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PETITIONER: STATE OF KARNATAKA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: L. MUNISWAMY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/03/1977

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. GOSWAMI, P.K. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1489            1977 SCR  (3) 113  1977 SCC  (2) 699  CITATOR INFO :  E          1980 SC 962  (7,63,64,110)  D          1992 SC1894  (10)

ACT:             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act II of 1974)--S.482         (s.  561 A of -1899 Code)--Inherent power of the High  Court         to   quash   proceedings  at  the  stage   of   framing   of         charges--Explained.

HEADNOTE:         The  apellants are accused Nos. 10, 13, 14, 15 and 17 to  20         before  the Sessions Court for trial under various offences,         viz.,  .  324, 326, and  307 read with s. 34  of  the  Penal         Code.  While discharging accused Nos. 11, 12 and 16 u/s  227         of  the  Criminal  Procedure Code 1973,  on  8.8.1975,   the         learned Sessions Judge observed that there was "some materi-         al to hold that the remaining accused have had something  to         do with the incident   which occurred on 6.12.1973 in I.T.I.         Colony,  Banglore"  and adjourned the case to  September  1,         1975,  "for  framing specific charges as made out  from  the         material on record against the rest of the accused person  .         Two revision petitions were filed against this order, one by         accussed  Nos. 10, 13, 14 and 15  and the other  by  accused         Nos.  17 to 20.   These petitions were allowed by  the  High         Court  on the view that there was no sufficient  ground  for         proceeding  against  the petitioners before it.    The  High         Court  accordingly quashed the the proceedings in regard  to         them.                 In  appeal  by Special Leave,  the  appellant  State         contended:   (1) The High Court ought not to have  exercised         its  power to quash the proceedings against  the  respondent         without  giving to the Sessions Court, which was  seized  of         the  case,  an  opportunity to consider  whether  there  was         sufficient material on the record on which to frame  charges         against  the respondents. (ii) In any event the  High  Court         could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appreci-         ating the weight of material on the record in order to  find         whether any charges could be legitimately framed against the         respondents.          Dismissing the appeal, the Court                 HELD:  (1) The High Court was justified  in  holding

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       that for meeting the ends of justice the proceedings against         the  respondents  ought to be quashed. It would be  a  sheer         waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings  to         continue  against the respondent, when there is no  material         on the record on which any tribunal could reasonably convict         them for any offence connected with the assault on the  com-         plainant.   This is one of these cases in which a charge  of         conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence  of         direct involvement of the accused is lacking.  [118 A, D-E]                 (2) The saving of the High Court’s inherent  powers,         both in civil  and criminal matters, is designed to  achieve         a Salutary public purpose which  is that a Court proceedings         ought  not  to be permitted to degenerate into a  weapon  of         harassment or persecution.   In a criminal case, the  veiled         object  behind  a lame prosecution, the very nature  of  the         material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and         the  like would justify the High Court in quashing the  pro-         ceeding in the interest of justice.  [117 F-G]         (3)  Considerations  justifying  the  exercise  of  inherent         powers  for securing the ends of justice vary from  case  to         case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by         s. 482 ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a         rigid  formula.  The three instances’ cited in the  Judgment         in R.P. Kapoor Vs. The State of Punjab, [1960] 3 SCR 388, as         to when the High Court would be justified in exercising  its         inherent  jurisdiction are only illustrative and can in  the         very  nature of things not be regarded as exhaustive.   [118         F-H, 119 A]         114         R.P. Kapur vs. State of  Punjab [1960] 3 SCR 338 explained..             (4)  It  is wrong to say that at the  stage  of  framing         charges  the   Court cannot apply its judicial mind  to  the         consideration whether or not there is any ground for presum-         ing the commission of the offence.  [119 B]             (5)  While  considering  whether  there  is   sufficient         ground   for  proceeding against an accused. the court  pos-         sesses a comparatively wider discretion  in the exercise  of         which it can determine the question whether the material  on         the  record. if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which  a         conviction can be said reasonably to be possible.  [119 B-E]             Vadilal  Panchal  v.  D. D. Ghadigaonkar  AIR   1960  SC         1113;  Century  Spinning & Manufacturing, Co.  v.  State  of         Maharashtra AIR 1972 SC 545 applied.             (6)  In the instant case the High Court is right in  its         view that the materials on which the prosecution proposed to         rely   against   the  respondents  is wholly  inadequate  to         sustain  the  charge that they are in any  manner  connected         with the assault on the complainant.  [119 E-F]             (7)  The grievance that the High Court  interfered  with         the  Sessions’ Court’s order prematurely is  not  justified.         The  case  was  adjourned by  the  Sessions  Judge  not  for         deciding  whether any charge at all could be framed  against         the  remaining accused, but for the purpose of  deciding  as         to  which  charge  or charges could appropriately be  framed         on the basis of the material before him.                                                     [116 G-H]          (8) The object of s. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,         Act  2 of 1974, is to enable the superior Court  to  examine         the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions  Judge         has held that there is not sufficient ground   for  proceed-         ing against the accused.  [117 C-D]             (9)  The High Court is entitled to go into  the  reasons         given by   the Sessions Judge in support of his order and to         determine  for itself whether the order is justified by  the         facts and circumstances of the case.  [117 D-E] .

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           (10)  In the exercise of the wholesome power u/s 482  of         the  Act 2 of 1974 (s. 561 of 1898 Code), the High Court  is         entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion         that  allowing the proceeding to continue would be an  abuse         of  the  process of the Court or that the  ends  of  justice         require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.  [117 E-F]         Observations:             The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law         though justice has got to be administered according to  laws         made by the legislature. Without a proper realisation of the         object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save  the         inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between  the         State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate         the  width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.   [117         G-H]

JUDGMENT:             CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  Nos.         345-346 of 1976.             (Appeals  by Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated  30-9-1975 of the Karnataka High Court in  Crl.  Peti-         tions Nos. 248 and 253 of 1975).         D. Mookherjee, and B.R.G.K. Achar, for the Appellant,          Frank  Anthony, K.B. Rohtagi  and M.N.  Kashyap,  for   the         Respondents.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             CHANDRACHUD, J. These two appeals by social leave  arise         out  of a judgment dated september 30, 1975 rendered by  the         High Court         115         of Karnataka in Criminal Petitions Nos. 248 and 253 of 1975.         By the aforesaid judgment the High Court in the exercise  of         its inherent powers has quashed proceedings initiated by the         State  of Karnataka appellant herein, against  the  respond-         ents.             The  incident out of which these proceedings arise  took         place  on  December 6, 1973 in the Central   Avenue  of  the         Indian  Telephone Industries Colony, Bangalore.   Thyagaraja         Iyer,  accused  No. 1, who was an employee  of  the  Indian’         Telephone  Industries  Ltd. was dismissed  from  service  on         September 20, 1973 on the allegation that he had assaulted a         Canteen  supervisor.    The  complainant  Ajit  Dutt,  Works         Manager  of the Crossbar Division, attempted  to serve   the         dismissal  order  on  him but he refused to  accept  it  and         threatened  the  complainant that he, the  complainant,  was         primarily  responsible for the dismissal and would  have  to         answer   the  consequences.  It is alleged that  the  I.T.I.         Employees’   Union  took up  cudgels on his behalf  and  re-         solved to support his cause.  The case of the prosecution is         that  accused Nos.  1 and 8 to 20 conspired  to commit   the         murder  of  the complainant and that in  pursuance  of  that         conspiracy accused Nos. 1, 8 and 10 hired accused Nos. 2,  a         notorious criminal, to execute the object of the conspiracy.         Accused No. 2 in turn engaged the services of accused Nos. 3         to  7  and  eventually on the morning of  December  6,  1973         accused  Nos.  1  to 6 are  alleged to  have  assaulted  the         complainant with knives, thereby committing  offences  under         ss.  324,  326 and 307 read with s. 34. of the  Penal  Code.         Accused No. 2 was charged separately under s. 307 or in  the         alternative under s. 326, Penal Code.             By his order dated October 23,  1974 the learned  Metro-         politan  Magistrate, V Court, Bangalore directed all the  20         accused  to take their trial before the Sessions  Court  for

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       offences  under s. 324, 326 and 307 read with s. 34  of  the         Penal Code.             At  the  commencement of the trial  before  the  learned         First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, two         preliminary  questions were raised, one by  the  prosecution         and  the  other  by the, accused. It was  contended  by  the         prosecution that the specification of particular sections in         the committal order did not preclude the Sessions Court from         framing  a new charge under s. 120-B of the Penal Code.   On         the  other hand it was contended by the accused  that  there         was  no sufficient ground for proceeding with the   prosecu-         tion and therefore they ought to be discharged.  The learned         Additional  Sessions  Judge accepted the contention  of  the         prosecution that he had the power to frame a charge under s.         120-B.   The  correctness of that view  was  not  challenged         before us by Mr. Frank Anthony who appears on behalf of  the         accused.  That is as it ought to be because the power of the         Sessions  Court to frame an appropriate charge is not  tram-         melled  by  the specifications  contained in  the  committal         order.   The Sessions Court, being seized of the  case,  has         jurisdiction  to frame appropriate charges as the facts  may         justify or the circumstances may warrant. The contention  of         the accused that they ought to be discharged was accepted by         the learned Additional Sessions Judge partly.  lie held that         there  was  no case against accused Nos. 11, 12 and  16  and         that         116         they were therefore entitled to be  discharged.  By an order         dated  August 8, 1975 the, learned Judge.  discharged  those         three.  accused in the. exercise of his powers under s.  227         of  the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. We  are  informed         that the correctness of that order is under challenge before         the High Court in a proceeding taken by the State of  Karna-         taka.   We  are not concerned with that order in  these  ap-         peals.   After  discharging accused Nos. 11, 12 and  16  the         learned.  Judge, turning to the case against  the  remaining         accused,   observed  that there was "some material  to  hold         that  they have had something to do with the incident  which         occurred   on  6-12-1973 in  the I.T.I.  Colony  Bangalore".         The  learned Judge adjourned the case to September  1,  1975         "for framing specific charges as made out from the  material         on record against the rest of the accused persons."             Two revision petitions were filed  against this   order,         one   by  accused Nos. 10, 13, 14 and 15 and  the  other  by         accused Nos. 17 to 20.  Those petitions were allowed by  the         High’Court  on the view that there was no sufficient  ground         for proceeding against the petitioners before it.  The  High         Court accordingly quashed the proceedings in regard to. them         which has led to these appeals.             Mr.  Mookerjee  who. appears on behalf of the  State  of         Karnataka  contends  that the High Court ought not  to  have         exercised  its; powers to quash the proceedings against  the         respondents without giving to the Sessions Court, which  was         seized of the case, an opportunity to consider whether there         was  sufficient  material on the record on  which  to  frame         charges  against  the respondents.  It is  argued  that  the         Sessions Court had adjourned the case for a consideration of         that very question and it was not proper for the High  Court         to  withdraw the case, as it were, and to exercise  its  ex-         traordinary powers, thereby preventing the Trial Court  from         examining the  sufficiency of the  material which it is  the         primary  duty and function of that Court to  examine.  There         is some apparent justification for this  grievance   because         the  language in which the sessions Court couched its  order         would  seem  to suggest that it had adjourned  the  case  to

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       September 1, 1975 for consideration of the question  as  to.         whether   there   was   sufficient  ground  for   proceeding         against  the  respondents.   But a careful  reading  of  the         Sessions Courts judgment would reveal that  while  discharg-         ing  accused Nos. 11, 12 and 16 it came, to  the  conclusion         that insofar as the other accused were. concerned there  was         some  material  to hold that they were  connected  with  the         incident.   The case was, therefore, adjourned by the  Court         for flaming specific charges against them.  In other  words,         the learned Judge adjourned the case not for deciding wheth-         er any charge at all could be framed  against the  remaining         accused  but for the purpose of deciding as to which  charge         or charges could appropriately be framed on the basis of the         material before him.  The grievance therefore that the  High         Court interfered with the sessions Court’s order prematurely         is not justified.             The  second limb of Mr. Mookerjee’s argument is that  in         any event the High Court could not take upon itself the task         of  assessing or appreciating the weight of material on  the         record in order to find whether any charges could be legiti-         mately framed against the respondents. So         117         long as there is some material on the record to connect  the         accused with the crime, says. the learned counsel, the  case         must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction. to put  a         precipitate  or  premature  end to the  proceedings  on  the         belief that the prosecution is not likely to succeed.  This,         in  our  opinion,  is too broad  a  proposition  to  accept.         -Section  227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 of  1974,         provides that:                             "If, upon consideration of the record of                       the   case and the documents submitted  there-                       with,   and after hearing the  submissions  of                       the  accused and the prosecution in  this  be-                       half,  the Judge considers that there  is  not                       sufficient  ground for proceeding against  the                       accused,  he shall  discharge the accused  and                       record his reasons for so doing."         This  section is contained in Chapter XVIII  called   "Trial         Before   a Court of Sessions".  It is clear from the  provi-         sion that the  Sessions Court has the power to discharge  an         accused  if   after  perusing  the record  and  hearing  the         parties  he comes to the conclusion, for reasons to  be  re-         corded, that there is not  sufficient ground for  proceeding         against  the  accused.  The object of  the  provision  which         requires  the  Sessions Judge to record his  reasons  is  to         enable the superior court to examine the correctness of  the         reasons  for  which  the Sessions Judge has held that  there         is  of is not sufficient ground for proceeding  against  the         accused.   The High Court therefore is entitled to  go  into         the  reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support  of  his         order  and  to  determine for itself whether  the  order  is         justified  by  the  facts and  circumstances  of  the  case.         Section  482 of the New Code, which corresponds to s.  561-A         of the Code of 1898, provides that:                                "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed                       to  limit or affect the inherent powers of the                       High  Court  to  make such orders  as  may  be                       necessary  to give effect to any  order  under                       this  Code or to prevent abuse of the  process                       of  any  Court or otherwise to secure  the ends                       of justice."         In  the, exercise of this. whole some power, the High  Court         is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclu-         sion  that  allowing the proceeding to continue would be  an

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       abuse  of  the process  of  the Court or that the;  ends  of         justice  require  that the proceeding ought to  be  quashed.         The  saving  of the High Court’s inherent  powers,  both  in         civil and criminal matters, is designed to. achieve a  salu-         tary  public purpose which is that a court proceeding  ought         not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of  harassment         or  persecution.   In  a criminal case,  the  veiled  object         behind  a lame prosecution, the very nature of the  material         on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like         would  justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding  in         the  interest  of justice.  The ends of justice  are  higher         than  the,  ends of mere law though justice has got  to  be.         administered  according  to laws made by  the,  legislature.         The  compelling necessity for making these  observations  is         that  without a proper realisation of the  object  and  pur-         pose  of  the provision which seeks to.  save  the  inherent         powers  of the High Court to do justice between  the   State         and  its.  subjects, it would be impossible.  to  appreciate         the width and contours of  that salient jurisdiction.         118             Let us then turn to the facts of the case to see, wheth-         er the High Court was justified in holding that the proceed-         ings against the respondents ought to be quashed in order to         prevent  abuse of the process of the court and in  order  to         secure the ends of justice.  We asked the State counsel time         and again to point out any data or material on the basis  of         which  a  reasonable likelihood of  the  respondents   being         convicted  of any offence in connection with  the  attempted         murder  of the complainant could be predicated.  A few  bits         here and a few bits there on which the prosecution  proposes         to rely are  woefully inadequate for connecting the respond-         ents with the crime, howsoever, skilfully one may attempt to         weave  those  bits into a presentable  whole.  There  is  no         material on the record on which  any  tribunal could reason-         ably convict the respondents for any offence connected  with         the  assault on the complainant.  It is undisputed that  the         respondents  were nowhere near the scene of offence  at  the         time  of the assault. What is alleged against them is,  that         they had conspired to commit that assault.  This, we  think,         is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit         upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement         of  the accused is lacking.  we have been taken through  the         statements  recorded  by  the police during  the  course  of         investigation and the other material.  The worst that can be         said  against the respondents on the basis thereof  is  that         they used to meet one another frequently after the dismissal         of accused No. 1 and prior to the commission of the  assault         on  the  complainant.   Why they met, what  they  said,  and         whether  they held any deliberations at all, are matters  on         which no witness has said a word.  In the circumstances,  it         would  be a sheer waste of public time and money  to  permit         the  proceedings to continue against the  respondents.   The         High  Court   was  therefore justified in holding  that  for         meeting  the  ends of justice the  proceedings  against  the         respondents ought to be quashed.             Learned  counsel for the State Government relies upon  a         decision of this Court in R.P. Kapur v. The State of  Punjab         (1) in which it was held that in the exercise of its  inher-         ent jurisdiction under s. 561A of the Code of 1898, the High         Court  cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the  evi-         dence in the case is reliable or not.  That may be so.   But         in the instant case the question is  not  whether any  reli-         ance can be placed on the veracity of this or that  particu-         lar  witness.   The fact of the matter is that there  is  no         material  on the record on the basis of which  any  tribunal

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       could reasonably come to the conclusion that the respondents         are  in any manner connected with,  the incident leading  to         the  prosecution.   Gajendragadkar, J., who  spoke  for  the         Court  in Kapur’s(1) case observes in his judgment  that  it         was  not  possible, desirable or expedient to lay  down  any         inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of the  High         Court’s inherent jurisdiction.  The three instances cited in         the judgment as to when the High Court would be justified in         exercising  its inherent jurisdiction are only  illustrative         and  can  in the very nature of things not  be  regarded  as         exhaustive.   Considerations   justifying the   exercise  of         inherent  powers for securing the ends of justice  naturally         vary from case to         (1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 388         119         case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by         s. 482 ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a         rigid formula.             On  the  other  hand, the decisions  cited.  by  learned         counsel  for the respondents in Vadilal Panchaly. D.D.  Gha-         digaonkar(1) and  Cen-tarS, Spinning & Manufacturing Co.  v.         State of Maharashtra(2) show that it is wrong to say that at         the  stage  of flaming charges the court cannot  apply.  its         judicial mind to the  consideration whether  or not there is         any  ground for presuming the commission of the  offence  by         the  accused.   As observed in the latter case,  the   order         framing   a charge affects a person’s liberty  substantially         and therefore it is the duty of the court to consider  judi-         cially  whether  the material warrants the  framing  of  the         charge.  It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prose-         cution  that the accused be. asked  to  face a   trial.   In         Vadilal Panchal’s case. (supra) section 203 of the old  Code         was under consideration, which provided that the  Magistrate         could   dismiss  a complaint if  after  considering  certain         matters  mentioned in the section there was in his  judgment         no sufficient ground for  proceeding with the case.. To  art         extent  section  227 of the new Code contains  an  analogous         power which is conferred on the Sessions Court. It was  held         by this Court, while considering the true scope of s. 203 of         the  old Code that the Magistrate. was not bound  to  accept         the  result of an enquiry or investigation and that he  must         apply  his judicial mind to the material on which he had  to         form  his  judgment.   These decisions show  that  for’  the         purpose  of determining whether there is  sufficient  ground         for  proceeding  against an accused the  court  possesses  a         comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which.  it         can  determine  the  question whether the  material  on  the         record,  if  unrebutted, is such on the: basis  of  which  a         conviction can-be said reasonably to be possible.             We are therefore in agreement with the view of the  High         Court   that   the  material  on  which.   the   prosecution         proposes.to  rely against the respondents is  wholly  inade-         quate  to.  sustain the charge that they are in  any  manner         connected  with the assault on the  complainant.  We  would,         however, like to observe that nothing in our judgment or  in         the .judgment of the High Court should be taken as  detract-         ing from the case of the prosecution, to. which we have  not         applied our mind, as against accused Nos. 1 to 9.  The  case         against those accused must take its due and lawful course.         The appeals are accordingly dismissed.         S.R.                                  Appeals dismissed.              (1) A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1113.              (2) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 545.          9--240SCI/77         120

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