REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.                OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.10676 of 2007)

State of Haryana …Appellant

Versus

Ramesh Kumar  … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge  in  this  appeal  is  to  the  order  passed  by  a

Division  Bench  of  the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court

summarily dismissing the Civil Writ Petition filed by the State.

Challenge in the writ petition was to the award passed by the

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Presiding  Officer,  Labour  court,  U.T.  Chandigarh  in  a

reference made under Section 10 of the Industrial  Disputes

Act, 1947 (in short the ‘Act’). The respondent claimed that he

was working in the office of the Public Works Department B&R

since December 1991 and continued to work upto 31st March,

1993. He claimed to have completed 240 days of service and

to have drawn the salary. The allegation was that without any

justifiable  reason  his  services  were  terminated  w.e.f.

31.3.1993.  A  civil  suit  was  filed  for  mandatory  injunction

against the department.  The Department took the view that

the  Civil  Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  suit.

Subsequently, demand notice was issued and the matter was

referred to the Labour Court. The Labour Court found that the

alleged  termination  was not  sustainable.  The  Labour  Court

took  the  view  that  since  the  workman  was  engaged  in

December, 1991 and worked upto 31.1.1993 he is presumed

to have completed 240 days of service. Therefore, provision of

Section 25 of the Act was not complied with.  

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3. Writ  Petition  was  filed  by  the  appellant  questioning

correctness of the award which was dismissed summarily as

noted above.  

4. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  the

Labour  Court  did  not  take  note  of  the  fact  that  the  claim

petition  was  made  after  about  5  years  of  the  alleged

termination. The High Court should not have dismissed the

writ  petition  in  a  summary  manner  without  indicating  any

reason.  It was further submitted that the respondent had not

completed  240  days  of  service  within  12  calendar  months

preceding the alleged date of termination. The award of 50%

back wages with a direction of re-instatement therefore cannot

be sustained.  

5. Learned counsel  for the respondent on the other hand

submitted that the burden is on the employer to show that the

concerned employee had not completed 240 days of service.

6. Reasons  introduce  clarity  in  an  order.  On  plainest

consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth

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its  reasons,  howsoever  brief,  in  its  order  indicative  of  an

application  of  its  mind,  all  the  more  when  its  order  is

amenable  to  further  avenue  of  challenge.  The  absence  of

reasons has rendered the High Court order not sustainable.

Similar view was expressed in State of U.P. v. Battan and Ors

(2001  (10)  SCC  607).  About  two  decades  back  in  State  of

Maharashtra v.  Vithal  Rao  Pritirao  Chawan (AIR  1982  SC

1215) the desirability of a speaking order while dealing with

an  application  for  grant  of  leave  was  highlighted.  The

requirement  of  indicating  reasons  in  such  cases  has  been

judicially recognized as imperative. The view was re-iterated in

Jawahar Lal Singh v.  Naresh Singh and Ors. (1987 (2) SCC

222).  Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this

Court, cannot be forsaken, under any pretext by any authority

or Court, be it even the Highest Court in a State, oblivious to

Article  141  of  the  Constitution of  India,  1950 (in short  the

‘Constitution’).    

7. Even in respect  of  administrative  orders Lord  Denning

M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All

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E.R.  1148)  observed  “The  giving  of  reasons  is  one  of  the

fundamentals  of  good  administration”.  In  Alexander

Machinery  (Dudley) Ltd. v.  Crabtree (1974 LCR 120)  it  was

observed:  “Failure  to  give  reasons  amounts  to  denial  of

justice”.  Reasons  are  live  links  between  the  mind  of  the

decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision

or conclusion arrived at”. Reasons substitute subjectivity by

objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the

decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by

its  silence,  render  it  virtually  impossible  for  the  Courts  to

perform  their  appellate  function  or  exercise  the  power  of

judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right

to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system,

reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to

the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected

party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of

the  salutary  requirements  of  natural  justice  is  spelling  out

reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out.

The “inscrutable  face of a sphinx”  is  ordinarily  incongruous

with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.  

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8. These  aspects  were  highlighted  in  State  of  Punjab v.

Bhag Singh (2004(1) SCC 547) and Suga Ram @ Chhuga Ram

v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (2006 (8) SCC 641).

9. In  Mohan Lal v.  Bharat Electronics Ltd. (1981 (3) SCC

225), it is said by this Court that before a workman can claim

retrenchment not being in consonance  with Section 25-F of

the Industrial Disputes Act, he has to show that he has been

in  continuous  service  for  not  less  than  one  year  with  the

employer who had retrenched him from service.

10. In  Range Forest Officer v.  S.T. Hadimani (2002 (3) SCC

25) this Court held that: (SCC p. 26, para 3)

“In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first  determining  on  the  basis  of  cogent evidence  that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his  termination.  It  was  the  case  of  the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was denied by the appellant. It  was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he

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had in fact  worked for  240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is  only  his  own statement  in his  favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for  any  court  or  tribunal  to  come  to  the conclusion  that  a  workman  had,  in  fact, worked  for  240  days  in  a  year.  No  proof  of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or  record  of  appointment  or  engagement  for this period was produced by the workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside.”

11. This Court again in Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills

Ltd. v.  State  of  Rajasthan (2004  (8)  SCC  161),  Municipal

Corpn., Faridabad v.  Siri Niwas (2004 (8) SCC 195) and M.P.

Electricity Board v. Hariram (2004 (8) SCC 246), has reiterated

the principle that the burden of proof lies on the workman to

show that he had worked continuously for 240 days in the

preceding one year prior to his alleged retrenchment and it is

for  the  workman to  adduce  evidence  apart  from examining

himself to prove the factum of his being in employment of the

employer.

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12. The  position  was  highlighted  in  Surendrangar  District

Panchayat and Anr. vs. Jethabhai Pitamberbhai (2005 (8) SCC

450).  

13. In view of the position in law as highlighted by this Court

as afore-noted we set aside the impugned order of the High

Court  and  remit  the  matter  for  fresh  consideration  in

accordance with law. Since the matter is pending since long, it

would be desirable that the High Court should dispose of the

writ  petition  as  early  as  practicable  preferably  within  6

months from the date of receipt of this order.  

14. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to

costs.   

………………………...J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………………...J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

New Delhi, July 11, 2008

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