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PETITIONER: STATE OF HARYANA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHANDRA MANI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       30/01/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1623            1996 SCC  (3) 132  JT 1996 (3)   371        1996 SCALE  (2)820

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have  heard the counsel on both sides. We decline to express any  opinion on  merits. The  Division Bench  of the High Court  refused to  condone the  delay of  109  days  in filing the  Letters  Patent  Appeal.  We  have  perused  the reasons given  for the  delay in  filing the  Letters Patent Appeal.      Section 5  of the  Limitation Act  1963 [for short, the ‘Act’) extends prescribed period of limitation, in filing an application or  an appeal  except under  the  provisions  of Order 21  of Civil  Procedure  Code  1908  [for  short,  the ‘Code’] and  gives power to the Court to admit the appeal or application after  the prescribed period. The only condition is that  the applicant/appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application  within such period. In Ramlal,  & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [(1962) 2 SCR 762], it was laid down that in showing sufficient cause to condone the delay, it is not necessary  that the  applicant/appellant has  to explain whole of  the period  between the  date of the judgment till the date  of filing  the appeal.  It is  sufficient that the applicant/appellant would  explain the  delay caused  by the period between  the last  of the dates of limitation and the date on which the appeal/application is actually filed.      What constitute sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra  [AIR  1976  SC  237],  this  Court  held  that discretion given  by Section  5 should  not  be  defined  or crystalized so  as to  convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule  of law. The expression "sufficient cause’ should receive a liberal construction. In Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram [AIR 1917  PC 156]  it was  observed that  true guide  for a court to  exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether

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the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal.  In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari & Ors. [(1969) 1  SCR 1006],  a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want  of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive  a party  of the  protection of  Section 5  is proved, the  application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.      In Concord  of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi & Ors.  [(1979) 3 SCR 694] which is a case  of negligence of the counsel  which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy  the default  in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v.  A. Narayanan  [(1970) 2 SCR 90], this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself  is always  sufficient cause  for  condonation  of delay. It  is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a devise tn cover an ulterior purpose. in that case  it was  held that  the mistake  committed by  the counsel was  bona fide  and it  was not  tainted by any mala fide motive.      In State  of Kerala  v. E.K.  Kuriyipe &  Ors.  [(1981) Supp. SCC  72], it  was held  that whether  or not  there is sufficient cause  for condonation  of delay is a question of fact dependant  upon the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the particular case.  In Smt. Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCR 366],  it was  held that  the appellant  had  sufficient cause for  not  filing  the  appeal  within  the  period  of limitation. This Court under Art.136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or  the Tribunal  and remit  the matter for hearing on merits. It  was accordingly  allowed, delay was condoned and case was remitted for decision on merits.      In O.P.  Kathpaliaa v.  Lakhmir  Singh  (dead)  &  Ors. [(1984) 4  SCC 66], a Bench of three Judges had held that if the  refusal   to  condone   the  delay   results  in  grave miscarriage of  justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay  was accordingly  condoned. In  Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantrag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. [(1987) 2 SCC 107],  a Bench  of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5  was enacted  in order  to enable  the court to do substantial justice  to the  parties by disposing of matters on merits.  The expression  "sufficient cause  is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which  subserves the  ends of  the justice-that being the life-purpose  for the  existence of  the institution  of courts. It  is common  knowledge that  this Court  has  been making a  justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this  Court. But  the message  does not  appear  to  have percolated down  to all  the other  courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day’s delay must be  explained" does  not mean  that a pedantic approach should be  made. The  doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense  pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations  are  pitted  against  each  other, cause of  substantial justice  deserves to  be preferred for the  other  side  cannot  claim  to  have  vested  right  in injustice being  done because  of  a  non-deliberate  delay. There  is   no  presumption   that   delay   is   occasioned deliberately, or  on account  of culpable  negligence, or on account of  mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting  to delay.  In fact  he runs  a  serious  risk. Judiciary is  not respected  on  account  of  its  power  to legalize injustice  on technical  grounds but  because it is capable of  removing injustice  and is  expected to  do  so. Making a  justice-oriented approach  from this  perspective,

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there was  sufficient cause  for condoning  the delay in the institution of  the appeal.  The fact  that it was the State which was  seeking condonation  and not  a private party was altogether irrelevant.  The doctrine  of equality before law demands  that  all  litigants,  including  the  State  as  a litigant, are  accorded the  same treatment  and the  law is administered in  an even-handed  manner. There is no warrant for according  a step-motherly  treatment when  the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.      Experience shows  that  on  account  of  an  impersonal machinery (  no one  in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt  by the  judgment sought  to be subjected to appeal) and the  inherited bureaucratic  methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing,  and  passing-on-the-buck  ethos, delay on  its part  is less  difficult to  understand though more  difficult   to  approve.  The  State  which  represent collective cause  of  the  community,  does  not  deserve  a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with  the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course  of  the  interpretation  of  the  expression  of sufficient cause.  Merit is  preferred to scuttle a decision on merits  in turning  down the  case on  technicalities  of delay  in  presenting  the  appeal.  Delay  was  accordingly condoned, the  order  was  set  aside  and  the  matter  was remitted to  the High  Court for  disposal on  merits  after affording opportunity  of hearing  to the  parties. In  Smt. Prabha v.  Ram Parkash  Kalra [(1987)  Supp. SCC  338], this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice- oriented  approach   in  rejecting   the   application   for condonation of  delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned  and   the  matter  was  remitted  for  expeditious disposal in accordance with law.      In G.  Ramegowda, Major & Ors, v. Spl, Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore  [(1988) 2  SCC 142], it was held that no general principle  saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could  be laid.  The expression  "sufficient  cause" must  receive  a  liberal  construction  so  as  to  advance substantial justice  and generally  delays in preferring the appeals are  required to  be condoned  in  the  interest  of justice where no gross  negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of  bona is  imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.  In litigations  to which  Government is  a party, there is  yet  another  aspect  which,  perhaps,  cannot  be ignored. If  appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no  person is  individually affected; but what, in the ultimate  analysis,  suffers  is  public  interest.  The decisions of  Government are  collective  and  institutional decisions and  do not share the characteristics of decisions of private  individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the  same   for  a   private  citizen  as  for  Governmental authorities. Government,  like any  other litigant must take responsibility for  the acts  or omissions  of its officers. But a  somewhat different  complexion  is  imparted  to  the matter where  Government  makes  out  a  case  where  public interest was  shown to  have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore,  held   that  in   assessing   what   constitutes sufficient cause  for  purposes  of  Section  5,  it  might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that  go  into  the  judicial  verdict,  these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of  the  Government.  Government  decisions  are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of  procedural red  tape  in  the  process  of  their

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making. A  certain amount  of latitude  is,  therefore,  not impermissible. It  is  rightly  said  that  those  who  bear responsibility of  Government must have a little play at the joints’.   Due   recognition   of   these   limitations   on Governmental functioning  -  of  course,  within  reasonable limits -  is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic.  It  would,  perhaps,  be  unfair  and unrealistic to  put Government  and private  parties on  the same footing  in all  respects in  such matters. Implicit in the very  nature of  Governmental functioning  is procedural delay incidental  to the  decision making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned.      In Scheduled  Caste Coop.  Land  Owning  Society  Ltd., Bhatinda v.  Union of  India &  Ors. [(1991)  1 SCC  174], a Bench of three Judges of this Court held that the bona fides of the  parties are  to be tested on merits and the delay of 1146 to  1079 days  was not  condoned on the ground that the parties approached  the court  after decision  on merits was allowed in other cases by this Court. Therefore, it was held that it  did not  furnish a  ground for condonation of delay under Section  5. In  Binod Bihari  Singh v.  Union of India [(1993) 1  SCC 572], it was held that it is not at all a fit case where  in the  anxiety to  render justice to a party so that a  just cause  is not defeated, a pragmatic view should be taken  by the  court in  considering sufficing  cause for condonation of  the delay  under Section 5. It was held that when the  party has come with a false plea to get rid of the bar of  limitation, the  court  should  not  encourage  such person by  condoning the  delay and  result in  the  bar  of limitation  pleaded  by  the  opposite  party.  This  Court, therefore, refused  to condone  the delay  in favour  of the party who came forward with false plea. In M/s. Shakambari & Co. v.  Union of  India [(1993) Supp. 1 SCS 487], a Bench of three Judges held that delay caused in filing the appeal due to fluctuation  in laying  down the  law was  held to  be  a sufficient cause  and delay  of 14 days was condoned. In Ram Krishan &  Anr. v.  U.P. State  Roadways Transport  Corpn. & Anr. [(1994)  Supp. 2  SCC 507],  this Court  had held  that although the  story put  forward by  the applicant  for  not filing the  application for  compensation  under  the  Motor Vehicles Act  within the  period of limitation was not found convincing but  keeping in  vies the facts and circumstances and cause  of justice, the delay was condoned and the appeal was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal to dispose it on merits. In Warlu v. Gangotribai & Anr. [(1995) Supp. 1  SCC 37]  a three-Judge  Bench condoned  delay of 11 years in filing the special leave petition.      It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party  or the  State -  are barred by limitation and this Court  generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay  finding somewhat  sufficient cause  to decide  the appeal on  merits.  It  is  equally  common  knowledge  that litigants  including   the  State   are  accorded  the  same treatment and  the law  is administered  in  an  even-handed manner.  When   the  State  is  an  applicant,  praying  for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of  impersonal  machinery  and  the  inherited  bureaucratic methodology imbued  with the  note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less  difficult  to  understand  though  more  difficult  to approve, but  the State  represents collective  cause of the community. It  is axiomatic  that  decisions  are  taken  by officers/agencies proverbially  at slow  pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping

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it on  table for considerable time causing delay intentional or  otherwise   -  is   a  routine.  Considerable  delay  of procedural red  tape in the process of their making decision is a  common feature.  Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not  impermissible. If  the appeals  brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but  what  in  the  ultimate  analysis  suffers,  is  public interest.  The   expression   "sufficient   cause"   should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather  than the  technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions  would be  cognizant to and requires adoption of  pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court  should decide  the matters  on merits  unless the case is  hopelessly without  merit. No separate standards to determine the  cause laid  by the  State  vis-a-vis  private litigant  could   be  laid  to  prove  strict  standards  of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal  cells to  examine the  cases  whether  any legal principles  are involved for  decision by the cours or whether cases  require adjustment  and should  authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In  the event  of decision to file appeal needed prompt action  should be  pursued by the officer responsible to  file  the  appeal  and  he  should  be  made  personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on  the same  footing as  an individual.  The individual would always  be quick  in taking  the decision  whether  he would pursue  the remedy  by way of an appeal or application since he  is a  person legally  injured while  State  is  an impersonal  machinery   working  through   its  officers  or servants. Considered  from this perspective, it must be held that the  delay of  109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.      On the  facts and  circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion  that it  is a fit case for condoning the delay. The  delay  is  accordingly  condoned.  The  High  Court  is requested to  dispose of  the  appeal  as  expeditiously  as possible.      The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.