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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  30 of 2005

PETITIONER: State of Haryana

RESPONDENT: Mahender Singh & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/11/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 30 OF 2005 WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 31 OF 2005 CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 21 OF 2007 in CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 30 OF 2005

S.B. SINHA,  J :

1.      A circular letter issued by the State of Haryana laying down criteria  for pre-mature release of the prisoners has been declared to be  unconstitutional by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court  by reason of the impugned judgment.

2.      Respondents herein are life convicts.  They were chargesheeted for  commission of an offence of murder of Ran Singh, Rattan Singh and Satbir  Singh.  They have been found guilty thereof by a judgment of conviction  and sentence dated 25.01.1988.  Indisputably, their appeals before the High  Court as also this Court [since reported in (1995) 5 SCC 187] had been  dismissed.   

3.      The State of Punjab in exercise of its power conferred upon it under  the Prisons Act, 1894 made rules.  They have statutory force.  Sub-rules (a),  (b), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 2 read as under:

"(a) "prisoner" includes a person committed to  prison in default of furnishing security to keep the  peace or be of good behaviour; (b)     "class I prisoner" means a thug, a robber by  administration of poisonous drugs or a  professional, hereditary or specially dangerous  criminal convicted of heinous organized crime,  such as dacoity; (c)     "class 2 prisoner" means a dacoit or other  person convicted of heinous organized crime, not  being a professional, hereditary, or specially  dangerous criminal; (d)     "class 3 prisoner" means a prisoner other  than a class 1 or class 2 prisoner; (f)     "life convict" means \026          (i)     a class 1 or class 2 prisoner whose  sentence amounts to twenty-five years’  imprisonment, or         (ii)    a class 3 prisoner whose sentence  amounts to twenty years’ imprisonment"

4.      Rules 20 and 21 of the said Rules read thus:

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"20. When a life-convict being a class 1 prisoner  has earned such remission as entitles him to  release, the Superintendent shall report accordingly  to the Local Government with a view to the  passing of orders under section 401 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1898. 21.     Save as provided by rule 20, when a  prisoner has earned such remission as entitles him  to release, the Superintendent shall release him."

5.      It, however, appears that on 12.07.1910, a note was appended to the  existing Rules 20 and 21 which is in the following terms:

"The intention of these rules is (a) that the cases of  class I life-convicts, or class II or class III life- convict who have more than one sentence for  offences committed either before their admission  to Jail or while in jail, and of any other life- convicts in whose cases the local Government may  have deemed it desirable, should be submitted for  the special orders of the local Government as to  whether release should be granted, and if so, on  what conditions (such conditions must, it should be  noted, be prescribed by order under section 401,  Code of Criminal Procedure), and (b) that all other  convicts should, on the expiry of their sentences,  less the periods of remission earned, be released  unconditionally without any special orders from  the Local Government."

       The Punjab Rules were amended on 9.03.1962, in terms whereof, ’life  convict’ has been defined to mean ’prisoner whose sentence amounts to 20  years imprisonment’.

6.      Indisputably, the State of Punjab had been issuing instructions in  relation to pre-mature release of the convicts from time to time.  In the year  1988, when the respondents were convicted, the Rules which were  applicable were of 27.02.1984; relevant portion whereof is as under:

"The Haryana Government vide letter No. 7483/2JJ/77/30099 dated  28.11.1987 had directed that cases of life convicts of the following two  categories be put up to the State Level Committee for review of their  premature release and final decision of the State Government thereon.  The  categories are:

1. Adult male life convicts After completion of 8-1/2 years of  substantive sentence and 14 years  sentence including remission. 2. Female and Juvenile life  convicts who were below 20  years of age at the time of  commission of offence. After completion of 6 years of  substantive sentence and 10 years  sentence including remission."

7.      On or about 28.09.1988, the said instructions were amended in the  following terms:

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"(a). Convicts whose death  sentence has been commuted  to life imprisonment by the  President of India or by the  Governor of Haryana on  acceptance of mercy petition. Their cases will be reviewed after  completion of 14 years actual  sentence including  undertrial/detention period.  In case  of very good conduct in jail for 12  years, their cases will be considered  after 12 years of actual  imprisonment including undertrial/  detention period. (b) Juvenile life convicts below  the age of 18 years at the time  of commission of offence and  female life convicts. Their cases may be considered after  6 years actual sentence including  undertrial/ detention period,  provided the total of period of such  detention including remissions is  not less than 10 years. (c) Adult life convicts (above 18  years) not convicted for  heinous crimes as defined in  (d) below. Their cases may be considered after  completion of 8 = years of  substantive detention including  undertrial/ detention period,  provided that the total period of  such detention including remissions  is not less than 14 years. (d) Adult life convicts involved  in heinous crimes such as  dowry deaths, bride burning,  husband killing and cases  disclosing great depravity of  character and greed and those  involving extreme brutality,  murder with rape, murder  while undergoing life  sentence, organized and  professional crimes of  heinous nature like dacoity  with murder and life convicts,  who are dangerous and  hardened criminals as  evidenced for example from  cumulative sentences,  persistent bad conduct in the  prison and those who could  not for some definite reasons  be prematurely released  without danger to public  safety. After undergoing 14 years actual  detention including undertrial/

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detention period. (e) Persons sentenced to life  imprisonment inclusive of  those convicted of crimes  under (d) above and in whose  cases death sentence has been  commuted to life  imprisonment but who are  suffering from terminal  illness like cancer or  tuberculosis likely to result in  death in the near future. These prisoners may be considered  for release irrespective of the  detention undergone on report of  Medical Board designated by the  Government.  Medical re- examination of the convict should  be done 3 months after such release  for the confirmation of the disease.   Conditions of release should  contain the provision regarding  medical re-examination and re- admission to the prison if patient is  not found to be suffering from such  a disease or is on the road to  recovery."

8.      From the 1984 and 1988 instructions, it would appear that there did  not exist any category of a life convict involved in a heinous crime apart  from the ones stated therein.   

       Yet again on 19.11.1991, the policy was modified to the following  effect:

"2(b) Adult life convicts who have  been imprisoned for life but  whose cases are not covered  under (a) above and who have  committed crime which are  not considered heinous as  mentioned in clause (a)  above. Their cases may be considered after  completion of 10 years of actual  sentence including their trial  period, provided that the total  period of such sentence including  remission is not less than 14 years.

***                                     ***                                     ***

5.      Such cases will be put to the Governor through the Minister for Jails  and the Chief Minister, with full background of the prisoner and  recommendations of the State Level Committee, alongwith the copy of  judgment etc. for orders under Article 161 of the Constitution of India."

9.      Similar provisions were again made by reason of a policy statement  made on 4.02.1993.   

10.     Concededly, the Government of India, Ministry of Home issued  instructions for revising the rules made under Section 59(5) of the Prisons  Act, 1894 wherein the following recommendations were made:

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"1\005"Transportation for life" or "Imprisonment for  life" should be taken to mean imprisonment for 20  years in practice.  However, in treating  "transportation or imprisonment for life" as a term  of 20 years’ imprisonment, necessary distinction  between different classes of prisoners can be  adequately allowed for, when reckoning  remissions before release of prisoners".

***                     ***                     *** 3.      In view of the decision referred to in para 1  above, according to which the period of 25 years’  imprisonment in case of class I and II prisoners,  has been reduced to 20 years.  The Government of  India consider that it would be desirable to amend  the relevant Remission Rules also for the purpose.   As, however, those powers are vested in the State  Government under section 59(5) of the Prisons  Act, 1894, I am to suggest that the State  Government may consider taking necessary steps  to amend the relevant provisions of the Remission  Rules at an early date \026 This Ministry may be  informed of the action taken in the matter."   

11.     Paragraphs 516-B and 635 of the Punjab Jail Manual read as under:

"516-B. ( a) With the exception of females and of  males who were under 20 years of age at the time  of commission of offence, the cases of every  convicted prisoner sentenced to :  (i) Imprisonment for life,   (ii) Imprisonment/s for life and term/s of  imprisonment,   (iii) Cumulative periods of rigorous imprisonment  aggregating to more than 14 years,   ( iv ) A single sentence of more than 20 years:  (a) who has undergone a period of detention in jail  amounting together with remission earned to 14  years, shall be submitted through the Inspector- General of Prisons, Punjab for the orders of the  State Government,   (b) the case of a female prisoner and of a male  prisoner under 20 years of age at the time of  commission of offence , who is undergoing\027  (i) Imprisonment/s for life,   ( ii) Imprisonment/s for life and a term/s of  imprisonment,   (iii) Cumulative periods of rigorous imprisonment  aggregating to more than 10 years or,   (iv) A single sentence of more than 20 years shall  be submitted through the Inspector-General of  Prisons, Punjab, for the orders of the State  Government when the prisoner has undergone a  period of detention in jail amounting together with  remission earned to 10 years,   ( v ) Notwithstanding anything contained above, a  Superintendent, Jail may, in his discretion, refer at  any time, for the orders of the State Government  through the Inspector-General of Prisons, Punjab,  the case of any prisoner sentenced to imprisonment  for life whose sentence might in the  Superintendent’s opinion be suitably commuted  into a term of imprisonment.

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635. Scale of award of remission \026 Ordinary  remission shall be awarded on the following scale  \026  (a)     two days per month for thoroughly good  conduct and scrupulous attention to all prison  regulations. (b)     two days per month for industry and the due  performance of the daily task imposed.

12.     Paragraph 647 is in pari materia with Rule 20 of the Statutory Rules.

13.     The State of Haryana, however, formulated a policy in regard to pre- mature release of life convicts in terms whereof the cases for remission were  required to be considered after completion of 10 years of actual  imprisonment and 14 years including remission.  The said policy, however,  was reformulated on or about 12.04.2002; the relevant portion whereof is as  under:

"Convicts whose death sentence has  been commuted to life imprisonment  and convicts who have been  imprisonment for life having  committed a heinous crime such as :- (i) Murder after rape repeated chained  rape/ unnatural offences. (ii) Murder with intention for the  ransom. (iii) Murder of more than two persons. (iv) Persons convicted for second time  for murder. (v) Sedition with murder. Their cases may be considered after  completion of 20 years of actual  sentence and 25 years total  sentence with remissions. (a) Convicts who have been  imprisoned for life having committed  a heinous crime such as: (i) Murder with wrongful confinement  for extortion/ robbery. (ii) Murder while undergoing life  sentence (iii) Murder with dacoity (iv) Murder with offence under TADA  Act, 1987 (v) Murder with untouchability  (offences) Act, 1955 (vi) Murder in connection with dowry. (vii) Murder of a child under the age  14 years. Their cases may be considered after  completion of 14 years of actual  sentence including their trial  period, provided that the total  period of such sentence including  remissions is not less than 20  years."

14.     The writ petition preferred by the respondents questioning the  constitutionality of the said policy decision has been allowed by the High  Court on the premise that no discrimination could be made inter se amongst  the life convicts; all of them being similarly situated and, thus, the purported

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classification on the ground of number of murders was arbitrary and  discriminatory.   

15.     The State of Haryana is, thus, before us.

16.    Mr. P.N. Misra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  appellant, submitted that the State having an unfettered right to formulate a  policy decision in regard to remission of sentence, the High Court  committed a manifest error in arriving at the aforementioned conclusion;  particularly, having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 54 and 55  of the Indian Penal Code and Section 433A of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973.   

17.    The learned counsel would contend that the executive government of  the State in exercise of its constitutional power under Article 161 of the  Constitution of India can formulate such a policy decision and the same has  been approved by this Court and in that view of the matter it can also  reformulate the policy from time to time.   

18.     Article 14, learned counsel would contend, does not forbid reasonable  classification.  Such a policy decision having been formulated for the benefit  of the convicts themselves, as in terms of Section 433A of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, a convict does not have any constitutional or statutory  right of remission of sentence, cannot be held to be unconstitutional.  

19.     Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the right to be considered  for obtaining remission itself is a fundamental right.  According to the  learned counsel, the said policy decision, if taken into consideration in the  backdrop of the criminal case in which the respondents had been convicted,  would lead to an inference of hardship inasmuch as although they have been  found to be guilty for murder of more than one person, the same arose out of  a land dispute, and although not accepted by the Trial Court, a plea of self- defence was also raised.

20.     Mr. B. Malik, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of some of  the respondents, supplemented the submissions of Mr. Hansaria stating that  no policy decision could be formulated in derogation of the Statutory Rules  and in any event, the said policy decision would have prospective operation  and, thus, would not apply in the fact of this case, as the respondents have  been convicted in the year 1988.

21.     The State indisputably is entitled to take a prison policy as contra- distinguished from a sentencing policy.  The Prisons Act, 1894 was enacted  to amend the law relating to Prisons.  Sub-section (5) of Section 59 thereof  empowers the State Government to make rules for the award of marks and   shortening of sentences.  The State of Punjab, pursuant to the said power,   framed rules.   

22.     The Rules put the convicts into three categories.  It also defines the  term ’life convicts’.  Whereas a classification had been made from amongst  the convicts having regard to the gravity of the offences committed by them,  indisputably no classification has been made on the basis of the number of  deaths which might have taken place at the hands of the persons.  The State  apart from making the Statutory Rules, as noticed hereinbefore, had been  issuing executive instructions.

23.     Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for power to  suspend or remit sentences.  Section 433 provides for power to commute  sentence.  Section 433A, which was inserted in the Code of Criminal  Procedure by Act No. 45 of 1978 and which came into force with effect  from 18.12.1978, provides that ’notwithstanding anything contained in  Section 432, no convict shall be released from prison unless he has served at  least 14 years of imprisonment where a sentence of imprisonment for life  has been imposed’.

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24.     We may also notice Sections 54 and 55 of the Indian Penal Code  which read as under:

"54 - Commutation of sentence of death  : In every  case in which sentence of death shall have been  passed, the appropriate Government may, without  the consent of the offender, commute the  punishment for any other punishment provided by  this Code. 55 - Commutation of sentence of imprisonment for  life : In every case in which sentence of  imprisonment for life shall have been passed, the  appropriate Government may, without the consent  of the offender, commute the punishment for  imprisonment of either description for a term not  exceeding fourteen years."

25.     It is true that no convict has a fundamental right of remission or  shortening of sentences.  It is also true that the State in exercise of its  executive power of remission must consider each individual case keeping in  view the relevant factors.  The power of the State to issue general  instructions, so that no discrimination is made, is also permissible in law.   

26.     The question, however, which would inter alia arise for consideration  is as to whether new policy decision adopted by the State of Haryana will  have a prospective operation.   

27.     At the point of time when the respondents were convicted, viz., in the  year 1988, for consideration of their cases for remission, the following  conditions were required to be fulfilled:  

(i)     They should have undergone at least 8 = years of the substantive  or actual sentence (ii)    They should have also undergone 14 years of sentence including  the period of remission earned.

       Indisputably, however, the same was subject to Section 433A of the  Code of Criminal Procedure.

28.    Validity or otherwise of Section 433A of the Code of Criminal  Procedure came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this  Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India and Others [(1981) 1 SCC 107]  wherein this Court inter alia held:

 "54. The major submissions which deserve high  consideration may now be taken up. They are three  and important in their outcome in the prisoners’  freedom from behind bars. The first turns on the  "prospectivity" (loosely so called) or otherwise of  Section 433-A. We have already held that Article  20(1) is not violated but the present point is  whether, on a correct construction, those who have  been convicted prior to the coming into force of  Section 433-A are bound by the mandatory limit.  If such convicts are out of its coils their cases must  be considered under the remission schemes and  "short-sentencing" laws. The second plea, revolves  round "pardon jurisprudence", if we may coarsely  call it that way, enshrined impregnably in Articles  72 and 161 and the effect of Section 433-A  thereon. The power to remit is a constitutional  power and any legislation must fail which seeks to

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curtail its scope and emasculate its mechanics.  Thirdly, the exercise of this plenary power cannot  be left to the fancy, frolic or frown of Government,  State or Central, but must embrace reason,  relevance and reformation, as all public power in a  republic must. On this basis, we will have to  scrutinise and screen the survival value of the  various remission schemes and short-sentencing  projects, not to test their supremacy over Section  433-A, but to train the wide and beneficent power  to remit life sentences without the hardship of  fourteen fettered years."

29.     In regard to the first point, it was held that a person convicted before  coming into force of Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure goes  out of the pale thereof and will enjoy the benefits as had accrued to him.

       In regard to the second point, it was held that Articles 72 and 161 of  the Constitution of India must yield to Section 433A of the Code of Criminal  Procedure.

       The Constitution Bench was of the opinion that remission schemes  offer healthy motivation for better behaviour, inner improvement and  development of social fibre.  It was observed that remission and short  sentencing scheme provides for good guidelines for exercise of pardon  power, a jurisdiction meant to be used as often and as systematically as  possible and not to be abused, much as the temptation so to do may press  upon the men of power.

       It was also opined:

"(10) Although the remission rules or short- sentencing provisions proprio vigore may not  apply as against Section 433-A, they will override  Section 433-A if the Government, Central or State,  guides itself by the selfsame rules or schemes in  the exercise of its constitutional power. We regard  it as fair that until fresh rules are made in keeping  with experience gathered, current social conditions  and accepted penological thinking \027 a desirable  step, in our view \027 the present remission and  release schemes may usefully be taken as  guidelines under Articles 72/161 and orders for  release passed. We cannot fault the Government, if  in some intractably savage delinquents, Section  433-A is itself treated as a guideline for exercise of  Articles 72/161. These observations of ours are  recommendatory to avoid a hiatus, but it is for  Government, Central or State, to decide whether  and why the current Remission Rules should not  survive until replaced by a more wholesome  scheme."

30.     However, in Sadhu Singh and Others v. State of Punjab [(1984) 2  SCC 310], although this Court noticed the aforementioned binding precedent  in Maru Ram (supra) without dwelling upon the question in depth, while  interpreting the provisions of paragraph 516-B of the Jail Manual, opined  that the same does not have the force of a statutory rule and, thus, it would  be open to the State Government to alter or amend or even withdraw such  executive instruction stating:

 "6\005In other words any existing executive  instructions could be substituted by issuing fresh  executive instructions for processing the cases of

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lifers for premature release but once issued these  must be uniformly and invariably applied to all  cases of lifers so as to avoid the charge of  discrimination under Article 14."           The contention that those convicts who had been sentenced to death  but whose sentence on mercy petitions has been commuted to life  imprisonment will be governed by the 1976 instructions was negatived.

       This Court, however, upheld the right of two convicts whose cases  were entitled to be considered for pre-mature release immediately in view of  1976 instructions.  Unfortunately, the attention of this court was not drawn  to the relevant paragraphs of the decision in Maru Ram(supra).  

31.    We may notice that the question has been considered by this Court in  State of Punjab and Others v. Joginder Singh and Others [(1990) 2 SCC 661]  wherein it was held:

"9....Even in such cases Section 433-A of the Code  or the executive instruction of 1976 does not insist  that the convict pass the remainder of his life in  prison but merely insists that he shall have served  time for at least 14 years. In the case of other  ’lifers’ the insistence under the 1971 amendment is  that he should have a period of at least 8 1/2 years  of incarceration before release. The 1976  amendment was possibly introduced to make the  remission scheme consistent with Section 433-A of  the Code. Since Section 433-A is prospective, so  also would be the 1971 and 1976 amendments.  ***             ***                     *** 11. We, therefore, find it difficult to uphold the  view taken by the High Court in this behalf. We  may make it clear that paragraph 516-B insofar as  it stands amended or modified by the 1971 and  1976 executive orders is prospective in  character\005"  

                                       [Emphasis supplied]

       [See also State of Haryana and Another v. Ram Diya [(1990) 2 SCC  701 and Rajender and Others v. State of Haryana [(1995) 5 SCC 187].

32.     A right to be considered for remission, keeping in view the  constitutional safeguards of a convict under Articles 20 and 21 of the  Constitution of India, must be held to be a legal one.  Such a legal right  emanates from not only the Prisons Act but also from the Rules framed  thereunder.  Although no convict can be said to have any constitutional   right for obtaining remission in his sentence, he in view of the policy  decision itself must be held to have a right to be considered therefor.   Whether by reason of a statutory rule or otherwise if a policy decision has  been laid down, the persons who come within the purview thereof are  entitled to be treated equally.  [State of Mysore and Another v. H.  Srinivasmurthy (1976) 1 SCC 817]                  It is now well-settled that any guidelines which do not have any  statutory flavour are merely advisory in nature.  They cannot have the force  of a statute.  They are subservient to the legislative act and the statutory  rules. [See Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India and Others  (1981) 1 SCC 166, J.R. Raghupathy and Others v. State of A.P. and Others  (1988) 4 SCC 364 and Narendra Kumar Maheshwari v. Union of India 1990  (Supp) SCC 440]

33.     Whenever, thus, a policy decision is made, persons must be treated

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equally in terms thereof.  A’ fortiori the policy decision applicable in such  cases would be which was prevailing at the time of his conviction.  [See  Commissioner of Municipal Corporation, Shimla v. Prem Lata Sood and  Ors., 2007 (7) SCALE 737]

34.     Furthermore, if the Punjab Rules are applicable in the State of  Haryana in view of the State Reorganisation Act, no executive instruction  would prevail over the Statutory Rules.  The Rules having defined ’convicts’  in terms whereof a ’life convict’ was entitled to have his case considered  within the parameters laid down therein, the same cannot be taken away by  reason of an executive instruction by redefining the term ’life convict’.  It is  one thing to say that the ’life convict’ has no right to obtain remission but it  is another thing to say that they do not have any right to be considered at all.   Right to be considered emanates from the State’s own executive instructions  as also the Statutory Rules.   

       Strong reliance, however, has been placed by Mr. Misra on Mohd.  Munna v. Union of India and Others [(2005) 7 SCC 417].  In that case, a  writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the  appellant therein stating that as he had undergone 21 years of imprisonment  he should be set at liberty forthwith having regard to the provisions of  Clause 751(c) of the West Bengal Jail Code and Section 6 of the West  Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992.  Claim for damages was also  advanced.  It was in that factual backdrop, this Court held:

 "14. The Prisons Rules are made under the Prisons  Act and the Prisons Act by itself does not confer  any authority or power to commute or remit  sentence. It only provides for the regulation of the  prisons and for the terms of the prisoners confined  therein. Therefore, the West Bengal Correctional  Services Act or the West Bengal Jail Code do not  confer any special right on the petitioner herein."

       In the said decision, unfortunately, again Maru Ram(supra) was not  considered.  In any event, the respondents had inter alia prayed for payment  of damages.   

35.     Reliance was also placed by Mr. Misra on Epuru Sudhakar and  Another v. Govt. of A.P. and Others [(2006) 8 SCC 161].  Therein, a  Division Bench opined:

"65. Exercise of executive clemency is a matter of  discretion and yet subject to certain standards. It is  not a matter of privilege. It is a matter of  performance of official duty. It is vested in the  President or the Governor, as the case may be, not  for the benefit of the convict only, but for the  welfare of the people who may insist on the  performance of the duty. This discretion, therefore,  has to be exercised on public considerations alone.  The President and the Governor are the sole judges  of the sufficiency of facts and of the  appropriateness of granting the pardons and  reprieves. However, this power is an enumerated  power in the Constitution and its limitations, if  any, must be found in the Constitution itself.  Therefore, the principle of exclusive cognizance  would not apply when and if the decision  impugned is in derogation of a constitutional  provision. This is the basic working test to be  applied while granting pardons, reprieves,  remissions and commutations."

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       There may not be any dispute with regard to the said proposition of  law.  But herein we are concerned with the right of the respondents to be  considered for remission and not what should be the criteria when the matter  is taken up for grant thereof.

36.     We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court might not be  correct in holding that the State has no power to make any classification at  all.  A classification validly made would not offend Article 14 of the  Constitution of India.  We, thus, although do not agree with all the  reasonings of the High Court, sustain the judgment for the reasons stated  hereinbefore.   

       It appears that during pendency of the Special Leave, Respondent  Nos. 6 and 11 have already been directed to be released.  No order, therefor,  is required to be passed in their case.  So far as the cases of other  respondents are concerned, the same may be considered by the appropriate  authority in the light of the observations made hereinabove.

37.     The appeals are dismissed with the aforementioned observations.  In  view of the findings aforementioned, it is not necessary to pass any order in  the contempt matter.  The contempt application is dismissed.  No costs.