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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1270 of 2008

PETITIONER: State of Jharkhand & Ors.

RESPONDENT: Bijay Kumar & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/02/2008

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & V.S. Sirpurkar

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No.16466 of 2006)

S.B. Sinha, J.

       Leave granted. 1.      Respondents herein were appointed on ad hoc basis in Frozen Semen  Bank Project as Technical Assistants in the Department of Animal  Husbandry of the Government of Bihar.  The said appointments were made  by the Regional Director, Animal Husbandry, Ranchi.   

2.      In the year 1996, a scam known as \021Fodder Scam\022 came to light and  all unauthorized appointments were declared illegal by the State, inter alia,  on the premise : \0231.  The Regional Director, Animal Husbandry,  Ranchi was not competent to make any such  appointment. 2.      No advertisement was issued before making  such appointment. 3.      No reservation policy was followed. 4.      The number of persons appointed, were  much more than the sanctioned post and 5.      Besides these many other rules and norms of  appointment were also flouted.\024

       Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, the services of the  respondents were terminated in 1997.  Services of some other employees  were also terminated on 23.10.1998.  They filed writ petitions before the  then Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court, which were dismissed.         Letters Patent Appeals preferred thereagainst were also dismissed  observing that in the event their cases are considered for appointment,  relaxation in respect of age and weightage in the future appointment should  be given.

3.      One Umakant Sinha and others approached this Court.  By a judgment  and order dated 23.7.2003, this Court while opining that ad hoc appointees  have no right to claim regularization in the service, directed : \023In this view of the matter, we direct the State of  Jharkhand to consider at the earliest for recruiting  Technical Assistant for the Semen Bank Project  and ti fill up the existing vacancies within a period  of three months from today.  For that purpose the  Respondent-State is directed to constitute a  Selection Committee as per the existing Rules  within a period of three months from today. (ii)    The appellants whose services are

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terminated may apply to the Secretary of the  Animal Husbandry Department within a period of  one month for being re-appointed or for  regularization of their services.  The Committee  shall consider the eligibility, suitability, past record  as well as the educational qualifications of the  appellants as per the rules as on today. (iii)   The Committee shall give relaxation of age  and weightage over outsiders as directed by the  High Court.  However, if the appellants are found  unsuitable for some reasons, it would be open to  the Committee to reject their applications.         Appropriate authority shall issue orders for  appointment after considering the roster and the  merit list, on available vacancies.         The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.   There shall be no order as to costs.  We, however,  make it clear that this case shall not be treated as  precedent as we have decided it purely on the facts  and in the peculiar circumstances of this case.\024 (Emphasis supplied)

4.      An interlocutory application was filed for extension of time to comply  with the said order and by an order dated 2.12.2003, three months\022 time was  granted for constitution of the Committee.  It was clarified that directions by  this Court were in relation to the appellants in the said appeals.         Another writ petition, however, was filed in the High Court of  Jharkhand which came into being in November 2000 by Bijay Kumar and  others.  The said writ petition was also dismissed by an order dated 6.2.2004.   Special Leave Petitions were also filed thereagainst and by a judgment and  order dated 10.4.2006, a Bench of this Court directed : \023We are of the view that the issue should be  resolved finally and should not be kept pending.   The earlier order of this Court was passed on  23.7.2003.  The right to be selected thereunder  cannot continue indefinitely.  Therefore, we direct  : (1) that the Respondent-Authority shall advertise  in the local newspapers having wide circulation of  the holding of selections for the purpose of filling  of those vacancies which according to the Rules,  are to be filled by direct appointment.  (2)  Applications should be asked for from these ad hoc  employees who were appointed in the Frozen  Semen Bank Project between 1988 to 1992 and  whose services were terminated in 1998.  No such  employee who has already been considered by the  Selection Committee under the order dated  23.7.2003 shall apply.  (3) No appointment already  made either in the normal course or pursuant to the  earlier order of this Court shall be disturbed.  (4)The advertisement shall specify the last date  with which the candidate concerned shall apply for  consideration including thereon proof that the  candidate had served with the Respondents.  (5)  The selection shall be made by the Selection  Committee only against the available vacancies.   Preference shall be given to those who have longer  tenure of service over those who have shorter  tenure of service, other things being equal.  (6) All  other conditions in the order dated 23.7.2003 shall  be operative as far as the procedure to be followed  by the Selection Committee to be set up pursuant  to this order is concerned.  (7)  This shall be a one  time exercise.  No further application shall be  entertained by such ad hoc employees.  This fact

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should also be mentioned in the advertisement.\024 (Emphasis supplied)

5.      An advertisement by the appellant was issued.  Questioning the  legality of the said advertisement, a writ petition was filed before the  Jharkhand High Court which was marked as Writ Petition (S) No.156 of  2005.  A direction was issued therein that the process of selection should be  completed within four months.        Respondents, however, filed another writ petition before the High  Court which by reason of the impugned judgment dated 30.6.2006 was  disposed of, directing : \023In view of the judgment rendered by the Division  Bench on 23rd June, 2006 in W.P.(S) No.156 of  2005 (Chandra Kant and ors. vs. State of  Jharkhand and ors.) Supreme Court decision dated  10th April, 2006 and earlier decision dated 23rd  July, 2003 passed in Civil Appeal no.5342-5343 of  2003 and analogous cases, this application is  disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to apply  (those who have not applied in pursuance of the  advertisement to the post of Technical Assistant),  if any advertisement is issued in future.\024

6.      Mr. B.B. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant,  would submit that the aforementioned direction of the High Court, if  implemented, would run contrary to and inconsistent with the directions  contained in this Court\022s orders dated 23.7.2003, 2.122003 and 10.4.2006.  It  was urged that this Court, in the aforementioned orders, having directed not  to treat the same as precedent as also one time exercise, the directions issued  by the High Court are clearly violative thereof. 7.      Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  respondents, on the other hand, urged that one time exercise directed to be  carried out by this Court had not been fully complied with and, thus, the  High Court was entitled to pass the impugned order.  It was submitted that  this Court, in any event, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of  the Constitution of India, can issue necessary directions so as to extend the  benefits also to those who had not approached this Court earlier.  Strong  reliance in this behalf has been placed on Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of  Central Excise, New Delh & Ors. [(1975) 3 SCR 960] and B.N. Nagarajan &  Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors. [(1966) 3 SCR 682].  It was contended that  advertisement having been issued in July 2006 and the impugned order  having been passed by the High Court in June 2006 and furthermore in view  of the fact that the respondents have appeared in the examination, this Court  should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the  Constitution of India.   8.      Respondents herein were appointed in 1992.  They were removed  from service in 1997.  They did not question the said orders of termination.   We have noticed hereinbefore that Abhay Kumar, Uma Kant Sinha and  others had questioned the orders of their termination from service before the  Patna High Court. 9.      This Court in its order dated 23.7.2003, although opined that they had  no right to continue in service, issued some directions evidently in exercise  of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.      The said order was to be kept confined only to the appellants thereof,  was reiterated by this Court in its order dated 2.12.2003.         It may be true that while Abhay Kumar and others approached this  Court aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated  16.2.2004 of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, this Court, in its  order dated 10.4.2006 intended to resolve the issue finally.  It was in that  situation opined that the right to be selected cannot continue indefinitely.   This Court dealt with the grievances of those employees whose services  have been terminated in the year 1998. 10.     The core question, therefore, which arises for our consideration is as  to whether the High Court had any jurisdiction to issue a similar direction

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relying on or on the basis of the orders of this Court which had been passed  in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution and confined only to the  appellants of those cases.        Indisputably, Respondents were not parties to the said orders.  No  benefit thereof, thus, could be extended in their favour.  The High Court,  therefore, in our opinion, could not have issued the aforementioned  directions.   11.     Constitution of India conferred a special jurisdiction in  this Court  only.  Although power of judicial review has been conferred on the High  Courts, it had not been given any special jurisdiction as has been done on the  Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India.  It is,  therefore, very difficult to comprehend that the High Court could issue the  impugned direction which, in effect and substance, would be violative  thereof.         Reliance placed by Mr. Rao on Amrit Lal Berry (supra) is not  apposite.  When a law is declared by this Court, it becomes the law of land  in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.  Indisputably, therefore,  such law would enure to the benefit of the persons similarly situated but it is  incomprehensible that when this Court grants some special benefits to the  parties who are before it and confined the relief only to them, such a benefit  can be extended by the High Court relying on or on the basis thereof.  The  matter might have been different if this Court had not issued such directions,  namely, the said order should be kept confined to the parties before it.   When this Court declared that no further application should be entertained at  the instance of other ad hoc employees in the name of parity or otherwise,  the High Court could not have issued a direction which would run counter to  the spirit of the said order.   12.     Submission of Mr. Rao that notwithstanding the orders dated  23.7.2003 and 10.4.2006, the High Court have committed no mistake in  issuing the impugned directions, is stated to be rejected.  This Court  intended to pass a final order.  The said order should have been allowed to  attain finality.  If a third order can be issued, others who are waiting on the  fence may be held to be entitled to file a fourth application.  The process,  thus, would go on unendingly.  Relaxation given for a limited purpose would  become a rule and not the exception.           In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors. v. Sajal Kumar Roy & Ors.  [(2006) 8 SCC 671], dealing with the question of age relaxation, it was held: \023The appointing authorities are required to apply  their mind while exercising their discretionary  jurisdiction to relax the age-limits.  Discretion of  the authorities is required to be exercised only for  deserving candidates and upon recommendations  of the Appointing Committee/Selection  Committee.  The requirements to comply with the  rules, it is trite, were required to be complied with  fairly and reasonably.  They were bound by the  rules.  The discretionary jurisdiction could be  exercised for relaxation of age provided for in the  rules and within the four corners thereof.  As the  respondents do not come within the purview of the  exception contained in Article 45 of the Education  Code, in our opinion, the Tribunal and  consequently, the High Court committed a  manifest error in issuing the aforementioned  directions.\024

13.     There is a sea change in the situation in the field of public  employment. Ten years have passed.  A new State has come into being.   Thousands of persons have acquired similar or higher qualifications.  They  have got their names registered in the employment exchanges.  The job  opportunities in a specialized field being limited, those who are now entitled  to be considered, may not be considered at all, if the order of the High Court  is allowed to operate.   14.     Constitutional guarantee of equality as envisaged under Articles 14  and 16 of the Constitution of India must be protected.  While passing one

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order or the other, we should not forget the interest of those who are not  before us.  Citizens have human right of development and offer of  appointment on such posts should be directed to be made only on merit.   Only because some persons had approached this Court and obtained an  order, the same should not be extended to others to which they are not  otherwise entitled to, namely, weightage in service over the new applicants. 15.     For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be  sustained.  It is set aside accordingly.  The appeal is allowed with no order as  to costs.