STATE OF HARYANA Vs M/S S.L.ARORA & COMPANY
Case number: C.A. No.-001094-001094 / 2010
Diary number: 430 / 2009
Advocates: NARESH BAKSHI Vs
S. JANANI
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
Page 11
Page 12
Page 13
Page 14
Page 15
Page 16
Page 17
STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. v.
S.L. ARORA & COMPANY (Civil Appeal No.1094 of 2010)
JANUARY 29, 2010 [R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, JJ.]
2010 (2) SCR 297
The Order of the Court was delivered by
O R D E R
R.V. RAVEENDRAN J. 1. Leave granted. Heard the parties.
2. The appellants awarded a construction contract to the respondent. The
work which had to be completed within 18 months from 18.3.1985, was
actually completed on 30.11.1989. The delay led to claims by the contractor
and counter-claims by the employer (appellants). The disputes were referred
to a sole Arbitrator who made an award dated 22.06.2000. The Arbitral
Tribunal rejected the counter claims of the appellants. It awarded in all
Rs.14,94,000/- with interest to the respondent-contractor. The operative
portion of the award is extracted below:
“I award Rs.14.94 lacs (Rupees Fourteen Lacs Ninety Four Thousands
only) along with interest at the rate of 12% with effect from 19.12.1990 till
the date of award in favour of M/s. S.L. Arora and Company, 5E-10,
Bunglow Plot, N.I.T., Faridabad(Claimant) to be paid by the Haryana
PWD B&R Branch Department (respondent). In case the total amount of
award together with this interest is not paid within 30 days from the date
of making this award, future interest shall be paid @ 18% per annum on
the sums due to the claimant from the date of Award upto the actual date
of payment …………”
(emphasis supplied)
3. The application filed by the appellants to set aside the said the award,
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (‘Act’ for short),
was rejected by the civil court. Thereafter, on 26.10.2004, the respondent
levied execution against the appellants, to recover the following amount:
(i) Principal amount : Rs.14,94,000/- (ii) Interest at 12% per annum
on Rs.14,94,000/- from 19.12.1990 to 22.6.2000 (date of the award) : Rs.17,04,879/-
(iii) Interest at 18% per annum on Rs.14,94,000/- from 23.6.2000 to 23.10.2004 (date of : Rs.11,67,039/- execution
petition) ——————— TOTAL : Rs.43,65,918/-
============= The appellants paid to the respondent, a sum of Rs.44,59,587/- on
1.3.2005, which was made up Rs.14,94,000/- plus interest thereon at the rate
of 12% per annum from 19.12.1990 to 22.6.2000 plus interest at the rate of
18% per annum from 23.6.2000 to 28.2.2005. According to the appellants,
the said payment was in full and final settlement, though full satisfaction of
the decree was not entered.
4. On 25.5.2005, the respondent made an application for modification of
the amount claimed, contending that due to inadvertence, a lesser amount
had been claimed in the execution petition. The respondent alleged that
earlier, due to oversight, it had calculated the future interest at the rate of
18% per annum from 23.6.2000 to date of execution petition (24.10.2004),
only on the principal sum of Rs.14,94,000/-; that the future interest ought to
have been calculated on a higher sum of Rs.31,98,879/= (made up of
Rs.14,94,000/- being the principal amount plus Rs.17,04,879/- being the
interest at 12% per annum which had accrued due up to the date of Award);
and that therefore the amount due as on the date of execution petition was
Rs.56,97,685/- instead of Rs.43,65,918/- claimed therein. The Executing
Court after hearing the parties, by its order dated 5.9.2007 accepted the
revised calculation made by the respondent. The revision petition filed by the
appellants against the said order was dismissed by the High Court by the
impugned order dated 9.9.2008 without examining the issue on merits, on the
assumption that what was claimed was the balance of an admitted liability
under the award.
5. The appellants did not dispute their liability to pay interest. They
however contended that Section 31(7) of the Act does not contemplate award
of interest on interest; that an arbitral tribunal can award future interest only
on the principal amount but not on the interest thereon which had accrued
due up to the date of award; and that the Arbitral Tribunal in this case has in
fact awarded interest only on the principal of Rs.14,94,000/- and not on the
interest which had accrued due up to the date of the award. It was also
submitted that even if the Arbitral Tribunal had power to award interest, the
award could not be interpreted as awarding interest upon interest, unless the
arbitral tribunal expressly awards interest upon interest.
6. The respondent contended that Section 31(7) authorises and
empowers the arbitral tribunal to award interest upon interest from the date of
the award to date of payment. The respondent submitted that the operative
portion of the award stated that future interest has been awarded at 18% per
annum “on the sums due to the claimant” from the date of award to the actual
date of payment; and that as the interest up to date of award is a ‘sum due’
on the date of the award, the said amount would also carry interest at 18%
per annum from the date of the award.
7. On the contentions urged, the following questions arise for
consideration:
(i) Whether section 31(7) of the Act authorizes and enables arbitral
tribunals to award interest on interest from the date of award?
(ii) Whether the Arbitral Award granted future interest from the date of
award, only on the principal amount found due to the respondent
(that is Rs.14,94,000/-) or on the aggregate of the principal and
interest upto the date of award (Rs.31,98,879/-).
Re : Question (i)
8. Payment of interest arises in different circumstances. It can be the
consideration paid by a borrower to a lender for use of the money lent or
made available by the lender. It can be the return given by a bank, financial
institution or a company on amounts deposited or invested with them by a
customer or constituent. It can be the compensation paid by a person who
withholds or defaults in paying an amount or in discharging a liability, when it
is due and payable. Interest may be payable in pursuance of a contract, or a
provision in a statute, or the fiat of a court of tribunal. It is usually quantified in
terms of a percentage of the ‘principal’ or the ‘investment’ or the ‘amount of
liability’. Interest unless otherwise specified, refers to simple interest, that is
interest paid on only the principal and not on any accrued interest.
9. Compound interest refers to a method of charging interest where
interest is computed not only on the principal, but also the accrued interest.
For this purpose, periodical rests are provided for computation of interest, say
yearly, or quarterly or monthly. At the end of the first ‘rest’, the interest
accrued till then is added to the principal, so that for the second interest
bearing period, the aggregate of the original principal and interest thereon
becomes the enhanced principal. At the end of the second rest, the accrued
interest on the enhanced principal is added to the enhanced principal so that
such further enhanced principal becomes the principal for charging the
interest for the third period. It goes on in this manner until repayment, by
progressively enlarging the principal base by adding interest at regular
intervals. As a result, the debtor is made to pay interest not only on the
original principal, but on the interest on the principal, and on the interest upon
the interest on the principal and so on. A variant of compound interest,
involves limited compounding, where interest is not added to the principal
with periodical rests, but only once or twice at agreed stages. For example,
where a loan is repayable within one year, if a provision is made in the
contract that in the event of the loan not being repaid within one year, the
interest which had accrued during the one year period will be added to the
principal, and as a consequence, after one year, interest will be payable on
the aggregate of the principal and the interest for one year, it is a provision for
interest upon interest. Compound interest can be awarded only if there is a
specific contract, or authority under a Statute, for compounding of interest.
There is no general discretion in courts or tribunals to award compound
interest or interest upon interest.
10. Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 enables the courts and arbitral
tribunals to award interest from the date of cause of action to the date of
institution of legal proceedings or initiation of arbitration proceedings. Sub-
section (3)(c) of section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 makes it clear that nothing
in the said section shall empower the Court or arbitrator to award interest
upon interest. It should be noted that section 3 of Interest Act does not deal
with either pendente lite or future interest.
11. This Court in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd v. General Electric Co. –
[1994 Supp.(1) SCC 644] held that award of interest on interest was not
opposed to the public policy of India, but could be awarded only if authorized
by contract or statute. This Court observed:
“Merely because in Section 3(3)(c) of the Interest Act, 1978, the court is
precluded from awarding interest on interest does not mean that it is not
permissible to award such interest under a contract or usage or under the
statute. It is common knowledge that provision is made for the payment of
compound interest in contracts for loans advanced by banks and financial
institutions and the said contracts are enforced by courts. Hence it cannot
be said that award of interest on interest, i.e., compound interest, is
against the public policy of India. We are, therefore, unable to accept the
contention that award of interest on interest i.e. compound interest is
contrary to public policy of India.”
[emphasis supplied]
In State Bank of India vs. Ganjam District Tractor Owners Association –
1994 (5) SCC 238, this Court again observed that in the absence of a
provision for compound interest or interest with periodical rests in the
agreement between a bank and the borrower, the bank cannot claim such
interest.
In Central Bank of India vs. Ravindra – 2002 (1) SCC 367, a constitution
bench of this Court, after exhaustive consideration of the case law,
summarized the legal position regarding compound interest thus:
“The English decisions and the decisions of this Court and almost all the
High courts of the country have noticed and approved long established
banking practice of charging interest at reasonable rates on periodical
rests and capitalising the same on remaining unpaid. Such a practice is
prevalent and also recognised in non-banking money lending
transactions. Legislature has stepped in from time to time to relieve the
debtors from hardship whenever it has found the practice of charging
compound interest and its capitalization to be oppressive and hence
needing to be curbed. The practice is permissible, legal and judicially
upheld excepting when superseded by legislation. There is nothing wrong
in the parties voluntarily entering into transactions, evidenced by deeds
incorporating covenant or stipulation for payment of compound interest at
reasonable rates, and authorising the creditor to capitalise the interest on
remaining unpaid so as to enable interest being charged at the agreed
rate on the interest component of the capitalised sum for the succeeding
period. Interest once capitalised, sheds its colour of being interest and
becomes a part of principal so as to bind the debtor/borrower.”
[emphasis supplied]
12. In the Arbitration Act, 1940 (‘old Act’ for short) there was no provision
dealing with the power of arbitral tribunals to award interest. Section 29 of the
old Act merely provided for post-decree interest and authorized the court to
direct in the decree, where the award was for payment of money, payment of
interest from the date of decree at such rate as the court deemed reasonable,
to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by
the decree. The power of arbitral tribunals to award interest was governed by
the provisions of Interest Act, 1978 and the law enunciated by courts.
13. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, on the other hand, contains
a specific provision dealing with the power of the arbitral tribunal to award
interest. The said provision is incorporated in sub-section (7) of Section 31
which deals with the form and contents of arbitral awards. The said Sub-
section (7) is extracted below:-
“31(7)(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where and insofar as an
arbitral award is for the payment of money, the arbitral tribunal may
include in the sum for which the award is made, interest, at such rate as it
deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money, for the whole
or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of action
arose and the date on which the award is made.
(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award shall, unless the award
otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of eighteen per cent per
annum from the date of the award to the date of payment.”
14. Section 31(7) makes no reference to payment of compound interest
or payment of interest upon interest. Nor does it require the interest which
accrues till the date of the award, to be treated as part of the principal from
the date of award for calculating the post-award interest. The use of the
words “where and in so far as an arbitral award is for the payment of money”
and use of the words “the arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for which
the award is made, interest…… on the whole or any part of the money” in
clause (a) and use of the words “a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral
award shall carry interest” in clause (b) of sub-section (7) of section 31 clearly
indicate that the section contemplates award of only simple interest and not
compound interest or interest upon interest. ‘A sum directed to be paid by an
arbitral award’ refers to the award of sums on the substantive claims and
does not refer to interest awarded on the ‘sum directed to be paid by the
award’. In the absence of any provision for interest upon interest in the
contract, the arbitral tribunals do not have the power to award interest upon
interest, or compound interest, either for the pre-award period or for the post-
award period.
15. There is a tendency among contractors to elevate the claims for
interest and costs to the level of substantive disputes by describing them as
separate and independent heads of claim. The long pendency of arbitration
matters either due to prolonged arbitration proceedings or due to litigations
(both intervening and post-arbitral), has the unfortunate effect of swelling the
interest payable on the amount awarded and costs to very substantial
amounts. In many arbitral awards for money, the interest awarded often
exceeds the amount awarded, by several times. Leisurely arbitrations,
avoidable judicial interventions, and indecisiveness on the part of decision
makers in government and statutory bodies in accepting and settling genuine
claims either at the stage when the claim is made or at least at the stage
when the award is made have resulted in undue emphasis and importance
being bestowed upon interest and costs. However substantial their quantum
may be in a given case, interest, in particular interest from the date of the
award, and costs are ancillary issues and are not substantive disputes.
16. Some Arbitral Tribunals have misconstrued clause (b) of section 31(7)
of the Act and assumed that the said provision requires the rate of post-award
interest in all arbitral awards should be 18% per annum, and that they do not
have any discretion in regard to post-award interest. Some have
misconstrued it further to infer the rate of interest mentioned therein is an
indication that invariably the rate of interest in arbitrations, either pre-award or
post-award, should be 18% per annum. Both these assumptions are baseless
and erroneous. If that was the legislative intention, there would have been no
need for vesting discretion in Arbitral Tribunals, in the matter of interest,
under section 31(7)(a). The principles relating to award of interest, in general,
are not different for courts and arbitral tribunals, except to the extent indicated
in section 31(7) of the Act and CPC. A comparatively high rate of post-award
interest is provided in section 31(7)(b) of the Act, not because 18% is the
normal rate of interest to be awarded in arbitrations, but purely as a deterrent
to award-debtors from avoiding payment or using delaying tactics. In fact a
provision similar to section 31(7)(b) of the Act, if provided in section 34 of
Code of Civil Procedure, will considerably reduce the travails of plaintiffs in
executing their decrees in civil cases. Be that as it may.
17. The difference between clauses (a) and (b) of section 31(7) of the Act
may conveniently be noted at this stage. They are :
(i) Clause (a) relates to pre-award period and clause (b) relates to post-
award period. The contract binds and prevails in regard to interest during
the pre-award period. The contract has no application in regard to interest
during the post-award period.
(ii) Clause (a) gives discretion to the Arbitral Tribunal in regard to the rate,
the period, the quantum (principal which is to be subjected to interest)
when awarding interest. But such discretion is always subject to the
contract between the parties. Clause (b) also gives discretion to the
Arbitral Tribunal to award interest for the post-award period but that
discretion is not subject to any contract; and if that discretion is not
exercised by the arbitral Tribunal, then the statute steps in and mandates
payment of interest, at the specified rate of 18% per annum for the post-
award period.
(iii) While clause (a) gives the parties an option to contract out of interest,
no such option is available in regard to the post-award period.
In a nutshell, in regard to pre-award period, interest has to be awarded as
specified in the contract and in the absence of contract as per discretion of
the Arbitral Tribunal. On the other hand, in regard to the post-award period,
interest is payable as per the discretion of the Arbitral Tribunal and in the
absence of exercise of such discretion, at a mandatory statutory rate of 18%
per annum.
18. As there is some confusion as to what section 31(7) authorizes and
what it does not authorize, we will attempt to set out the legal position
regarding award of interest by the arbitral tribunals, as emerging from section
31(7) of the Act.
(18.1) The provision for interest in the Act is contained in section 31
dealing with the form and contents of arbitral award. It employs two significant
expressions “where the arbitral award is for payment of money” and “the
arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made,
interest….. on the whole or any part of the money”. The legislature has thus
made it clear that award of interest under sub-section (7) of section 31 (and
award of costs under sub-section (8) of Section 31 of the Act) are ancillary
matters to be provided for by the award, when the arbitral tribunal decides the
substantive disputes between the parties. The words ‘sum for which the
award is made’ and ‘a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award’
contextually refer to award on the substantive claims and not ancillary or
consequential directions relating to interest and costs.
(18.2.) The authority of the arbitral tribunals to award interest under
section 31(7)(a) is subject to the contract between the parties and the
contract will prevail over the provisions of section 31(7)(a) of the Act. Where
the contract between the parties contains a provision relating to, or regulating
or prohibiting interest, the entitlement of a party to the contract to interest for
the period between the date on which the cause of action arose and the date
on which the award is made, will be governed by the provisions of the
contract, and the arbitral tribunal will have to grant or refuse interest, strictly in
accordance with the contract. The arbitral tribunals cannot ignore the contract
between the parties, while dealing with or awarding pre-award interest.
Where the contract does not prohibit award of interest, and where the arbitral
award is for payment of money, the arbitral tribunal can award interest in
accordance with Section 31(7) (a) of the Act, subject to any term regarding
interest in the contract.
(18.3) If the contract provides for compounding of interest, or provides for
payment of interest upon interest, or provides for interest payable on the
principal upto any specified stage/s being treated as part of principal for the
purpose of charging of interest during any subsequent period, the arbitral
tribunal will have to give effect to it. But when the award is challenged under
Section 34 of the Act, if the court finds that the interest awarded is in conflict
with, or violating the public policy of India, it may set aside that part of the
award.
(18.4) Where an arbitral tribunal awards interest under section 31(7)(a) of
the Act, it is given discretion in three areas to do justice between the parties.
First is in regard to rate of interest. The Tribunal can award interest at such
rate as it deems reasonable. The second is with reference to the amount on
which the interest is to be awarded. Interest may be awarded on the whole or
any part of the amount awarded. The third is with reference to the period for
which the interest is to be awarded. Interest may be awarded for the whole or
any part of the period between the date on which cause of action arose and
the date on which the award is made.
(18.5) The Act does away with the distinction and differentiation among
the four interest bearing periods, that is, pre-reference period, pendente lite
period, post-award period and post-decree period. Though a dividing line has
been maintained between pre-award and post-award periods, the interest
bearing period can now be a single continuous period the outer limits being
the date on which the cause of action arose and the date of payment, subject
however to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal to restrict the interest to such
period as it deems fit.
(18.6) Clause (b) of Section 31(7) is intended to ensure prompt payment
by the award-debtor once the award is made. The said clause provides that
the “sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award” shall carry interest at the
rate of 18% per annum from the date of award to the date of payment if the
award does not provide otherwise in regard to the interest from the date of
the award. This makes it clear that if the award grants interest at a specified
rate up to the date of payment, or specifies the rate of interest payable from
the date of award till date of payment, or if the award specifically refused
interest, clause (b) of Section 31 will not come into play. But if the award is
silent in regard to the interest from the date of award, or does not specify the
rate of interest from the date of award, then the party in whose favour an
award for money has been made, will be entitled to interest at 18% per
annum from the date of award. He may claim the said amount in execution
even though there is no reference to any post award interest in the award.
Even if the pre-award interest is at much lower rate, if the award is silent in
regard to post- award interest, the claimant will be entitled to post- award
interest at the higher rate of 18% per annum. The higher rate of interest is
provided in clause (b) with the deliberate intent of discouraging award-debtors
from adopting dilatory tactics and to persuade them to comply with the award.
19. We will next deal with the three cases relied upon by the learned
counsel for the respondent to contend that this Court has recognized and
accepted the power of the arbitral tribunals to award interest upon interest:
Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. M.C. Clelland Engineers S.A. - (1999) (4)
SCC 327, Mcdermott International Inc. vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd and Others
- (2006) 11 SCC 181, and Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Federation Limited vs.
Three Circles - (2009) 10 SCC 374. But out of these three decisions only the
decision in Mcdermott relates to an award under the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. The other two decisions relate to awards under the old
Act (Arbitration Act, 1940) and are of no assistance in interpreting section
31(7) of the new Act.
20. In Mcdermott, paras 154 to 159 of the judgment deal with the issue of
interest. Relevant portions thereof are extracted below in entirety:
“The power of the arbitrator to award interest for pre-award period,
interest pendent lite and interest post-award period is not in dispute.
Section 31(7) (a) provides that the arbitral tribunal may award interest, at
such rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money,
for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the
cause of action arose and the date on which award is made, i.e., pre-
award period. This, however, is subject to the agreement as regard the
rate of interest on unpaid sum between the parties. The question as to
whether interest would be paid on the whole or part of the amount or
whether it should be awarded in the pre- award period would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The arbitral tribunal in
this behalf will have to exercise its discretion as regards (i) at what rate
interest should be awarded; (ii) whether interest should be awarded on
whole or part of the award money; and (iii) whether interest should be
awarded for whole or any part of the pre-award period.”
“The 1996 Act provides for award of 18% interest. The arbitrator in his
wisdom has granted 10% interest both for the principal amount as also for
the interim. By reason of the award, interest was awarded on the principal
amount. An interest thereon was upto the date of award as also the future
interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
However, in some cases, this Court was resorted to exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 142 in order to do complete justice between the
parties………. In this case, given the long lapse of time, it will be in
furtherance of justice to reduce the rate of interest to 7 1/2%. ”
A careful reading of the same shows that there is no reference to
awarding of compound interest or interest from the date of the award on the
interest that had accrued due up to the date of award. The decision dealt with
the rate of interest and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution to set right anomalies in regard to rate of interest. The said
decision is therefore, of no assistance.
21. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in Three Circles,
this Court has observed that Mcdermott recognized that interest awarded on
the principal amount upto the date of the award becomes part of the principal
from the date of the award. We extract below the relevant portion of Three
Circles relied upon by the respondent :
“Now the question comes which is related to awarding of `interest on
interest’. According to the appellant, they have to pay interest on an
amount which was inclusive of interest and the principal amount and,
therefore, this amount to a liability to pay `interest on interest. This
question is no longer res integra at the present point of time. This Court in
McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd, and Ors.- 2006
(11) SCC 181 has settled this question in which it had observed as
follows:
The Arbitrator has awarded the principal amount and interest thereon
upto the date of award and future interest thereupon which do not amount
to award of interest on interest as interest awarded on the principal
amount upto the date of award became the principal amount which is
permissible in law.”
[emphasis supplied]
But a careful reading of the decision in Mcdermott, shows that the portion of
Mcdermott extracted in Three Circles, assuming it to be the law laid down in
Mcdermott, is not a finding or conclusion of this court, nor the ratio decidendi
of the case, but is only a reference to the contention of the respondent in
Mcdermott. Paras 1 to 27 (of the SCC report) in Mcdermott state the factual
background. Paras 28 and 29 contain the submissions of the learned counsel
for BSCL, the respondent therein. Paras 30 to 44 contain the submissions
made by the learned counsel for Mcdermott, the appellant therein, in reply to
the submissions made on behalf of BSCL. The passage that is extracted in
Three Circles is part of para 44 of the decision which contains the last
submission of the learned counsel for Mcdermott on the question of interest.
The reasoning in the decision starts from para 45. This Court considered the
several questions seriatum in paras 45 to 160. The question relating to
interest was considered in paras 154 to 159 relevant portions of which we
have extracted above. Therefore, the observation in Three Circles that
Mcdermott held that interest awarded on the principal amount upto the date of
award becomes the principal amount and therefore award of future interest
therein does not amount to award of interest on interest, is per incuriam due
to an inadvertent erroneous assumption.
Re : Question (ii)
22. The operative portion of an arbitral award dealing with several claims
on which separate decisions have been recorded, is really an abstract of the
decisions/awards on each of the claims. Therefore, the findings/award
reached by the Arbitrator on claim No. (8) relating to interest, have to be read
with the operative portion to know what is directed by the award. We
therefore extract below the reasoning, finding and award on claim No. (8)
relating to interest:
“Claim 8 : Payment on account of interest at the rate of 30% per annum
with effect from 18.8.1990 till final payment.
The claimant has claimed interest @ 30% per annum with effect from
18.8.1990 till final payment of Award. Keeping in view the reasonability of
the claim, I allow interest @ 12% per annum on the total amount of
Award i.e. on Rs.14.94 lacs with effect from 19.12.1990 (date of first
reference of Arbitrator) upto the date of making this award. In case the
total amount of award together with this interest is not paid within 30 days
from the date of making this award, future interest shall be paid @ 18%
per annum on the entire Award from the date of Award upto the actual
date of payment”.
(emphasis supplied)
The above portion of the award when read with the operative portion of the
award shows that the words ‘entire award’ used in the para dealing interest
and the words ‘sums due’ used in the operative portion of the award refer to
the ‘total amount of award’ referred to earlier in the said two portions relating
to interest.
23. The Arbitrator allowed interest at the rate 12% per annum on the total
amount of the award, that is Rs.14,94,000/-, with effect from 19.12.1990 up to
the date of the Award. He further directed that in case the “total amount of the
award together with this interest” is not paid within 30 days from the date of
making the award, future interest shall be paid at the rate 18% per annum on
the entire Award from the date of Award upto the actual date of payment. The
words “total amount of the Award together with interest” makes it clear that
the Arbitrator has used the words “total amount of the Award” as referring to
the total or aggregate of the awards on the substantive claims of the
contractor (claims 1 to 7) excluding the ancillary claims (claim No.8) relating
to interest. The Arbitrator has also used the words “entire award” and “sums
due” synonymous with the words “total amount of the award”. Therefore,
when the operative portion states that future interest is awarded on the “sums
due”, it refers to the “total amount of the award”, that is total of the amounts
awarded on substantive claims (that is claims (1) to (7) of the contractor)
excluding the claim relating interest. Therefore, what was awarded by the
Arbitrator was future interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the amounts
awarded on various claims (that is Claim No.1 to 7) in all aggregating to
Rs.14,94,000/- and not upon the interest awarded thereon upto to date of the
award. It should be noted that the difference in the interest awarded for the
pre-award period and post-award period, is only with reference to the rate of
interest and not the quantum of principal (that bears interest).
Conclusion
24. Thus it is clear that section 31(7) merely authorizes the arbitral
tribunal to award interest in accordance with the contract and in the absence
of any prohibition in the contract and in the absence of specific provision
relating to interest in the contract, to award simple interest at such rates as it
deems fit from the date on which the cause of action arose till the date of
payment. It also provides that if the award is silent about interest from the
date of award till date of payment, the person in whose favour the award is
made will be entitled to interest at 18% per annum on the principal amount
awarded, from the date of award till date of payment. The calculation that was
made in the execution petition as originally filed was correct and the
modification by the respondent increasing the amount due under the award
was contrary to the Award.
25. In view of the above, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of
the Executing Court dated 5.9.2007 and the order of the High Court 9.9.2008
and hold that the respondent was entitled only to simple interest on the
principal amount as per original calculation shown in the Execution Petition.