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PETITIONER: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KEMPAIAH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       27/07/1998

BENCH: M.K. MUKHERJEE, SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T QUADRI,J.      Leave is granted.      In these  appeal,  filed  by  the  State  of  Karnataka against the  common judgment  of the  Division Bench  of the Karnataka High  Court dated  2nd July, 1996 in Writ Petition No. 16857  of 1993  and Criminal  Petition No.1155  of 1993, only that part of the judgment is assailed, which deals with the interpretation of ’action’ as defined in Section 2(1) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (for short "the K.L.Act").      To appreciate  the contentions of Mr.K.R. Nagaraja, the learned counsel for the appellants, it would be necessary to refer  to  the  facts  giving  rise  to  these  appeals.  On 17.12.92, an  unsigned representation containing allegations against   certain    government   officers   including   the respondent, Kempaiah,  an IPS  Officer, who  was working  as Deputy commissioner  of Police,  East, Bangalore, during the relevant period, was forwarded by the Under Secretary to the Governor of Karnataka to the Registrar, Lokayukta for taking necessary action.  The Upalokayukta referred the allegations against  the   respondent  to   the  police   wing  of   the Upalokayukta for  preliminary inquiry  under Section 7(2) of the  K.L.Act.   Apropos  to   the  preliminary  inquiry  the Upalokayukta, by  letter dated  18.5.93, called for comments of the  respondent under  Section 9(3) of the Lokayukta Act. The respondent  challenged, inter  alia, the validity of the said letter  in the  said  Writ  Petition  No.,16857/93.  It appears that  as a  sequel of  issuing orders  of search  by Upalokayukta, FIR  was lodged  under Section  13(1)(e)  read with Section  13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short "the  P.C.Act"); in Criminal Petition No.1155 of 1993, he prayed  before the  High Court  to quash  the proceedings under the  P.C.Act. Those  two cases were disposed of by the common judgment by the High Court, referred to above.      Mr.Nagaraja, the  learned counsel  for the  appellants, contended  that  under  Section  7(2)  of  the  K.L.Act  the Upalokayukta  was   competent  to   investigate   into   the allegation of  amassing of  wealth by  the respondent  as it would fall  within the  meaning  of  the  word  ’action’  in Section 2(1)  of that  Act and  that narrow  construction of

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that word by the High Court would defeat the very purpose of the  Act.   Mr.T.V.Ratnam,  the   learned  counsel  for  the respondent, submitted  that the  Preamble of  the Act itself would show  that the  Act  was  confined  to  administrative actions  taken   by  any   public  servant,   therefore  the allegation  of   amassing  of   wealth  could   not  be   an administrative action for purposes of Section 7 and the High Court had rightly interpreted that word.      The short  point that arises for consideration is: What is the  true import of the definition of ’action’ in Section 2(1) of the K.L. Act?      A perusal  of the  provisions of  the K.L.  Act reveals that the  object  of  the  Act  is  to  ensure  fairness  in administrative action  and for  that purpose it provides for investigation by  Lokayukta or  Upalokayukta where complaint is made  against such  action by  either a  grievance or  an allegation and  for granting redress/remedy if a complainant is prejudiced  by such action and/or initiating departmental proceedings or  prosecution against  any public  servant  in giving effect  to the  recommendations on  findings  of  the Lokayukta or  Upalokayukta, as  the case  may be.  Section 7 deals  with   matters  which  may  be  investigated  by  the Lokayukta or  Upalokayukta;  Section  8  enumerates  matters which cannot  be investigated under the Act; Section 9 to 11 and Rules  2 and  4 of  the Karnataka  Lokayukta Rules, 1985 (for short  "the Rules")  prescribe  procedure  relating  to complaints and  investigations.  Section  12  requires  that report  of  investigation  into  the  action  complained  of together with recommendation of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta be forwarded to the competent authority who is enjoined to take action thereon  and Section  14 contemplates  initiation  of prosecution  by   Lokayukta  or  Upalokayukta  where  he  is satisfied that the public servant has committed any criminal offence and  should be  prosecuted. These are the provisions relevant to the issue under consideration.      It would  be useful  to refer  to Section 7 of the K.L. Act here:      "7(1).   Matters   which   may   be      investigated by  the Lokayukta  and      an Upalokayukta  - (1)  Subject  of      the provisions  of  this  Act;  the      Lokayukta   may   investigate   any      action which  is taken  by or  with      the general  or  specific  approval      of, -      (i) the Chief Minister:      (ii) a Minister or a Secretary,      (iii)  a   member  of   the   State      Legislature; or      (iv) any other public servant being      a  public   servant  of   a   class      notified by the State Government in      consultation with  the Lokayukta in      this behalf;      in  any   case  where  a  complaint      involving   a   grievance   or   an      allegation is  made in  respect  of      such action.      (2) Subject  to the  provisions  of      this  Act,   an  Upalokayukta   may      investigate  any  action  which  is      taken by  or with  the  general  or      specific approval  of,  any  public      servant   not   being   the   Chief      Minister, Minister,  Member of  the

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    Legislature,  Secretary   or  other      public servant  referred to in sub-      section (1),  in any  case where  a      complaint involving  a grievance or      an allegation is made in respect of      such action  or such action or such      action can  be or  could have been,      in the opinion of Upalokayukta, the      subject  of   a  grievance   or  an      allegation." A plain  reading of this section, makes it evident that sub- section (1)  envisages investigation  by the  Lokayukta  and sub-section (2)  by Upalokayukta.  Lokayukta is empowered to investigate any action which is taken by or with the general or  specific  approval  of  (i)  the  Chief  Minister;  (ii) Minister; (iii)  Member of  the Legislature;  and  (iv)  any other public  servant being  a public  servant  of  a  class notified by  the States  Government in consultation with the Lokayukta in  this behalf. Under sub-section (2) Upalkayukta is enabled  to investigate  any action  which is taken by or with the  general or specific approval of any public servant [other than  those enumerated  in sub-section (1)]. However, Upalokayukta may also, suo motu, investigate an action which in his  opinion can be or could have been the subject-matter of grievance  or an allegation. In other words, the subject- matter of  investigation by  the Lokayukta under sub-section (1). The  words ’action’,  ’allegation’ and  ’grievance’ are defined in  sub-sections (1),  (2)  and  (8)  of  Section  2 respectively. The  word ’complaint’ is, however, not defined in the Act or the Rules though in rule 2(b) ’complainant’ is defined to mean a person who makes a complaint under Section 9 of the Act.      The definition  of the  word ’action’  in Section  2(1) reads as under:      "  "action"   means  administrative      action taken  be way  of  decision,      recommendation or finding or in any      other manner  and  includes  wilful      failure or  omission to act and all      other  expressions   [relating  to]      such  action   shall  be  construed      accordingly." A perusal  of the  definition indicates  that it encompasses administrative action  taken in  any form  whether by way of recommendation or  finding or  ’in any  other manner’, e.g., grating   licenses   or   privileges,   awarding   contract, distributing  Government   land  under  statutory  Rules  or otherwise or  withholding decision  on any  matter etc.  The expression ’in  any other  manner’ takes it in fold the last mentioned categories of administrative actions. Mr. Nagaraja has argued  that the  expression ’in  any other manner’ will have to  be given  a wider  meaning so  as to  include other actions of  the public  servants such  as the  action of the respondent in  amassing wealth otherwise the very purpose of the Act  will be  frustrated. We are afraid we cannot accede to the  contention of  the learned  counsel as  it would not only  be  contrary  to  the  principle  of  construction  of statutes but  will also  be repugnant  to the  object of the Act, pointed out above. The expression ’in any other manner’ contains general  words  which  construed  literally  should receive their  full and natural meaning but when they follow specific and  particular words of the same genus, it will be presumed that  the legislature has used the general words in a limited  sense to  convey the  meaning implied by specific and particular  words. This follows from application of Rule

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of eiusdem  generis. That  rule which is an exception to the rule of  construction that  general words  should  be  given their full  and natural  meaning,  was  enunciated  by  Lord Campbell  in   R  vs.   Edmundson  (1859)   28  L.J.M.C.213, ".......where there  are general  words following particular and specific  words, the  general words  must be confined to things of  the same  kind as  those specified".  ["Craies on Statute Law"  6th Edn. p.179]. These rules of interpretation are so  well-settled that  they hardly need any authority to support our  conclusion. Now in the definition of action the expression  ’in   any  other   manner’  follows  ’decision’, ’recommendation’  or   ’finding’  so   it   cannotes   other categories  of   administrative   action;   it   cannot   be interpreted to  mean actions  which have  no  nexus  to  any administrative action.      Our  attention   was  invited   to  the  definition  of allegation’ in  Section 2(2)  which is  couched in very wide terms but,  as notices  above, for  purposes of Section 7(2) the scope  of investigation  is confined  to a  grievance or allegation made  in respect  of an action within the meaning of Section  2(1) of  the Act, no support can be had from the definition of ’allegation’.      Inasmuch  as   Upalokayukta   initiated   investigation against the  respondent on  the basis  of an unsigned letter forwarded  by   the  Under  Secretary  to  the  Governor  of Karnataka  to   the  Registrar,   Lokayukta,  the  scope  of investigations by the Upalokayukta under Section 7(2) has to be limited to ’action’ as explained above.      In this  view of the matter, we are in entire agreement with the  view expressed  by the High Court. The appeals are devoid of any merit so they are dismissed.