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PETITIONER: STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AMAR NATH BANSAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       15/01/1997

BENCH: S.C. AGRAWAL, G.T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S. C. AGRAWAL, J.:      This appeal,  by special  leave, arises  out of  a suit filed by  the respondent-Amar  Nath Bansal for a declaration that his  retirement on  attaining the  age of  58 years was illegal and  that he is entitled to continue in service till he attains the age of 62 years.      The respondent was appointed as a civilian clerk in the Army in the erstwhile State of Jind on July 12, 1943. In the Jind State  the age  of  superannuation,  as  prescribed  by Regulation 27  of the  Jind State Civil Service Regulations, 1945, was  62 years.  On May 5, 1948 the Ruler of Jind State and the  Rulers of the States of Patiala, Kapurthala, Nabha, Fariodkot, Malerkotla,  Nalagarh and  Kalsia entered  into a Covenant whereby  they agreed  to unite  and integrate their territories in  one State  to be  known as  Patiala and East Punjab States  Union (for short "PEPSU"). As a result of the integration  of  the  services  of  the  union  States,  the respondent was  posted as  Auditor in the Treasury in PEPSU. On the coming into force of the Constitution, PEPSU became a Part B  State and continued as such till the re-organisation of the  States under  the States  Re-organisation Act, 1956. With effect from November 1, 1956, the Part B State of PEPSU Became a  part of  the reorganised  State of  Punjab and the respondent was  absorbed in  the service  of  the  State  of Punjab. As  a result  of the re-organization of the State of Punjab and  the formation  of the  State of  Haryana by  the Punjab Re-organisation Act 1966 with effect from November 1, 1966, the  respondent was allocated to the State of Haryana. While he  was employed  as Assistant Treasury Officer in the State of  Haryana, he  was retired from service on attaining the age  of 58 years with effect from September 30, 1984. On September 25,  1987 he  filed a  suit (Civil Suit No. 392 of 1987) in  the court  of Sub-Judge  IInd Class, Rohtak, for a declaration that  his retirement  at the age of 58 years was illegal and  against the  service condition  and that he was entitled to  continue in  service upto  the age of 62 years. The said  suit was  dismissed by the trial court on the view that the  Jind State  Service Rules  were not applicable and the conditions  of service  of respondent  were governed  by

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Rule 3.26  of the  Punjab Civil  Service Rules Vol. I Part I which prescribes  58 years as the age of superannuation. The said judgment  of the  trial court was, however, reversed in appeal by the Additional District Judge IV, Rohtak, who held that the  age of  superannuation constitutes  a condition of service and by virtue of clause XVI of the Covenant the said condition continued  in operation  in the State of PEPSU and thereafter in  the State of Punjab in view of the States Re- organisation Act,  1956 and  in the State of Haryana in view of the  Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 and it has not been shown that  the approval  of the Central Government had been taken for  applying the  provisions of  Rule 3.26  of Vol. I Part I  of the Punjab Civil Service Rules to the respondent, Second appeal  filed by the appellant-State against the said judgment and  decree of  the Additional  District judge  was dismissed by  the High  Court by the impugned judgment dated July 6, 1993. Hence this appeal.      The question  that falls  for consideration  is whether the provisions  of the  Jind State Service Regulations, 1945 which prescribed  62 years  as the age for superannuation of persons employed in the State service continued in operation after the  formation of  PEPSU and  thereafter the  State of Punjab and  the State  of Haryana. For a proper appreciation of the submissions of the learned counsel it is necessary to take note of the relevant provisions of the Covenant.      "Article X(2).  Until a Legislature      elected  in   accordance  with  the      terms of the Constitution framed by      it   comes    into    being,    the      Constitution  framed  by  it  comes      into   being,    the    Constituent      Assembly  as   constituted  in  the      manner  indicated  in  Schedule  II      shall  function   as  the   interim      Legislature of the Union."      "Article XVI(1).  The Union  hereby      guarantees either  the  continuance      in service of the permanent members      of the  public services  of each of      he Covenanting  State on  condition      which will be not less advantageous      than  those   on  which  they  were      serving on the 1st of February 1948      or  the   payment   of   reasonable      compensation   or   retirement   on      proportionate pension.      In accordance  with Article  VI of the Covenant the Raj Pramukh took over the administration of Jind State on August 20, 1948  and on  the same  date the Raj Pramukh promulgated the Patiala  and East  Punjab  States  Union  Administration Ordinance No. 1. of S. 2005. Section 3 of the said Ordinance contained the following provision :-      "As soon  as the  administration of      any  covenanting   State  has  been      taken over  by the  Raj Pramukh  as      aforesaid  all   Laws,  Ordinances,      Acts,      Rules,      Regulations,      Notifications,  Hidayate  Firman-i-      Shahi,  having   force  of  law  in      Patiala  State   on  the   date  of      commencement  of   this   Ordinance      shall apply mutatis mutandis to the      territories of  the said  State and      with effect from that date all laws      in force  in such Covenanting State

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    immediately before  that date shall      be repealed:      Provided that  proceedings  of  any      nature whatsoever  pending on  such      date in  the courts  or offices  of      any such  Covenanting State  shall,      notwithstanding anything  contained      in  this  Ordinance  or  any  other      Ordinance   be   disposed   of   in      accordance with  the laws governing      such proceedings  in force  for the      time being  in any such Covenanting      State."      On February  15, 1949  Ordinance No.  1 of  S, 2005 was repealed and  replaced by  Ordinance No.  XVI  of  S.  2005. Section 3(1)  of the said Ordinance was in the same terms as Section 3  of the  Ordinance No.  1 of  S. 2005. On April 9, 1949 the  Rulers of  the States  constituting PEPSU  entered into a  Supplementary Covenant  whereby  Article  X  of  the original Covenant was substituted as under :-      "Until  the   commencement  of  the      Constitution    of    India,    the      legislative authority  of the Union      shall vest  in the Raj Pramukh, who      may promulgate  Ordinances for  the      peace and  good Government  of  the      Union or  any part thereof, and any      Ordinance so  made shall  have  the      like force  of law as an Act passed      by the Legislature of the Union."      On November  24, 1949 the Raj Pramukh of PEPSU issued a proclamation accepting  the Indian  Constitution as  that of the PEPSU  and, as  a result,  PEPSU became  a Part  B State under the Indian Constitution on January 26, 1950. By virtue of Article  372 of  the Constitution  the laws  in force  in PEPSU   immediately   before   the   commencement   of   the Constitution were continued in force until altered, repealed or amended  by  competent  legislature  or  other  competent authority.      By Notification  Dated January  18, 1951  issued by the finance Department of Government of PEPSU provision was made for  payment  of  compensation  to  permanent  employees  of covenanting States  for premature  retirement. In  the  said Notification it  was stated  that the  PEPSU Government  had adopted  the  age  limit  of  55  years  for  retirement  of government servants  on superannuation  for pension and that the service rules which were in force in erstwhile Nabha and Jind States  prescribe 60  and 62  years respectively as the age  for   compulsory  retirement  from  service.  The  said Notification made  provision for  payment of compensation by way of  increase in monthly pension. Government servants who had retired  between 1st  September, 1948  and 31st  August, 1949 were given an increase of 10% of monthly pension; those who retired  between 1st September 1949 and 31st August 1950 were given  an increase  of 7%  of monthly pension and those who retired  between 1st September 1950 and 31st August 1950 were given  an increase  of 4%  of the  monthly pension.  NO compensation  was   provided  for  government  servants  who retired on  or after  1st September  1950 on the ground that they would  be getting the full benefit of the increased pay for pension.  Thereafter the  PEPSU  Government  issued  the PEPSU Services Regulations, 1952. In Chapter IX, Article 9.1 of  the  said  Regulations  it  was  prescribed  that  every Government servant  shall on  attaining the  age of 55 years retire on such pension as may be admissible to him under the

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rules for  the time  being in  force. As a result of the re- organisation of  the States under the States Re-organisation Act. 1956 the Part 8 State of PEPSU became a part of the re- organised State  of Punjab.  Provisions relating to services were made  in Section 115 of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956. By  virtue of  sub-section (1)  of Section  115  every person who  immediately before the appointed day was serving in connection  with the  affairs of  the existing  State  of PEPSU was  to be  deemed to have been allotted to service in connection with  the affairs of successor State, namely, the State of  Punjab as  from that  day. In  the proviso to sub- section (7)  of Section  115  it  was  prescribed  that  the conditions of  service  applicable  immediately  before  the appointed day  in the case of any person referred to in sub- section (1)  shall not  be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. In the State of  Punjab there were Punjab Civil Service Rules which prescribed 58  years  as  the  age  of  retirement  for  all employees except  Class IV government employees (Rule 3.26). The  State  of  Haryana  was  formed  as  a  result  of  re- organisation of  the State  of Punjab  under the  Punjab Re- organisation Act,  1966. The  proviso to  sub-section (6) of Section 82  of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, 1966 contains a provision similar to that contained in the proviso to sub- section (7)  of Section  115 of  the States  Re-organisation Act, 1956.      On behalf  of the  appellants it  has been  urged  that after the  formation of  PEPSU in  1948  the  conditions  of service  of  the  respondent  were  governed  by  the  rules applicable in  the State of Patiala and after the framing of the Pepsu  Service Rules  in  1952,  the  Jind  State  Civil Service Regulations,  1945, ceased  to be applicable and the conditions of service of the respondent were governed by the Pepsu Service  Rules of 1952 till the merger of Part B State of PEPSU  into the  State of Punjab in 1956 under the States Re-organisation Act  when the  Punjab Service  Rules  became applicable. It  was submitted  that under  the Patiala State Rules the  age of retirement was 55 years and that under the PEPSU Civil  Service Rules also the age of retirement was 55 years and  that as  a result  of the  re-organisation of the States  under  the  States  Re-organisation  Act,  1956  the respondent was  governed by  the Punjab  Civil Service Rules wherein the age of retirement was 58 years and therefore the respondent has been rightly retired on his attaining the age of 58  years and he cannot claim to continue in service till he had  attained the  age of  62 years  on the  basis of the provisions  contained   in  the  Jind  State  Civil  Service Regulations 1945.      Shri Pradeep  Gupta, the  learned counsel appearing for the respondent,  has urged  that the respondent was entitled to continue  in service till he attained the age of 62 years in view  of the provisions contained in the Jind State Civil Service Regulations,  1945 and  reliance has  been placed on clause XVI  of the  Covenant  which  guaranteed  either  the continuance in  service of  the  permanent  members  of  the public  services  of  each  of  the  Covenanting  States  on conditions which will be not less advantageous than those on which they  were serving  on  1st  February,  1948,  or  the payment  of   reasonable  compensation   or  retirement   on proportionate pension.  Shri Gupta  has submitted  that  the Covenant was  in the  nature of  constitution for  the newly constituted State  of PEPSU  and the  provision contained in Article XVI  of the Covenant was binding on PEPSU as well as the successor State, namely, the Part B State of PEPSU under the Indian  Constitution as  well as  the State of Punjab as

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re-organised under  the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 and the State  of  Haryana  established  under  the  Punjab  Re- organisation Act,  1966. Shri  Gupta has  placed reliance on the decision  of this court in Bholanath J. Thaker vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1954 SC 680.      The Covenant  entered into  by the Rulers of the States which had  joined together  to form  the PEPSU  was a treaty entered into  by the Rulers of independent States. Under the Covenant the  rulers gave  up their  sovereignty over  their respective territories and vested it in the ruler of the new State of  PEPSU. As  a result  of  the  Covenant  there  was establishment  of  a  new  sovereign  over  the  territories comprising the  States of the Rulers who had signed the said covenant. The  Covenant is, therefore, an Act of State. With regard to  an act  of State  the law  is well settled by the decisions of  this Court.  The residents  of the territories which are  acquired do  not carry with them the rights which they possessed  as subjects of the ex-sovereign. As subjects of the  new sovereign  they possess  only such rights as are granted or  recognised by him. The process of acquisition of new territories  is one  continuous act of State terminating on the  assumption of  sovereign powers de jure over them by the new  sovereign and  it is  only thereafter  that  rights accrue to  the residents of those territories as subjects of that sovereign.  No act  done or declaration made by the new sovereign prior  to his  assumption of sovereign powers over acquired  territories  can  quoad  the  residents  of  those territories by  regarded as  having the  character of  a law conferring on  them the  rights such as could be agitated in courts.  The  clauses  in  a  treaty  entered  into  by  the independent rulers  providing for  the  recognition  of  the rights of the subjects of the ex-sovereign are in capable of enforcement in  the courts of the new sovereign. [See : M/s. Dalmia Dadri  Cement Co. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (1959) SCR  729, at  p. 746;  Pramod Chandra Deb v. State of Orissa, 1962  Supp. (1)  SCR 405  at pp.  434-436; State  of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali, 1964 (6) SCR 461; Pema Chibar alias Premabhai Chhibabhai  Tangal v.  Union of India & Ors., 1966 (1) SCR  357; and  Vinodkumar Shantilal Gosalia v. Gangadhar Narsingdas Agarwal & Ors., 1982 (1) SCR 392].      In M/s.  Dalmia Dadri  Cement Co,  Ltd. (supra)  it was contended that  the Covenant  that the Covenant entered into by the  rulers of the States to form the PEPSU was more than an act  of State and was in the nature of a constitution for the new  State in the sense that it is a law under which all the authorities  of the  new State including the Raj Pramukh had to  act. Reliance  was also placed on Article XVI of the Convenant to  show that  the rights  of the  subjects of the quondam states  were intended to be protected. Rejecting the said contention  it was  held that  the Covenant is in whole and in  parts an act of State. As regards Article XVI of the Covenant, it was a stated that     "a  clause  in  a  treaty between high  contracting parties  does not confer any right on the  subjects which  could be  made the subject-matter of action in  the courts,  and that  the Patiala  Union is  not bound by  it, because  it was  not a party to the Covenant". [p. 745]. After referring to Ordinance No. 1 of S. 2005, the Court observed :-      "That undoubtedly  is a law enacted      by the  sovereign conferring rights      on his  subjects and enforceable in      a court  of law,  but at  the  same      time the  enactment of  such a  law      serves   to   emphasis   that   the      Articles have not in themselves the

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    force of  law and were not intended      to create or recognise rights."      [p. 745]      Reference may  be made at this stage to the decision in Bholanath J.  Thaker (supra)  on  which  reliance  has  been placed by  Shri  Gupta.  In  that  case  the  appellant  was employed in  the service of Wadhawan State. The ruler of the Wadhawan State  along with  the rulers  of  other  Kathiawar States had  entered into a Covenant to form the United State of Kathiawar  (later known  as Saurashtra)  on  January  24, 1948. The  raj Pramukh  took oath  of his office on February 15, 1948  and on  March 1, 1948 he promulgated an Ordinance, being Ordinance No. 1 of 1948, continuing in force all laws, ordinances, acts,  rules, regulations  etc. having the force of law  in the  covenanting State  until repealed or amended under the  provisions of  the ordinance.  The ruler  of  the Wadhawan State  made over the administration of the State to the Saurashtra  Government on March 16, 1948 and on the same date a proclamation was insured by the Saurashtra Government declaring that  whatever rights,  jurisdiction and authority were with the Ruler with respect to the said State were then vested in  the Saurashtra  Government  and  the  duties  and obligations with  regard to  the Ruler’s own State passed to the Saurashtra  Government  and  the  Saurashtra  Government would fulfill  the same.  Article XVI(1)  of the Covenant of the United  States of Kathiawar contained provisions similar to those  contained in Article XVI(1) of the Covenant of the Rulers forming  the States of PEPSU. By Order dated June 29, 1948, the appellant was retired by the Saurashtra Government on the  ground that he had crossed the age of superannuation which was  taken as  55 years. The appellant claimed that he was entitled  to continue  in service till the completion of 60 years  of age on the basis of the provisions contained in Section 5  of the  Dhara (Act)  No. 29  of S. 2004 which had been promulgated  by the  Ruler of  the Wadhawan State which came into force with effect from January 1, 1948 whereby the age of superannuation of state civil servants had been fixed at 60.  He filed  a civil suit claiming compensation for his premature compulsory  retirement. The  said suit was decreed by the  trial court  but on appeal the suit was dismissed by the High  Court. Before this Court it was urged on behalf of the State  that the  Covenant by  the  rulers  of  Kathiawar States was an act of State and the municipal courts were not competent to  entertain  any  dispute  arising  out  of  the Covenant. Reliance  was also  placed on  Article 363  of the Constitution  which  bars  interference  by  courts  in  any dispute arising  out of  certain treaties and Covenants. The said contention  was rejected by this Court on the view that when the Wadhawan State merged with the Saurashtra State and again when  it acceded  to the  Dominion of  India  all  the existing laws  continued until  repealed and the appellant’s rights under  Dhara No.  29 of  S. 2004  were still good and could have  been enforced  in  the  municipal  courts  until either repealed  or repudiated  as an  act of  State. It was observed that  there was  in fact  no such  legislation  and therefore his rights remained and the municipal courts would be entitled  to examine  the contract and apply Dhara No. 29 of S.  2004 and  enforce whatever  rights the  appellant had under that  Dhara and  his contract  of service. It was held that the  Covenant could be looked at to see whether the new sovereign had  waived his right to ignore rights given under the laws  of the  former sovereign and that the terms of the covenant showed  that the existing laws were to continue and whatever rights  of the  appellant were  under the  existing laws were  available for  enforcement to  the appellant  and

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there was  no bar  to municipal courts entertaining the suit to enforce  such rights.  As regards  that bar under Article 363 of  the Constitution  it was  observed that there was no dispute arising  out of  the Covenant and what the appellant was doing  was  merely  to  enforce  his  rights  under  the existing laws  which continued  in force  and till they were repealed  by   appropriate  legislation.   The  decision  in Bholanath J. Thaker (supra) thus proceeded on the basis that the law  of the  Wadhawan State  (Dhara No.  29 of  S. 2004) prescribing 60  as  the  age  of  superannuation,  had  been continued in  force after  the establishment of the State of Saurashtra by  Ordinance NO. 1 of 1948 and the appellant was entitled to  enforce his rights under the said law which was in force  at the  relevant time.  Moreover, in that case the Saurashtra Government  had issued a proclamation on the same date on  which the  administration of the Wadhawan State was taken over  by the  Saurashtra Government,  whereby  it  was declared by  the Saurashtra  Government that  the duties and obligations with  regard to the Ruler’s own State had passed to  the   Saurashtra  Government  and  that  the  Saurashtra Government would  fulfill the same. Thus it was a case where apart from  continuing the laws of the old sovereign the new sovererign had  made an  express declaration recognising the duties and obligations of the old sovereign.      In the  instant case,  there was no such declaration by the PEPSU  Government recognising the duties and obligations of the  rulers of  Jind State  under the  laws of  the  Jind State. Nor  was there  a law  similar to  Ordinance No. 1 of 1948 of Saurashtra continuing the laws of the Jind State. On the other  hand, there  was  Ordinance  No.  1  of  S.  2005 followed by the Ordinance No. 16 of S. 2005 whereby the laws of the  covenanting States  were repealed  and the  laws  of Patiala State  were made  applicable in the entire territory of PEPSU.  Can  it  be  said  that  in  spite  of  the  said ordinances  the  Jind  Service  Regulations  of  1945  which prescribed 62  years as  the age of superannuation was a law in force  in PEPSU  on  the  date  of  commencement  of  the Constitution  and   by  virtue   of  Article   372  of   the Constitution the  said Regulations  continued in  the Part B State  of   PEPSU  after   the  coming   into  fore  of  the Constitution and  in the  reorganised State  of Punjab under the States  Re-organisation Act,  1956 and  in the  State of Haryana under  the Punjab  Re-organisation Act, 1966. In our opinion, this  question must be answered in the negative. As noticed earlier  the Raj  Pramukh of  PEPSU  look  over  the administration of  Jind State  on August 20, 1948 and on the same date  he promulgated  Ordinance No. 1 of S. 2005 and by section 3  of the said ordinance all laws, ordinances, acts, rules, regulations,  notifications,  Hidayate,  Shahi-farman having force  of  law  in  Patiala  State  on  the  date  of commencement of  the said  Ordinance  were  made  applicable mutatis mutandis  to the  territories of all the covenanting States (including Jind State) and with effect from that date all laws  of such covenanting States immediately before that date would  stand repealed.  Ordinance No.  1 of S. 2005 was followed by  Ordinance No.  16 of  S. 2005 which contained a similar provision.  As a  result of  the said ordinances the Jind State  Civil Service Regulations of 1945 stood repealed on August 20, 1948 and the relevant law as applicable in the State of  Patiala became  applicable in  the entire  area of PEPSU,  including   the  Jind   State,  and  the  terms  and conditions of  the respondent  were, therefore,  governed by the provisions  contained in  the law that was applicable in Patiala State  and he could not claim any right on the basis of the Jind State Civil Service Regulations 1945.

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    Shri Pradeep Gupta has urged that Ordinance No. 1 of S. 2005 which  was followed  by Ordinance No.16 of S. 2005 were both temporary  laws having  an operation  of six  months in view of  Article X(2)  of the  Covenant and  that after  the expiry of  Ordinance No.  16 of  S. 2005  in August 1949 the repeal of  the Jind  State  Service  Regulations  under  the Ordinances Nos.  1 and  16 of S. 2005 became ineffective and the Jind  State Service  Regulations stood  revived and were law in  force on  the date  of  coming  into  force  of  the Constitution of  India and  by virtue  of Article 372 of the Constitution  the   said  regulations   contained  in  force thereafter.  In   this  connection,   Shri  Gupta  has  also submitted that  the amendment  that was made in Article X of the Covenant by the Supplementary Covenant was invalid since the rulers  of the  covenanting States, after having entered into the  Covenant  on  May  5,  1948  and  having  divested themselves of  all the  sovereignty, were  not competent  to enter into  the Supplementary  Covenant and,  therefore, the Ordinances Nos.  1 and  16 of  S. 2005  could only remain in force for  a period  of six  months. In  support of the said submission Shri Gupta has placed reliance on the decision of this Court  in Lachhman  Das on behalf of firm Tilak Ram Ram Bux vs.  State of Punjab and Ors., 1963 (2) SCR 353, wherein it has  been laid  down that the Supplementary Covenant that was entered  into by  the rulers of the States forming PEPSU cannot be  held to be effective for modifying the provisions in  the  original  Covenant.  Shri  Gupta  has  also  placed reliance on  the decision  of the  Judicial Committee of the Privy Council  in Gooderham  and  Worts  Ltd.  vs.  Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,  AIR 1949 PC 90, in support of his submission that  a law  repealed by  a temporary legislation automatically resumes  its full  force after  the  temporary legislation has expired by efflux of the prescribed time.      In view  of the  decision of this Court in Lachhman Das (supra) it must be held that Ordinance No. 16 of S. 2005 had ceased to  operate on  August 15, 1949, on the expiry of the period of  six months  from the  date of its promulgation on February 15, 1949. The question which requires consideration is whether  on the  expiry of  the said  ordinance the  Jind State  Civil  Service  Regulations,  1945,  which  had  been repealed by  the said  ordinance, stood  revived. A  similar question came  up for  consideration before  this  Court  in State of  Orissa vs.  Bhupendra Kumar Bose, 1962 Supp, 2 SCR 380. In  that case an ordinance had been promulgated whereby the elections to the Cuttack Municipality which had been set aside by  the Orissa  High Court  and  the  electoral  rolls prepared in respect of the other Municipalities in the State of Orissa,  which would  have otherwise  been irregular  and invalid in  accordance with  the judgment of the Orissa High Court,   were    validated.   The   Bill   which   contained substantially similar  provisions as  those of the ordinance was introduced  in the  Orissa Legislative  Assembly but was defeated by  majority of votes and as a result the Ordinance lapsed after the expiration of the prescribed period. It was contended that  the ordinance  was a temporary statute which was bound  to lapse  after the  expiration of the prescribed period and  that as  soon as it lapsed the invalidity in the Cuttack Municipal  elections which  had  been  cured  by  it revived. Rejecting  the said contention, this Court has laid down :-      "In our opinion, what the effect of      expiration of a temporary Act would      be must depended upon the nature of      the right  or obligation  resulting      from   the    provisions   of   the

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    temporary  Act   and   upon   their      character whether  the said right a      liability are enduring or not."      [p. 398]      "Therefore,  in   considering   the      effect  of   the  expiration  of  a      temporary  statute   it  would   be      unsafe to  lay down  any inflexible      rule. If  the right  created by the      statute is of an enduring character      and has  vested in the person, that      right cannot  be taken away because      the statute by which it was created      has expired.  If a penalty had been      incurred under  the statute and had      been imposed  upon  a  person,  the      imposition  of  the  penalty  would      survive  the   expiration  of   the      statute. That  appears  to  be  the      true legal position in the matter."      [p. 400]      The following  statement of  law in Craies on Statutes, 7th Edn, at p. 419, has been approved :-      "If an act which repeals an earlier      Act is  itself only a temporary Act      the earlier  Act is  revived  after      the temporary  Act  is  spent;  and      inasmuch   as   ex-hypothesis   the      temporary Act  expires and  is  not      repealed, the rules of construction      laid down by Ss. 11(1) and 38(2) of      the Interprotection  Act, 1889,  do      not apply.  But there  will  be  no      reviver  if   it  was  clearly  the      intention  of  the  legislature  to      repeal the earlier Act absolutely."      After   referring   to   the   observations   of   Lord Ellenborough C.J.,  in Warren vs. Windle, (1803) 3 East 205: 102 E.R.(K.B)  578, this  Court has  observed that  the said decision shows  that "in some cases the repeal effected by a temporary Act would be permanent and would endure even after the expiration  of the  temporary Act".  The  ordinance  was construed by  this Court  as providing that the order of the court declaring  the election tot he Cuttack Municipality to be invalid  shall be deemed to be and always to have been of no legal  effect whatever  and that  the said elections were valid and  that effect  of the said Ordinance would not come to an end on the expiry of the Ordinance.      In Gooderham and Worts Ltd. (supra) Section 9(b) of the Canada Radio  Broadcasting Act,  1932 had  been repealed and substituted by  a temporary  Act in  1933 which  was  to  be operative till  April 30,  1934. The  period of operation of the  temporary  Act  was  extended  from  time  to  time  by successive temporary Acts till March 31, 1936. The last such temporary Act  contained an  express provision to the effect that on  and after  April 1,  1936 the principal Act of 1932 shall be  read as  if the  temporary  acts  had  never  been enacted. In  these circumstances the Privy Council held that the repeal  effected by the temporary legislation was only a temporary repeal  and when  the temporary repeal expired the original legislation automatically resumed its full force.      If the provisions of Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1 of S. 2005 and  Section 3(1)  of Ordinance  No. 16  of S. 2005 are construed in  the light  of the principles laid down by this Court in  Bhupendra Kumar Bose (supra), it must be held that

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the object  underlying said  provisions was  to exclude  the applicability of the laws of other covenanting States in the territory of PEPSU by repealing them absolutely and to apply the laws applicable in Patiala State in the entire territory of PEPSU.  Since the repeal of the laws of other Covenanting States by  Ordinances Nos.  1 and 16 of S. 2005 was intended to be  for all  time, the  expiration of the said Ordinances would not  mean that  the  effect  of  the  said  Ordinances regarding on-applicability of the laws of other convenanting States in  the territory  of  PEPSU  was  nullified  on  the expiration of  Ordinance No.  16 of  S. 2005. In view of the express terms  used in  the said  Ordinances it must be held that  Jind   State  Civil  Service  Regulations  1945  stood repealed absolutely and ceased to have any application after the Raj  Pramukh of  PEPSU took  over the  administration of Jind State on August 20, 1948.      There  is  one  more  difficulty  in  the  way  of  the respondent. The  provisions of  the Jind State Civil Service Regulations 1945  were not continued after the establishment of PEPSU on August 20, 1948. The repeal of the provisions of the laws  of covenanting States of PEPSU by section 3 of the ordinance No.  1 of  S. 2005 does not mean that but for such repeal the  said  laws  without  anything  more  would  have continued in  force in  the  covenanting  States.  In  tsthe absence of  any law,  similar to that contained in Ordinance No. 1 of 1948 promulgated by the Raj Pramukh in Bholanath J. Thaker (supra),  continuing the  laws of  Jind State  in the territory of  that State  it cannot  be said  that the  Jind State Civil  Service Regulations,  1945 continued  in  force after the administration of Jind State was taken over by the Raj Pramukh  of PEPSU  on August  20, 1948.  The  expiry  of Ordinance No.  16 of  S. 2005 could, therefore, not have the effect of  reviving Jind  State Civil Service Regulations of 1945 after the expiry of the said Ordinance.      Moreover, there is nothing to show that the Raj Pramukh of PEPSU  had ever  given  his  recognition  to  the  rights conferred on  the employees of the Jind State under the Jind State Civil  Service Regulations of 1945 after the formation of PEPSU.  On the other hand, we find that by Article 9.1 of Chapter IX  of the PEPSU Service Regulations, 1952, 55 years was prescribed  as the age for compulsory retirement for the employees of the State of PEPSU. The said provision in PEPSU Service Regulations, 1952 was law which modified the earlier laws regarding age of superannuation applicable in the State of PEPSU  including the Jind State Civil Service Regulations of 1945,  even if  it be  assumed that  the said Regulations were in  force at  that time by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution. There  was no  legal impediment  in the Part B State of  PEPSU making  a law  modifying  a  law  which  was continued in  force under  Article 372  of the Constitution. Clause XVI  of the Covenant, on which reliance was placed by Shri Gupta,  cannot be  invoked to  impose such a limitation because, as  stated earlier, the Covenant is an act of State and the  respondent cannot  claim any  right on the basis of the said  clause in  the Covenant.  After the  making of the PEPSU  Service  Regulations,  1952  the  age  of  compulsory retirement of  government servants  in part B State of PEPSU was fixed  at 55 years which continued till the Part B State of PEPSU  merged into  the reorganised State of Punjab under the States  Re-organisation Act,  1956  and  thereafter  the Punjab Civil  Service Rules were made applicable to the east while employees of PEPSU Government who became the employees of the  Punjab Government  and, as  a result,  their age  of superannuation was  fixed at  58 years. Once it is held that the PEPSU  Service Regulations  and the  Punjab Service Rule

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were applicable  to  all  PEPSU  government  employees,  the respondent, who was one such employee, has to be governed by the PEPSU  Service Regulations  and the Punjab Service Rules and he  cannot claim that he continued to be governed by the provisions of  the Jind  State  Civil  Service  Regulations, 1945. Since  the  age  of  superannuation  prescribed  under Article  3.26  o  the  Punjab  Service  Rules  was  58,  the respondent was  rightly retired  on his  attaining the  said age.      For the reasons aforementioned, we are unable to uphold the judgment  of the  High Court  that  the  respondent  was entitled to  continue in service till he attained the age of 62 years  on the  basis of  the provisions  contained in the Jind State  Civil Service  Regulations, 1945. The appeal is, therefore, allowed,  the impugned judgment of the High Court dated July  6, 1993 passed in R.S.A. No. 1491 of 1990 is set aside  and  the  civil  suit  filed  by  the  respondent  is dismissed. But  in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.