02 September 1996
Supreme Court
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STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs S.M. KOTRAYYA .

Bench: K. RAMASWAMY,G.B. PATTANAIK
Case number: C.A. No.-012037-012048 / 1996
Diary number: 89477 / 1993
Advocates: M. VEERAPPA Vs


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PETITIONER: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S.M. KOTRAYYA & ORS. ... RESPONDENTS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       02/09/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Delay condoned.      Leave granted.      At the outset, we express our deep appreciation for the valuable assistance  rendered by  Shri D.V.  Sehgal, learned senior counsel  who appeared as amicus curiae at our request since the  respondents did  not appear  either in  person or through counsel.      These appeals  by special  leave arise  from the common order of the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, dated August 14, 1989  made in  Application Nos. 4134-45/89. The admitted facts are that the respondents, while working as teachers in the  Department   of  Education,  availed  of  Leave  Travel Concession during  the year 1981-82. But later it transpired that they   had  never utilised  the benefit of LTC but drew the amount  and used  it. Consequently,  recovery came to be made  in  the  year  1984-86.  Some  of  the  persons  filed applications in  the Tribunal  questioning the  power of the Government  to  recover  the  same.  It  would  appear  that thereafter in  August  1989  the  Tribunal  allowed  similar claims and  had held that the appellant-Government could not recover the  same from the respondents, On coming to know of it, the respondents filed applications in August 1989 before the Tribunal  with an  application to condone the delay. The Tribunal has condoned the delay by the impugned order. Thus these appeals by special leave.      Shri  Veerappa,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant, placing reliance  on the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court  in S.S.  Rathore Vs.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh [(1989) 4  SCC 582  at 591,  para 21],  contended  that  the Tribunal  has   no  power   to  condone  the  delay  if  the respondents had  not given  any explanation  why  they could not file  the application within six months and if they came to be  filed beyond six months covered by sub-section (2) of Section 21  of the  Administrative Tribunals  Act, 1985 (for short, the  "Act"), the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay we find no force in the contention.      Section 21 reads as under :      "21. LIMITATION  - (1)  A  Tribunal      shall not admit an application, -

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    (a)  in a  case where a final order      such as  is mentioned  in clause 20      has been  made in  connection  with      the    grievance     unless     the      application  is  made,  within  one      year from  the date  on which  such      final order has been made;      (b)  in a  case where  an appeal or      representation such as is mentioned      in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of      Section 20  has  been  made  and  a      period of  six months  had  expired      thereafter without such final order      having been  made, within  one year      from the date of expiry of the said      period of six months      (2)    Notwithstanding     anything      contained in sub-section (1), where           (a)  the grievance  in respect      of which an application is made had      arisen by  reason of any order made      at any  time during  the period  of      three years  immediately  preceding      the date on which the jurisdiction,      powers   and   authority   of   the      Tribunal   become exercisable under      this Act  in respect  of the matter      to which such order relates; and           (b)  no  proceedings  for  the      redressal  of  such  grievance  had      been commenced before the said date      before   any    High   Court,   the      application shall be entertained by      the Tribunal  if it  is made within      the period  referred to  in  clause      (a), or, as the case may be, clause      (b), of sub-section (1) or within a      period of  six months from the said      date,  whichever   period   expires      later.      (3)    Notwithstanding     anything      contained  in  sub-section  (1)  or      sub-section (2), an application may      be admitted after the period of one      year specified  in  clause  (a)  or      clause (b)  of sub-section  (1) or,      as the  case may  be, the period of      six months specified in sub-section      (2), if the applicant satisfies the      Tribunal that  they had  sufficient      cause   for    not    making    the      application within such period."           [emphasis supplied]      A reading  of the said section would indicate that sub- section (1)  of  Section  21  provides  for  limitation  for redressal of  the grievances  in clauses  (a)  and  (b)  and specifies the  period of one year. Sub-section (2) amplifies the limitation  of one year in respect of grievances covered under clauses  (a) and  (b) and an outer limit of six months in respect  of grievances  covered  by  sub-section  (2)  is provided. Sub-section  (3) postulates  that  notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), if the  applicants   satisfy  the   Tribunal  that.   they  had sufficient cause for not making the applications within such period enumerated  in sub-sections (1) and (2) from the date

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of application  the Tribunal has been given power to condone the delay,  on satisfying  itself that  the applicants  have satisfactorily   explained   the   delay   in   filing   the applications for  redressal of  their grievances.  When sub- section (2)  has given  power for making applications within one year of the grievances covered under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section  (1) and within the outer limit of six months in respect  of the grievances covered under sub-section (2), there is  no need  for the applicant to give any explanation to the delay having occured during that period. They are entitled, as  a matter  of right, to invoke the jurisdiction of the  Court for  redressal  of  their  grievance.  If  the applications come  to be  filed beyond that period, then the need to  give satisfactory  explanation for the delay caused till date  of filing  of the  application must  be given and then the  question of  satisfaction of  the Tribunal in that behalf would  arise.  Sub-section  (3)  starts  with  a  non obstante clause which rubs out the effect of sub-section (2) of  Section   21  and   the  need  thereby  arises  to  give satisfactory explanation  for  the  delay  which  occasioned after the  expiry of  the period  prescribed in sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof.      The  decision   of  the   Constitution  Bench  in  S.S. Rathore’s case  [supra] has  no application  to the facts in this case.  Therein,  this  Court  was  concerned  with  the question whether  the total  period of  six  months  covered under sub-section  (3) had  to be  excluded  in  filing  the petition in  the  suit,  when  it  was  transferred  to  the Tribunal under  the Administrative  Tribunal Order.  In that behalf, the  Constitution Bench  held that  a suit  under  a civil courts  jurisdiction is  governed  by  Article  58  of Limitation Act,  1963 and  the claims  for redressal  of the grievances are  governed by  Article  21  of  the  Act.  The question whether the Tribunal has power to condone the delay after the  expiry of  the period  prescribed in sub-sections (1) and  (2) of  Section 21, did not arise for consideration in that case.      Thus considered,  we hold that it is not necessary that the respondents  should give  an explanation  for the  delay which occasioned  for the  period mentioned  in sub-sections (1) or  (2) of  Section 21, but they should give explanation for the  delay which  occasioned after  the  expiry  of  the aforesaid respective  period applicable  to the  appropriate case and  the Tribunal  should be required to satisfy itself whether the  explanation offered  was proper explanation. In this case,  the explanation  offered was  that they  came to know of  the relief  granted by  the Tribunal in August 1989 and that  they filed  the petition  immediately  thereafter. That is  not a  proper explanation at all. What was required of them  to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievance before  the expiry  of the period prescribed under sub-section (1)  or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the  Tribunal is  wholly unjustified in condoning the delay.      The appeals  are accordingly  allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside. No order as to costs.