05 October 2005
Supreme Court
Download

STATE OF HARYANA Vs CHARANJIT SINGH .

Bench: S. N. VARIAVA,DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN,S. H. KAPADIA
Case number: C.A. No.-006562-006562 / 2002
Diary number: 17131 / 2002
Advocates: T. V. GEORGE Vs RR-EX-PARTE


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6562 of 2002

PETITIONER: STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                                   

RESPONDENT: CHARANJIT SINGH & ORS., ETC. ETC.                         

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/10/2005

BENCH: S. N. Variava,Dr. AR. Lakshmanan & S. H. Kapadia

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T With

(Civil Appeal No.6567/2002, Civil Appeal No.6568/2002, Civil  Appeal No.6570/2002, Civil Appeal No.6572/2002, Civil Appeal  No.6569/2002, Civil Appeal No.6573/2002, Civil Appeal  No.6574/2002, Civil Appeal No.6575/2002, Civil Appeal  No.6528/2002, Civil Appeal No.6647/2002, Civil Appeal  No.6485/2002, Civil Appeal No.7093/2002, Civil Appeal  No.8090/2002, Civil Appeal No. __________ of 2005 (arising  out of SLP(C)........../2003 CC 905), Civil Appeal No.1272/2003,  Civil Appeal No.1475/2003, Civil Appeal No. 6167 of  2005 (arising out SLP(C) No.4852/2003), Civil Appeal  No.4154/2003, Civil Appeal No.4636/2003, Civil Appeal  No.5104/2003, Civil Appeal No.6322/2003, Civil Appeal  No.4447/2003, Civil Appeal Nos.6654-6657/2003, Civil Appeal  No.8636/2003, Civil Appeal No.185/2004, Civil Appeal  No.189/2004, Civil Appeal No.6648/2002)

S. N. VARIAVA, J.         Delay condoned.           Special leave granted in S. L. Ps.

1)      In all these Appeals, the Respondents were daily wagers who  were appointed as ledger clerks, ledger keepers, pump operators,  mali-cum-chowkidar, fitters, petrol men, surveyors etc.  All of them  claimed the minimum wages payable under the pay-scale of regular  Class IV employees from the date of their appointments.  The question  whether or not these persons were entitled to the minimum of the  pay-scale of a regular Class IV employee was referred to a Full Bench  for consideration.  The Full Bench gave its decision. Following the Full  Bench decision all these Writ Petitions have been disposed off with  short Orders.  In all these cases the Respondents have been directed  to be given the minimum of the wages in the scale payable to a  regular Class IV employee from the date of the filing of the respective  Petition.   2)      One other fact which must be mentioned is that, whilst these  Appeals were pending before this Court, all the Respondents have  been regularized. From the date of their regularization they being paid   pay-scales as payable to a regular Class IV employee.   The question  therefore is only whether the directions of the High Court to pay the  minimum wage in the scale payable to a Class IV employee, from the  date of their filing  the respective Petition, is required to be interfered  with. 3)      When these Appeals came up for hearing on 23rd August, 2004  this Court referred the matters to a larger Bench for consideration by  passing the following Order:         "The respondents in all these appeals were initially

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 11  

appointed as Ledger-clerks, ledger keepers, pump  operators, mali-cum-chowkidars, fitters, petrol man,  surveyor, drivers etc. on daily wages or on contractual  basis.  They were all regularized with effect from October,  2003 and they have been getting the minimum payable  under the regular pay scale of Class-IV employees from  the date of their regularization.  In the writ petitions filed  by these respondents before the High Court of Punjab and  Haryana at Chandigarh, the Division Bench directed that  these respondents shall be paid the minimum salary and  dearness allowances payable to their counter parts  working on regular basis.  The question for consideration  before this Court, in the present set of cases, is that  whether these respondents are entitled to get the  minimum scale of pay from the date of their appointment  as daily wagers/casual employees or they are entitled to  get the minimum salary in the scale of pay from the date  of their regularization.         

       Learned counsel for the State contended that they  are entitled to get minimum of the scale of pay only from  the date of regularization whereas the respondents  contended that applying the principle of "equal pay for  equal work" they are entitled to get the minimum of the  pay scale from the date of their employment as casual  employees or daily wagers.  The respondents, in this  connection, relied on the decision of this Court reported in  AIR 1986 SC P. 584, Surinder Singh & Anr. vs. Engineer- in-Chief, C.P.W.D. & Ors. wherein the petitioners were  appointed on daily wages in the Central Public Works  Department were given salary and allowances which were  payable to the regular employees from the date on which  they were employed but in series of other decisions  rendered by this Court reported in 1996 (11) SCC p.77,  State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Jasmer Singh & Ors. in paras  9 and 10 it was held that the daily rated workmen who  were to be paid minimum wages admissible to such  workmen as prescribed and not in the pay scale applicable  to similar employees working on regular service.  Reliance  was also placed on earlier decisions in Harbans Lal Vs.  State of H.P. 1989 (4) SCC p.459.  A similar view was  taken by this Court in Orissa University of Agriculture &  Technology & Anr. Vs. Manoj K. Mohanty,  2003 (5) SCC  P.188 AND Ghaziabad Development Authority & Ors. Vs.  Vikram Chaudhary & Ors.,  1995 (5) SCC p.210 and also in  State of Haryana & Anr. Vs. Tilar Raj & Ors.,  2003 (6)   SCC p.123.                  It appears that there is a conflict of decision and  earlier decision in Surinder Singh & Anr. Vs. Engineer-in- Chief, C.P.W.D. & Ors., [AIR 1986 SC 584] was not  referred to in later decisions.  Therefore, in our view, these  cases have to be considered by a larger bench so that the  conflict may be resolved.  The registry is requested to  place these matters before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of  India for posting the same before a larger bench."

The matters are thus before this three Judge Bench.

4)      In the case of Surinder Singh vs. Engineer-in-Chief,  C.P.W.D., reported in (1986) 1 SCC 639 = AIR (1986) SC 4, a two  Judge Bench of this Court held that the doctrine of "equal pay for  equal work" is not an abstract doctrine which is not capable of being  enforced in a court of law.  This Court cited with approval the following  observations made in the case of Dhirendra Chamoli vs.  State of

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 11  

U.P., reported in (1986) 1 SCC 637:         "We therefore allow the writ petitions and  make the rule absolute and direct the Central  Government to accord to these persons who are  employed by the Nehru Yuvak Kendras and who are  concededly performing the same duties as Class IV  employees, the same salary and conditions of service  as are being received by Class IV employees, except  regularization which cannot be done since there are  no sanctioned posts.  But we hope and trust that  posts will be sanctioned by the Central Government  in the different Nehru Yuvak Kendras, so that these  persons can be regularized.  It is not at all desirable  that any management and particularly the Central  Government should continue to employ persons on  casual basis in organizations which have been in  existence for over 12 years.  The salary and  allowances of Class IV employees shall be given to  these persons employed in Nehru Yuvak Kendras  with effect from the date when they were  respectively employed.

Earlier the court also observed that it was a peculiar  attitude to take on the part of the Central Government to  say that they would pay only daily wages and not the  same wages as other similarly employed employees,  though all of them did identical work.  The court said:

       This argument lies ill in the mouth of the  Central Government for it is an all too familiar  argument with the exploiting class and a welfare  State committed to a socialist pattern of society  cannot be permitted to advance such an argument.   It must be remembered that in this country where  there is so much unemployment, the choice for the  majority of people is to starve or to take  employment on whatever exploitative terms are  offered by the employer.  The fact that these  employees accepted employment with full knowledge  that they will be paid only daily wages and they will  not get the same salary and conditions of service as  other Class IV employees, cannot provide an escape  to the Central Government to avoid the mandate of  equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.   This article declares that there should be equality  before law and equal protection of the law and  implicit in it is the further principle that there must  be equal pay for equal work of equal value .......    It  makes no difference whether they are appointed in  sanctioned posts or not.  So long as they are  performing the same duties, they must receive the  same salary and conditions of service as Class IV  employees."

5)    In Dhirendra Chamoli’s case this Court then held that the Central  Government like all organs of a State is committed to the Directive  Principles of State Policy and Article 39 enshrines the principle of equal  pay for equal work.  On this basis, this Court directed the Government  to pay to the Petitioners therein and all other daily wagers the same  salary and allowances as were paid to regular and permanent  employees.  To be immediately noted that in this case, there is no  discussion as to whether or not the concerned employees were  similarly situated with the regular employees and what was the nature  of their work and the nature of work of a regular employee.  The case

4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 11  

appears to have proceeded on the footing that everything was  identical and that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applied.  Counsel for the Respondents have also relied upon other Judgments of  this Court. They are being dealt with later. 6)      The question as to when such a doctrine can apply was  considered by this Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Jasmer  Singh, reported in (1996) 11 SCC 77.  In this case, it was held that  the principle of equal pay for equal work is not easy to apply.  It was  held that there are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating  the work of different persons in different organizations or even in the  same organization.   Earlier judgments directing payment on the basis  of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work were taken note of. The  Court recorded that a note of caution had been expressed in the case  of State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia [(1989) 1 SCC 121]. It was pointed  out that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical  application in every case of similar work. It was held that Article 14  permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics  of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were  left out. It was held that these qualities or characteristics must have a  reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. It was held   that in service matters merit or experience can be a proper basis for  classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in  administration. It was held that a higher pay scale to avoid stagnation  or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an  acceptable reason for pay differentiation. It was held that even though  persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. It  was held that where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on  the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale  granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority  cannot be challenged. Note was also taken of the case of Mewa Ram  Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences [(1989) 2 SCC 235]  wherein it was held that a classification based on difference in  educational qualifications justified a difference in pay scales. This  Court further observed that the judgment of the Pay Commission in  this regard relating to the nature of the job, in the absence of material  to the contrary, should be accepted. The case of Harbans Lal v. State  of H.P. [(1989) 4 SCC 459 was referred to with approval. In that case  it was held that a mere nomenclature designating a person as a  carpenter or a craftsman was not enough to come to the conclusion  that he was doing the same work as another carpenter in regular  service. In that case, carpenters employed by the Himachal Pradesh  Handicraft Corporation on daily wages sought parity of wages with  carpenters in regular service. This Court negatived this contention,  holding that a comparison cannot be made with counterparts in other  establishments with different management or even in the  establishments in different locations though owned by the same  management. The quality of work which is produced may be different  and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a  comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of  "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various  dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity  that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It was held that it  must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. In  Jasmer Singhs’ case this Court summed up as follows: "\005\005\005\005\005the quality of work performed by different sets of  persons holding different jobs will have to be evaluated.  There may be differences in educational or technical  qualifications which may have a bearing on the skills which  the holders bring to their job although the designation of  the job may be the same. There may also be other  considerations which have relevance to efficiency in service  which may justify differences in pay scales on the basis of  criteria such as experience and seniority, or a need to  prevent stagnation in the cadre, so that good performance  can be elicited from persons who have reached the top of

5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 11  

the pay scale. There may be various other similar  considerations which may have a bearing on efficient  performance in a job. This Court has repeatedly observed  that evaluation of such jobs for the purposes of pay scale  must be left to expert bodies and, unless there are any  mala fides, its evaluation should be accepted.  9. This court in the case of Harbans Lal v. State of H.P.  [(1989) 4 SCC 459 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 71 : (1989) 11 ATC  869] further held that daily-rated workmen who were  before the Court in that case were entitled to be paid  minimum wages admissible to such workmen as prescribed  and not the minimum in the pay scale applicable to similar  employees in regular service - unless the employer had  decided to make such minimum in the pay scale applicable  to the daily-rated workmen. The same position is  reiterated in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority  v. Vikram Chaudhary [(1995) 5 SCC 210 : 1995 SCC (L&S)  1226 : (1995) 31 ATC 129].  10. The respondents, therefore, in the present appeals  who are employed on daily wages cannot be treated as on  a par with persons in regular service of the State of  Haryana holding similar posts. Daily-rated workers are not  required to possess the qualifications prescribed for regular  workers, nor do they have to fulfil the requirement relating  to age at the time of recruitment. They are not selected in  the manner in which regular employees are selected. In  other words the requirements for selection are not as  rigorous. There are also other provisions relating to regular  service such as the liability of a member of the service to  be transferred, and his being subject to the disciplinary  jurisdiction of the authorities as prescribed, which the  daily-rated workmen are not subjected to. They cannot,  therefore, be equated with regular workmen for the  purposes for their wages. Nor can they claim the minimum  of the regular pay scale of the regularly employed."  

7)      In the case of State of Haryana vs. Tilak Raj, reported in  (2003) 6 SCC 123, it has been held that the principle of equal pay for  equal work is not always easy to apply.  It has been held that there  are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work of  different persons in different organizations or even in the same  organization.  It has been held that this is a concept which requires,  for its applicability, complete and wholesale identity between a group  of employees claiming identical pay scales and the other group of  employees who have already earned such pay scales.  It has been held  that the problem about equal pay cannot be translated into a  mathematical formula.   It was further held as follows: "11.  A scale of pay is attached to a definite post and in  case of a daily wager, he holds no posts. The respondent  workers cannot be held to hold any posts to claim even  any comparison with the regular and permanent staff for  any or all purposes including a claim for equal pay and  allowances. To claim a relief on the basis of equality, it is  for the claimants to substantiate a clear cut basis of  equivalence and a resultant hostile discrimination before  becoming eligible to claim rights on a par with the other  group vis-a-vis an alleged discrimination. No material was  placed before the High Court as to the nature of the duties  of either categories and it is not possible to hold that the  principle of "equal pay for equal work" is an abstract one. " 8)     In the case of Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology  vs. Manoj K. Mohanty, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 188, this Court set  aside the Order of the High Court granting equal pay for equal justice  on the basis that the High Court, before issuing such directions, had  not examined facts of the case in order to appreciate whether the

6

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 11  

Respondent therein satisfied the relevant requirements such as the  nature of work done by him as compared to the nature of work done  by a regularly employed person, the qualifications, the responsibilities,  etc.   It was noted that as the Respondent therein was only on a  temporary basis and he had not undergone the process for regular  recruitment and in such cases direction to give regular pay scale could  not be given without examining the relevant factors.  It was held that  before giving such directions the Court must also keep in mind what to  what would be its implications and impact on the other employees.     It was held that in the absence of necessary averments and materials  placed on record, there is no scope to give such a direction.  It was  held that the burden to prove that everything was equal is on the  person claiming equal pay for equal work and in the absence of  necessary averments and proofs a party would not be entitled to get  such directions. 9)       In the case of Government of West Bengal vs. Tarun K. Roy  reported in (2004) 1 SCC 347, a three Judge Bench of this Court has  also considered the doctrine of equal pay for equal work in the  following terms:  

"Equal Pay for Equal Work  Article 14 read with Article 39(d) of the Constitution of  India envisages the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.  The said doctrine, however, does not contemplate that  only because the nature of the work is same, irrespective  of an educational qualification or irrespective of their  source of recruitment or other relevant considerations the  said doctrine would be automatically applied. The holders  of a higher educational qualification can be treated as a  separate class. Such classification, it is trite, is reasonable.  Employees performing the similar job but having different  educational qualification can, thus, be treated differently.  In State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Trilok Nath Khosa AIR  1974 SC 1 : 1974 (1) SCC 19 : 1974-I-LLJ-121, this Court  held :  "Educational qualifications have been recognized by this  Court as a safe criterion for determining the validity of  classification."  The Post of Operator-cum-Mechanic and Sub-Assistant  Engineers are technical posts. As noticed hereinbefore,  whereas for the posts of Operator-cum-Mechanic the  qualification of school final examination and a certificate  obtained from the Industrial Training institute would be  sufficient; for the posts of Sub-Assistant Engineer the  person must have a diploma from a polytechnic apart from  being a matriculate.  It is also not in dispute that such qualification was  prescribed as far back as in the year 1971 and the  respondents herein were appointed thereafter.  The Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review cannot  hold that matriculates with a certificate from ITIs or simply  graduates in science would be entitled to hold the posts of  Sub-Assistant Engineers. It is for the executive to lay down  the qualification required for holding a post and not for the  Courts.  In Debdas Kumar’s case (supra) the issue which fell for  determination by this Court was as to whether those  Operators-cum-Mechanic who were diploma holders,  having regard to the aforementioned notification dated  November 19, 1974 were entitled to be designated as Sub- Assistant Engineers. This Court noticed that the Post of  Sub-Assistant Engineer is direct recruitment post and not a  promotional post and, thus, they are entitled to be  designated as Sub-Assistant Engineers, particularly, when  such a status had been conferred upon 17 persons

7

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 11  

similarly situated. This Court granted relief to Debdas  Kumar’s case (supra), only on the ground that they had  been discriminated against.  Question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of  India on the part of the State would arise only if the  persons are similarly placed. Equality Clause contained in  Article 14, in other words, will have no application where  the persons are not similarly situated or when there is a  valid classification based on a reasonable differentia.  Doctrine of ’equal pay for equal work’, therefore is not  attracted in the instant case.  There is nothing on record to show that the duties and  functions of two categories of employment are at par, and,  thus, parity in pay-scales is not permissible.  The very fact that from the very beginning two different  pay scales were being maintained is itself suggestive of the  fact that the duties and functions are also different. In fact  it is not disputed that the two post of Sub-Assistant  Engineer is a higher post.  In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, National Textiles  Corporation Ltd. v. N.T.C. (WBAB & O) Ltd. Employees  Union 2003-III-LLJ-1102, this Court, held at p. 1106 :  "9. In view of the fact that the nature of duties of the staff  in the two categories has been found to be not at par,  parity in pay scales may not be possible. ....."  In Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Manoj  K. Mohanty 2003-II-LLJ-968 this Court noticed at p. 970 :  "10. It is clear from the averments made in the writ  petition extracted above, nothing is stated as regards the  nature of work, responsibilities attached to the respondent  without comparing to the regularly recruited Junior  Assistants. It cannot be disputed that there was neither  necessary averments in the writ petition nor any material  was placed before the High Court so as to consider the  application of principle of ’equal pay for equal work’."  This Court further noticed at p. 971 of LLJ :  "11. In the absence of material relating to other  comparable employees as to the qualifications, method of  recruitment, degree of skill, experience involved in  performance of job, training required, responsibilities  undertaken and other facilities in addition to pay scales,  the learned single Judge was right when he stated in the  order that in the absence of such material it was not  possible to grant relief to the respondent. ........  12. Before giving such direction, the High Court also did  not keep in mind as to what would be its implications and  impact on the other employees working in the appellant- University. From the averments made in the writ petition  extracted above, it is clear that no details were given and  no material was placed before the High Court for  comparison in order to apply the principle of ’equal pay for  equal work’. The Court in State of Haryana v. Jasmer  Singh AIR 1997 SC 1788 : 1996 (11) SCC 77 : 1997-II- LLJ-667 observed that the principle of ’equal pay for equal  work’ is not always easy to apply. There are inherent  difficulties in comparing and evaluating work done by  different persons in different organizations or even in the  same organization.  13. Yet, in another decision in State Bank of India v. M. R.  Ganesh Babu 2002 (4) SCC 556 : 2002-II-LLJ-829, a  Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, while dealing  with the same principle, has expressed that :  ’......... It is well settled that equal pay must depend upon  the nature of work done. It cannot be judged by the mere  volume of work; there may be qualitative difference as

8

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 11  

regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the  same but the responsibilities made a difference. ...’"  In Tarun Roy’s case an argument that relief should be given as in an  earlier matter objection was not taken was rejected in the following  terms: "In a case of this nature, the Courts are required to  determine the issue having regard to larger public interest.  It is one thing to say that in a given case the High Court or  this Court may not exercise an equitable jurisdiction under  Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India, but it  is another thing to say that the Courts shall grant a relief  to a party only on the ground that a contention which is  otherwise valid would not be raised on the ground that the  same was not done in an earlier proceedings.  In the instant case, the appellant has explained under  what circumstances the order of the learned single Judge  of the Calcutta High Court had to be obeyed. If rule of law  is to be followed, judicial discipline demands that the Court  follows its earlier binding precedent. The Calcutta High  Court itself has rejected such a plea. The matter is pending  in appeal. An order passed to the contrary by another  learned single Judge in ignorance of the earlier binding  precedent by itself would not constitute a binding  precedent and may be held to have been rendered per  incuriam.  Furthermore, in the order dated October 1, 1991, the  learned Judge categorically directed that the same would  be subject to any order that may be passed in the appeal  which is pending before the Division Bench from the  judgment and order dated January 20, 1989 passed in  Nemai Chand Ghosh’s case (supra). The said order,  therefore, did not attain finality.  In the aforementioned situation, the Division Bench of the  Calcutta High Court manifestly erred in refusing to  consider the contentions of the appellant on their own  merit, particularly, when the question as regard difference  in the grant of scale of pay on the ground of different  educational qualification stands concluded by a judgment  of this Court in Debdas Kumar’s case (supra). If the  judgment of Debdas Kumar’s case (supra) is to be followed  a finding of fact was required to be arrived at that they are  similarly situated to the case of Debdas Kumar (supra)  which in turn would mean that they are also holders of  diploma in engineering. They admittedly, being not, the  contention of the appellants could not be rejected, non- filing of an appeal, in any event, would not be a ground for  refusing to consider a matter on its own merits State of  Maharashtra v. Digambar 1995 (4) SCC 683.  In State of Bihar v. Ramdeo Yadav AIR 1996 SC 3135 :  1996 (3) SCC 493 wherein this Court noticed Debdas  Kumar’s case (supra) holding :  "Shri B. B. Singh the learned counsel for the appellants  contended that though an appeal against the earlier Order  of the High Court has not been filed, since larger public  interest is involved in the interpretation given by the High  Court following its earlier judgment, the matter requires  consideration by this Court. We find force in this  contention. In similar circumstances, this Court in State of  Maharashtra v. Digambar 1995 (4) SCC 683 and in State  of West Bengal v. Debdas Kumar 1991 Suppl (1) SCC 138  : 1995-III-LLJ (Suppl)-294, had held that though an  appeal was not filed against an earlier order, when public  interest is involved in interpretation of law, the Court is  entitled to go into the question."

9

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 11  

The three Judge Bench decision of this Court is binding on this Court.  Even otherwise we are in full agreement with what has been stated  therein.   10)     In the case of State of Orissa vs Balaram Sahu & Ors.,  reported in (2003) 1 SCC 250, this Court has held that the applicability  of the principle depends not only on the nature or volume of the work  but also on the qualitative difference in reliability and responsibilities  also. It is held that it is for the claimant of parity to substantiate a  clear cut basis of equivalence and a resultant hostile discrimination. It  is held that in the absence of requisite substantiating material the  Court would be wrong to grant parity in pay merely on the  presumption of equality of nature of work. It was held that such  workers would be entitled to prescribed minimum wages. 11)     Now we examine the authorities relied upon by counsel for  various Respondents to see whether this Court has laid down anything  contrary. 12)      In the case of State of U.P. & Ors. vs  Putti Lal, reported in  (2003) 8 Scale 259, a three Judge Bench of this Court, of which one of  us (Variava, J.) was a party directed the Government to pay the  concerned daily rated workers the minimum of the pay scale payable  to a regularly employed worker. However, this was pending a scheme  for regularization. Thus, there was no direction to pay retrospectively.  Further the order proceeds on the basis that everything was equal and  that the principle applied. It was not argued before this court that the  principle had no application. 13)     In the case of State of Punjab vs Devinder Singh & Ors.,  reported in (1988) 9 SCC 595, it was noted that the concerned Ledger  Clerks were found to have been given similar work as regular Ledger  Clerks. This Court without any further discussion or consideration held  that concerned Ledger Clerks would be entitled to the minimum of the  pay scale of Ledger Clerks. It was directed that this be paid for a  period of three years prior to the filing of the Writ Petition. It seems  that attention of this Court was not brought to the earlier authorities,  which lay down when the principle of equal pay for equal work can  apply. Also we are unable to accept the finding that for similar work  the principle of equal pay applies. Equal pay can only be given for  equal work of equal value.  14)     In the case of Sandeep Kumar & Ors. vs State of Uttar  Pradesh & Ors., reported in (1993) Supp (1) SCC 525, regularisation  was refused but equal pay was granted on the admitted position  that  the concerned workmen were doing the same work.      15)     In the case of Bhagwan Dass & Ors. vs State of Haryana &  Ors., reported in (1987) 4 SCC 634, this Court held that if the duties  and functions of the temporary appointees and regular employees are  similar there cannot be discrimination in pay merely on the ground of  difference in modes of selection. It was held that the burden of proving  similarility in the nature of work was on the aggrieved worker. We are  unable to agree with the view that there cannot be discrimination in  pay on the ground of differences in modes of selection. As has been  correctly laid down in Jasmer Singh’s case (supra)  persons  selected  by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to  seniority can be granted a higher pay scale as they have been   evaluated by competent authority and in such cases payment of a  higher pay scale cannot be challenged. Jasmer Singh’s case has been  noted with approval in Tarun K. Roy’s case.  16)     In the case of State of Punjab vs Talwinder Singh & Ors.,  reported in (2003) 11 SCC 776,  this Court granted equal pay following  Devinder Singh’s case (supra). Jasmer Singh’s case was brought to the  notice of the Court but it differentiated the case on the ground that in  Jasmer Singh’s case the Court had concluded that the daily wagers did  not discharge the same duties. Thus, this case also proceeds on the  basis that the work was identical.  17)     Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of  the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer Singh, Tilak Raj,  Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology and Tarun K. Roy lay

10

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11  

down the correct law.  Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay for  equal work" is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being  enforced in a Court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of  equal value. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no  mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable  classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited  and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course,  the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the  object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience  can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order  to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid  stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is  also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the  person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in  certain cases, make a difference.  If the educational qualifications are  different, then also the doctrine may have no application.    Even  though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may  differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the  basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted  to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be  challenged. A classification based on difference in educational  qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature  designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough  to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another  carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is  produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may  be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The  application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires  consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy  required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job  to job.  It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may  be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility.  Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference.  Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be  evaluated and determined by an expert body.  These are not matters  where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming  equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this  regards. In any event the party who claims equal pay for equal work  has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal.   Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court, the Court must  first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof.   If  the High Court, is on basis of material placed before it, convinced that  there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are  fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of the filing  of the respective Writ Petition.   In all these cases, we find that the  High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of  equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant  factors.   18)     As stated above in all these cases the High Court has followed a  Full Bench decision of that Court. The Full Bench has also observed  that the essential ingredient is similarity. This would be correct.  However, at one stage the Full Bench observes that even if some  dispute is raised. That would be wrong law. In each case the Court  must satisfy itself that the burden of proving that the work and  conditions are equal is discharged by the aggrieved employee.  19)     We, therefore, set aside all the impugned Judgments and remit  all these matters back to the High Court.  The High Court shall now  examine each case and see whether the necessary averments are  there.  It shall then consider all relevant facts, as enumerated above,  and decide whether everything is identical and equal.  If the High  Court feels that there is a dispute which would necessitate extensive  evidence it may direct that party to raise an appropriate dispute where  such questions could be dealt with and which, in fact, would be the  appropriate proceedings.    20)     One other fact which must be noted is that Civil Appeals Nos.

11

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11  

6648 of 2002, 6647 of 2002, 6572 of 2002 and 6570 of 2002 do not  deal with casual or daily rated workers. These are cases of persons  employed on contract. To such persons the principles of equal pay for  equal work has no application. The Full Bench Judgment dealt only  with daily rated and casual workers. Where a person is employed  under a contract, it is the contract which will govern the terms and  conditions of service. In the case of State of Haryana vs Surinder  Kumar & Ors., reported in (1997) 3 SCC 633, persons employed on  contract basis claimed equal pay as regular workers on the footing that  their posts were interchangeable. It was held that these persons had  no right to the regular posts until they are duly selected and  appointed. It was held that they were not entitled to the same pay as  regular employees by claiming that they are discharging same duties.  It was held that the very object of selection is to test eligibility and  then to make appointment in accordance with rules. It was held that  the Respondents had not been recruited in accordance with the rules  prescribed for recruitment.  21)     In the case of Union of India & Ors. vs K. V. Baby & Anr.,  reported in (1998) 9 SCC 252, the question was whether Commission  Bearers/Vendors are entitled to the same salary as regular employees.  It was held that their appointment and mode of selection, their  qualifications cannot be compared with regular employees. It was held  that by their very nature of employment they cannot be equated with  regular employees. It was held that recruitment rules and service  conditions do not apply to such persons. It was held that their  responsibilities cannot be equated with those of regular employees.  22)     Thus it is clear that persons employed on contract cannot   claim  equal pay on basis on equal pay for equal work. Faced with this  situation it was submitted that all these persons were in fact claiming  that their respective appointments were regular appointments by the  regular process of appointment but that instead of giving regular  appointments they were appointed on contract with the intention of  not paying them regular salary. It was admitted that the Petitions may  be badly drafted and such a contention not put forth specifically.  The  High Court has disposed of these Petitions also on the footing that the  principle of equal pay for equal work applied. We therefore set aside  the impugned orders in these cases also and remit the matters back to  the High Court for disposal. The High Court shall permit these  Petitioners to amend their Petitions to make necessary averments and  will also permit the Respondents in these cases to file replies to the  amended Petitions. 23)     With the above directions all these Appeals stand disposed off.  All the matters are remitted back to the High Court.  There will be no  order as to costs.