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PETITIONER: STATE OF HARYANA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHANAN MAL ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/03/1976

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH RAY, A.N. (CJ) SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1654            1976 SCR  (3) 688  1977 SCC  (1) 390  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1980 SC1955  (41)  F          1982 SC 697  (28)  RF         1991 SC1676  (46,47,48,50)

ACT:      Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 67 of 1957- Section 16(1)(b)-Scope of.      Haryana  Minerals  (Vesting  of  Rights)  Act,  1973-If repugnant to the provisions of Central Act.      Mandamus-Issue of-Petitioner should first call upon the authority to discharge legal obligation.      Statement of  Objects and Reasons-When could be used in interpretation      New questions-When could be raised.

HEADNOTE:      On  the  strength  of  entries  in  the  (wajib-ul-arz) (village administration  papers) of  some villages the State Government considered  itself to  be the  owner of saltpetre deposits. By a notification it declared saltpetre as a minor mineral and  auctioned the  mines  in  accordance  with  the Punjab Minor  Minerals Con  Cessions Rules,  1964 made under the provisions  of the  Mines and  Minerals (Regulation  and Development) Act  67 of  1957. In  a writ  petition the High Court  held   that,  unless   the  mineral   deposits   were specifically mentioned  in the Wajib-ul-arz of a village, as having vested  in the  State, their  ownership  would  still remain vested  in the  former proprietors  according to  the record  of   rights.  To  meet  this  situation,  the  State legislature passed  the Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973.  Since the  owners of  the lands  had haphazardly created lessee  rights in contravention of the Punjab Rules, 1964, two  notifications were  issued with the object of the conservation  as  well  as  of  scientific  exploitation  of mineral resources.  By one notification the State Government purported to acquire rights to saltpetre in the lands and by the second it announced that certain saltpetre bearing areas would be auctioned.      In a  writ petition under Art. 226, the High Court held (i) that in view of the declaration contained in s. 2 of the

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Central Act  the field  covered  by  the  impugned  Act  was already fully  occupied by  the Central  legislation so that the State  Act was  inoperative and  void for repugnancy and quashed the  two notifications; and (ii) that rights in such lands had  continued to vest in the former owners of estates despite acquisitions of other parts of their estates.      The respondents  in the  appeals  containded  that  the declaration in s. 2 of the Central Act that it was expedient in the  public interest that the Union should take under its control the  regulation of  mines  and  the  development  of minerals would  become unworkable  if the  provisions of the State Act were permitted to operate.      While the  appeals were  pending  writ  petitions  were filed in this Court under Article 32. The petitioners in the first batch  of  writ  petitions  have  asserted  rights  as holders of  mining lesses  granted by  persons who  had been entered as  proprietors of  estates in  the record of rights and that  the State under the State Act had wrongly acquired the right  to mineral deposits in their former lands. It was contended that  the effect  of the  State Act  was  only  to change the ownership without interfering with the regulation of leasehold  or  licensee  rights  in  minerals  under  the Central Act.      Allowing the  appeals of  the State  and dismissing the writ petitions, ^      HELD: (i) The Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act. 1973, is  valid, as  it is not, in any way, repugnant to the provisions of the Mines and 689 Minerals (Regulation of Development) Act 67 of 1957, made by Parliament. Ownership  rights could be and have been validly acquired by the State Government under the State Act. [710G]      (ii) No rights are shown by any petitioner to have been conferred upon  him under  any lease  or licence executed in accordance with  the provisions of the Central Act, but, any petitioner, either  before the  High Court or in this Court, who can  establish any such right governed by the provisions of the  Central Act  67 of  1957 may  take such  proceedings before an  appropriate court,  as may  still be  open to him under  the  law,  against  any  such  action  or  Government notification as is alleged to infringe that right. [710H]      (iii) Any petitioner who applied for a writ or order in the nature  of a mandamus should, in compliance with a well- known rule  of practice,  ordinarily, first  call  upon  the authority concerned  to discharge  its legal  obligation and show that it had refused or neglected to carry it out within a reasonable  time before  applying to  a court  for such an order even  where the  alleged  obligation  is  established. [711B]      1. (a)  It is  difficult to  sustain  the  respondents’ contention that  the provisions  of the Central Act would be really unworkable  by mere  change of  ownership of  land in which mineral  deposits were  found. The  character  of  the State Act  has to  be judged  by the substance and effect of its provisions  and not  merely by  the purpose given in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. [706C]      (b) The provisions of the Central Act show that subject to the  overall supervision  of the  Central Government  the State Government has a sphere of its own powers and can take legally specified  actions under  the Central Act and rules. Thus, the  whole field  of control  and regulation under the provisions of  the Central Act cannot be said to be reserved for the Central Government. [698B]      (c) The  stated objects  and reasons  of the  State Act

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showed that  the acquisition  was to  be made to protect the mineral potentialities  of the  land  and  to  ensure  their proper development  and exploitation on scientific lines. If this was  the actual  purpose behind  the  Act  it  did  not materially differ  from that  which could  be  said  to  lie behind the Central Act. [692E]      (d) The  provisions contained  in s. 16(1)(b) show that Parliament itself contemplated state legislation for vesting of  lands   containing  mineral   deposits  in   the   State Government. It  only required  that rights to mining granted in such land should be regulated by the provisions of Act 67 of 1957  as amended  in 1972.  This feature  could  only  be explained on  the assumption  that Parliament did not intend to trench  upon powers  of State legislatures under entry 18 of List  II read  with entry 42 of List III. Again, s. 17 of the Central  Act  shows  that  there  was  no  intention  to interfere with  vesting  of  lands  in  the  States  by  the provisions of the Central Act. [707B-C]      (e)  There  is  no  force  in  the  contention  of  the respondents that  the vesting contemplated by s. 16(1)(b) as it now  stands must  be of "estates" of proprietors or lands of tenureholders under some legislation for agrarian reform. Agrarian  31A   of  the  Constitution  is  not  confined  to legislation for agrarian reform. Agrarian reform is only one of the  possible or alternative objects of such acquisition. It need  not be  the exclusive  or  only  purpose  of  State legislation contemplated  by s. 16(1)(b) of the Central Act. Power to  legislate for  the acquisition  of the whole of an estate or  ’tenure’ would include the power to legislate for any part of it. [707 D-E]      Hingir-Rampur Coal  Co. Ltd.  & Ors.  v. The  State  of Orissa &  Ors.,[1961] 2  S.C.R. 537; State of West Bengal v. Union of India,[1964] 1 S.C.R. 371; State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch &  Co.,[1964] (4) S.C.R. 461 & Baijnath Kedia v. The State of Bihar,[1970] 2 S.C.R. 100, held inapplicable.      (2) The  lessee and  licensee rights  governed  by  the Central Act or rules are not covered by the State Act. It is clear from  s. 3(2)  of the State Act that the provisions of this Act  were to  be read subject to the provisions made by or under  the Central  Act. The  State Act did not and could not upso facto 690 terminate  either  lessee  or  licensee  rights  which  were subsisting on  the date  when the State Act came into force. On the other hand. s. 9 of the Central Act 56 of 1972, which amended s.  16 of  the principal Act, made it imperative for such lessee  rights as  existed in estates (which had vested in a  State Government)  to be  brought into conformity with the Central  Act. Therefore,  if there  were  no  lessee  or licensee rights  of mining  in minor  minerals on land which were actually regulated by the provisions of the Central Act they would continue. [708H]      In the  instant case, however. it was not shown how the notification of  auctions  of  mining  rights  affected  any subsisting rights  of any alleged lessee or licensee. It has not been  shown that  any lessee or licensee asked the State Government  to   carry  out  any  statutory  or  contractual obligation before  he invoked  the writ  jurisdiction of the High  Court  or  this  Court.  The  essential  averments  to disclose subsisting  rights  or  the  locus  standi  of  the petitioners were wanting in these petitions. [709A]      (3) In  the second batch of petitions, the only dispute between the  parties related  to the  vesting  of  ownership rights in  minor minerals  in those  plots. The  petitioners have come to this Court as lessees and not as owners. Rights

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of former  owners have  been validly terminated by the State Act. It  is difficult  to make  out from these petitions how any lessee  rights acquired  by the  petitioners  themselves under  any   law  subsisted   or  were   affected   by   the notifications. [710E-F]      (4) The  statement of  objects and  reasons is relevant when the  object or purpose of an enactment is in dispute or uncertain. It  can never  override the  effect which follows logically from the explicit and unmistakable language of its substantive provisions.  Such effect is the best evidence of intention. A  statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the statute, and, therefore, it is not even relevant in a case in which the language of the operative parts of the Act leaves no  room whatsoever,  to doubt  what was meant by the legislators. [706D-E]      In the  instant case it is not disputed that the object and effect  of the  State Act  was  to  acquire  proprietary rights to  mineral  deposits  in  "land".    Its  provisions however, do  not mention  leasehold or licensee rights. This is so  because these rights were governed by the Central Act 67 of 1957.      (5) It  is not correct to say that any new question was allowed  to  be  raised  simply  because  the  parties  were permitted to place their points of view on the same question after taking  into account  the changes brought about in Act 67 of  1957 by  Act 56  of 1972 and how earlier decisions of this Court, which were given before the amendments came into force, could  be at  all helpful  in deciding the questions. The Court  is bound to take judicial notice of the law as it exists and not the law as it once was. [706G]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 840 to 860 of 1975.      From the Judgments and orders dated 7-5-74, 27-8-74, 2- 9-74 and  10-9-74 of  the Punjab  and Haryana  High Court in Civil Writ  Nos. 1133,  1118, 1180,  1208, 1225, 1226, 1231, 1238, 1277, 1251,1352/74 and 1188, 1198, 1221/74 and L.P.As. Nos. 395 and 399 of 1974 respectively and          Writ Petitions 1309-1318 and 1371-1373/75       (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)      M. C.  Bhandare, (In Case 844-860/75) and L. N. Singhvi (In   all  Writ  Petitions)  and  R.  N.  Sachthey  for  the Appellant and Respondents. 691      S. Gopal Singh and P. Keshwa Pillai for the Petitioners in W.P. 1371-73/75.      Harbans Singh  Marwah for the Petitioners in W.P. 1371- 73/75.      A. K.  Sen, Kapil Sibbal, S. K. Jain and S. S. Khanduja for the Respondents excepting C.As. 852, 853 and 855/75.      Naunit Lal  for the Intervener in C.A. 845/75 Ch. Dhyan Singh etc.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BEG, J.  The seventeen  appeals before  us by the State and  by   the  Director  of  Industries  of  Haryana,  after certification  under   Article  133   (1)  (a)  (b)  of  the constitution, are  directed against  a Judgment  of the High Court of  Punjab and  Haryana on  Writ Petition of owners of lands and  lessees of mineral rights in land seeking reliefs in the  nature of  Mandamus to  enforce  fundamental  rights conferred by  Article 31  (2) and to restrain the Government of  Haryana   from  taking   any  action  to  implement  two

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notifications void:  (i) No. 1217-2-1-B-II-74/7622 dated the 20th February,  1974, and, (ii) No. GIG/SP/Auc/ 1173/3075-C, dated the  22nd February,  1974, after declaring the Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Haryana Act’).      Under the  notification of  20th  February,  1974,  the State Government purported to acquire rights to Saltpetre, a minor mineral  in the  land described in a schedule appended to the notification issued in exercise of power conferred by Section 3,  sub. section  (i) of  the Haryana  Act.  By  the notification of  22nd February,  1974, the  State Government announced to  the  general  public  that  certain  saltpetre bearing areas  in the  State of  Haryana, mentioned therein, would  be   auctioned  on   the  dates   given  there.   The notifications have  not been placed before us. But, from the averments in  the statements  on behalf  of the State and on behalf  of   some  of  the  respondents  in  the  affidavits supporting their  respective cases in proceedings for a stay of the  operation of  the High  Court’s judgment, it appears that the  intention of  the State  was to  acquire Saltpetre deposits in  lands whose  owners had  granted mining  leases claimed by  petitioners in  the High Court to be subsisting. The  auctions  advertised  were  probably  of  fresh  lessee rights. Whether  the auctions  were to  be of  ownership  or lessee rights in lands, the result was that one owner or one lessee was  to be  substituted by  another in each case as a result of  acquisition and  sale. The  State was  to get the difference between  the  price  of  acquisition  and  amount realised on  sale of  each part sold. The apparent effect of mere change  of owners  or lessees  was that  the  State  of Haryana would  benefit financially from the acquisitions and sales, although  the object  of the  Haryana Act was said to include conservation as well as "scientific exploitation" of mineral resources.  The case  of the  appellant  State  also seemed to  be that  the owners  of lands  had  "haphazardly" created lessee  rights in  contravention of the Punjab Minor Minerals Concession  Rules, 1954,  made under the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation of Development) Act 67 of 1957 (hereinafter 692 referred to  as the  Central Act’).  Learned Counsel for the appellant State  contended that  the Haryana  Act  was  only meant to  supplement and  not supplant  the Central Act. The State claimed  to be  dealing with  lessee rights  under the Central Act and not under the Haryana Act at all.      The case of the petitioners in the High Court was:      Firstly, that the Haryana Act was beyond the competence of the State Legislature inasmuch as the field in which this Act  operated   was  necessarily  occupied  already  by  the provisions of  the Central Act enacted under entry No. 54 of the Union  List (List  I) of  the Seventh   Schedule  to the Constitution which reads as follows:           "54, Regulation  of mines  and mineral development      to the  extent to which such regulation and development      under  the   control  of   the  Union  is  declared  by      Parliament  by  law  to  be  expedient  in  the  public      interest".      Secondly, that  the  purported  acquisition  under  the Haryana  Act   offended  the  provisions  of  Article  31(2) inasmuch as  it was  neither for  a public  purpose nor  for adequate compensation, the provision for compensation in the Act being, according to the petitioners, illusory.      A Division  Bench of  the High  Court allowed  the Writ Petitions  and  quashed  the  impugned  notifications  after declaring the  Act to  be ultra-vires. It also held that the

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Haryana  Act   violated  Article   31(2).   It   found   the compensation provided  by the  Haryana Act to be grossly low and illusory,  although its  view was that, judging from the statement of  reasons and  objects of  the  Haryana  Act,  a public purpose  was made out. The stated reasons and objects of the  Haryana Act  showed that  the acquisition  was to be made to  protect the  mineral potentialities of the land and to ensure  their  proper  development  and  exploitation  on scientific lines.  If this was the actual purpose behind the Haryana Act  it did  not materially  differ from  that which could be said to lie behind the Central Act.      The real  question, however, was not whether any of the purposes of  the  two  Acts  were  common  but  whether  the provisions of  the Central Act so operated as necessarily to exclude, in carrying out their objects, the operation of the State Act.  The High  Court had  held that,  in view  of the declaration contained  in Section  2 of the Central Act, and decisions of this Court in the Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors. v.  The State of Orissa & Ors., State of West Bengal v. Union of  India, State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch & Co., and Baijnath Kedia  v. The  State of Bihar, the field covered by the impugned  Act was  already fully occupied by the Central Legislation so  that the  State Act  had to  be held  to  be inoperative and void for repugnancy.      Section 2 of the Central Act lays down:           "It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the      public interest  that the  Union should  take under its      control the 693      regulation of  mines and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided". Section 3(a) of this Act says:           " ’minerals’  includes all minerals except mineral      oils;" Section 3(c) reads:           "’mining lease’  means a  lease  granted  for  the      purpose of  undertaking mining operations, and includes      a sub-lease granted for such purpose"; Section 3(d) enacts:           "’mining   operations’    means   any   operations      undertaken for the purpose of mining any mineral;" Section 3(e) elucidates:           " ’Minor  minerals’ means  building stones, gravel      ordinary clay,  ordinary sand  other than sand used for      prescribed purposes,  and any  other mineral  which the      Central Government may, by notification in the official      Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral"; Section 3 (g) indicates:           "’prospecting licence’ means a licence granted for      the purpose of undertaking prospecting operations;" Section 3(h) enacts:           "’prospecting  operations’  means  any  operations      under taken  for the  purpose of  exploring locating or      proving mineral deposits;" Section 3(i) lays down:           "the expressions,  ’mine’ and  ’owner’,  have  the      meanings assigned to them in the Mines Act, 1952".      Sections 4  to 9  of the  Central Act deal with General Restrictions on Prospecting and Mining operations. Section 4 indicates that all prospecting and mining operations will be governed by  the Central Act. But, Section 4A, introduced by Section 2 of the Central Act 56 of 1972, lays down:           "4A(1)  Where   the   Central   Government   after      consultation with  the State  Government, is of opinion      that it  is expedient  in the interest of regulation of

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    mines and  mineral development so to do, it may request      the State Government to make a premature termination of      a mining  lease in respect of any mineral, other than a      minor mineral,  and, on  receipt of  such request,  the      State Government shall make an order making a premature      termination of  such mining  lease and granting a fresh      mining lease  in favour  of such  Government company or      corporation owned or controlled by Government as it may      think fit". 694      Section  5   concerns  restrictions  on  the  grant  of prospecting licences  or mining  leases. It shows that these will be  granted by  the State  Government and  the  Central Government was  to give  its approval  in certain  specified cases  only.   Section  6   indicates  areas   for  which  a prospecting licence or mining lease or more than one licence or lease  may be  granted in  any  one  State.  The  Central Government could  make exceptions  to this  rule. Section  7 limits duration of a prospecting licence, which is evidently to be  granted by the State Government, to one year for mica and two  years for  other minerals, subject to renewal, and, in the  case of  scheduled minerals,  subject to approval by Central Government  for each  grant or  renewal.  Similarly, Section 8 provides periods of grant and renewal of leases by the State  Government. Section  9 deals  with  Royalties  in respect of  mining leases.  Section 9A is concerned with the Dead rent  to be  paid by the lessee to the State Government subject to the regulation of it by the Central Government.      Sections 10  to 12 of the Central Act contain procedure for obtaining  prospecting licences or mining leases in land in which  mineral rights  vest in the Government. It is true that it  is not specified here in which Government rights to minerals in  any land  vest. But, the machinery provided for applications  and   for   maintaining   the   registers   of applications for  prospecting  licences  and  mining  leases shows  that  it  is  the  State  Government  which  will  be concerned with  this matter  subject to  the  provisions  of Sections 10 to 12 of the Act.      Rules for  regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining  leases are  to be made by the Central Government according to  the detailed  provisions  of  Section  13  and Section 13A. Section 14, however, lays down:           "14.  The   provisions  of   Sections  4   to   13      (inclusive) shall  not apply  to quarry  leases, mining      leases, or  other mineral  concessions  in  respect  of      minor minerals". Section 15  makes it  clear that  it is the State Government which has  the power  to make rules for regulating the grant of  quarry   leases,  mining   leases,  or   other   mineral concessions in  respect of "minor minerals" and for purposes connected therewith.           Section 16(1) of the Central Act enacts: "16(1)(a)      All mining  leases granted  before the  commencement of      the Mines  and Minerals  (Regulation  and  Development)      Amendment Act,  1972, if in force at such commencement,      shall be brought into conformity with the provisions of      this Act,  and the  rules made  thereunder, within  six      months from  such commencement, or such further time as      the Central  Government  may,  by  general  or  special      order, specify in this behalf           (b) Where  the  rights  under  any  mining  lease,      granted by the proprietor of an estate or tenure before      the commencement  of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation      and Development)  Amendment Act,  1972, have vested, on      or

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695      after the  25th day  of October,  1949,  in  the  State      Government in pursuance of the provisions of any Act of      any Provincial  or State Legislature which provides for      the acquisition  of estates  or tenures or provides for      agrarian reform,  such mining  lease shall  be  brought      into conformity with the provisions of this Act and the      rules  made  thereunder  within  six  months  from  the      commencement of  the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and      Development)  Amendment   Act,  1972,  or  within  such      further time  as the Central Government may, by general      or special order, specify in this behalf". Section 16(2)  provides for  rules to be made by the Central Government to carry out the purposes of Section 16(1).      Special powers  of Central  Government  in  respect  of mining operations  in certain  lands  are  provided  for  in Section 17. Clause (1) of this Section reads:-           "17(1) The  provisions of this Section shall apply      in respect  of land  in which  the minerals vest in the      Government of a State or any other person". Clause (2)  of Section  17 provides  for undertakings by the Central  Government,   in  consultation   with   the   State Government, of prospecting or mining operations "in any area not already  held under  any prospecting  licence or  mining lease....".  Section  17(3)  makes  the  Central  Government liable in such cases to pay the State Government prospecting fee, royalty,  surface rent,  or dead  rent, as the case may be, at  the same  rate at  which it  would have been payable under this Act, if such prospecting or mining operations had been undertaken  by a  private person  under  a  prospecting licence or  mining lease.  Section 17(4)  contains powers of the Central  Government,  in  consultation  with  the  State Government, to  prohibit  grant  of  prospecting  or  mining leases in any area specified in a notification.      Section 18,  dealing with  the development  of minerals enacts:           "18(1)  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Central      Government to  take all  such steps as may be necessary      for the  conservation and  development of  minerals  in      India, and for that purpose the Central Government may,      by notification  in the  Official  Gazette,  make  such      rules as it thinks fit.           (2) In  particular, and  without prejudice  to the      generality of  the  foregoing  power,  such  rules  may      provide for  all  or  any  of  the  following  matters,      namely:-           (a)  the opening  of new  mines and the regulation                of mining operations in any area;           (b)  the   regulation   of   the   excavation   or                collection of minerals from any mine;           (c)  the measures  to be  taken by owners of mines                for the  purpose of  beneficiation  of  ores,                including   the    provision   of    suitable                contrivances for such purpose; 696           (d)  the development  of mineral  resources in any                area;           (e)  the notification of all new borings and shaft                sinkings and  the preservation  of  bore-hole                records, and  specimens of  cores of  all new                bore-holes;           (f)  the regulation  of the  arrangements for  the                storage of  minerals and  the stocks  thereof                that may be kept by any person;           (g)  the submission  of samples  of minerals  from

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              any mine  by the owner thereof and the manner                in which  and the  authority  to  which  such                samples shall be submitted; and the taking of                samples of  any minerals from any mine by the                State Government  or any  authority specified                by it in that behalf; and           (h)  the submission  by owners  of mines  of  such                special or  periodical returns and reports as                may be  specified, and  the form in which and                the  authority  to  which  such  returns  and                reports shall be submitted.           (3)  All rules  made under  this section  shall be      binding on the Government".      It should  be noted  that  Section  18  set  out  above empowers the  Central  Government  to  make  rules  for  the "conservation and  development of  minerals in  any part  of India". The  State Government  is not  even  entitled  under Central Act  to be  consulted about  this subject, but it is bound by the rules made on it by the Central Government. The term "Government", according to Section 3(23) of the General Clauses Act,  includes both  the Central  Government  and  a State Government.      Section 18A,  sub-section (1) inserted by Section 11 of the Act  of 56  of 1972, does, however, require consultation with the State Government on one matter. It says:           "18.A(1)  Where   the  Central  Government  is  of      opinion that  for the  conservation and  development of      minerals in  India,  it  is  necessary  to  collect  as      precise information  as possible  with  regard  to  any      mineral available  in or  under any land in relation to      which any  prospecting licence or mining lease has been      granted, whether  by the  State Government  or  by  any      other person,  the Central  Government may authority or      the Geological Survey of India, or such other authority      or agency  as it  may specify  in this behalf, to carry      out such  detailed investigations  for the  purpose  of      obtaining such information as may be necessary:           Provided that in the cases of prospecting licences      or mining leases granted by a State Government, no such      authorisation shall  be made  except after consultation      with the State Government". 697 The remaining  clauses (2)  to (6)  of Section 18A deal with the consequences  of the  authorisation of  investigation by the Central  Government and matters connected therewith. The proviso  to   clause  (6)   dealing  with   the   costs   of investigation enacts:-           "Provided that where the State Government or other      person in whom the minerals are vested or the holder of      any prospecting  licence or mining lease applies to the      Central Government  to furnish  to it  or him a copy of      the report  submitted under sub-section (5), that State      Government  or   other  person   or  the  holder  of  a      prospecting licence  or mining  lease, as  the case may      be, shall  bear such  reasonable part  of the  costs of      investigation as  the Central Government may specify in      this behalf  and shall,  on payment of such part of the      costs of investigation, be entitled to receive from the      Central Government  a true copy of the report submitted      to it under sub-section (5)".      Miscellaneous provisions  are contained  in Sections 19 to 33 of the Central Act. Here, Section 19 lays down:           "19.  Any  prospecting  licence  or  mining  lease      granted renewed  or acquired  in contravention  of  the      provisions of  this Act  or any  rules or  orders  made

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    thereunder shall be void and of no effect". Section 20 enacts:           "20. The provisions of this Act and the rules made      thereunder shall apply in relation to the renewal after      the commencement of this Act of any prospecting licence      or mining  lease granted  before such  commencement  as      they apply  in relation to the renewal of a prospecting      licence   or    mining   lease   granted   after   such      commencement". Section 21 provides for penalties for anyone who contravenes the provisions  of Section  4(1) of  the  Act.  Among  these miscellaneous provisions  is Section 25 recast by Section 14 of Act 56 of 1972. It lays down that:           "Any rent,  royalty, tax,  fee or other sum due to      the  Government  under  this  Act  or  the  rules  made      thereunder or  under the  terms and  conditions of  any      prospecting  licence   or  mining   lease  may,   on  a      certificate of  such officer as may be specified by the      State Government  in this  behalf by general or special      order, be  recovered in the same manner as an arrear of      land revenue". Section 25,  sub-section (2) shows that these dues are to be specified either  by the Act or by the Rules made thereunder or under the terms and conditions of any prospective licence or  mining  lease.  The  control  however,  is  of  officers appointed by the State Government.      Section 26 provides for delegation of the powers of the Central Government  by notification  in the official Gazette to either  the State  Government or any officer or authority either subordinate to the 698 Central Government or the State Government. Section 30 shows that the  orders made  by  the  State  Government  or  other authority in  exercise of powers by or under the Central Act are  revisable   by  the   Central  Government.  Hence,  the provisions of  the Central  Act show  that, subject  to  the overall supervision  of the  Central Government,  the  State Government has  a sphere  of its  own powers  and  can  take legally specified  actions under  the Central  Act and rules made thereunder.  Thus,  the  whole  field  of  control  and regulation under  the provisions  of the  Central Act  67 of 1957  cannot   be  said  to  be  reserved  for  the  Central Government.      As  indicated   above,  there   have  been   some  very significant changes  by the  Central Act  56 of  1972. These seem to  us to make it necessary to reconsider the effect of the declaration contained in Section 2 of the Central Act as interpreted by  the decisions  of this  Court so far. Before outlining the provisions of Haryana Act, we may indicate the position resulting  from the  four decisions mentioned above relied upon by Punjab & Haryana High Court.      In Hingir-Rampur  Coal Co’s  case (supra), the validity of the  Orissa Mining  Areas Development Fund Act, 1952, was questioned on  the ground  that it  authorised the  State of Orissa to  impose a  cess on  the valuation of the minerals. The State of Orissa had relied upon entries 23 and 66 of the State List  (List II)  of the  Seventh Schedule. Entry 23 of List II is:           "Regulation  of   mines  and  mineral  development      subject to  the provisions  of List  I with  respect to      regulation and  development under  the control  of  the      Union". And entry 66 of List II is:           "Fees in  respect of  any of  the matters  in this      list, but not including fees taken in any court".

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The petitioning Coal Co. had relied on entry 84 of List I of the Seventh  Schedule empowering  the  Parliament  alone  to impose excise  duty on  tobacco and other manufactured goods with the  exception of Alcoholic liquor, opium, Indian hemp, and other  narcotics. It  had also  cited, in support of its case, entry  52 of  List I  of "Industries,  the control  of which by  the Union  is declared  by Parliament by law to be expedient in  the public  interest". Furthermore,  the  Coal Company relied  on entry  54 of List I relating to Mines and mineral development,  already set out above. This Court held that the  imposition of  the cess  under the State enactment was really a fee falling within entries 23 and 66 of List II of the  Seventh Schedule.  It held  that the  State Act  was neither hit  by entry  54,  read  with  Mines  and  Minerals Development Act  3 of  1948, nor  by entry 52 of List I. The decision in that case turned on an interpretation of Article 372 of  the Constitution.  It was held that a declaration in the Act of 1948 could not be equated with a declaration made by the  Parliament in a post-Constitution enactment in terms of entry  54 of  List I.  It was,  therefore, not  really  a decision on the effect of Section 2 of the Central Act 67 of 1957. 699      The State  of West Bengal v. Union of India (supra) was the case of a suit filed by the State of West Bengal against the Union. It was contended, on behalf of West Bengal State, that the  Coal Bearing  Areas (Acquisition  and Development) Act, 1957,  enacted  by  Parliament,  proposing  to  acquire certain coal  bearing areas  in the  State, did not apply to areas owned  by the  State itself,  and, in the alternative, that, even if it did so apply to areas owned by the State of West Bengal,  it was  beyond the  legislative competence  of Parliament because  entry 42  in the  Concurrent List  (List III) did  not authorise  an acquisition  of property already vested in  the State  although this  entry in the Concurrent List  merely   reads:  "acquisition  and  requisitioning  of property". It was urged there that, without a constitutional amendment, Parliament  could not acquire the property of the State of  West Bengal  under the  provisions of the impugned Act. It was held there (at p. 417):           "... the  power  of  the  Union  to  legislate  in      respect of  property situate  in the States even if the      States are regarded qua the union as Sovereign, remains      unrestricted, and the State property is not immune from      its operation.  Exercising  powers  under  the  diverse      entries which  have been referred to earlier, the Union      Parliament could  legislate so  as to  trench upon  the      rights of  the State in the property vested in them. If      exclusion of  State property  from the purview of Union      legislation is regarded as implicit in those entries in      List I, it would be difficult if not impossible for the      Union  Government  to  carry  out  its  obligations  in      respect of matters of national importance".      Learned Counsel  for the  appellant State before us has relied upon  the case  of State  of West  Bengal (supra) for contending that  the powers  of  the  State  of  Haryana  to acquire land  are not  impaired by the declaration contained in the Central Act. He cited the rule of construction stated there as follows (at p. 393):           "Unless  a   law   expressly   or   by   necessary      implication so  provides, a State is not bound thereby.      This well recognised rule applies to the interpretation      of the  Constitution. There fore, in the absence of any      provision express  or  necessarily  implying  that  the      property of  the State  could be acquired by the Union,

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    the rights  claimed  by  the  Union  to  legislate  for      acquisition of State property must be negatived." Applying this rule, he contends that the powers of the State Government to  acquire land  are left  intact by the Central Act 67 of 1957.      Learned Counsel  for the respondent, however, relied on another passage  in the  State of West Bengal’s case (supra) to submit that legislative power for acquisition of minerals for their  development and conservation must be deemed to be vested in  Parliament now  even if the mineral resources are situated in the State. He quoted (at p. 436):-           "By  making   the  requisite   declarations  under      Entries 54  of List  I, the  Union  Parliament  assumed      power to regulate 700      mines and  minerals and thereby to deny to all agencies      not under  the control  of the Union, authority to work      the mines.  It could  scarcely  be  imagined  that  the      Constitution  makers   while  intending  to  confer  an      exclusive power  to work  mines and  minerals under the      control  of   the  Union,   still  prevented  effective      exercise  of   that  power   by  making  it  impossible      compulsorily to  acquire the  land vested in the States      containing minerals.  The  effective  exercise  of  the      power would  depend-if such an argument is accepted-not      upon the  exercise of the power to undertake regulation      and control  by issuing  a notification under Entry 54,      but upon  the will  of the  State in  the territory  of      which  mineral   bearing  land  is  situate.  Power  to      legislate for  regulation and  development of mines and      minerals under  the control  of  the  Union,  would  by      necessary implication  include  the  power  to  acquire      mines and  minerals. Power to legislate for acquisition      of property  vested in  the States  cannot therefore be      denied  to   the  Parliament   if   it   be   exercised      consistently with the protection afforded by Art. 31."      In the  two cases  discussed above  no provision of the Central Act  67 of  1957 was  under  consideration  by  this Court.  Moreover,   power  to   acquire  for   purposes   of development and  regulation has not been exercised by Act 67 of 1957.  The existence  of power of Parliament to legislate on this  topic as  an incident  of exercise  of  legislative power on  another subject  is one thing. Its actual exercise is another.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  field  of acquisition could  become occupied  by a  Central Act in the same way  as it  had been  in the West Bengal’s case (supra) even before  Parliament legislates  to  acquire  land  in  a State. Atleast  until Parliament has so legislated as it was shewn to  have done  by the statute considered by this Court in the  case from  West Bengal,  the field is free foe State legislation falling under the express provisions of entry 42 of List III.      In State  of Orissa  v. M. A. Tulloch & Co. (supra) the provisions of  the Central Act 67 of 1957 were considered by this Court  directly. In  this case, the legality of certain demands as fee under the Orissa Act 27 of 1952, the validity of which had been upheld by this Court in Hingir-Rampur Coal Co.’s case  (supra), came  up for consideration again in the light of  the provisions  of the  Central Act 67 of 1957. It was contended  on behalf  of the  State of  Orissa that  the objects and  purposes of  the Orissa  Act and of the Central Act were  entirely distinct and different so that they could validly co-exist  since neither trespassed into the field of the other.  It was  pointed out  there that  this Court  had indicated, in  the Hingir-Rampur  Coal  Co.’s  case  (supra)

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that, if  the declaration in the 1948 Act relied upon by the petitioner in that case had been made after our Constitution became operative,  the position  would have  been different. Reliance was placed upon the provisions of Section 18 of the Central Act to hold (at p. 477):           "Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within      the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when      the 701      Constitution  expressly  or  by  necessary  implication      provides that  the enactment  of  one  Legislature  has      superiority over  the other  than to  the extent of the      repugnancy  the  one  supersedes  the  other.  But  two      enactments may  be repugnant  to each other even though      obedience  to   each  of   them  is   possible  without      disobeying the  other. The  test  of  two  legislations      containing contradictory  provisions is  not,  however,      the only  criterion of  repugnancy, for  if a competent      legislature  with  a  superior  efficacy  expressly  or      impliedly evinces  by its  legislation an  intention to      cover the  whole field,  the enactments  of  the  other      legislature whether  passed before  or after  would  be      overborne on  the ground  of repugnance.  Where such is      the position,  the inconsistency is demonstrated not by      a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes      but  by  the  mere  existence  of  the  two  pieces  of      legislation. In  the present case, having regard to the      terms of  S. 18(1)  it appears  clear to  us  that  the      intention of  Parliament was  to cover the entire field      and thus  to leave no scope for the argument that until      rules were  framed, there  was no  inconsistency and no      supersession of the State Act". It was also held there (at p. 478):           "If by reason of the declaration by Parliament the      entire subject-matter  of conservation  and development      of minerals’  has been  taken over for being dealt with      by Parliament,  thus depriving  the State  of the power      which it  therefore possessed, it would follow that the      ’matter’ in  the State  List is  to the  extent of  the      declaration, subtracted  from the  scope and  ambit  of      Entry 23  of the  State List.  There would,  therefore,      after the  Central Act  of 1957  be ’no  matter in  the      List’ to  which the  fee could  be related  in order to      render it valid".      In Baijnath  Kedia’s case  (supra), the  proviso (2) to Section 10(2)  of the  Bihar Land  Reforms (Amendment)  Act, 1964 (Bihar  Act 4 of 1965) and a sub-rule of Rule 20, added on December  10, 1964,  by a notification of the Governor to the  Bihar   Minor  Mineral   Rules,  1961,   came  up   for consideration. Under  the Bihar  Land Reforms Act, 1950, the former landlords  had ceased  to have  any interest from the date of  vesting so  that their  rights as lessors under the mining leases  granted by  them in  their  "estates"  became vested in the State of Bihar under Section 19(1) of the Land Reforms Act; and, by Section 10(2) of that Act, the terms on which the  lands were  held on  leases between  the original lessors and  lessees became  binding on the State Government under the  impugned proviso  to Section  10(2), amounting to alteration of  the terms  of  the  leases  executed  by  the original lessors,  the former  landlords, additional demands were made upon lessees. The State Government had also relied upon a  sub-rule added to Rule 20 framed under Section 15 of the Central  Act 67 of 1957. This Court, after examining the relevant provisions of the 702

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Central Act,  held, relying on Hingir-Rampur Coal Co.’s case (supra) and M. A. Tulloch Co.’s case (supra), as follows (at p. 113):           "The declaration is contained in s. 2 of Act 67 of      1957 and  speaks of  the taking  and the control of the      Central  Government   the  regulation   of  mines   and      development of  minerals to  the extent provided in the      Act itself.  We have thus not to look outside Act 67 of      1957, to  determine what  is left within the competence      of the  State Legislature  but have to work it out from      the terms of that Act". After referring  to what  was decided  in the earlier cases, this Court said (at p. 114):           "These two cases bind us and apply here. Since the      Bihar State  Legislature amended  the Land  Reforms Act      after the  coming into  force of  Act 67  of 1957,  the      declaration in  the latter  Act would carve out a field      to the  extent provided  in that Act and to that extent      entry 23 would stand cut down. To sustain the amendment      the State  must show  that the matter is not covered by      the Central  Act. The  other side must, of course, show      that the matter is already covered and there is no room      for legislation". It added (at p. 114-115):           "We have  already analysed Act 67 of 1957. The Act      takes over  the control  of  regulation  of  mines  and      development of minerals to the Union; of course, to the      extent  provided.   It  deals   with   minor   minerals      separately from the other minerals. In respect of minor      minerals it  provides in s. 14 that ss. 4-13 of the Act      do not apply to prospecting licences and mining leases.      It goes  on to state in s. 15 that the State Government      may, by  notification in  the  official  Gazette,  make      rules for  regulating the grant of prospecting licences      and mining  leases in respect of minor minerals and for      purposes connected  therewith, and that until rules are      made, any rules made by the State Government regulating      the grant  of prospecting licences and mining leases in      respect  of   minor  minerals   which  were   in  force      immediately before  the commencement  of the  Act would      continue in  force. It  is admitted  that no such rules      were made  by the State Government. It follows that the      subject of  legislation is  covered in respect of minor      minerals by  the express  words of s. 15(1). Parliament      has  undertaken   legislation  and   laid   down   that      regulation of  the grant  of prospecting  licences  and      mining leases  in respect  of minor  minerals  and  for      purposes connected  therewith must  be by rules made by      the State Government. Whether the rules are made or not      the topic  is covered  by Parliamentary legislation and      to that  extent the  powers of  State  Legislature  are      wanting.  Therefore,   there  is   no  room  for  State      Legislation". 703 In Baijnath  Kedia’s case  (supra), this Court also said (at p. 116):           "We have  already  held  that  the  whole  of  the      legislative field  was  covered  by  the  Parliamentary      declaration read  with provisions  of Act  67 of  1957,      particularly s.  15  We have also held that entry 23 of      List II was to that extent cut down by entry 54 of List      I. The  whole of  the topic  of minor minerals became a      Union subject. The Union Parliament allowed rules to be      made but  that did not recreate a scope for legislation      at the  State level.  Therefore, if the old leases were

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    to be modified a legislative enactment by Parliament on      the lines of s. 16 of Act 67 of 1957 was necessary. The      place of  such a  law could not be taken by legislation      by the  State Legislature  as it  purported  to  do  by      enacting the  second Proviso  to  s.  10  of  the  Land      Reforms Act. It will further be seen that Parliament in      s. 4  of the  Act 67  of 1957  created an  express  bar      although s.  4 was  not applicable  to minor  minerals.      Whether s. 4 was intended to apply to minor minerals as      well or  any part  of it  applies to minor minerals are      questions we  cannot consider  in  view  of  the  clear      declaration in  s. 14  of  Act  67  of  1957  that  the      provisions  of  ss.  4-13  (inclusive)  do  not  apply.      Therefore, there does not exist any prohibition such as      is to  be found  in s. 4(1) Proviso in respect of minor      minerals. Although  s. 16  applies to minor minerals it      only permits  modification  of  mining  leases  granted      before October  25, 1949.  In regard to leases of minor      minerals executed  between this  date and December 1964      when Rule  20(1) was  enacted, there is no provision of      law which  enables the  terms of  existing leases to be      altered. A mere rule is not sufficient". Again, referring  to the  earlier decisions  it said  (at p. 117):           "On the  basis of  those rulings we have held that      the entire  legislative  field  in  relation  to  minor      minerals had been withdrawn from the State Legislature.      We have  also held  that vested  rights could  only  be      taken away by law made by a competent legislature. Mere      rule-making power  of the State Government was not able      to reach  them. The authority to do so must, therefore,      have emanated  from Parliament.  The existing provision      related to  regulation of  leases and matters connected      therewith  to   be  granted   in  future  and  not  for      alteration  of  the  terms  of  leases  which  were  in      existence before  Act 67  of  1957.  For  that  special      legislative  provision   was  necessary.   As  no  such      parliamentary law  had been  passed by  the second sub-      rule to  Rule 20  was ineffective.  It could not derive      sustenance from  the second  Proviso to s. 10(2) of the      Land Reforms  Act since  that proviso  was not  validly      enacted."      The question  which arises  before us  now is  whether, possibly as  a result  of the  decision  of  this  Court  in Baijnath  Kedia’s  case  (supra),  the  Parliament  had  not amended the law, as we find it in the present 704 Section 16  of the  Act 67  of 1957, as amended by Act 56 of 1972, so  as to  undo its  effect. If  that amendment  is in response to  the need  pointed out  in Baijnath Kedia’s case (supra) would it not cover the provisions of the Haryana Act now before us ?      The preamble to the Haryana Act states that it is:           "An Act  to vest  the mineral  rights in the State      Govt. and  to provide  for payment  of  amount  to  the      owners of  minerals and  for  other  matters  connected      therewith." The crucial section is S. 3 of the Haryana Act which runs as follows:           "S. 3 Vesting of minerals in State Government.-(1)      The  State  Government  may,  from  time  to  time,  by      notification, acquire  the right to any minerals in any      land and  the right  to the  minerals specified  in the      notification shall,  from the  date of its publication,      vest in the State Government.

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         (2) Notwithstanding  anything contained in any law      for the  time being in force, on the publication of the      notification under  sub-section (1),  the right  to the      minerals in  the land  specified  in  the  notification      shall vest  absolutely in  the State Government and the      State Government  shall, subject  to the  provisions of      the Mines  and Minerals  (Regulation  and  Development)      Act, 1957, have all the powers necessary for the proper      enjoyment or disposal of such right.           (3) The right to the minerals in the land includes      the  right  of  access  to  land  for  the  purpose  of      prospecting and  working mines  and  for  the  purposes      subsidiary thereto  including the  sinking of  pits and      shafts, erection  of plants and machinery, construction      of roads,  stacking of minerals and deposits of refuse,      quarrying and  obtaining building  and road  materials,      using water  and taking  timber and  any other  purpose      which the State Government may declare to be subsidiary      to mining.           (4) If  the State  Government has  assigned to any      person its  right over  any minerals,  and if  for  the      proper enjoyment  of such  right, it  is necessary that      all or  any of  the powers  specified in subsection (2)      and (3)  should be  exercised, the Collector may, by an      order  in   writing  subject  to  such  conditions  and      reservations as he may specify, delegate such powers to      the person to whom the right has been assigned".      Other provisions  of the  Haryana Act are not material. Section 1 merely gives the Act its title and Section 2 deals with definitions. Section 4 relates to compensation. Section 5 provides  for references or disputes about compensation to Civil  Courts.   Section  6   applies  Civil   procedure  to compensation proceedings.  Section 7  provides for  appeals. Section  8  contains  the  necessary  powers  of  the  State Government to frame rules. These provisions exhaust the Act. 705      Saltpetre was  declared a minor mineral by notification No. 1(31)  65-MII on  21st January,  1967. Its  deposits are said to  have been  found in  638 villages  of  Haryana.  It appears that  the State  of Haryana  considered itself to be the owner  of these  deposits on  the strength of entries in the records  of rights  (Wajib-ul-arz) of these villages and used to  auction them  in accordance  with the  Punjab Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 1964. But, on 25th May, 1971, the Punjab &  Haryana High  Court held  on a Writ Petition (C.W. No. 1221  of 1971),  that unless  the mineral  deposits  are specifically mentioned  in the  Wajib-ul-arz of a village as having vested  in the  State, their  ownership  would  still remain vested  in the former proprietors mentioned as owners of their  lands in  a Wajib-ul-arz.  As  a  result  of  this decision, the  right to  Saltpetre deposits  was found to be vested in  individual proprietors  of their estates and Gram Panchayats in  about 600  out of  638 villages. It is stated that, in  order to  meet this situation, the Haryana Act No. 48 of  1973 was  framed and  passed. The  President of India gave his  assent to  it on 6th December, 1973. It was thus a logical corollary  of land reforms. Apparently, there was no conflict between  the State  and the Union Government on the policy underlying the Act.      The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant State were:      Firstly, that the Central Act does not purport to cover or operate  upon the  power to acquire ownership in minerals which are part of "land". The relevant entry for exercise of legislative power  to acquire  property is  entry 42  in the

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Concurrent List  (List III)  of the  Seventh  Schedule.  The Central Act  purports to  have been  made in exercise of the power  under   entry  54   of  List  I  for  regulation  and development of  mines, whereas  the Haryana  Act operates in the distinct and separate field of acquisition of property.      Secondly, minerals  being part  of "land" in the State, within the  competence of the State Legislature to legislate upon,  under   entry  18   of  the  State  List  (List  II), legislation falling substantially under this head, read with entry 23  of the  State List  and entry 42 of the Concurrent List (List  III), should  not be  invalidated unless  we are compelled to do so.      Thirdly, entry  54 of  List  I,  set  out  above  would naturally  cover   only  those   parts  of   the  field   of acquisition, in  accordance  with  rules  of  interpretation indicated in  State of West Bengal’s case (supra), which are expressly excluded  from this  special field  by the Central Act. Particularly,  as acquisition  belongs to  a  different head in  the concurrent  field, on  which there is neither a Central Act  for acquiring ownership of mineral deposits nor any express  provision for it in Act 67 of 1957, there could be no  question of  the exclusion  of the power of the State Legislature to  pass the  impugned Act.  There was  thus  no unavoidable conflict between it and the State Act.      Fourthly,  the  impugned  Act  is  protected  from  any challenge on the ground of inadequacy of compensation or the unreasonableness of the principles contained in Section 4(1) of the Haryana Act, as the 706 acquisition of  parts of  estates of  former proprietors  of land falls under Article 31A.      On  the   other  hand,  the  learned  Counsel  for  the respondents has  urged that  the cases before us are covered completely by  the decisions  of this Court discussed above, and, in  particular by  those in Tulloch Co’s., case (supra) and Baijnath  Kedia’s case  (supra). It  is urged that, when acquisition is  only a  means of conservation or development of mineral  resources, even  this field  must be  held to be necessarily excluded  by the  declaration in  Section 2  and other provisions of Central Act 67 of 1957 which will become unworkable  if  the  provisions  of  the  Haryana  Act  were permitted to operate.      It  seems  difficult  to  sustain  the  case  that  the provisions of  the Central Act would be really unworkable by mere change  of ownership  of land in which mineral deposits are found. We have to judge the character of the Haryana Act by the substance and effect of its provisions and not merely by the purpose given in the statement of reasons and objects behind it.  Such statements of reasons are relevant when the object  or   purpose  of  an  enactment  is  in  dispute  or uncertain. They  can never override the effect which follows logically from the explicit and unmistakable language of its substantive provisions.  Such effect is the best evidence of intention. A  statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the  statute, and, therefore, not even relevant in a case in which  the language  of the  operative parts  of the  Act leaves no  room whatsoever,  as it  does not  in the Haryana Act, to  doubt what  was meant by the legislators. It is not disputed here  that the object and effect of the Haryana Act was to  acquire proprietary  right to  mineral deposits’  in "land". Its provisions, however, do not mention leasehold or licensee rights.  Obviously, this is so because these rights are governed by the Central Act 67 of 1957.      As we  found nothing in the judgment under appeal or in the arguments  advanced by  either side to indicate that the

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effect of  Act 56  of 1972  which had amended Act 67 of 1957 had been specifically noticed, we considered it necessary to hear further  arguments with  a view  to giving  parties  an opportunity of  showing us  how earlier  decisions, when the provisions introduced  by Act  56 of  1972 were  not  there, could be  at all helpful in deciding the question now before us. One  of the  objections taken  before us, at the further hearing given to the parties, was that we should not allow a new point  to be  argued. We  do  not  think  that  any  new question was  allowed by  us to  be raised simply because we have permitted  parties to place their points of view on the same question  after taking into account some changes in the Central Act. Indeed, we are bound to take judicial notice of the law  as it exists after its amendment. We can only apply the law  as it  exists and  not the  law as  it once was. No party could  justifiably  complain  that  it  was  given  an additional opportunity to meet what follows from the amended law even  if the  effect of  the amendment  was not  noticed earlier.      We are  particularly impressed  by  the  provisions  of Sections 16  and 17  as they  now stand. A glance at section 16(1)(b) shows that the 707      Central Act  67 of  1957 itself contemplates vesting of lands, which  had belonged to any proprietor of an estate or tenure holder  either on  or after  25th October, 1949, in a State Government  under a  State enactment providing for the acquisition of  estates or  tenures in  land or for agrarian reforms. The  provisions lay down that mining leases granted in such  land must  be  brought  into  conformity  with  the amended law  introduced by  Act 56  of 1972.  It seems to us that this  clearly means that Parliament itself contemplated State legislation  for vesting  of lands  containing mineral deposits in  the State Govt. It only required that rights to mining granted  in such  land should  be  regulated  by  the provisions of  Act 67 of 1957 as amended. This feature could only be  explained on the assumption that Parliament did not intend to  trench upon  powers of  State Legislatures  under entry 18  of List II, read with entry 42 of List III. Again, Section 17  of the  Central Act  67 of 1957 shows that there was no  intention to  interfere with vesting of lands in the States by the provisions of the Central Act.      The only  answer given  on behalf of the respondents to this contention  is that  such vesting as it contemplated by Section 16(1)(b)  of the Central Act, as it now stands, must be of  "estates" of  proprietors or  lands of tenure holders under some legislation for agrarian reform. We are unable to find any  force in  this contention.  Article 31  A  of  the Constitution is  not confined  to legislation  for  agrarian reform. Agrarian  reform is  only one  of  the  possible  or alternative objects  of such acquisition. It need not be the exclusive or  only purpose of State legislation contemplated by Section  16(1) (b)  of the  Central Act.  And,  power  to legislate for  the acquisition  of the whole of an estate or "tenure" would  include the  power to legislate for any part of it.      Writ Petition  Nos. 1309  to 1318  and 1371  to 1373 of 1975, directed against the provisions of this Act, have also been placed  before us for arguments and appropriate orders. The petitioners  in these  cases assert rights as holders of mining leases  granted by  persons who  had been  entered as proprietors of  estates in  the records of rights in various villages. The  rights of persons so entered (in a "Wajib-ul- arz") to  mineral deposits  in their  former lands have been acquired by  the State  under the  Haryana Act. According to

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the Haryana  State, the Act was passed so as to, inter-alia, change the  law as  declared by  the Punjab  & Haryana  High Court in  the case reported in AIR 1972 P&H p. 50. According to the  view of  the High  Court, rights  in such  lands had continued to  vest  in  former  owners  of  estates  despite acquisitions of other parts of their "estate". The effect of the Haryana  Act was,  it was  urged,  only  to  change  the ownership  without   interfering  with   the  regulation  of leasehold  or   licensee  rights   in  minerals   under  the provisions of  the Central  Act 67  of 1957. The Haryana Act expressly states  that it operates subject to the overriding provisions of Act 67 of 1957.      Dr. L.  M. Singhvi, appearing on behalf of the State of Haryana, in  the Writ  Petitions under  Article 32, submits: Firstly,  that  the  legislative  competence  of  the  State Legislature, under entry 23 of List II is subjected to entry No. 54 of List I only "to the extent to which" 708 Parliament chooses  to take  upon itself  the regulation  of mines and  minerals and  no more. Secondly, in arriving at a decision on  the extent  to  which  Parliament  has  removed regulation and  development of  mines  from  State  control, strict construction  ought to  be adopted so that, without a specific and  clear declaration  by Parliament,  ousting the power of  State Legislature  to deal with vesting of land in the State  Government, it  should not  be assumed  that  the legislative power of the State to acquire what is "land" had been  taken  away.  Thirdly,  Parliament  having  legislated specifically only  in order  to regulate the grant of mining leases and concessions, irrespective of the ownership of the lands in  which mining  leases and  concessions are granted, the clear  legislative intent  of Parliament,  gathered from the Central  Act 67  of 1957 itself, also was to exclude the topic of  acquisition of ownership and other rights in land, apart from  those of  holders of mining leases and licences, from its  purview. Fourthly,  the majority view in the State of West  Bengal’s case (supra) should be read in the context of the particular Act considered there under which the Union Govt. had  been given powers of acquiring lands belonging to the State  of West  Bengal. No such Central Act is before us for interpretation.  Even if  the power  was vested  in  the Parliament to  acquire land as an incident of regulation and development  of   minerals,  that   power  not  having  been exercised at  all by  Act is of 1957, it was not permissible to assume  any conflict  between the  Central Act 67 of 1957 and the  Haryana Act. Fifthly, D. M. Collieries & Industries Ltd. v.  Commissioner Burdwan  Division, following 66 C.W.N. p. 304=AIR  1960 Cal. 646, could be relied upon to urge that States had  not lost their legislative competence altogether to acquire  lands in  which mineral rights could be granted. Examples of  such acquisitions were: section 10 of the Bihar Land Reforms  Act, 1950,  Section 5(2)  of the  West  Bengal Estate Acquisition  Act, 1953 (as amended by Act 22 of 1964) Coal Bearing  Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957: Coaking Coal  Mines (Nationalisation)  Act  1972,  and  Coal Mines, (Nationalisation)  Act,  1973.  In  any  case,  until Parliament  legislates   to  acquire  ownership  of  mineral deposits in  a State,  this  field  cannot  be  said  to  be occupied merely because of the declaration in Act 67 of 1957 which contains  nothing whatsoever  about the  ownership  of minerals. Sixthly,  the provisions  of Act  67 of  1957 also show that  the power  of granting  leases and concessions in respect  of  mineral  deposits  is  left  largely  to  State Government.      There is,  however, one  argument advanced on behalf of

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holders of leases or licences of mining rights which must be upheld. It  is that  lessee and licensee rights, governed by the provisions  of Act  67 of 1957 or rules made thereunder, are not covered by the Haryana Act. It is clear from Section 3(2) of  the Haryana  Act itself that the provisions of this Act are  to be  read subject  to the  provisions made  by or under the  Central Act.  Moreover, the  Haryana Act does not and cannot  ipso facto  terminate either  lessee or licensee rights which  were subsisting  on the  date when the Haryana Act came  into force.  On the  other hand,  section 9 of the Central Act 709 56 of  1972, which  amended section  16 of the Principal Act (Central Act 67 of 1957), made it imperative for such lessee rights as  existed in  estates, (which had vested in a State Government) to  be brought  into conformity with the Central Act. Obviously,  therefore,  if  there  are  any  lessee  or licensee rights  of mining  in minor  minerals on land which were actually regulated by the provisions of the Central Act 67 of  1957, they will continue. Although, this is a legally correct  contention,   it  was  not  shewn  to  us  how  the notification of  auctions  of  mining  rights  affected  any subsisting rights  of any  alleged lessee  or licensee.  The facts of no individual case were placed before us. We do not know which  respondent in  the appeal or which petitioner in Writ Petitions  before us has any subsisting rights governed by any  of the  provisions of  the Central Act or rules made thereunder. It has also not been shewn to us that any lessee or licensee  asked the  State Government  to carry  out  any statutory or  contractual obligation  before he  invoked the Writ jurisdiction  of the High Court or of this Court. Thus, essential averments  to disclose  subsisting rights  or  the locus standi of the petitioners are wanting here.      In Writ  Petitions No. 1309-1318 and 1371-1373 of 1975, the petitioners  only assert  that they are lessees of minor minerals holding  rights under registered leases executed by the owners of minor minerals. But, they do not state whether their leases  are governed  by or  have  been  brought  into conformity with the provisions of the Central Act.      Annexure ’A’  is the  notification, dated  10th  April, 1974, assailed  by petitioner  in this Court. Its purpose is stated in the following terms:           "In exercise  of powers  conferred by  sub-section      (1) of  Section 3  of the  Haryana Mineral  (Vesting of      Rights) Act,  1973,  the  Governor  of  Haryana  hereby      acquires the right to the minerals, mentioned in column      6 of  the schedule given below in the land specified in      column 5 thereof". The schedule  contains a  large number  of khasra numbers of plots in various villages covered by the notification      Another   notification   of   11th   September,   1975, challenged by the petitioners in this Court says:           ’It is hereby notified for the general public that      Minor Mineral  quarries of  Gurgaon  District,  as  per      particulars given  below, will  be put to auction on 1-      10-1975 in  the office  of  Senior-District  Industries      Officer, Faridabad, at 10 A.M.". Thereafter, follows  the names  of 139  villages  in  Tehsil Gurgaon under  the heading  "Name of Quarry". Under the next heading. "Name  of the Minor Mineral", occur the words "Road metal and stone." 710 The notification then proceeds to say:           "The terms and conditions of the auction are given                below :-

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         (i)  Each bidder  shall be  required to  deposit a                sum of Rs. 200 in cash as earnest money, with                the Presiding Officer before participating in                the auction.           (ii) The period  of contract  shall commence  from                the date of execution of the agreement to the                21st March, 1977.           (iii)Other terms  and conditions  of auction shall                be the  same as contained in the Punjab Minor                Mineral Concession Rules, 1964, as adopted by                Haryana Government.           (iv) The  highest  bidder  shall  be  entitled  to                obtain short  term permits  from the  date of                auction till  the date  of acceptance  of his                bid by the competent authority. Therefore, he                will  not   have  any  right  to  revoke  his                officer. Any other  information  he  had  from  the  Senior  District Industries Officer. Faridabad.                                               (B. L. MITTAL)                            Director of Industries, Haryana".      Some of  the numbers  given in  the first  notification correspond with  the number of plots in respect of which the petitioners allege  to be  lease-holders. A  perusal of  the petitions and  the  counter-affidavits  filed  in  reply  on behalf of  the State  of Haryana shows that the only dispute between the  parties relates  to the  vesting  of  ownership rights  in   a  minor  mineral  in  these  plots.  But,  the petitioners have  come before  us  as  lessees  and  not  as owners.  Rights   of  former   owners  have   been  validity terminated by  the Haryana  Act. We  are unable to make out, from these  petitions how  any lessee rights acquired by the petitioners  themselves,   under  any  law  subsist  or  are affected by the notifications mentioned above.      We proceed to record our conclusions as follows:      1. The  Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act, 1973, is valid,  as it  is not,  in  any  way,  repugnant  to  the provisions  of   the  Mines   and  Minerals  (Regulation  of Development) Act  67 of  1957, made by Parliament. Ownership rights could  be and  have been  validity  acquired  by  the Haryana Govt. under the Haryana Act.      2. No  rights are  shewn by any petitioner before us to have been  conferred upon  him under  any lease  or  licence executed or  brought in accordance with the provision of the Central Act  67 of  1957, but, any petitioner, either before the High  Court or  in this  Court, now  before us,  who can establish any  such right  governed by the provisions of the Central Act  67 of  1957 may take such proceedings before an appropriate Court,  if so  advised, as  may still be open to him  under  the  law,  against  any  such  action  or  Govt. notification as 711 is alleged to infringe that right. We are unable to find any such right in any writ petition, as framed, now before us.      3. Any  petitioner who  applies for  a writ or order in the nature  of a  mandamus should, in compliance with a well known rule  of practice,  ordinarily, first  call  upon  the authority concerned  to discharge  its legal  obligation and show that it has refused or neglected to carry it out within a reasonable  time before  applying to  a Court  for such an order even where the alleged obligation is established.      Accordingly, subject to the observations made above, we allow Civil  Appeals Nos. 844-860 of 1975, and set aside the judgment and  orders of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and dismiss the Writ petitions.

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    We also  dismiss the  Writ Petitions Nos. 1309-1318 and 1371-1373 of  1975, subject  to the observations made above, filed in this Court.      Parties will bear their own costs. P.B.R.                                      Appeal allowed &                                         Petitions dismissed. 712