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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2751 of 2006

PETITIONER: State of Haryana & Ors.                                  

RESPONDENT: M/s AGM Management Services Ltd

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/06/2006

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & ALTAMAS KABIR

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 9913 of 2006)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Leave granted.   

The State of Haryana, Deputy Commissioner-cum- Collector, Faridabad and the Sub-Registrar, Faridabad call in  question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench  of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by which Civil Writ  Petition No.167 of 2006 filed by the respondnt was disposed  of.

The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition with the  following direction :

"The only prayer of the petitioner at this  stage is that the present matter be disposed of  by the respondents by keeping in mind the  order of this Court appended as Annexure P-7  with application. We accordingly issue a  direction to the respondents that necessary  exercise be completed within a period of four  months from the date that a certified copy of  this order is supplied to them."

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High  Court without indicating as to how the order of the High Court  in an earlier case in Ramesh Chand and Ors. v. The Registrar- cum-Deputy Commissioner, Jind & Ors. i.e  C.W.P. No.14360  of 2005 had any relevance so far as the dispute raised by the  respondent No.1 before it. According to him the judgment in  CWP No. 14360 of 2005 related to refusal to register the sale  deed on two grounds.  The present case, according to the  learned counsel for the appellant, does not relate to a refusal  to register the sale deed.  By the impugned letter dated  21.12.2005, the respondent was required to obtain "No  objection certificate" from the office of the District and Town  Planner, Faridabad. The High Court, therefore, was not  justified in giving the directions as noted above.

In response, learned counsel for the respondents

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submitted that though the letter dated 21.12.2005 appears to  be innocuous, in a sense that relates to refusal of registration.   Reference is made to Section 7(A) of the Haryana Development  and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (in short the ’Act’) to  substantiate the stand.

We find that the High Court has not even indicated as to  the applicability of the decision in Ramesh Chand’s case  (supra) to the facts of the present case.

The Courts should not place reliance on decisions  without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with  the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.  Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s  theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken  out of their context. These observations must be read in the  context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments  of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret  words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become  necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but  the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges  interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They  interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be  interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v.  Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

       "The matter cannot, of course, be settled  merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of  Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of  Parliament and applying the rules of  interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not  to detract from the great weight to be given to  the language actually used by that most  distinguished judge."

       In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294)  Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin’s speech.....is not to be treated as  if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in  new circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062  observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved  judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament."  And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR  537) Lord Morris said:

       "There is always peril in treating the  words of a speech or judgment as though they  are words in a legislative enactment, and it is  to be remembered that judicial utterances  made in the setting of the facts of a particular  case."

       Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact  may make a world of difference between conclusions in two  cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a  decision is not proper.  

       The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of  applying precedents have become locus classicus:

       "Each case depends on its own facts and  a close similarity between one case and  another is not enough because even a single  significant detail may alter the entire aspect,  in deciding such cases, one should avoid the

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temptation to decide cases (as said by  Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case  against the colour of another. To decide,  therefore, on which side of the line a case  falls, the broad resemblance to another case  is not at all decisive."

       ***             ***             ***         "Precedent should be followed only so far  as it marks the path of justice, but you must  cut the dead wood and trim off the side  branches else you will find yourself lost in  thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the  path to justice clear of obstructions which  could impede it."   

As noted above, the High Court has not even discussed  as to how the decision in Ramesh Chand’s case (supra) had  any similarity to the facts of the present case.   

In the aforesaid background we set aside the order of the  High Court and remit the matter for a fresh hearing in  accordance with law.  We make it clear we have not expressed  any opinion on the merits of the case.   

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that  similar cases are pending in the High Court awaiting decision  in this case.  Therefore, it would be proper that the writ  petition is disposed of finally.

Keeping in view the aforesaid submission, we request the  High Court to dispose of the writ petition as early as possible.   The appeal is accordingly disposed of.  No costs.