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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5184 of 2006

PETITIONER: State of Haryana & Ors.                                          

RESPONDENT: Devi Dutt & Ors.                                                         

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/11/2006

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.16017-16019 of 2004)

S.B. Sinha, J.

       Leave granted.

       Respondents herein were recruited on daily wages.  They were  muster-roll employees.  Pursuant to a decision of the High Court in  Kulbhushan vs. State of Haryana [1996 (1) RSJ 775], engagement of daily  wagers was purported to have been banned  in terms whereof the State  issued instructions on 9.1.1996 to all the heads of departments, forbidding  continuance of daily wagers on muster-roll.  The work was directed to be  carried out by workmen, whose services were to be regularised on  fulfillment of terms and conditions of the policy laid down therefor.  In  terms of the said policy decision, the services of the respondents were  terminated.  Industrial Disputes were raised alleging violation of different  provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (’the Act’).  Before the Labour  Court, both the parties adduced their respective evidences.  By reason of  three different Awards, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court arrived at a  definite finding that the workmen having not been in continuous service for  a period of 240 days during a period of 12 months preceding the order of  termination, the retrenchment of the workmen was not violative of Section  25F of the Act.  It was further held that the provisions of Sections 25G  thereof had also not been infringed.   

       Writ petitions were filed by the respondents aggrieved by and  dissatisfied therewith.  In the said proceedings, additional affidavits were  filed.  The High Court reversed the findings of fact arrived at by the  Presiding Officer, Labour Court holding that as the appellants had not  denied or disputed that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers from  February, 1993 to January, 1996, the impugned Awards could not be  sustained.  The matters were directed to be remitted to the Labour Court.  

       The State is, thus, before us.            

       Mr. Ajay Siwach, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  appellants would submit that the High Court committed a manifest error in  setting aside the findings of fact arrived at by the Labour Court.

       Mr. Harish Chandra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of  the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the Labour Court

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having not considered the materials on record in their proper perspective, the  High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in reversing the said  findings.  Our attention was also drawn to the following statements made in  the counter affidavit in this behalf :

"....If the muster roll for the months of February, 1995,  March, 1995 and June, 1995 are taken into consideration,  the working days as reflected by the workman as 21=, 30  and 24 are taken into consideration, a period of 75= days  is required to be added and after adding 75= days, the  total number of days comes to 264= days which is more  than 240 days.  The respondent had also worked in  January, 1996 for 21 days, thus total number of days  comes to 285= days."

       Before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, evidences were adduced  by the parties.  The Labour Court, on the basis of the materials placed before  it, arrived at a definite conclusion that the respondents herein had not been in  continuous service for a period of 240 days within 12 months preceding the  date of termination.   

       The High Court ordinarily should not have interfered with the said  finding of fact.  We, although, do not mean to suggest that the findings of  fact cannot be interfered with by the superior courts in exercise of their  jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the same  should be done upon application of the well known legal principles such as :  (1) when it is perverse; (2) when wrong legal principles have been applied;  (3) when wrong questions were posed; (4) when relevant facts have not been  taken into consideration; or (5) the findings have been arrived at on the basis  of the irrelevant facts or on extraneous consideration.

       The High Court ordinarily also ought not to have entertained an  additional affidavit without assigning any sufficient or cogent reason  therefor.  The parties adduced their evidences before the Industrial Court.   Why could they not bring on records any other evidence before the Labour  Court, was not explained.  The contentions raised before the High Court for  the first time in the additional affidavits filed before it, were also not  admitted by the appellants herein.

       We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court erred in passing  the impugned judgments.  Submission of Mr. Harish Chandra that this Court  should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the  Constitution of India, cannot be accepted.  The High Court, in our opinion,  has exceeded its jurisdiction.  It failed to apply the well known legal  principles of judicial review.  Furthermore, the appellants acted bona fide.   The orders of termination were passed in terms of its policy decision.  The  Presiding Officer, Labour Court categorically opined that the workmen had  been disengaged keeping in view the exigency of work, which had been  mentioned in the muster-roll itself.  It was found as of fact that no junior had  been retained.  The State also acted in terms of the directions issued by the  High Court.  Whether such directions were legal or illegal, is not a matter  which fell for consideration before the Labour Court, but, there cannot be  any doubt whatsoever that the appellants acted bona fide.

       For the reasons mentioned, the impugned judgments cannot be  sustained, which are set aside.  The appeal is allowed.  No costs.