too procrastinatory to be  arbitrary. We  need hardly say, that the court is not powerless  to   quash  and  grant  relief  where,  arbitrary protraction or  mala fide inaction of authorities injures an owner.      An aside:  We are  surprised  at  the  obsolescent  and obscurantist vocabulary  surviving in  the Town Planning Act because there  are many B feudal and incongruous expressions such  as   ’our  Governments   and  references   to  a  Land Acquisition Act  which has  already  been  repealed  by  the Kerala  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1961.  Modernisation  is  a process necessary  even for  the statute book and yet it has not been  done, despite  opportunity  for  the  legislature, while amending  later, to  carry out such simple, verbal and yet necessary  changes.  Be  it  remembered  that  the  Town Planning Act  did undergo  an extensive amendment as late as 1976 when,  surely, some  of the  verbal replacements  could easily have been made. Medievalism lingering in legislations is hardly a tribute to the awareness of our legislators.      Section 12 of the Act provides for publishing the draft schemes so that objections or suggestions may be put forward by affected  persons. The  scheme  is  then  passed  by  the Municipal Council,  of course,  after considering objections and  suggestions.   Thereupon,  it   is  submitted   to  the Government for  sanction and  the fact of such submission is also published so that the public may still raise objections or make  suggestions to Govt. which will consider them, make further inquiries, if necessary, and ultimately sanction the scheme with  or without  modifications or  may  even  refuse sanction or  return the  scheme to  the  Council  for  fresh consideration.  Once   the  scheme   is  sanctioned  by  the Government, it  is again  published. Section  12(6)  imparts finality to the scheme and this virtually corresponds to the declaration under  sec.  6  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act. Chapter III  of the Act is comprehensive and complex because the subject  of scheme-making  demands expert  attention and

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affects community  interest. A  Director of Town Planning is appointed who  shall be  consulted by  Municipal Councils in matters of  town planning.  Developmental  schemes  are  not sudden creations.  On the  other hand, the Municipal Council first decides to prepare a scheme, adopts a draft scheme, if any, made by the owners of the lands, prepares the necessary plan of  the lands  which is  proposed to be included in the scheme and  notify its  resolution for public information. A copy of  the plan  is kept for the inspection of the public. Since all improvement schemes are matters of public concern, on the  passing of  a resolution  and its notification under sec. 8,  a time-bound  obligation is  cast on  the Municipal Council by s. 9, which reads thus : 296      "S. 9: Publication of draft scheme:      (1)  If the  resolution is  to make a scheme, municipal           council shall,  within twelve months from the date           of the  notification  under  s.8  or  within  such           further period not exceeding twelve months, as our           Government may allow, and after consulting, in the           prescribed  manner,   the  owners   of  lands  and           buildings  in   the  area  affected,  prepare  and           publish a draft scheme."      It is  apparent that improvement schemes cannot hang on indefinitely and  an outside  limit of  2 years is given for the preparation  and publication  of draft  schemes from the initial resolution  to make or adopt the scheme is passed by the Municipal  Council. Government  itself may  step in  and direct the  Municipal Council to prepare schemes and sec. 10 empowers it  in  this  behalf.  Sec.  11  contains  detailed provisions regarding  the material  to be  included  in  the draft scheme.  These are  preparatory  exercises,  and  then comes the  sanction of  the scheme  by the  Government under Sec.  12.   We  indicate  the  elaborate  character  of  the strategy, stages,  contents and  character  of  schemes  for improvement  and   the  opportunities   for  objections  and suggestions  to   the  public   and  the  consultation  with technical experts  and Government,  time and  again, only to emphasise the  complex nature  of modern  urban  development schemes which  makes it a different category altogether from the common  run of  ’public purposes’  for which  compulsory acquisition is  undertaken by  the  State.  Conceptwise  and strategywise,  development   schemes  stand  on  a  separate footing  and   classification  of   town  planning   schemes differently from  the routine  projects demanding compulsory acquisition  may  certainly  be  justified  as  based  on  a rational differentia  which has a reasonable relation to the end in  view viz.,  improvement of  towns  and  disciplining their development.      Once this  basic factor is recognised, the raison detre of a separate legislation for and separate treatment of town planning as  a special subject becomes clear. It was pointed out that  under the  Kerala Land Acquisition Act, there is a time limit of 2 years written into Section 6 by engrafting a proviso thereto  through an amendment of 1968 Act (Act 29 of 1968). Section  6 deals  with a  declaration  that  land  is required for  a public  purpose  and  the  relevant  proviso thereto reads:      "S.6(i) Proviso :      Provided  that   no  declaration   in  respect  of  any      particular land  covered by  a notification  under sub-      section (1) of 297      Sec. 3 shall be made after the expiry of two years from      the  date of publication of such notification."

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An argument  was put forward that under the Land Acquisition Act there is thus a protection against unlimited uncertainty for the  owners once  lands are  frozen  in  the  matter  of dealing  with   them  by   an  initial   notification.  This protection against  protraction and  inaction on the part of the State  and immobilisation  of ownership is absent in the Town  Planning   Act.  According  to  Mr.  T.  C.  Raghavan, appearing for some respondents, this makes for arbitrariness and discrimination  invalidatory of  the relevant provisions of the  Town Planning Act. In our view there is no substance in this  submission, having regard to the specialised nature of improvement schemes and the democratic a participation in the process required in such cases. We repel the submission.      Much  argument   was  addressed   on  the  ’either  or’ arbitrariness implicit  in s.  33 of  the Act.  The  precise contention is that it is open to the Trust to acquire either under the  Kerala Land  Acquisition Act or under Chapter VII of the  Town Planning  Act. In the latter event, no solatium is payable  while under the former statute it is a statutory obligation of  the acquiring Govt. Thus, if an Authority has an option  to proceed under one statute or the other and the consequences upon the owner are more onerous or less, such a facultative provision bears the lethal vice of arbitrariness in its  bosom and  is violative of Art. 14 and is therefore, void. Section  32 of  the Act  is the  foundation  for  this argument and reads thus: 32. Modification of Land Acquisition Act:      Immovable property  required for  the purpose  of  town      planning scheme shall be deemed to be land needed for a      purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act,      XI of  1089, and  may be  acquired under the said (Act)      modified in the manner provided in this chapter. What is  spun out of the words used is that for the purposes of town  planning schemes  an  immovable  property  "may  be acquired under  the said  Act  (The  Land  Acquisition  Act) modified in the manner provided in this Chapter". Of course, Chapter VII,  particularly sub-sec.  (1) of  s. 34  thereof, relates to  compensation and does not provide for payment of solatium. Moreover,  it is  mentioned that the provisions of ss. 14,  22 and 23 (both sides agree, this should be read as Sec.  25)   of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  shall  have  no application in  the acquisition  of property for the purpose of the Town Planning Act. 298      We do  not accept  the argument  that there  is a legal option for  the authority  to acquire  either under the Land Acquisition Act  or under the Town Planning Act when land is needed for  a scheme.  Theoretically, yes,  but practically, no. Which sensible statutory functionary, responsible to the Treasury and  to the  community, will  resort  to  the  more expensive process  under the Land Acquisition Act as against the specially  designed and  less costly  provision under s. 34? Fanciful  possibilities, freak  exercise and speculative aberrations are  not  realistic  enough  for  constitutional invalidation on  the score of actual alter. natives or alive options, one  more onerous  than the  other. In  Magan lal’s case, the Court pointed out :      "The statute  itself is the two classes of cases before      us clearly  lays down  the purpose behind them, that is      premises  belonging   to  the   Corporation   and   the      Government should be subject to speedy procedure in the      matter of evicting unauthorised persons occupying them.      This is  a sufficient  guidance for  the authorities on      whom  the  power  has  been  conferred.  With  such  an      indication clearly  given in  the statutes  one expects

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    the officers  concerned  to  abail  themselves  of  the      procedures prescribed by the Acts and not resort to the      dilatory procedure  of the  ordinary Civil  Court. Even      normally one  cannot  imagine  an  officer  having  the      choice of  two procedures, one which enables him to get      possession of  the property quickly and the other which      would be  a prolonged  one, to  resort to  the  latter.      Administrative officers,  no less  than the  courts, do      not function  in a vacuum. It would be extremely unreal      to hold  that an administrative officer would in taking      proceedings for  eviction of  unauthorised occupants of      Govt. property  or Municipal  property  resort  to  the      procedure prescribed by the two Acts in one case and to      the ordinary  Civil Court  in the other. The provisions      of these two Acts cannot be struck down on the fanciful      theory  that  power  would  be  exercised  in  such  an      unrealistic  fashion.   In  considering   whether   the      officers would  be discriminating  between one  set  of      persons and  another, one  has got to take into account      normal human  behaviour  and  not  behaviour  which  is      abnormal.  It  is  not  every  fancied  possibility  of      discrimination but the real risk of discrimination that      we must  take into  account. This  is not  one of those      cases where discrimination is writ large on the face of      the statute. Discrimi- 299      nation may  be possible  but is very improbable. And if      there is  discrimination in  actual practice this Court      is not powerless. Furthermore, the fact that the Legis-      lature  considered   that  the  ordinary  procedure  is      insufficient or  ineffective in  evicting  unauthorized      occupants  or   Govt.  and   Corporation  property  and      provided a special speedy procedure therefor is a clear      guidance for  the authorities  charged with the duty of      evicting unauthorised  occupants.  We  therefore,  find      ourselves unable  to agree  with the  majority  in  the      Northern India Caterers’ case."      The same  reasoning applies  to the  present situation. The Town  Planning Act is a special statute where lands have to be  acquired on a large scale and as early and quickly as possible  so   that  schemes   may   be   implemented   with promptitude.  What   is  more,   there  is  a  specific  and purposeful provision  excluding some  sections of the Kerala Land  Acquisition   Act.  In   such  circumstances,   it  is incredible that  the authority  acting under  the  Act  will sabotage Chapter  VII, in  particular s. 34, by resorting to the Kerala Land Acquisition Act in derogation of the express provision facilitating  acquisition of lands on less onerous terms. He functions under the Town Planning Act, needs Lands for  the   schemes  under   that  Act,  has  provisions  for acquisition under  that Act.  Then  would  be,  by  reckless action, travel beyond that Act and with a view to oblige the private owner  betray the  public interest and resort to the power under  the Land  Acquisition Act, disregarding the non obstante provision  in  Sec.  of  the  Act?  Presumption  of perversity cannot  be the foundation of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the  expression, used  in the  context of  s.  32, clearly (does  not bear  the meaning attributed to it by the counsel for  the respondents. All that it means is that when immovable property  is found  necessary for the purpose of a ’scheme’ it  may  be  acquired  by  the  compulsory  process written into s. 32. It is, as if there were only one option, not two.  If the  scheme is  to be  implemented, the mode of acquisition shall  be under  s. 32  and the  manner of  such acquisition is the same under the Land Acquisition Act minus

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ss. 14,  22 and  25 thereof.  A slight  reflection makes  it clear that  the mode  prescribed is  only one,  and  so  the theory of  alternatives one of which being mere onerous than the other,  and the  consequent inference  of arbitrariness, cannot arise. We overrule that argument.      We must  notice, before  we part  with this  point, the argument of  Sri  Raghavan  for  the  respondents  that  the existence of  alternatives is not theoretical nor chimerical but real,  and proof  of the  pudding is  in the  eating. He pointed to  one of  the appeals  in  this  batch  where  the proceedings under  sec. 34  of the  Act were  given up,  the provision 300 of the  Land Acquisition Act used, and full compensation and solatium paid  to the  owner. This  instance gave  flesh and blood to  the submission  about discrimination. Shri Khader, for  the  trust  countered  this  argument  by-stating  that because the High Court struck clown the Act and the land was needed. the only statute then available to the State was the Land Acquisition  Act. So,  the  authority  was  reluctantly constrained to notify and acquire under the Land Acquisition Act. Had  Sec. 34 of the Act been available, this step would not have  been taken  and absent  Sec. 34  the  argument  of alternatives has  no basis. We agree with this reasoning and repel the  submission of arbitrary power to pick and choose. At worst,  a swallow does not make a summer but we must warn that prodigal state action to favour some owner when sec. 34 has been  resuscitated will  be betrayal  of public interest and invalidated  as mala  fide even  at the  instance  of  a concerned citizen.  The legislature  cannot be stultified by the suspicious improvidence, or worse, of the Executive.      The  more   serious  submission   pressed  tersely  but clearly, backed  by a  catena of  cases, by Shri Viswanathan merits our  consideration. The  argument is shortly this. As between two  owners of  property.  the  presence  of  public purpose empowers  the State  to take  the lands of either or both. But the differential nature of the public purpose does not furnish  a rational  ground to pay more compensation for one  owner  and  less  for  another  and  that  impertinence vitiates the  present  measure.  The  purpose  may  be  slum clearance, flood  control or  housing for  workers, but  how does  the   diversity  of   purposes  warrant   payment   of differential scales  or quantum  of  compensation  where  no constitutional immunity  as in  Art. 31A, or applies? Public purpose sanctions compulsory acquisition, not discriminatory compensation, whether  you take  A’s  land  for  improvement scheme or  irrigation scheme,  how can you pay more or less, guided by an irrelevance viz. the particular public purpose? The State  must act  equally when  it takes  property unless there is an intelligent and intelligible differentia between two categories  of owners  having a  nexus with  the object, namely  the   scale  of  compensation.  It  is  intellectual confusion   of    constitutional   principle    to    regard classification good  for one  purpose,  as  obliteration  of differences for  unrelated aspects.  This  logic  is  neatly applied in a series af cases of this Court.      It is  trite that  the test  to rebuff Art. 14 turns of the differentia  vis-a-vis the object of the classification. In Vajarveu  Mudaiar’s case,  the Court  took the  view, (on this  aspect   the  decision  is  not  shown  to  have  been overruled) that where there is no rational relation in the 301 matter of quantum of compensation between one public purpose and another you cannot differentiate between owners. Whether you acquire for a hospital or university, for slum clearance

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or housing  scheme, compensation  cannot vary in the rate or scale or otherwise.           "Out of  adjacent lands  of the  same quality  and      value, one  may be  acquired for a housing scheme under      the Amending Act and the other for a hospital under the      Principal Act,  out of  two adjacent plots belonging to      the same individual and of the same quality’ and value,      one may  be acquired  under the Principal and the other      under the Amending Act. From whatever aspect the matter      is  looked   at,  the   alleged  differences   have  no      reasonable  relation   to  the   object  sought  to  be      achieved.      In Durganath  Sharma’s case,  a special legislation for acquisition  of   land  for   flood  control   came  up  for constitutional examination.  We  confine  ourselves  to  the differentiation in  the rate  of compensation  based on  the accident of the nature of the purpose where the Court struck a similar  note. In the Nagpur Improvement Trust case and in the Om Prakash case, this Court voided the legislation which provided differential  compensation based  upon the purpose. In the latter case the Court observed :           "There can  be  no  dispute  that  the  Govt.  can      acquire land for a public purpose including that of the      Mahapalika  or  other  local  body,  either  under  the      unmodified Land  Acquisition Act,  1894, or  under that      Act as  modified by  the Adhiniyam.  If it  chooses the      first course,  then the  land-owners concerned  will be      entitled to better compensation including 15% solatium,      the potential  value of the land etc. nor will there be      any impediment  or hurdle  such as  that enacted  by s.      372(a) of the Adhiniyam in the way of such land owners,      dissatisfied by  the Collector’s award, to approach the      Court under s. 18 of that Act.           ....It is  not necessary to dilate further on this      point at  this matter  stands concluded by this Court’s      decision in  Nagpur Improvement  Trust’s  case  by  the      ratio of which we bound. It will be sufficient to close      the discussion  by extracting  here  what  Sikri  C.J.,      speaking for  the Court  in Nagpur  Improvement Trust’s      case said:           "Can the  Legislature say that for a hospital land      will be  acquired at  50% of  the market  value, for  a      school at 60 % of the value and for a Govt. building at      70 % of the 302      market value? All three objects are public purposes and      as far  as the owner is concerned it does not matter to      him whether it is one public purpose or the other. Art.      14 confers  an individual right and in order to justify      a  classification   there  should  be  something  which      justifies a  different  treatment  to  this  individual      right. It  seems to us that ordinarily a classification      based on  the public  purpose is  not permissible under      Art. 14  for the  purpose of  determining compensation.      The position  is different  when the  owner of the land      himself  is   the  recipient   of  benefits   from   an      improvement scheme,  and the  benefit to  him is  taken      into  consideration   in   fixing   compensation.   Can      classifications be  made  on  the  basis  of  authority      acquiring  the  land?  In  other  words  can  different      principles of  compensation be  laid  if  the  land  is      acquired for  or by  an Improvement  Trust or Municipal      Corporation or  the Government? It seems to us that the      answer is  in the  negative because as far as the owner      is concerned it does not matter to him whether the land

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    is acquired by one authority or the other.           It  is   equally  immaterial  whether  it  is  one      Acquisition Act  or another Acquisition Act under which      the land  is acquired.  If the  existence of  two  Acts      could enable  the State  to give  one  owner  different      treatment from  another equally  situated the owner who      is discriminated  against, can  claim the protection of      Article 14."      The principle  that may be distilled from these rulings and  the   basics  of   ’equality’  jurisprudence   is  that classification is  not permissible for compensation purposes so long  as  the  differentia  relied  on  has  no  rational relation to the object in view viz. reduction in recompense.      Is it rational to pay different scales of compensation, as pointed  out by  Sikri, C.J.  in the  Nagpur  Improvement Trust case,  depending on whether you acquire for housing or hospital, irrigation  scheme  or  town  improvement,  school building  or  police-station?  The  amount  of  compensation payable has  no bearing  on this distinction, although it is conceivable that classification for purposes of compensation may exist  and in such cases the statute may be good. We are unable to  discern any  valid discremen in the Town Planning Act  vis-a-vis   the  Land   Acquisition  Act  warranting  a classification in the matter of denial of solatium.      We uphold  the Act  in other  respects but  not when it deals invidiously  between two owners based on an irrelevant criterion viz.  the acquisition  being  for  an  improvement scheme. We are not to be 303 understood to  mean that  the rate  of compensation  may not vary  or   must  be  uniform  in  all  cases.  We  need  not investigate this  question further as it does not arise here although  we   are  clear  in  our  mind  that  under  given circumstances  differentiation   even  in   the   scale   of compensation may  comfortably comport  with Art. 14. No such circumstances are  present here  nor  pressed.  Indeed,  the State, realising  the force  of this facet of discrimination offered, expilatory  fashion, both before the High Court and before us,  to pay  15% solatium  to obliterate  the hostile distinction.      The core  question now  arises. What is the effect even if we  read a  discriminatory design  in Sec. 34? Is plastic surgery permissible or demolition of the section inevitable? Assuming that  there is  an untenable  discrimination in the matter of  compensation does  the whole  of s. 34 have to be liquidated or  severable portions  voided? In  our  opinion, scuttling the section, the course the High Court has chosen, should be  the last step. The Court uses its writ power with a constructive design, an affirmative slant and a sustaining bent.  Even   when  by   compulsions  of  inseverability,  a destructive stroke becomes necessary the court minimises the injury by  an intelligent  containment. Law  keeps alive and "operation  pull   down"  is   de  mode.  Viewed  from  this perspective, so  far  as  we  are  able  to  see,  the  only discriminatory factor  as between s. 34 of the Act and s. 25 of the  Land Acquisition  Act  vis-a-vis  quantification  of compensation is  the non-payment  of solatium  in the former case because  of the provision in s. 34(1) that s. 25 of the Land Acquisition  Act shall  have no  application. Thus,  to achieve the  virtue of equality and to eliminate the vice of inequality what  is needed  is the  obliteration of s. 25 of the Land  Acquisition Act from s. 34(1) of the Town Planning Act. The  whole of s. 34(1) does not have to be struck down. Once we  excise the discriminatory and, therefore, void part in Sec.  34(1) of  the Act,  equality is restored. The owner

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will then  be entitled  to the  same compensation, including solatium, that  he  may  be  eligible  for  under  the  Land Acquisition Act. What is rendered void by Art. 13 is only to the extent  of the  contravention of  Art. 14. The lancet of the Court  may remove  the offending  words and  restore  to constitutional health the rest of the provision.      We hold  that the  exclusion of  Sec. 25  of  the  Land Acquisition Act  from sec. 34 of the Act is unconstitutional but  it   is  severable  and  we  sever  it.  The  necessary consequence is that s. 34(1) will be read omitting the words ’and s.  25’ .  What follows  then? Section 32 obligates the state to  act under  the Land  Acquisition Act  but we  have struck down  that part  which excludes  sec. 25  of the Land Acquisition Act 304 and so,  the ’modification’  no  longer  covers  s.  25.  It continues to  apply to the acquisition of property under the Town Planning  Act. Section  34(2) provides for compensation exactly like  s. 25(1)  of the  Land Acquisition Act and, in the light  of what  we have just decided, s. 25(2) will also apply and  "in addition  to the  market value of the land as above provided, the court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per cen tum on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition."      The upshot  of this  litigation thus is that the appeal must be  allowed except to the extent that solatium shall be payable as  under the  Land Acquisition Act. Since the State has always  been willing  to  pay  that  component  and  has repeated that offer even before us right from the beginning, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs. P.B.R.    Appeal allowed. 305