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PETITIONER: STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THAKUR GANGA SINGH AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/11/1959

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  356            1960 SCR  (2) 346  CITATOR INFO :  R          1965 SC 682  (11)

ACT: Supreme  Court, Appellate jurisdiction of-Special  leave  to appeal-When can be granted-Substantial question of law as to the   interpretation   of   the   Constitution-Meaning   of- Constitution of India, Art. 132(2).

HEADNOTE: The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of  Jammu JUDGMENT: Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules.  The High Court held that  the said  rule  was  ultra vires as offending  Art.  14  of  the Constitution.   The appellants filed an application  in  the High  Court  for  a certificate under  Art.  132(1)  of  the Constitution  which  was  rejected on  the  ground  that  no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of  the Constitution  was  involved  in the  case.   Thereafter  the appellant applied to this Court for special leave under Art. 132(2)  of the Constitution, which was granted with  liberty to the respondents to raise the question of  maintainability of the appeal.  There was no controversy between the parties in   regard  to  the  interpretation  of  Art.  14  of   the Constitution,  and the dispute centered round  the  question whether  the  impugned  rule stood the  test  of  reasonable classification.    The  respondents  raised  a   preliminary objection  that  special  leave under  Art.  132(2)  of  the Constitution  could be granted by this court only if it  was satisfied  that the case involved a substantial question  of law  as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and  that since, in the present case, the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution was not in dispute by reason of a series of decisions of this Court and no question of law, much less  a substantial question of law, could arise for  consideration, no special leave could be granted under the said Article. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that whenever a question  of  classification  was  raised  that  by   itself involved  the interpretation of Art. 14 of the  Constitution so far as the impugned classification was concerned.

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Held,  that  the principle underlying Art.   132(2)  of  the Constitution is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution  must rest with the Supreme Court.   With  that object that Article is freed from other limitations  imposed under  Arts.  133  and 134 and the right of  appeal  of  the widest  amplitude is allowed irrespective of the  nature  of the  proceedings  in  a case involving  only  a  substantial question   of   law  as  to  the   interpretation   of   the Constitution. The interpretation of a provision means the method by  which the  true  sense or the meaning of the word  is  understood. Where                      347 the  parties  agree  as  to the  true  interpretation  of  a provision  or do not raise any question in respect  thereof, the  case  does not involve any question of law  as  to  the interpretation of the Constitution.  A substantial  question of  law  cannot arise where that law has  been  finally  and authoritatively decided by this Court. In  the instant case, the question raised does  not  involve any  question  of  law  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the Constitution. T.M.  Krishnaswami  Pillai v. Governor  General  in  Council (1947)  52 C.W.N. (F.R.) 1, Bhudan Choudury v. The State  of Bihar,  [1955]  1 S.C.R. 1045, Chiranjit  Lal  Chowdhuri  v. Union  of  India, [1950] S.C.R. 869, Ram Krishna  Dalmia  v. justice  Tendolkar,  [1959] S.C.R. 279 and  Mohammad  Haneef Quayeshi v. State of Bihar, [1959] S.C.R.629, relied on.

& CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 217 of 1959. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated June 20, 1958, of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in  Writ Petition No. 108 of 1958. H.   N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, N.   S.  Bindra,  R.  H.  Dhebar and  T.  M.  Sen,  for  the appellants. R.   K. Garg and M. K. Ramamurthy, S. N. Andley, J.    B. Dadachanji,  Rameshwar  Nath  and  P.  L.  Vohra,  for   the respondents. 1959.  November 26.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA  RAO  J.-This  appeal  by  special  leave  raises  the question of the scope of Art. 132(2) of the Constitution. The  first  respondent  is one of the  shareholders  of  the second   respondent,  M/s.   Jammu  Kashmir  Mechanics   And Transport   Workers  Co-operative  Society   Limited   Jammu (hereinafter   called   the  Society).   The   Society   was registered   under  the  Jammu  and   Kashmir   Co-operative Societies Act No. 6 of 1993 (Vikrimi).  They put in a number of applications before the third appellant for the grant  of stage  carriage  and  public carrier  permits  to  them  for various  routes  in  the State of Jammu &  Kashmir,  but  no permits were granted to them on the ground that under r.  4- 47 of the Jammu 348 and  Kashmir  Motor Vehicle Rules  (hereinafter  called  the Rules), service licence could only be issued to a person  or a company registered under the Partnership Act and that,  as the Society was neither a person nor a partner Ship, it  was not entitled to a licence under the Rules.   The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir  under S.  103 of the Constitution of Jammu &  Kashmir  challenging

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the  vires  of r. 4-47 of the Rules.  To that  petition  the appellants  herein, viz., the Government of Jammu &  Kashmir State, the Transport Minister, the Registering Authority and the Traffic Superintendent, were made party-respondents: The High  Court  held  that the said rule  was  ultra  vires  as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution, and, on that  finding directed a writ of mandamus to issue against the  appellants herein from enforcing the provisions of the said rule.   The appellants  filed  an application in the High  Court  for  a certificate  under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution, but  the High  Court  rejected it on the ground that  no  substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution was involved in the case.  Therefter the appellants  applied for special leave under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution  and this  Court granted the same.  The order giving the  special leave expressly granted liberty to the respondents herein to raise  the question of the maintainability of the appeal  at its final hearing. Learned  Counsel  for the respondents raises  a  preliminary objection  to  the maintainability of the  appeal.   Shortly stated  his  objection  is that under  Art.  132(2)  of  the Constitution special leave can be given only if the  Supreme Court  is  satisfied that the case  involves  a  substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution that  in the present case the interpretation Art. 14 of  the Constitution has been well-settled and put beyond dispute by a  series  of decisions of this court, that,  therefore,  no question   of   law  as  to  the   interpretation   of   the Constitution,  much  less a substantial question of  law  in regard  to that mattter, arises for consideration and  that, therefore,  no special leave can be granted under  the  said Article.                             349 This argument is sought to be met by the learned  Additional Solicitor-General  in  the  following  manner:  Whenever   a question  of  classification  is  raised,  it  involves  the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution with reference to  the classification impugned.  To state  it  differently, the  argument is that the question in each case  is  whether the   classification  offends  the  principle  of   equality enshrined in Art. 14.  Therefore, whether a registered firm, a  limited company and a person have equal attributes  is  a question of interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Before considering the validity of the rival contentions  it would  be  convenient to ascertain precisely  what  was  the question raised in the High Court and what was the  decision given thereon by it.  The argument advanced before the  High Court  on  behalf of the Society was that under  r.  4-47  a licence can be issued only to a person or a firm  registered under   the  Partnership  Act  and  not  to  a   corporation registered   under   the  Co-operative  Societies   Act   or otherwise,   and,   therefore,   the   said   rule,    being discriminatory   in   nature,  offends  Art.   14   of   the Constitution.  The learned AdvocateGeneral appearing for the appellants contended that under Art. 14 of the  Constitution rational  classification is permissible and the  legislature has framed the impugned rule on such a basis, the object  of which is to safeguard the interest of the public.  The  High Court, after considering the rival arguments, expressed  the opinion  that the said rule did not proceed on any  rational basis of classification and that, as a corporation had  been arbitrarily  singled out for discriminatory  treatment,  the impugned   rule   offended  the  equality  clause   of   the Constitution.  The appellants in their petition for  special leave filed in this Court questioned the correctness of  the

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conclusion  of the High Court.  They asserted that the  said rule was based upon reasonable classification and  therefore could  not  be struck down as repugnant to Art.  14  of  the Constitution.   In  other grounds they elaborated  the  same point in an attempt to bring out the different attributes of the two classes affording an intelligible differentia for 45 350 classification.  They clearly posed the question proposed to be  raised  by  them in the appeal as under  Ground The Grouns iv: " The aforesaid rule 4-47 (of the  Motor Vehicles Rules) is based upon reasonable  classification and is and was perfectly intra vires   and  valid and could  not be  struck down as repugnant to Art. 14 of the  Constitution of India." Ground  vi:  "  There  is  a  marked  difference  between  a corporate   body  and  partnership  registered   under   the Provisions  of  the  Partnership Act  and  these  points  of difference   provide   an   intelligible   differentia   for classification.  The Hon’ble High Court has only referred to one  point of difference and has overlooked other points  of distinction  and  has erred in striking down  the  aforesaid rule 4-47." Ground viii : " Rule 4- 47 was framed in the light of  local conditions    prevailing.    Co-operative   Societies    and Corporations in the matter of transport were not  considered to  be  proper objects for the grant of licence  or  permit. The   classification  is  rational  and   reasonable.    The exclusion  of artificial persons from the ambit of the  Rule is natural and not discriminatory." The  other grounds are only a further clarification  of  the said grounds.  In part It of their statement of case the appellants stated as follows; "  It  is now well-established that while  Art.  14  forbids class   legislation,   it   does   not   forbid   reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation." The  respondents, in their statement of case,  accepted  the said  legal position but contested the position  that  there was  reasonable  classification.  It is  therefore  manifest that  throughout there has never been a controversy  between the  parties in regard to the interpretation of Art.  14  of the  Constitution,  but their dispute centered only  on  the question  whether  the  impugned  rule  stood  the  test  of reasonable classification. In  the  premises,  can  special leave  be  granted  to  the appellants  under Art 132(2) of the Constitution ?   Article 132(2) reads: ,,Where   the  High  Court  has  refused  to  give  such   a certificate, the Supreme Court may, if it is                             351 satisfied  that the case involves a substantial question  of law  as  to the interpretation of  the  Constitution,  grant special leave to appeal from such judgment, decree or  final order." Under  cl. (2) of Art. 132 there is no scope for granting  a special  leave unless two conditions are satisfied: (i)  the case   should   involve  a  question  of  law  as   to   the interpretation  of  the  Constitution;  and  (ii)  the  said question  should  be  a substantial question  of  law.   The principle underlying the Article is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution must rest with the  Supreme Court.   With  that object the Article is freed  from  other limitations imposed under Arts. 133 and 134 and the right of appeal  of the widest amplitude is allowed  irrespective  of the  nature  of the proceedings in a case involving  only  a

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substantial question of law as to the interpretation of  the Constitution. What   does   interpretation   of   a   provision   mean   ? Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or  the meaning  of  the  word  is  understood.   The  question   of interpretation  can  arise  only if  two  or  more  possible constructions  are  sought to be placed on  a  provision-one party suggesting one construction and the other a  different one.  But where the parties agree on the true interpretation of  a  provision  or do not raise any  question  in  respect thereof,  it is not possible to hold that the case  involves any  question  of  law  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the Constitution.  On an interpretation of Art. 14, a series  of decisions   of   this   Court  evolved   the   doctrine   of classification.  As we have pointed out, at no stage of  the proceedings either the correctness of the interpretation  of Art.  14  or  the  principles  governing  the  doctrine   of classification  have  been  questioned  by  either  of   the parties.  Indeed accepting the said doctrine, the appellants contended  that there was a valid classification  under  the rule  while  the  respondents argued  contra.   The  learned Additional Solicitor General contended, for the first  time, before us that the appeal raised a new facet of the doctrine of  equality,  namely, whether an artificial  person  and  a natural person have equal attributes 352 within  the meaning of the equality clause, and,  therefore, the   case   involves  a  question  of   interpretation   of "the  Constitution.   This  argument,  if  we  may  say  so, involves  the  same  contention in  a  different  garb.   If analysed, the argument only comes to this: as an  artificial person  and a natural person have different attributes,  the classification  made between them is  valid.  This  argument does  not  suggest a new interpretation of Art.  14  of  the Constitution, but only attempts to bring the rule within the doctrine  of classification.  We, therefore, hold  that  the question  raised in this case does not involve any  question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Assuming  that the case raises a question of law as  to  the interpretation of the Constitution, can it be said that  the question raised is a substantial question of law within  the meaning of cl. (2) of Art 14.  This aspect was considered by the  Federal Court in T. M. Krishnaswamy,Pillai v.  Governor General  In  Council  (1).  That decision  turned  upon  the provisions  of s. 205 of the Government of India Act,  1935. The material S.   205:  "  (1) An appeal shall lie to the  Federal  Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court  if the   High  Court  certifies  that  the  case   involves   a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Act or any Order in Council made thereunder...." The Madras High Court gave a certificate to the effect  that the  case involved a substantial question of law as  to  the interpretation of s. 240(3) of the Government of India  Act, 1935.  Under s. 240(3) of the said Act, no person who was  a member  of civil service of the Crown in India or  held  any civil  post under the Crown in India could be  dismissed  or reduced  in  rank  until  he had  been  given  a  reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed  to be  taken  in regard to him.  The High Court, on  the  facts found,  held that the appellant therein had been  offered  A reasonable opportunity of showing cause within the meaning (1)  (1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) 1. part of that section says : 353

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of the said section, but gave a certificate under s.  205(1) of  the  Government of India Act, 1935.In dealing  with  the propriety of issuing the certificate in the circumstances of that case, Zafrulla Khan, J., speaking on behalf the  Court, concisely and pointedly stated at p. 2 : "  It was urged before us that the case involved a  question relating to the interpretation of sub-section (3) of section 240  of the Act.  To the extent to which any guidance  might have  been  needed  for the purposes of  this  case  on  the interpretation   of  that  sub-section  that  guidance   was furnished so far as this Court is concerned in its  judgment in  Secretary of State for India v. I.M. Lal [(1945)  F.C.R. 103 The rest was a simple question of fact.  In our judgment no " substantial question of law " as to the  interpretation of  the  Constitution Act was involved in this  case,  which could  have formed the basis of a certificate under  section 205(1) of the Act." On  the  question  of  interpretation  of  Art.  14  of  the Constitution  this Court in Budhan Choudhry v. The State  of Bihar  (1)  explained  the true meaning and  scope  of  that Article thus: "  It is now well-established that while article 14  forbids class   legislation,  it  does  not  forbid   reason.   able classification  for the purposes of legislation.  In  order, however, to pass the the test of permissible  classification two  conditions  must  be fulfilled, namely,  (i)  that  the classification   must   be  founded   on   an   intelligible differentia  which distinguishes persons or things that  are grouped together from others left out of the group and  (ii) that  that differentia must have a rational relation to  the object sought to be achieved by the statue in question.  The classification  may be founded on different  bases:  namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or  the like.  What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act  under consideration." (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045,1049. 354 This  in  only  a  restatement of  the  law  that  has  been enunciated   by  this  Court  in  Chiranjit  Lal   Chowdhuri v. The Union of India (1) and in other subsequent decisions. The said principles were reaffirmed in the  recent decisions of this Court in Rama Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (2 )  and in Mohammed    Haneef Qureshi v. State of Bihar  (3). In  view of the said decision there is no further scope  for putting a new interpretation on the provisions of Art. 14 of the  Constitution vis-a-vis the doctrine of  classification. The  interpretation of Art. 14 in the context  of  classifi- cation has been finally settled by the highest Court of this land   and   under  Art.  141  of  the   Constitution   that interpretation  is  binding  on all the  Courts  within  the territory  of India.  What remained to be done by  the  High Court  was only to apply that interpretation to,  the  facts before it.  A substantial question of law, therefore, cannot arise  where that law has been finally  and  authoritatively decided by this Court. In  the  result  we accept  the  preliminary  objection  and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed. (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.        (2) [1959] S.C.R. 279. (3)  [1959] S.C.R. 629.                             355