REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 566  OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6638 of  2009)

STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. ..APPELLANTS

Versus

JAGDISH ..RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J

1. Delay condoned. Leave granted.

2. This matter has come up before us upon reference having been made  

by  a  Two-Judge  Bench  vide  order  dated  04.11.2009  upon  noticing  an  

inconsistency in the views expressed by this Court in the case of  State of  

Haryana & Ors. v.  Balwan AIR 1999 SC 3333 on one hand and in the  

cases of  State of Haryana v.  Mahender Singh & Ors. (2007) 13 SCC  

606; and State of Haryana v.  Bhup Singh AIR 2009 SC 1252, on the other  

hand.   The  inconsistency,  which  was  pointed  out  in  the  said  order  was  

noticed by taking into account the para 5 of the judgment in Balwan (supra)  

which is as follows :-

“……..However, in order to see that a life convict does  not  lose  any  benefit  available  under  the  remission  scheme  which  has  to  be  regarded  as  the  guideline,  it   would be just and proper to direct the State Government   to treat the date on which his case is/was required to be   put  up  before  the  Governor  under  Article  161  of  the   Constitution as the relevant date with reference to which   their cases are to be considered ……”  

3. The views expressed in  Mahender Singh (supra) and  Bhup Singh  

(supra) were as follows :-

Mahender Singh (supra)

“40.  Whenever, thus, a policy decision is made, persons  must be treated equally in terms thereof.  A’  fortiori the  policy decision applicable in such cases would be which  was prevailing at the time of his conviction.”   

Bhup Singh (supra)

“10….. The right to ask for remission of sentence by a   life convict would be under the law as was prevailing on   the  date  on  which  the  judgment  of  conviction  and  sentence was passed …….

11. .....It is, therefore, directed that if the respondents   have not already been released, the State shall consider   their  cases  in  terms  of  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in   Mahender  Singh  case  having  regard  to  the  policy  decision  as was applicable  on the  date  on which they  were convicted and not on the basis of the subsequent   policy decision of the year 2002….”

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4. The question that has been posed before us is as to whether the policy  

which makes a provision for remission of sentence, should be that which  

was existing on the date of the conviction of the accused or it should be the  

policy that exists  on the date of consideration of his case for pre-mature  

release by the appropriate authority?  

5. In  the  instant  case,  we  find  that  the  respondent,  herein,  has  been  

granted the relief by the Punjab and Haryana High Court for consideration of  

his case for grant of clemency as per the policy prevailing on the date of his  

conviction.   The  respondent  was  convicted  and  sentenced  for  life  

imprisonment  vide  judgment  and  order  dated  20.05.1999  and  the  policy  

which was in existence at that point of time was dated 04.02.1993.  The  

respondent, having served more than 10 years imprisonment, approached the  

High  Court  that  in  spite  of  having  undergone  the  sentence  as  per  the  

aforesaid policy dated 04.02.1993, his case for pre-mature release was not  

being considered in view of the new policy of short sentencing, introduced  

on 13.08.2008.  The policy dated 13.8.2008 has been brought  on record,  

which expressly recites that the same was being issued in exercise of the  

powers conferred by Sub-Section (1) of Section 432 read with Section 433  

of Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter called Cr.P.C.), 1973.  The same  

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further recites that  it  is  in supersession of the Government Memorandum  

dated 12.04.2002 and all other earlier policies.  

6. The  respondent  was  involved  in  a  case,  the  FIR  whereof  was  

registered on 16.01.1995 and he  was convicted  vide judgment  and order  

dated  20.5.1999  under  Sections  302,  148  and  149  Indian  Penal  Code  

(hereinafter  called IPC),  1860.   In the  above background,  the respondent  

filed  a  Criminal  Misc.  Application  before  the  High  Court.   The  Court  

placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in Mahender Singh (supra)  

and  Bhup  Singh (supra) came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  case  of  the  

respondent for pre-mature release was to be considered in the light of the  

short sentencing policy existing on the date of his conviction and thus, a  

direction was issued to the State Authorities to consider his case for pre-

mature release in view of the policy dated 4.2.1993 existing on the date of  

his conviction i.e. 20th May, 1999 within a period of one month from the  

date of receipt of the certified copy of the judgment.  Hence, this appeal.  In  

view of the conflicting views in various judgments of this Court, reference  

has been made to the larger Bench.  

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7. Heard Shri  Gopal Subramanium, learned Solicitor  General,  Amicus  

Curiae, Shri P.N. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of  

Haryana, Shri B.S. Malik,  Senior Advocate,  Shri Manoj Swarup, Shri D.P.  

Singh and Shri Sanjay Jain, Advocates  for respondents.

8. Shri P.N. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of  

Haryana has submitted that State has unfettered power to lay down a policy  

in regard to remission of sentence. The short sentencing policies are merely  

executive instructions having  no statutory force, therefore, do not create any  

legal/vested right in favour of the convict. Having regard to the provisions of  

Sections 54, 55 IPC and Section 433-A Cr.P.C., no interference was required  

by the High Court.  Case of the respondent for pre-mature release would be  

considered in view of the policy dated 13.8.2008.  Thus, the judgment and  

order of the High Court impugned herein, is liable to be set aside.  

9. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing for the respondent  in this  

appeal and other connected cases, which are being disposed of by separate  

order,  have  contended  that  all  remission  schemes  were  issued  making  

reference to Article 161 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter called the  

Constitution).  The clemency power of the executive cannot be subjected to  

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any law whatsoever and thus, a legal right stood crystallised in favour of the  

convict,  to  be  considered  for  pre-mature  release  in  view  of  the  scheme  

prevailing on the date of his conviction. They have emphasised that such  

scheme  envisaged  at  least  a  promise  and  in  view  of  the  provisions  of  

Articles  20(1)  and  21  of  the  Constitution,  the  conditions  contained  in  

subsequent  policies  being  more  stringent  cannot  be  enforced  against  the  

“lifer”.   Provisions  of  the  Prisons  Act,  1894  (hereinafter  called  as  ‘Act  

1894’) and rules framed under it create legal right in favour of the convict.  

Such  rights  cannot  be  taken  away  by  presently  prevailing  policy  dated  

13.8.2008.  No policy can be framed in  derogation of  the  statutory rules.  

However, in case a lenient policy is enforced at subsequent stage, the same  

can be made applicable and thus, the judgment and order of the High Court  

does not require any interference.  The appeal is liable to be dismissed.  

10. Shri Gopal Subramanium, learned Solicitor General who appeared as  

Amicus Curiae,  has submitted that even if there is no vested right of the  

convict  to  be  considered  for  pre-mature  release,  in  view  of  the  policy  

prevailing  on  the  date  of  his  conviction,  at  least  a  human  element  of  

expectation  that  the  convict  would  have  remission  as  per  the  guidelines  

prevailing on the date of his conviction cannot be ruled out.  Even if the  

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convict  does  not  satisfy  the  requirement  of  presently  existing  remission  

policy dated 13.8.2008,  his  case  can  always  be considered  for  remission  

under the provisions of Article 72 or 161 of the Constitution and it will be  

for the President or the Governor, as the case may be,  to take a view in the  

matter in conformity with the decision in  Maru Ram  v. Union of India  

(1981) 1 SCC 107.

11. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel  

for the parties and perused the record.  

12. In the instant case, the respondent was convicted on 20th May, 1999  

and sentenced for life imprisonment.  Remission policy has been changed  

from time to time and provided mainly as under:

    Date of Policy Minimum  required  sentence  for  pre-mature release  

4th February, 1993

(a)  Convicts  whose  death  sentence  has  been  commuted  to  life  imprisonment and convicts who have  been imprisoned for  life  for  having  committed a heinous crime such as:-

murder  with  wrongful  confinement,  for  extortion/robbery;  murder  with  rape;  murder  while  undergoing  life  imprisonment;   murder with dacoity  

Their cases may be considered  after  completion  of  14  years  actual  sentence including under trial period  and  after  earning  at  least  6  years  remission.   

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…. ; murder of a child under the age  of  14  years;  and  murder  on  professional/hired basis….

   (b)   Adult  life  convicts  who  have  been imprisoned  for  life  but  whose  cases  are  not  covered  under  (a)  above  and  who  have  committed  crime  which  are  not  considered  heinous  as  mentioned  in  clause  (a)  above,  or  other  life  convicts  imprisoned  for  life  for  offence  for  which  death  penalty  is  not  a  punishment.

Their cases may be considered after  completion  of  10  years of  actual  sentence including under trial period,  provided  that  the  total  period  of  such  sentence  including  remission  is not less than 14 years.  

8th August, 2000

(a)  Convicts  whose  death  sentence  has  been  commuted  to  life  imprisonment and convicts who have  been  imprisoned  for  life  having  committed a heinous crime such as:-

(i)  murder  with  wrongful  confinement,  for  extortion/robbery;  (ii)  murder  with  rape;  (iii)  murder  while undergoing life imprisonment;  (iv) murder with dacoity …. ; (viii)  murder of a child under the age of 14  years;  (ix)  murder  of  woman;  and  (xi)  murder  on  professional/hired  basis….  (xvi)  convicts  who  have  been  awarded  life  imprisonment  a  second time under any offence….

(b)  Adult  life  convicts  who  have  been imprisoned  for  life  but  whose  cases  are  not  covered  under  (a)  above  and  who  have  committed  crime  which  are  not  considered  

Their cases may be considered after  completion  of  14  years  actual  sentence including under trial period  provided  that  the  total  period  of  such  sentence  including  remission  is not less than 20 years.   

Their cases may be considered after  completion  of  10  years  actual  sentence including under trial period  provided  that  the  total  period  of  such  sentence  including  remission  

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heinous as mentioned in clause (a) is not less than 14 years.   

29th October, 2001

(aa)  Convicts  whose death sentence  has  been  commuted  to  life  imprisonment and convicts who have  been  imprisoned  for  life  having  committed a heinous crime such as:-  

(i)  murder  after  rape  repeated  chained rape/unnatural  offences; (ii)  murder  with  intention  for  the  ransom;  (iii)  murder  of  more  than  two persons;  (iv)  persons  convicted  for second time for murder; and (v)  sedition with murder.

(a)  Convicts  who  have  been  imprisoned for life having committed  a heinous crime  such as:-  

(i)  murder  with  wrongful  confinement  for  extortion/robbery;  (ii)  murder  while  undergoing  life  sentence;  murder  with  dacoity…..  and (vii) murder of a child under the  age of 14 years……  

(b)  Adult  life  convicts  who  have  been imprisoned  for  life  but  whose  cases are not covered under (aa) and  (a)  above and who have committed  crime  which  are  not  considered  heinous as mentioned in clause (aa)  & (a) above.

Their cases may be considered after  completion  of  20  years actual  sentence and 25 years total sentence  with remissions.  

Their cases may be considered after  completion  of   14  years  actual  sentence including under trial period  provided  that  the  total  period  of  such sentence including remissions  is not less than 20 years.  

Their cases may be considered after  completion  of  10  years  actual  sentence including under trial period  provided  that the  total  period  of  such sentence including remissions  is not less than 14 years.  

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13th August, 2008

(a)   Convicts  whose death sentence  has  been  commuted  to  life  imprisonment and convicts who have  been  imprisoned  for  life  having  committed a heinous crime such as:-

(i)  murder  with  rape/unnatural  offences;  (ii)  murder  with  intention  to  collect  ransom/robbery/  kidnapping/abduction; (iii) murder of  more than two persons; (iv) persons  convicted  for  second  time  for  murder;  (v)  sedition;  (vi)  sedition  with murder; and  (vii) murder while  undergoing life sentence……      (b)  Convicts  who  have  been  imprisoned for life having committed  any  crime  which  is  defined  in  IPC  and/or NDPS Act as punishable with  death sentence.

(c) ……

Their  cases  for  pre-mature  release  may be considered after completion  of 20 years actual sentence and 25  years  total  sentence  with  remissions.  

Their  cases  for  pre-mature  release  may be considered after completion  of  14  years  actual  sentence  including under trial period; provided  that  the  total  period  of  such  sentence  including  remissions  is  not less than 20 years.

…….

 It may also be pertinent to mention here that all the aforesaid policies  

made a clear-cut distinction and categorised the offence of murder in two  

separate categories.   Heinous crime means  murder,  i.e.,  (i)  murder with  

wrongful  confinement,  for  extortion/robbery;  (ii)  murder  with  rape;  (iii)  

murder  undergoing life  imprisonment;  (iv)  murder  with  dacoity  …. ;  (v)  

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murder of a child under 14 years; and (vi) murder on professional/hired basis  

etc.  Murders not mentioned in either of these above categories have been  

treated differently for the purpose of grant of pre-mature release.  In all the  

policies issued by the Government except policy dated 13th August, 2008,  

the provisions of Article 161 of the Constitution have been referred to. All  

the said policies provided that the cases of life convicts would be put to the  

Governor through the Minister  for Jails  and the  Chief  Minister,  Haryana  

with  full  background  of  the  prisoners  and  recommendations  of  the  

Committee alongwith the copy of the judgment etc. for orders under Article  

161 of the Constitution.  

13. This  Court in  Gopal Vinayak Godse v.  State of Maharashtra &  

Ors.  AIR 1961 SC 600 considered  the  provisions  of  Section  53-A IPC,  

Cr.P.C. and also considered the Code of Criminal  Procedure Amendment  

Act, 1955 which provided that a person sentenced to transportation for life  

before the Amendment Act would be considered as sentenced to rigorous  

imprisonment for life. The life convict was bound to serve the remainder of  

sentence imprisoned.  Unless the sentence was commuted or remitted by the  

Competent Authority, such sentence would not be equated with any fixed  

term. The benefit of remission or any short sentencing policy in accordance  

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with  the  rules  framed  under  the  Act  1894,  if  any,  would  be  considered  

towards the end of the term and the said question was within the exclusive  

domain of the appropriate Government.  In the said case, in spite of the fact  

that certain remissions had been made, the competent authority did not remit  

the entire sentence.  While deciding the said case, this court placed reliance  

on the judgment of the Privy Council in  Pt. Kishorilal v.  Emperor AIR  

1946 P.C. 64.  

14. In Dalbir Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1979 SC 1384, this  

court came to the conclusion that ‘life imprisonment’ means imprisonment  

for the whole of the man’s life. But in practice it amounts to incarceration  

for a period between 10 to 14 years.   

15. In State of Haryana v.  Nauratta Singh & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1179,  

this Court clearly held that 14 years mentioned in Section 433-A Cr. P.C. is  

the actual period of imprisonment undergone without including any period  

of remission.    

16. In  Swamy Shraddananda@Murali  Manohar Mishra v.  State  of  

Karnataka  AIR 2008 SC 3040, this Court had passed the order that the  

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appellant therein would not be released from prison till the rest of his life.  

Such a punishment was considered necessary because this Court substituted  

the death sentence given to the appellant by the Trial Court and confirmed  

by the High Court, with imprisonment for life with a direction that the said  

appellant would not be released from prison for the rest of his life.  Thus, the  

Court  came to  the  conclusion,  on  the  facts  of  that  case,  that  in  such an  

eventuality  the  pre-mature  release  after  a  minimum  incarceration  for  a  

period of 14 years as envisaged under Section 433-A Cr.P.C. would not be  

acceded to, since the sentence of death had been stepped down to that of life  

imprisonment which was definitely a lenient punishment.

17. In Ramraj @ Nanhoo @ Bihnu v. State of Chhattisgarh AIR 2010  

SC 420, this Court held as under:

“In the various decisions rendered after the decision in  Godse case, “imprisonment for life” has been repeatedly   held to mean imprisonment for the natural life term of a   convict,  though the actual period of imprisonment may  stand reduced on account of remissions earned. But in   no case, with the possible exception of the powers vested  in the President under Article 72 of the Constitution and  the powers vested in the Governor under Article 161 of   the  Constitution,  even  with  remissions  earned,  can  a  sentence of imprisonment for life be reduced to below 14  years.  It  is  thereafter  left  to  the  discretion  of  the   authorities concerned to determine the actual length of   imprisonment having regard to the gravity and intensity   of the offence.”

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18. In  Mohd. Munna v.  Union of India (2005) 7 SCC 417, this Court  

came  to  the  conclusion  that  life  imprisonment  was  not  equivalent  to  

imprisonment  for  14  years  or  20  years.  Life  imprisonment  means  

imprisonment  for  the  whole  of  the  remaining  period  of  the  convicted  

person’s natural life.  There was no provision either in the IPC or Cr.P.C.  

whereby life imprisonment could be treated as either 14 years or 20 years  

incarceration  without  there  being  a  formal  remission  by  the  Appropriate  

Government. The contention that having regard to the provisions of Section  

57 IPC,  a prisoner was entitled to be released on completing 20 years of  

imprisonment under the West Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992 and  

the West Bengal Jail Code, was rejected.  

19. Before we proceed to consider the exercise of powers with regard to  

remission,  as  provided  for  either  under  the  Constitution,  the  IPC  or  the  

Cr.P.C., it would be worth reiterating what has already been traversed and  

laid down by this Court right from the case of  Maru Ram (supra) to the  

decision in the case of Ram Raj  (supra).

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20. In  Maru Ram (supra), this Court elaborately dealt with the issue of  

validity  of  Section  433-A  Cr.P.C.  and  the  remission/short  sentencing  

policies and held as under:

“54.  The  major  submissions  which  deserve  high  consideration may now be taken up. They are three and  important  in  their  outcome  in  the  prisoners’  freedom  from behind bars. The first turns on the ‘prospectivity’   (loosely  so  called)  or  otherwise  of  Section  433-A.  We   have already held that Article 20(1) is not violated but   the present point is whether, on a correct construction,   those who have been convicted prior to the coming into   force of Section 433-A are bound by the mandatory limit.   If such convicts are out of its coils their cases must be   considered  under  the  remission  schemes  and  ‘short- sentencing’  laws.  The  second  plea,  revolves  round  ‘pardon jurisprudence’,  if  we may coarsely call it  that   way, enshrined impregnably in Articles 72 and 161 and  the effect of Section 433-A thereon. The power to remit is   a  constitutional  power  and  any  legislation  must  fail   which  seeks  to  curtail  its  scope  and  emasculate  its   mechanics.  Thirdly,  the exercise  of  this  plenary power  cannot  be  left  to  the  fancy,  frolic  or  frown  of   Government, State or Central, but must embrace reason,   relevance  and  reformation,  as  all  public  power  in  a   republic must. On this basis, we will have to scrutinize   and screen the survival  value of  the various remission   schemes and short-sentencing projects, not to test their   supremacy over Section 433-A, but to train the wide and   beneficent  power  to  remit  life  sentences  without  the   hardship of fourteen fettered years.

xx xx xx

67. All these go to prove that the length of imprisonment   is not regenerative of the goodness within and may be   proof of the reverse — a calamity which may be averted   

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by exercise of power under Article 161…… In short, the   rules  of  remission  may  be  effective  guidelines  of  a   recommendatory  nature,  helpful  to  Government  to   release the prisoner by remitting the remaining term.

xx xx xx

72(7) We declare that Section 433-A, in both its limbs   (i.e.  both types of  life  imprisonment  specified in it),  is   prospective  in effect…… It  follows,  by the same logic,   that  short-sentencing legislations,  if  any,  will  entitle  a   prisoner to claim release thereunder if his conviction by  the court of first instance was before Section 433-A was  brought into effect.

xx xx xx

72(10) Although the remission rules or short-sentencing  provisions  proprio  vigore  may  not  apply  as  against   Section  433-A,  they  will  override  Section  433-A if  the   Government,  Central  or  State,  guides  itself  by  the   selfsame  rules  or  schemes  in  the  exercise  of  its   constitutional power. We regard it as fair that until fresh  rules  are  made  in  keeping  with  experience  gathered,   current  social  conditions  and  accepted  penological   thinking—a  desirable  step,  in  our  view—the  present   remission and release schemes may usefully be taken as   guidelines under Articles 72/161 and orders for release  passed.  We  cannot  fault  the  Government,  if  in  some  intractably  savage  delinquents,  Section  433-A  is  itself   treated  as  a  guideline  for  exercise  of  Articles  72/161.   These observations of ours are recommendatory to avoid   a hiatus, but it  is for Government, Central or State, to   decide  whether  and  why  the  current  Remission  Rules   should not survive until replaced by a more wholesome  scheme.”

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21. Thus, the Court held that the amendment would apply prospectively.  

The life convicts who had been sentenced prior to 18.12.1978 i.e. date of  

enforcement  of  amendment  would  not  come  within  the  purview  of  the  

provisions of Section 433-A Cr.P.C. and short sentencing policy would also  

apply  prospectively.   Remission  rules/short  sentencing  policies  could  be  

taken as guidelines for exercise of power under Articles 72 or 161 of the  

Constitution and in such eventuality, remission rules will override Section  

433-A Cr.P.C.   

22. In  State of  Punjab v. Joginder Singh AIR 1990 SC 1396 this Court  

held that remission cannot detract from the quantum and quality of judicial  

sentence except to the extent permitted by Section 433 Cr.P.C. subject of  

course,  to  Section  433-A  or  where  the  clemency  power   under  the  

Constitution is invoked. But while exercising the constitutional power under  

Articles  72/161 of the Constitution, the President or the Governor, as the  

case  may be, can exercise an absolute power which cannot be fettered by  

any statutory provision such as Sections 432, 433  and 433-A Cr.P.C. This  

power  cannot  be  altered,  modified  or  interfered  with  in  any  manner  

whatsoever by any statutory provisions or Prison Rules.  

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23. In  Sadhu Singh v.  State of Punjab AIR 1984 SC 739, this Court  

examined the nature of the provisions contained in para 516-B of the Punjab  

Jail Manual which provided for remissions etc. and executive instructions  

issued  by  the  Punjab  Government  from  time  to  time  and  came  to  the  

conclusion  that  the  Jail  Manual  contained  merely  executive  instructions  

having no statutory force. Thus, it was always open to the State Government  

to alter, amend or withdraw the executive instructions  or supersede the same  

by issuing fresh instructions. But the Court observed as under:

“Any existing executive instruction could be substituted  by issuing fresh executive instructions for processing the  cases  of  lifers  for  pre-mature  release  but  once  issued  these must be uniformly and invariably apply to all cases  of lifers”  

24. A similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in Balwan (supra);  

and Laxman Naskar v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 595.  

25. In Ashok Kumar  @  Golu v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1991 SC  

1792 this Court considered the scope and relevancy of Rajasthan Prisons  

(Shortening of Sentences) Rules, 1958  qua the provisions of  Section 433-A  

Cr.P.C.  The  said  Rajasthan  Rules  1958  provided  that  a  “lifer”  who  had  

served actual sentence of about nine years and three months was entitled to  

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be  considered  for  pre-mature  release  if  the  total  sentence  including  

remissions  worked  out  to  14  years  and  he  was  reported  to  be  of  good  

behaviour.  The grievance of the petitioner therein had been that his case for  

pre-mature release had not been considered by the Concerned Authorities in  

view of the provisions of Section 433-A Cr.P.C. This Court considered the  

matter  elaborately  taking  into  consideration  large  number  of  its  earlier  

judgments  including  Maru  Ram (supra),  Bhagirath v.  Delhi  

Administration AIR 1985 SC 1050;  Kehar Singh & Anr. v.  Union of  

India & Anr. AIR 1989 SC 653, and came to the following conclusions:

(i) Section  433-A  Cr.P.C.   denied  pre-mature  release  before  

completion  of  actual  14 years  of  incarceration  to  only  those  

limited convicts convicted of a capital offence i.e. exceptionally  

heinous crime;

(ii) Section 433-A Cr.P.C. cannot and does not in any way affect  

the  constitutional  power conferred on the President/Governor  

under Article 72/161 of the Constitution;

(iii) Remission Rules have a limited scope and in case of a convict  

undergoing  sentence  for  life  imprisonment,  it  acquires  

significance  only  if  the  sentence  is  commuted  or  remitted  

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subject to Section 433-A Cr.P.C. or in exercise of constitutional  

power under Article 72/161 of the Constitution; and  

(iv) Case of a convict can be considered under Articles 72 and 161  

of the Constitution treating the 1958 Rules as guidelines.  

The aforesaid case was disposed of by this Court observing that in  

case the clemency petition of the petitioner therein was pending despite of  

the directive of the High Court, it would be open to the said petitioner to  

approach the High Court for compliance of its order.   

26. In  Mahender Singh (supra),  this  Court  as  referred to  hereinabove  

held that  the policy decision applicable in such cases would be which was  

prevailing at the time of his conviction.  This conclusion was arrived on the  

following ground:

“38. A right to be considered for remission, keeping in  view  the  constitutional  safeguards  of  a  convict  under  Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India, must be   held to be a legal one. Such a legal right emanates from  not only the Prisons Act but also from the Rules framed  thereunder.”  

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27. Nevertheless,  we may point out that the power of the sovereign to  

grant remission is within its exclusive domain and it is for this reason that  

our Constitution makers went on to incorporate the provisions of Article 72  

and Article 161 of the Constitution of India.  This responsibility was cast  

upon the Executive through a Constitutional mandate to ensure that some  

public purpose may require fulfillment by grant of remission in appropriate  

cases.   This  power  was  never  intended  to  be  used  or  utilised  by  the  

Executive as an unbridled power of reprieve.  Power of clemency is to be  

exercised cautiously and in appropriate cases, which in effect, mitigates the  

sentence of punishment awarded and which does not, in any way, wipe out  

the conviction.  It is a power which the sovereign exercises against its own  

judicial mandate. The act of remission of the State does not undo what has  

been done judicially.  The punishment awarded through a judgment is not  

overruled but the convict gets benefit of a liberalised policy of State pardon.  

However, the exercise of such power under Article 161 of the Constitution  

or under Section 433-A Cr. P.C. may have a different flavour in the statutory  

provisions, as short sentencing policy brings about a mere reduction in the  

period of imprisonment whereas an act of clemency under Article 161 of the  

Constitution commutes the sentence itself.

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28. In Epuru Sudhakar & Another v. Govt. of A.P. & Ors.  AIR 2006  

SC 3385  this  Court held that reasons had to be indicated while exercising  

power under Articles 72/161. It was further observed (per Kapadia, J) in his  

concurring opinion:  

“Pardons, reprieves and remissions are manifestation of   the exercise of prerogative power. These are not acts of   grace. They are a part of Constitutional scheme. When a  pardon is granted, it is the determination of the ultimate  authority  that  public  welfare  will  be  better  served  by   inflicting less than what the judgment has fixed……..

Exercise of Executive clemency is a matter of discretion  and yet subject to certain standards. It is not a matter of   privilege. It is a matter of performance of official duty. It   is vested in the President or the Governor, as the case   may be, not for the benefit of the convict only, but for the   welfare of the people who may insist on the performance  of the duty…….

Granting of pardon is in no sense an overturning of a  judgment  of  conviction,  but  rather  it  is  an  Executive   action that mitigates or sets aside the punishment for a   crime……..

The power under Article 72 as also under Article 161 of   the Constitution is of the widest amplitude and envisages   myriad  kinds  and  categories  of  cases  with  facts  and  situations varying from case to case.”

29. There  is  no  dispute  to  the  settled  legal  proposition  that  the  power  

exercised  under  Articles  72/161  could  be  the  subject  matter  of  limited  

judicial  review.   (vide  Kehar  Singh  (supra);  Ashok  Kumar (supra);  

2

Swaran Singh v. State of U.P.  AIR 1998 SC 2026; Satpal & Anr. v. State  

of Haryana & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1702; and Bikas Chatterjee v. Union of  

India (2004) 7 SCC 634). In Epuru Sudhakar (supra)  this Court  held that  

the  orders  under  Articles  72/161  could  be  challenged  on  the  following  

grounds:

(a) that the order has been passed without application of mind;

(b) that the order is mala fide;

(c) that  the  order  has  been  passed  on  extraneous  or  wholly  

irrelevant considerations;

(d) that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration;

(e) that the order suffers from arbitrariness.

30. The  power  of  clemency  that  has  been  extended  is  contained  in  

Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution.  This matter relates to the State of  

Haryana.   The  Governor  of  Haryana  may  exercise  the  clemency  power.  

Article 161 of the Constitution enables the Governor of a State “to grant  

pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit  

or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any  

law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends”

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31. Sections  54  and  55  IPC  provide  for  punishment.   However,  the  

provisions  of  Sections  432  and  433-A  Cr.P.C.,  relate  to  the  present  

controversy.   Section  432(1)  Cr.P.C.  empowers  the  State  Government  to  

suspend or remit sentences of any person sentenced to punishment for an  

offence,  at  any time,  without  conditions  or  upon any  conditions  that  the  

person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the  

whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. Section  

433-A Cr.P.C. imposes  restriction on powers of remission or commutation  

where a sentence of imprisonment  for life is imposed on conviction of a  

person for an offence for which death is one of the punishment provided by  

law or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted  

under section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be  

released  from  prison  unless  he  has  served  at  least  fourteen  years  of  

imprisonment.

32.  Pardon is one of the many prerogatives which have been recognised  

since  time  immemorial  as  being  vested  in  the  sovereign,  whoever  the  

sovereignty might be. Whether the sovereign happened to be an absolute  

monarch or a popular republic or a constitutional king or queen, Sovereignty  

has always been associated with the source of power — the power to appoint  

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or dismiss public servants, the power to declare war and conclude peace, the  

power to legislate and the power to adjudicate upon all kinds of disputes etc.  

The rule of law, in contradiction to the rule of man, includes within its  

wide connotation the absence of arbitrary power, submission to the ordinary  

law of the land, and the equal  protection of the laws. As a result  of the  

historical process aforesaid, the absolute and arbitrary power of the monarch  

came to be canalised into three distinct  wings of  the Government,  (Vide  

K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 112).

33. Articles  72  and  161  of  the  Constitution  provide  for  a  residuary  

sovereign power, thus, there can be nothing to debar the concerned authority  

to exercise such power, even after rejection of one clemency petition, if the  

changed  circumstances  so  warrant.  (Vide  G.  Krishta  Goud  &  J.  

Bhoomaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.  (1976) 1 SCC 157)

34. In  Regina v.  The Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home Department  

(1996)  EWCA Civ  555,  the  question  came for  consideration,  before  the  

Court  that  if  the  short-sentencing  policy  is  totally  inflexible,  whether  it  

amounts  to  transgression  on  the  clemency  power  of  the  State  which  is  

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understood as unfettered?  The court considered the issue at length and came  

to the conclusion as under:

“…… the policy must not be so rigid that it does not  allow  for  the  exceptional  case  which  requires  a  departure from the policy, otherwise it could result in  fettering of the discretion which would be unlawful…. It  is  inconsistent  with  the  very  flexibility  which  must  have been intended by the Parliament in giving such a  wide  and  untrammeled  discretion  to  the  Home  Secretary……Approximately  90  years  ago  an  enlightened  Parliament  recognised  that  a  flexible  sentence of detention is what is required in these cases  with  a  very  wide discretion  being  given  to  the  person  Parliament thought best suited to oversee that discretion  so that the most appropriate decision as to release could  be taken in the public interest.  The subsequent statutes  have not altered the nature of the discretion.”   (Emphasis  added).

Thus, it was held therein that the clemency power remains unfettered  

and in exceptional circumstances, variation from the policy is permissible.   

35. In view of the above, it  is evident that the clemency power of the  

Executive  is  absolute  and  remains  unfettered  for  the  reason  that  the  

provisions contained under Article 72 or 161 of the Constitution cannot be  

restricted by the provisions of Sections 432, 433 and 433-A Cr. P.C. though  

the Authority has to meet  the requirements referred to hereinabove while  

exercising the clemency power.   

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To say that clemency power under Articles 72/161 of the Constitution  

cannot be exercised by the President or the Governor,  as the case may be,  

before a convict completes the incarceration period provided in the short-

sentencing  policy,  even  in  an  exceptional  case,  would  be  mutually  

inconsistent with the theory that clemency power is unfettered.  

The Constitution Bench of this Court in Maru Ram (supra) clarified  

that  not  only  the  provisions  of  Section  433-A  Cr.  P.C.  would  apply  

prospectively but any scheme for short sentencing framed by the State would  

also apply prospectively.  Such a view is in conformity with the provisions  

of Articles 20 (1) and 21 of the Constitution.  The expectancy of period of  

incarceration  is  determined soon after  the  conviction  on  the  basis  of  the  

applicable laws and the established practices of the State.   When a short  

sentencing scheme is referable to Article 161 of the Constitution, it cannot  

be held that the said scheme cannot be pressed in service.  Even if, a life  

convict does not satisfy the requirement of remission rules/short sentencing  

schemes, there can be no prohibition for the President or the Governor of the  

State,  as  the  case  may  be,  to  exercise  the  power  of  clemency under  the  

provisions of Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution.  Right of the convict is  

limited  to  the  extent  that  his  case  be  considered  in  accordance  with  the  

relevant rules etc., he cannot claim pre-mature release as a matter of right.

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36. Two contrary views have always prevailed on the issue of purpose of  

criminal justice and punishment.  The punishment, if taken to be remedial  

and for the benefit of the convict, remission should be granted.  If sentence  

is taken purely punitive in public interest to vindicate the authority of law  

and to deter others, it should not be granted.   

In  Salmond  on  Jurisprudence,  12th Edition  by  P.J.  Fitzgerald,  the  

author in Chapter 15 dealt with the purpose of criminal justice/punishment  

as under :-

“Deterrence acts on the motives of the offender, actual   or potential; disablement consists primarily in physical   restraint.  Reformation, by contrast, seeks to bring about   a  change  in  the  offender’s  character  itself  so  as  to   reclaim him as  a  useful  member  of  society.   Whereas   deterrence  looks  primarily  at  the  potential  criminal   outside the dock, reformation aims at the actual offender   before the bench.  In this century increasing weight has   been  attached  to  this  aspect.   Less  frequent  use  of   imprisonment,  the abandonment of short sentences,  the   attempt to use prison as a training rather than a pure   punishment,  and the greater  employment  of  probation,   parole  and  suspended  sentences  are  evidence  of  this   general trend.  At the same time, there has been growing  concern to investigate the causes of crime and the effects   of penal treatment……... The  reformative  element  must  not be overlooked but it must not be allowed to assume  undue prominence.   How much prominence it  may be  allowed, is a question of time, place and circumstance.”    R.M.V.Dias, in his book Jurisprudence (Fifth Edition- 1985) observed  

as under :-

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“The easing of laws and penalties on anti-social conduct   may conceivably result in less freedom and safety for the   law-abiding.   As  Dietze  puts  it:  ‘Just  as  the  despotio   variant  of  democracy  all  too  often  has  jeopardized  human  rights,  its  permissive  variant  threatens  these  rights  by  exposing  citizens  to  the  crimes  of  their   fellowmen………

………. The more law-abiding people lose confidence in  the law and those in authority to protect them, the more   will  they be driven to the alternative of taking matters   into their own hands, the perils of which unthinkable and  are  nearer  than  some  liberty-minded  philanthropists   seem inclined to allow……”

Legal  maxim,  “Veniae  facilitas  incentivum  est  delinquendi”,   is  a  

caveat to the exercise of clemency powers, as it means - “Facility of pardon  

is an incentive to crime.”  It may also prove to be a “grand farce”, if granted  

arbitrarily, without any justification, to “privileged class deviants”.  Thus, no  

convict should be a “favoured recipient” of clemency.   

37. Liberty is one of the most precious and cherished possessions of a  

human  being  and  he  would  resist  forcefully  any  attempt  to  diminish  it.  

Similarly,  rehabilitation  and  social  reconstruction  of  life  convict,  as  

objective of punishment become of paramount importance in a welfare state.  

“Society without crime is a utopian theory”.  The State has to achieve the  

goal  of  protecting  the  society  from  convict  and  also  to  rehabilitate  the  

2

offender.  There is a very real risk of revenge attack upon the convict from  

others.  Punishment enables the convict to expiate his crime and assist his  

rehabilitation.   The  Remission policy  manifests  a  process  of  reshaping a  

person who, under certain circumstances, has indulged in criminal activity  

and is required to be rehabilitated.  Objectives of the punishment are wholly  

or  predominantly  reformative  and  preventive.    The  basic  principle  of  

punishment that “guilty must pay for his crime” should not be extended to  

the extent that  punishment becomes brutal.   The matter  is  required to be  

examined keeping in view modern reformative concept of punishment.  The  

concept  of  “Savage  Justice”  is  not  to  be  applied  at  all.   The  sentence  

softening schemes have to be viewed from a more human and social science  

oriented approach. Punishment should not be regarded as the end but as only  

the  means  to  an  end.  The  object  of  punishment  must  not  be  to  wreak  

vengeance but to reform and rehabilitate the criminal.  More so, relevancy of  

the circumstances of the offence and the state of mind of the convict, when  

the offence was committed, are the factors, to be taken note of.        

38. At the time of  considering the case of  pre-mature  release of a life  

convict, the authorities may require to consider his case mainly taking into  

consideration whether the offence was an individual act of crime without  

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affecting  the  society  at  large;  whether  there  was  any  chance  of  future  

recurrence  of  committing  a  crime;  whether  the  convict  had  lost  his  

potentiality  in committing the crime; whether there was any fruitful purpose  

of  confining the  convict  any more;  the  socio-economic condition  of  the  

convict’s family and other similar circumstances.

39. Considerations of public policy and humanitarian impulses – supports  

the concept of executive power of clemency.  If clemency power exercised  

and sentence is remitted, it  does not erase the fact that an individual was  

convicted  of  a  crime.  It  merely  gives  an  opportunity  to  the  convict  to  

reintegrate into the  society.  The modern penology with its correctional  

and rehabilitative basis emphasis that exercise of such power be made as a  

means of  infusing  mercy into the justice system.  Power of clemency is  

required  to  be  pressed  in  service  in  an  appropriate  case.   Exceptional  

circumstances, e.g. suffering of a convict from an incurable disease at last  

stage,  may warrant his release even at much early stage.   ‘Vana Est Illa  

Potentia Quae Nunquam Venit In Actum’ means-vain is that power which  

never comes into play.      

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40. Pardon is an act of grace, proceedings from the power entrusted with  

the  execution  of  the  laws,  which  exempts  the  individual  on  whom it  is  

bestowed  from  the  punishment  which  law  inflicts  for  a  crime  he  has  

committed. Every civilised society recognises and has therefore provided  

for the pardoning power to be exercised as an act of grace and humanity in  

appropriate cases. This power has been exercised in most of the States from  

time immemorial, and has always been regarded as a necessary attribute of  

sovereignty.  It is also an act of justice, supported by a wise public policy.  

It cannot, however, be treated as a privilege. It is as much an official duty as  

any other act.  It is vested in the Authority not for the benefit of the convict  

only, but for the welfare of the people; who may properly insist upon the  

performance of that duty by him if a pardon or parole is to be granted.   

41. This  Court  in  Mahender  Singh (supra)  has  taken  note  of  the  

provisions of Act 1894 and rules framed thereunder as well as the relevant  

paragraphs of Punjab Jail Manual. Section 59 (5) of Act 1894  enables the  

Government to frame rules for “award of marks and shortening of sentence”.  

Rules define prisoner including a person committed to prison in default of  

furnishing security to keep peace or be of good behaviour.  Rules further  

provide for classification of prisoners according to the intensity and gravity  

3

of  the  offence.   According  to  the  classification  of  prisoners,  Class  1  

prisoners  are  those  who  had  committed  heinous  organized  crimes or  

specially dangerous criminals. Class 2 prisoners include dacoits or persons  

who commit heinous organized crimes.  Class 3 prisoners are those who do  

not fall within Class 1 or Class 2.  Rule 20 thereof provides that life convict  

being a Class 1 prisoner if earned such remission as entitles him to release,  

the Superintendent shall report accordingly to the Local Government with a  

view to the passing of orders under Section 401 Cr.P.C. Rule 21 provides  

that save as provided by Rule 20, when a prisoner has earned such remission  

as entitles him to release, the Superintendent shall release him.  Instant case  

falls in Class 3, not being a case of organized crime or by professionals or  

hereditary or specially dangerous criminals.   

Undoubtedly, the aforesaid rules are applicable in Haryana in view of  

the  State  Re-organisation  Act.   These  are  statutory  rules,  not  merely  

executive  instructions.  Therefore,  a  “lifer”  has  a  right  to  get  his  case  

considered within the parameters laid down therein.

It may not be out of place to mention here that while deciding the case  

in  Sadhu Singh (supra),  provisions of the aforesaid Act 1894 and Rules  

referred to hereinabove, had not been brought to the notice of this Court.  

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More so,  consistent  past  practice  adopted  by  the  State  can  furnish  

grounds for legitimate expectation (vide Official Liquidator v. Dayanand  

& Ors. (2008) 10 SCC 1).    

42. We have already noticed that the earlier policies including the policy  

dated 04.02.1993 refers to the exercise of powers under Article 161 of the  

Constitution  whereas  the  policy  dated  13.08.2008  is  in  exercise  of  the  

powers under Section 432 read with Sections 433 and 433-A of Cr. P.C.  

The restriction under Section 433-A is only to the extent of the powers to be  

exercised in respect  of offences as referred to under Section 432 Cr.P.C.  

The notification dated 13.08.2008 is, therefore, under a rule of procedure,  

which is subordinate to the Constitution.  The power exercised under Article  

161  of  the  Constitution  is  obviously  a  mandate  of  the  Constitution  and,  

therefore,  the  policy  dated  13.08.2008  cannot  override  the  policy  dated  

04.02.1993.   

43. The  right  of  the  respondent  prisoner,  therefore,  to  get  his  case  

considered at par with such of his inmates, who were entitled to the benefit  

of the said policy, cannot be taken away by the policy dated 13.08.2008.  

This is evident from a bare perusal of the recitals contained in the policies  

3

prior to the year 2008, which are referable to Article 161 of the Constitution.  

The  High  Court,  therefore,  in  our  opinion,  was  absolutely  justified  in  

arriving  at  the  conclusion  that  the  case  of  the  respondent  was  to  be  

considered on the strength of the policy that was existing on the date of his  

conviction.   State  authority is  under an obligation to at  least  exercise  its  

discretion in relation to an honest expectation perceived by the convict, at  

the  time of  his  conviction that  his  case  for  pre-mature  release  would be  

considered  after  serving  the  sentence,  prescribed  in  the  short  sentencing  

policy existing on that date.  The State has to exercise its power of remission  

also keeping in view any such benefit to be construed liberally in favour of a  

convict which may depend upon case to case and for that purpose, in our  

opinion, it should relate to a policy which, in the instant case, was in favour  

of  the  respondent.   In  case  a  liberal  policy  prevails  on  the  date  of  

consideration of the case of a “lifer” for pre-mature release, he should be  

given benefit thereof.  

44. As per the information furnished by the appellant-State of Haryana,  

the respondent Jagdish has served more than 14 years (actual) on 12.2.2009  

i.e. prior to the date of judgment impugned herein dated 17.2.2009. By now,  

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the respondent has served (actual) for more than 15 years.   Respondent falls  

in category 3 of the prisoners as he did not indulge in any organised crime.

45. Accordingly, for the reasons given hereinabove, we find no reason to  

interfere with the judgment of the High Court, which is hereby affirmed.  

The  appeal  is  dismissed  accordingly,  subject  to  the  direction  that  the  

appellant-State Government shall proceed to calculate the sentence for the  

purpose of consideration of remission in the case of the respondent as per the  

policy dated 04.02.1993.   

………………………………CJI.

…………………………………J. (J.M. PANCHAL)

…………………………………J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi, March  22,  2010

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 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 5842  OF 2009

State of Haryana &Ors. …Appellants

Versus

Harpal  …Respondent

WITH  

SLP (Crl.) No.6385/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.6442/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.6441/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.6444/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.5768/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7629/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7579/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7580/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7581/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7582/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8140/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7631/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7630/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7628/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7622/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7623/2009

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SLP (Crl.) No.7625/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7619/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7621/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7659/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7654/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7656/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7657/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7652/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7655/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7661/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7653/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7651/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7660/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7649/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.7658/2009 SLP (Crl.) No……… /2009 @Crl.M.P. No.13253 SLP (Crl.) No.7974/2008 SLP (Crl.) No.9330/2008 SLP (Crl.) No.9234/2008 SLP (Crl.) No.9268/2008 SLP (Crl.) No. ……………. /2009 @Crl.M.P. No.12754 SLP (Crl.) No. ……………… /2009 Crl.M.P. No.13045 SLP (Crl.) No.6914/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.6913/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8288/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8290/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8291/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8292/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8293/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8294/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8297/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8298/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8300/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8301/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.8302/2009 SLP (Crl.) No……………. /2009 @Crl.M.P. No.18221 SLP (Crl.) No……………/2009 @Crl.M.P. No.18264 SLP (Crl.) No…………. /2009 @Crl.M.P. No. 18402 SLP (Crl.) No. 831/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 832/2009

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SLP (Crl.) No. 1026/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 1097/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 1615/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 2101/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 1861/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 2216/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 3475/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 3035/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 3042/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 3032/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.  3044/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 3040/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 3123/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4125/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4076/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4077/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4815/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4882/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 5117/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 5173/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6787/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6272/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6783/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6310/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6784/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6467/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6468/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6985/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6637/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.  6986/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6647/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6766/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6767/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6776/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6777/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 7147/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 8392/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4789/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6485/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4802/2009

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SLP (Crl.) No. 4803/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4909/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6487/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4933/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4934/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4943/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4956/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 6488/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 5115/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 5118/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 5166/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 5170/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 5174/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 8800/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 8802/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 8801/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 8806/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 8804/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 8807/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 4883/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9364/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9373/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9392/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9379/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9376/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.  9382/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9384/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9387/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9389/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9372/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9366/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9371/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9368/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9388/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9383/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9385/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9378/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9377/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9381/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9374/2009

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SLP (Crl.) No. 9358/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9367/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9369/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9370/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9380/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 10237/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9393/2009 SLP (Crl.) No.  9390/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9355/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9351/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9359/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9354/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 9386/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 10119/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 10122/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 10121/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 10123/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 10120/2009 SLP (Crl.) No. 200/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 211/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 210/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 206/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 207/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 196/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 193/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 194/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 199/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 205/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 197/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 198/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 204/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 208/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 203/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 192/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 437/2010 SLP (Crl.) No. 3118/2009

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J U D G M E N T  

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

In view of our judgment pronounced today in Criminal Appeal No…

….…..of  2010 @ SLP(Crl.) No. 6638 of 2009 (State of Haryana & Ors. v.  

Jagdish), these  Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.

………………………………CJI.

…………………………………J. (J.M. PANCHAL)

…………………………………J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi, March  22,  2010

           .

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