11 April 1985
Supreme Court
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STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH Vs A PARENT OF A STUDENT OF MEDICAL COLLEGE. SIMLA & ORS

Bench: BHAGWATI,P.N.
Case number: Writ Petition (Civil) 1499 of 1985


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PETITIONER: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: A PARENT OF A STUDENT OF MEDICAL COLLEGE. SIMLA & ORS

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/04/1985

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J) MISRA RANGNATH

CITATION:  1985 AIR  910            1985 SCR  (3) 676  1985 SCC  (3) 169        1985 SCALE  (1)758  CITATOR INFO :  R          1986 SC 847  (34)  RF         1989 SC1899  (23)  R          1990 SC1251  (11)  R          1990 SC1692  (30)  RF         1991 SC1792  (6)

ACT:     Constitution of India 1950 ,  Articles 32 and 226 Public Interest Litigation     Practice & Procedure      Courts-Public Interest litigation-Entertainment of-When arises      Letter treated  as Writ Petition-Disclosure of identity of petitioner- Necessity of.      Legislation-Initiation  of-Giving   of  directions   by Court-Validity of.

HEADNOTE:        The Chief Justice of the High Court received a letter from the  guardian of  a student  of the  Medical College in Simla complaining  about the  ragging of  freshers by senior students within  as also  outside the college campus and the hostel. The  guardian of  the student had annexed along with the said letter to the Chief Justice ,  a letter received by him from  his son.  The Division  Bench of  the  High  Court presided over by the Chief Justice treated these two letters as constituting  the Memo  of Writ  Petition ,  but directed that these two letters should not be placed on the record of the proceeding  in view  of the request made by the guardian that the  identity of  the writer should not be disclosed in the proceedings.      The Division Bench registered the two letters as a Writ Petition ,   and issued notice to the State Government,  and the Principal  of the  Medical College.  After  bearing  the respondents the  Division Bench  came to the conclusion that the practice of ragging was prevalent in the Medical College on a  noticeable scale  and that  ragging took  the form  of subjecting freshers including female students to inhuman and humiliating  treatment   degenerating  even   into  physical violence 677

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and that  the college  authorities  had  not  been  able  to effectively control such ragging. It gave various directions which included  a  direction  to  the  State  Government  to constitute a Committee-Anti-Ragging Committee-to go into the question and  make recommendations in regard to the curative ,   preventive and  punitive measures  to be  adopted by the college authorities to control and curb the evil of ragging.      Anti-Ragging  Committee   recommended  that  the  State Government could  initiate legislation which makes ragging a cognizable offence  an l  prescribe punishment  commensurate with the crimes committed.      When the  matter was  taken up  again for  hearing  the Division Bench  directed the  State Government  to  file  an affidavit indicating  the action  taken on  the  Report.  An affidavit to the effect that the State Government had ’taken notice of  the recommendations  to initiate legislation this behalf if  found necessary  and so  advised," was  filed  on behalf of  the State  Government. The Division Bench further directed  the   State  Government  to  initiate  legislation against ragging  and for  this  purpose  granted  the  State Government 6 weeks’ time.      In the  appeal by  the State  ,   to this  Court it was contended that  the Court  could not  give directions to the State Government to initiate legislation on ragging-      Allowing the Appeal. ^          HELD. t. The Division Bench was clearly in error in issuing a  direction to  the  Chief  Secretary  to  file  an affidavit within 6 weeks setting out the action taken by the State Government with a view to implementing the Committee’s recommendation. [684]      2. The direction given by the Division Bench was really nothing short  of an  indirect attempt  to compel  the State Government to  initiate legislation  with a  view to curbing the  evil of ragging. [683C]      3. It  is entirely a matter for the executive branch of the Government  to decide  whether or  not to  introduce any particular  legislation.  But  the  Court  certainly  cannot mandate the  executive or  any member  of the legislature to initiate legislation ,  howsoever necessary or desirable the Court may  consider it  to be. That is not a matter which is within the  sphere of  the functions and duties allocated to the judiciary under the Constitution. [683E-F]      4. If  the executive  is not carrying out any duty laid upon it  by the  Constitution or  the law  ,   the Court can certainly require  the executive  to carry out such duty and this is  precisely that  the Court  does when  it entertains public interest litigation. [683F] 678      s. When  the Court passes any orders in public interest litigation ,   the  Court does so not with a view to mocking at legislative  or exhaustive  authority or  in a  spirit of confrontation but  with a view to enforcing the Constitution and the  law ,   because  it is vital for the maintenance of the rule of law that the obligations which are laid upon the executive by  the Constitution and the law should be carried out faithfully and no one should go away with a feeling that the Constitution  and the law are meant only for the benefit of a  fortunate few and have no meaning for the large number of half-clad half-hungry people of this country. [684B-C]      6. It  is now settled law that this Court under Article 32 ,   and  the High Courts under Article 226 ,  can treat a letter as a Writ Petition and take action upon it. It is not every letter  which may be treated as a Writ Petition by the Supreme Court or the High Court. It is on , y where a letter

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is addressed  by an aggrieved person or by a public spirited individual or  a social  action group for enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights of a persons who by reason of poverty  ,     disability   or  socially   or   economically disadvantaged position  find it  difficult to  approach  the court for  redress that  the Supreme Court or the High Court would be  justified ,  nay bound ,  to treat the letter as a Writ Petition.  There may  also be cases where even a letter addressed for redressal of a wrong done to an individual may be treated as a Writ Petition where the Supreme Court or the High Court  considers it  expedient to do so in interests of justice. This  is an  innovative  strategy  which  has  been evolved by  the Supreme  Court. It  is  a  highly  effective weapon in the armoury of the law for reaching social justice to the common man. [684G-H; 685A-C]      7. The  Division  Bench  was  ,    certainly  right  in entertaining the  two letters  as a  Writ Petition ,  but it was wholly  in error  in directing that these two letters on which the  Division Bench  acted should not be placed on the record of  the proceedings  and the identity of the guardian and the  student should  not be  ,   disclosed. It  would be contrary to  all canons  of fair  play and  violative of all principles  of  judicial  propriety  and  administration  to entertain a Writ Petition without disclosing the identity of the  petitioner,    though  the  court  ,    knows  who  the petitioner is. [685D-F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1499 of 1985.      From the  Judgment and  order dated 18.9.84 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in C.W.P. No. 155/84.      K. Parasaran ,  Attorney General. A. K. Ganguli and A.K Chakravorty ,  for the Appellant.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BHAGWATI ,  J. This appeal by special leave is directed against 679 two orders  made by  a division  Bench of  the High Court of Himachal Pradesh  ,   one dated  24th July  ,   1984 and the other dated  18 September  1984 ,   in so far as they direct the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to file an  affidavit setting out what action has been taken by the  State   Government  towards   implementation   of   the recommendation contained  in paragraph  16 of  the Report of the Anti-Ragging  Committee. The  impugned orders are in our opinion wholly  unsustainable and  ordinarily we  would  not have taken  time to  deliver a  reasoned judgment and merely set aside  the impugned  orders with  a  brief  observation, but we  think it  necessary to  state  in  some  detail  our opinion in  regard to  the directions  given in the impugned orders ,   because  we find  that this  is one  of those few cases which demonstrates what we have often said before that public interest  litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great  care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be  extremely  careful  to  see  that  under  the  guise  of redressing a  public grievance it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the legislature. D      It appears  that the  Chief Justice  of the  High Court received a  letter dated  4th April  ,   1984 ,    from  the guardian of  a student  of the  Medical  College  in  Shimla complaining about the ragging of freshers by senior students

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within as  also outside  the college  campus and the hostel. The guardian  of the  student had  annexed  along  with  his letter to  the Chief  Justice a  letter  dated  25th  March, 1984 received by him from his son. The Division Bench of the High Court  presided over by the Chief Justice treated these two letters  as constituting  the Memo  of Writ Petition but directed that  these two letters should not be placed on the record of  the proceedings  in view  of the  request made in paragraph 6  of the letter of the guardian that the identity of the  writer should not be disclosed on account of fear of reprisal and  for the  self-same reason  the Division  Bench ordered that  the identity  of the  student and the guardian should not  be disclosed  in the  proceedings. The  Division Bench treating the two letters as a writ petition registered them as  Civil Writ  Petition No.  155 of  1984  and  issued notice to  the State  Government ,   the  Principal  of  the Medical College Simla ,  the Himachal Pradesh University and the Director  of Health  Services ,   Government of Himachal Pradesh who  were arrayed  as respondents  Nos. 1  to 4.  On receipt of the notice of the Writ Petition ,  the Government of Himachal Pradesh filed an affidavit setting out the steps which the H 680 State Government  and the  college authorities  had taken to check the  ragging  of  freshers  by  senior  students.  The Director of  Medical Education-cum-Principal  of the Medical College ,   Simla  also  filed  an  affidavit  opposing  the admission of  the Writ  Petition  on  the  ground  that  the college authorities  had taken various steps for the purpose of curbing  the evil of ragging and in fact had taken action On  at  least  two  occasions  awarding  punishment  to  the students who  indulged in  ragging by  suspending them for a period of  4 to  6 months  ,   The Division  Bench ,   on  a consideration of  this material  placed before it ,  came to the conclusion  that the  practice of ragging was prevailing in the  Medical College  ,   Simla on a noticeable scale and that ragging  took the form of subjecting freshers including female  students   to  inhuman   and  humiliating  treatment degenerating even  - into  physical violence  and  that  the college authorities had not been able to effectively control ragging with  the result that the college administration had lost confidence  of a sizeable section of student ,  parents and well-wishers  as regards  its capacity  to deal with the problem of  ragging. The  Division  Bench  accordingly  gave various directions  which included  a direction to the State Government to constitute a committee consisting of the Vice- Chancellor  of  the  Himachal  Pradesh  University  and  the Secretary  to   the  Government   ,    Health  Department  , interalia ,   to  make "recommendations  in  regard  to  the curative,  preventive and punitive measures to be adopted by the college  authorities to  control and  curb the  evil  of ragging and  the machinery  to be  set up  to enforce  these measures." This  Committee which  we shall  for the  sake of convenience refer to as the Anti-Ragging Committee ,  was to complete its  work and  submit its report within a period of six months from the date of its constitution.      The Anti-Ragging  Committee submitted its Report to the High Court  on 26th  June ,    1984.  The  Report  contained various recommendations  intended to  control and  curb  the ragging of  freshers  by  senior  students  in  the  Medical College and  its hostel. We are concerned here with only one recommendation namely  that contained in paragraph 16 of the Report which was in the following terms:            "In quite a number of States in the country there are Acts on ragging which make ragging a cognizable offence

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681      and prescribe the types of punishment commensurate with      the crimes  committed. The  Himachal Pradesh Government      could be  suggested to  initiate such  a legislation as      early as  possible. Pending  such a  legislation by the      State  Government,  the  University  authorities  could      think of  incorporating  some  provisions  relating  to      ragging in  the relevant ordinance of Discipline in the      Ordinance of the University.      The Division  Bench by  its order dated 24th July, 1984 gave  directions   for   implementation   of   the   various recommendations  made   in  the   Report  and   so  far   as recommendation contained  in paragraph  16 of the Report was concerned, the  Division Bench said: "The Chief Secretary to the State  Government will file an affidavit within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of the writ setting out the action  proposed  to  be  taken  on  the  recommendation contained in  paragraph 16  (First  Part)  of  the  relevant portion of the Report." Though this direction ostensibly did no more  than call  upon the  Chief Secretary  to inform the Court as  to what  action the  State Government  proposed to take on  the recommendations  to  initiate  legislation  for curbing ragging,  it was, in fact and substance, intended to require the  State Government to Initiate legislation on the subject. If  this direction  were merely  an  innocuous  one intended to  inform the  court whether  the State Government intended  to  take  any  action  on  the  recommendation  to initiate legislation  against ragging,  no  objection  could possibly be  taken against  it, because  it would  leave the Government  free  to  decide  whether  or  not  to  initiate legislation  in   regard  to   ragging  without  mandatorily requiring  the  State  Government  to  do  so-  But  as  the subsequent  event   would  show,  what  the  Division  Bench intended to achieve by giving this direction was not just to obtain information  as to what the State Government proposed to do  in the  matter but  to  actually  require  the  State Government to  initiate legislation against ragging. That is why, when the Chief Secretary in deference to this direction filed an  affidavit  stating,  inter-alia,  that  the  State Government had   "taken  notice  of  the  recommendation  to initiate legislation  in this behalf, if found necessary and so advised",  the Division Bench was not satisfied with this statement of  the Chief  Secretary and declined to close the proceeding so  far as  this particular  aspect was concerned and proceeded, inter-alia, to reiterate in its order dated 1 8th September 1984: 682         "The Chief  Secretary to  the State  Government will      file an  affidavit within  a period of 6 weeks from the      date of  receipt of  the Writ  setting out  the further      action taken  in the direction of the implementation of      the recommendation  contained in  paragraph  16  (First      Part) of  the relevant  portion of  the Report  of  the      Anti-Ragging Committee."      When this direction was given by the Division Bench, it clearly implied  that what  the Division  Bench  wanted  the State Government  to do  was to initiate legislation against ragging and for this purpose, time of 6 weeks was granted to the  State   Government  The   State  Government   thereupon preferred the  present appeal  with special  leave  obtained from this Court.      We may  point out, even at the cost of repetition, that the direction given by the Division Bench in its order dated 24th July  1984 and  reiterated  in  its  order  dated  18th September 1984  was not an innocuous direction issued merely

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for the purpose, of informing the Court as to what the State Governing proposed  to do in regard to the recommendation in paragraph 16  of the  Report to initiate legislation against ragging.  The  Division  Bench  would  have  been  certainly justified in  enquiring from  the Chief Secretary as to what action the  State Government  proposed to  take in regard to the  recommendation   of  the-   Anti-Ragging  Committee  to initiate legislation on the subject of ragging. Such enquiry could have  been legitimately made by the Division Bench for the purpose  of obtaining  information on a matter which the Division Bench  regarded, and  in our  opinion  rightly,  as necessary for eradicating the evil practice of ragging which is  not   only  subversive   of  human   dignity  but   also prejudicially affects  the interests of the students and the discipline in  the Campus  and no  exception could have been taken to  it because it would have left the State Government free to decide whether or not to initiate any legislation on the  subject   and  not   mandatorily  required   the  State Government to  initiate any  such legislation.  If such only were the  purpose of  the direction  issued by  the Division Bench and  the Division  Bench did not intend anything more, the Division  Bench would  have closed  the proceedings when the Chief  Secretary intimated  in his  affidavit  that  the State Government  would initiate  legislation in this behalf "if found  necessary  and  so  advised".  But  despite  this statement made by 683 the Chief  Secretary on  behalf of the State Government, the Division Bench  persisted in  reiterating its direction that the Chief  Secretary  should  file  an  affidavit  within  a further period  of 6  weeks setting  out the  further action taken  by   the  State   Government  in   the  direction  of implementation of  the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of  the  Report.  This  persistence  in  reiterating  the direction to  file an affidavit setting out the action taken by  the  State  Government  towards  implementation  of  the recommendation  to  initiate  legislation  against  ragging, clearly shows  that what the Division Bench intended was not merely to  obtain information  as to  what action  the State Government proposed  to  take  but  to  obligate  the  State Government  to   take  action   by  way   of  initiation  of legislation against  ragging. The  direction  given  by  the Division Bench  was really  nothing  short  of  an  indirect attempt  to   compel  the   State  Government   to  initiate legislation with  a view to curbing the evil of ragging, for otherwise it  is difficult  to see  why, after the clear and categorical statement  by the  Chief Secretary  on behalf of the State  Government that  the  Government  will  introduce legislation if  found necessary and so advised, the Division Bench  should   have  proceeded   to  again  give  the  same direction. This  the Division Bench was clearly not entitled to do.  It is  entirely a matter for the executive branch of the Government  to decide  whether or  not to  introduce any particular  legislation.   Of  course,  any  member  of  the legislature can  also introduce  legislation but  the  court certainly cannot  mandate the executive or any member of the legislature to  initiate legislation, howsoever necessary or desirable the  Court may  consider it  to be.  That is not a matter which  is within  the sphere  of  the  functions  and duties allocated to the judiciary under the Constitution. If the executive  is not  carrying out any duty laid upon it by the Constitution or the law, the Court can certainly require the executive  to carry  out such duty and this is precisely what the  Court does  when  it  entertains  public  interest litigation. Where  the Court  finds, on  being moved  by  an

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aggrieved party  or by  any public  spirited  individual  or social  action  group,  that  the  executive  is  remiss  in discharging its  obligations under  the Constitution  or the law, so  that the  poor and the under privileged continue to be subjected  to exploitation  and injustice or are deprived of their  social and  economic entitlements  or that  social legislation  enacted   for  their   benefit  is   not  being implemented thus  depriving them  of the rights and benefits conferred upon them, the Court certainly can and must 684 intervene  and   compel  the  Executive  to  carry  out  its constitutional and  legal obligations  and ensure  that  the deprived and  vulnerable sections  of the  community are  no longer subjected  to exploitation  or injustice and they are able to  realise their  social and economic rights. When the Court passes  any orders  in public interest litigation, the Court does  so not  with a view to mocking at legislative or executive authority or in a spirit of confrontation but with a view to enforcing the Constitution and the law, because it is vital  for the  maintenance of  the rule  of law that the obligations  which  are  laid  upon  the  executive  by  the Constitution and  the law  should be  carried out faithfully and  no   one  should  go  away  with  a  feeling  that  the constitution and the law are meant only for the benefit of a fortunate few  and have  no meaning for the large numbers of half-clad, half-hungry  people of  this country.  That is  a feeling which  should never  be allowed  to grow. But at the same time  the Court  cannot group  the function assigned to the executive and the legislature under the Constitution and it cannot even indirectly require the executive to introduce a particular  legislation or  the legislature  to pass it or assume to  itself a  supervisory role  over the  law  making activities of  the executive  and the  legislature- We  are, therefore of  the vie-that the Division Bench was clearly in error in  issuing a direction to the Chief Secretary to file an affidavit  within 6 weeks setting out the action taken by the  State  Government  with  a  view  to  implementing  the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of the Report.      There is  also one  other error into which the Division Bench of  the High  Court seems to have fallen. The Division Bench of  the High  Court treated the letter of the guardian of the  student along  with  the  letter  addressed  to  the guardian by  the student  as constituting  a  memo  of  Writ Petition. This  was certainly within the jurisdiction of the High Court  to do,  since it  is now  settled law  that this Court under  Article 32  of the  Constitution and  the  High Courts under  Article 226  of the  Constitution can  treat a letter as a Writ Petition and take action upon it. We may of course make  it clear  that it is not every letter which may be treated  as a  Writ Petition  by the Supreme Court or the High Court.  It is  only there  a letter  is addressed by an aggrieved person  or by  a public  spirited individual  or a social action group for enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights  of a  person in custody or of a class or group of  persons   who  by   reason  of  poverty,  disability  or sociallity 685 or economically  disadvantaged position find it difficult to approach the court for redress that the Supreme Court or the High Court  would be  justified, nay  bound,  to  treat  the letter as  a Writ  Petition. There  may also  be cases where even letter  addressed for  redressal of  a wrong done to an individual may  be treated  as a  Writ  Petition  where  the Supreme Court or the High Court considers it expedient to do so in  the interests  of  justice.  This  is  an  innovative

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strategy   which has  been evolved  by the Supreme Court for the purpose  of providing  easy access  to  justice  to  the weaker sections of Indian humanity and it is a powerful tool in the  hands of  public  spirited  individuals  and  social action groups  for combating  exploitation and injustice and securing for  the under-privileged segments of society their social and  economic entitlements.  It is a highly effective weapon  in  the  Armour  of  the  law  for  reaching  social justice.:  to  the  common  man.  The  Division  Bench  was, therefore, certainly  right in  entertaining the two letters as a  Writ Petition and no exception can be taken to it, but it was  wholly in  error in directing that these two letters on which  the Division  Bench acted  should not be placed on the record  of the  proceedings  and  the  identity  of  the guardian and  the student  should not  be  disclosed  It  is difficult to  see how  any proceedings can be entertained by the Court  keeping the petitioner before it anonymous or his identity secret.  If the  identity of  the petitioner is not disclosed, how  would the  respondent against whom relief is sought ever  he able  to  verify  the  authenticity  of  the petitioner and  the credibility  of the case brought by him. It would  be  contrary  to  all  canons  of  fair  play  and violative  of  all  principles  of  judicial  propriety  and administration  to   entertain  a   Writ  Petition   without disclosing the  identity of the petitioner, though the court knows who  the petitioner  is. We  are,  therefore,  of  the opinion that the procedure adopted by the Division Bench was wrong and  the Division Bench was not justified in directing that the  two letters  on which  action was initiated by the Division Bench  should not  be kept  in the  record  of  the proceedings and  that the  identity of  the guardian and the student should not be disclosed.      We accordingly  allow the  appeal  and  set  aside  the orders dated  24th July, 1984 and 18th September, 1984 in so far as  they direct the Chief Secretary to file an affidavit setting out  the action  taken by  the State  Government  in implementing the recommendation contained in paragraph 16 of the Report  of the  Anti-ragging Committee. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal. N.V.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 686