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PETITIONER: STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJA MAHENDRA PAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       31/03/1999

BENCH: V.N.  Khara, R.P.  Sethi.

JUDGMENT:

SETHI, J.

       Despite independence of the  country  about  half  a century  back  and  the establishment of a democratic set up with the declaration in the Constitution to have a  Secular, Socialist  Republic  in  the  country,  there are people and organisations who have not  mentally  re-conciled  with  the realities  of  life  and  the  writings  in  the chapters of history  for  various   reasons   including   their   vested interests.   Ignoring  the  establishment of the rule of law and the development of the constitutional set up, they  have made  and are making fanatic efforts to sabotage the path of the goal intended to achieve the  welfare  of  the  society. Ignoring  the  verdicts of this Court in Keshvananda Bharati vs.  State of Kerala (1973) Suppl, SCR 1), R.C.  Cooper  Vs. Union of  India  (1970) 3 SCR 530) and Madhav Rao Vs.  Union (1971) 3 SCR 9) and various  other  pronouncements,  efforts have  been  made to reverse back the wheel of history merely for personal gains to quench the lust for money  and  power. The  case  of  respondent  No.1 in this litigation is one of such persons who has done everything possible to utilise the forum of the Courts  for  the  attainment  of  his  personal benefits by attempting to utilise the alleged constitutional guarantees in  his favour.  A ruler of the yester years, the respondent No.  1, approached the High Court for issuance of the command to the State Forest Corporation by treating  him equivalent  to  the  Government  of  Himachal  Pradesh  with conferment of monetary gains which were permissible  to  the State Government on the basis of the decision of the Pricing Committee.   The High Court granted prayer sought for by the judgment impugned in this appeal.  The Maharaja was held, to have been equated with the Government and  entitled  to  the relief  claimed by him as according to the High Court he was found to  have  been  deprived  of  the  right  to  life  as envisaged by  Article  21 of the Constitution of India.  The High Court observed "We have held  that  the  petitioner  is entitled  to enforce his claim particularly the right to his livelihood through this writ petition." It was further held, "he  was,  for  all  purposes,  possessed   power   of   the government.  The Court further observed, "infact the Pricing Committee  on behalf of the Government in its wisdom, appear to have equated  the  petitioner  with  the  government  and directed  that the decision regarding the aforesaid payments taken in respect of the government product shall also  apply to  Kutlehar Forest as well." By way of issuance of the writ of mandamus, the respondent No.1 was held  entitled  to  the

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interest  on  the  delayed  payment of royalty, damages with respect to illicit felling plus 100 per cent penalty for the illegally felled trees.  He was further conferred  with  the grant  of  interest  on  interest  and  share in the levy of extension   fee   chargeable   by   the   State   from   the respondent-corporation  under  the terms of the agreement or the provisions of law applicable in the case.

       The  judgment  impugned  in  this  appeal  has  been assailed  on  various  grounds  including  the   ground   of non-maintainability  of the writ petition, error on the part of the High Court to equate  the  State  Government  with  a private  person, disentitlement of the respondent to claim a share in the penal interest and levies which the  State  was entitled  to  impose  and  recover  as  a consequence of its sovereign functions.

       The relevant facts for deciding the  present  appeal are,  that the dispute relates to Kutlehar Forest located in the district of Kangra, now a part of HimachalPradesh  State which was  earlier a Princely State.  The aforesaid Princely State was founded by one Shri  Narendra  Pai  about  300-400 years back  whose  descendant is respondent No.  1, the said State was conferred 16 Tappas’ (chunks of land),  four  were Jagir Tappas’  and  twelve  Khalsa  Tappas’.   In Four Jagir Tapas’, the land revenue  to  the  extent  of  Rs.10,000/was assigned  to  the  forefathers  of respondent No.1 by way of ’Jagir.  In addition to four Tappas’, about twenty  thousand acres of land belonging to the ’Baratandars’ (right holders) which  was  not  used  for  agricultural  purposes, was also assigned.  The forefathers of respondent No.1 are stated  to have grown large number of trees over the said land from the period before  1868  A.D.   Respondent No.1 claimed that his ancestors  protected  and  maintained  those   trees   while ’Baratandars’  were  granted  various  rights  including the right to get timber on concessional rate for their  domestic requirements and  the  right  to graze their cattle.  During the settlement operation of  civil  district  of  Kangra  in 1869, Mr.    James  Lyall,  Settlement  Officer,  had made a proposal vide the letter 12.2.1868 that  the  management  of forests in four ’Tappas’ be granted to the Raja of Kutlehar. The  aforesaid  proposal is claimed to have been accepted by the Government of Punjab  not  only  with  respect  to  four ’Jagir  Tappas’  but  also  for  all 16 Tappas’ including 12 Khalsa Tappas’.  The predecessor-in-interest  of  respondent No.1 are stated to have started managing the Kutlehar Forest subject  to  the  conditions contained in the approval dated 11.1 .1869.  The then Government is stated to  have  started laying  claims  to  the trees grown on the aforesaid land in the year  1915  which  was  resisted  and  resulted  in  the commencement   of   the  fresh  correspondence  between  the parties.  The controversies are said to  have  been  set  at rest by  the  Lt.   Governor of Punjab in the year 1916 vide letter dated 25.5.1916 by which it was made clear that  "All trees growing in the protected forests, subject to the right of  ’Bartandars’  and to the other conditions and exceptions hereinafter specified, belong to Government, but  have  been assigned  by  Government to the Raja so long as he abides by the conditions of management hereunto appended".

       In exercise of  his  powers  vested  under  Sections 28,29(a)  an  31  of  She  Indian Forests Act, 1878, the Lt. Governor of Punjab issued Notification  dated  31.8.1915  by which  various  lands  within  the  limits of various Jagirs including the Jagir of Kutlehar in the district  of  Kangra,

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the  management  of  the  forests was assigned to the Rajas’ including  the  predecessor-in-interest  of  the  respondent No.1,  subject  to the terms and conditions specified in the aforesaid orders.  The  Rajas’  were  directed  to  maintain proper account of the trees standing on the land which could be  sold  to traders only after the trees were marked by the Forest Department.  The trees could  be  sold  only  at  the rates approved  by the Forest Department.  The Raja was held entitled to  continue  to  realize  grazing  fees  from  the ’Gaddies’  at  the  rates  fixed  by government or by mutual agreement between the Raja and the ’Gaddi’  subject  to  the approval by   the   Deputy   Commissioner.    However,  vide Notification No.   4531-FT.    (CH-58/523  dated   1.10.1958 issued  under Section 2(2) of the Forest Act, the respondent was appointed as a Forest Superintendent and  the  employees working under him in the aforesaid forest declared as Forest Officers with  respect  to Kutlehar Forest.  As per terms of his appointment, the respondent was held entitled to  retain 3/4  of  the income derivable from the forest whereas 1/4 of the gross  income  was  payable  to  the  government.    The conditions explicitly provided:-

       "The  Raja  shall  keep  a  register showing all the receipts from the sate of timber, bamboos and  other  forest produce whether  to  zimidars or to traders.  Of this income the  Raja  shall  in  case  of  Kutlehar,  receive  3/4  and Government 1/4."

       The various forest produces such as  resin,  timber, bamboo and  bhabar grass etc.  were required to be auctioned by the respondent like the manner such auctions were held by the Forest Department in respect of  government  forests  in accordance  with the working plan and the highest bidder was to be granted the lease.   This  practice  was  discontinued after  the  forests were nationalised by the Appellant-State in the year 1974, when Himachal Pradesh  Forest  Corporation was  incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.  Produce of the government forests, thereafter,  could be sold  only  to  the  Forest  Corporation.  Ever since its incorporation    the    respondent-corporation     continued purchasing  timber and other forest produces from respondent No.1 in  accordance  with  the  working  plan.    The   said respondent  alleged that in add-on to his entitlement of the sale price of the various forest produces sold by him out of the Kutlehar forest to the  respondent-corporation,  he  was also  entitled  to  share  the  interest on delayed payment, interest on interest and compensation for damages caused  to the trees  in  the  course of extraction of timber etc.  The basis for his claim as pleaded In writ petition and  noticed by the High Court was:-

       Firstly,   the   Government   of   Himachal  Pradesh constituted a Committee of officers for determination of the price and terms and  conditions  of  the  supply  of  forest produce  sold  in favour of the second respondent (HP Forest Corporation) vide notification dated 18.5.1974  (Annexure-C) whereby  the fourth respondent (Pricing Committee) on behalf of the Government In its wisdom had equated  the  petitioner with the Government and directed that the decision regarding the  aforesaid  payments  taken in respect of the Government produce should apply to Kutlehar Forest as well;

       Secondly, that according to the practice  prevailing and trade custom, the petitioner is entitled to his share in the above said additional income:  and

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       Thirdly, that the Government and the petitioner were similarly  circumstanced In so far as the sale of the forest produce is concerned and, therefore, any  discrimination  of the share of additional amount by way of income is offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution."

The respondent asserted that the additional amounts  claimed by  him  were payable even by the private lessees to whom he and the government had sold various forest  produces  before coming  into  the  existence  of the respondent-corporation. The  appellant-State  was  claimed  to  have  constituted  a Pricing Committee which decided to apply the decisions taken by  it  in  regard to the sales made by Forest Department to the sales made by the respondent out of the Kutlehar  forest as well.    To  strengthen  his claim, the respondent relied upon Article  51  of  the  Article  of  Association  of  the respondent-corporation  which  provided  that the Government could issue directions from time to time which the directors of the company were bound to comply with.    The  respondent claimed  that  the corporation had an inescapable obligation to pay to him all the amounts claimed which it had failed to pay despite repeated written requests.    The  decision  qua interest  on  interest  is  stated to have been taken by the Pricing Committee with the object to curb  the  pendency  of belated  payments  attributed to the respondent-corporation. The decision  regarding  penalty  of  the  illicit/outshaped blazes was  stated to have been taken on 17.8.1982.  Levy of extension fee was  imposed  vide  decision  of  the  Pricing Committee dated  4.12.1986.    The  aforesaid  decisions are stated to have been made  applicable  in  the  case  of  the respondent vide  Item  No.   VIII recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting held on 16.5.1988.

       The  Pricing  Committee  in  its  meeting  held   on 6.10.1990  was stated to have reviewed the guidelines issued earlier in respect of the dealings of the  Himachal  Pradesh State Forest Corporation with the Government and the royalty to  be  charged from, and levies and penalties to be imposed upon the corporation in respect of the working of the forest by the corporation.  The Kutlehar Forest is stated  to  have been   resumed   by  the  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh  vide Notification dated 19.1.1990 issued under Section 3  of  the Punjab Resumption  of  Jagir Act, 1957.  The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests was directed to take over  management and  possession of Kutlehar forest from respondent No.1 with the assistance of the Collector.  Respondent  No.1  filed  a writ petition   (WP   No.     42/90)  with  respect  to  his pre-existing rights as also his entitlement  to  retain  the forest  by  challenging  the  validity  of the notification. Thereafter,  he  also  challenged   the   Himachal   Pradesh (Acquisition  of  Management)  Act,  1992  by  filing a writ petition(W.P.  No.  707 /92).  During the  pendency  of  the aforesaid writ  petition  No.   42/90, respondent No.1 filed C.W.P.  No.  528/91 in the High Court  of  Himachal  Pradesh claiming  the  relief  on  the basis of the decisions of the Pricing Committee being applicable to him.  The claim of the respondent No.1 was resisted on various grounds including :-

       "i) that the petitioner is  not  the  owner  of  the forest;         ii)  that  it  is  3  case  of enforcing contractual rights which can be done by way of  a  Civil  Suit  and  not through this writ petition.  Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable,

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       iii) that the  decision  of  the  fourth  respondent (Pricing  Committee)  regarding  the  payment  of additional amounts in question, such as, interest on belated  payments, interest  on interest, penalty on illicit out shaped blazes, levy of extension fees  etc.    to  the  petitioner  is  not binding  on  the  First  or the second respondent (HP Forest Corporation)

       iv)  that  the trees are not revenue but capital and that since the property in the trees is that  of  the  first respondent,  the  first  respondent is not liable to pay the share out of the damage caused to the trees, etc.  etc.

Rejecting the pleas of the appellant, the High Court allowed the writ petition vide the judgment impugned in this appeal.

       The  learned counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently argued that  the  writ  petition  filed  was  not maintainable   as  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in entertaining the same and consequently granting  the  relief to the  respondent  No.1.  The rights of respondent No.1, if any, are stated to be based upon a contract for which he was obliged to avail of the alternative  efficacious  remedy  of filing  a  suit  either for the recovery of the money or for rendition of  accounts.     It   is   contended   that   the discretionary  powers vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution could not have been exercised in the facts and circumstances  of  the  case.    Though,  we  find substance  in  the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, yet we are not inclined to allow the  appeal  and dismiss  the  writ  petition of respondent No.1 only on this ground, it is true that the powers conferred upon  the  High Court   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution  are discretionary  in  nature  which  can  be  invoked  for  the enforcement  of any fundamental right or legal right but not for mere contractual rights  arising  out  of  an  agreement particularly   in  view  of  the  existence  of  efficacious alternative remedy The Constitutional  Court  should  insist upon  the party to avail of the same instead of invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court.  This does not however debar the Court from granting the appropriate relief to   a   citizen   under   peculiar   and   special    facts notwithstanding  the  existence  of  alternative efficacious remedy.  The existence  of  the  special  circumstances  are required  to  be noticed before issuance of the direction by the High Court while invoking  the  jurisdiction  under  the said Article.    In the instant case, the High Court did not notice any special circumstance which could be held to  have persuaded  it to deviate from the settled proposition of law regarding  the  exercise  of  the  writ  jurisdiction  under Article 226  of  the Constitution.  For exercise of the writ jurisdiction,  the  High  Court  pressed  into  service  the alleged  fundamental  right  to livelihood of the respondent which was found to have been violated by not making him  the payment of  the amounts claimed in the writ petition.  It is true that Article  21  of  the  Constitution  is  of  utmost importance,  violation of which, as and when found, directly or indirectly, or even  remotely,  has  to  be  looked  with disfavour.   The  violation  of  the  right to livelihood is required to be remedied.  But the  right  to  livelihood  as contemplated  under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be so widely  construed  which  may  result  in  defeating  the purpose sought  to be achieved by the aforesaid Article.  It is also true that the right to livelihood would include  all

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attributes  of  life  but the same cannot be extended to the extent that it may embrace or  take  within  its  ambit  all sorts  of  claim relating to the legal or contractual rights of the parties completely Ignoring  the  person  approaching the court  and the alleged violation of the said right.  The High Court appears to have adopted a very generous,  general and  casual  approach in applying the right to livelihood to the facts and circumstances of the case apparently  for  the purpose  of  clothing itself with the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.  We are sure that  if the  High  Court  had  considered  the argument in the right perspective and in the light of  various  pronouncements  of this   Court,   it   would   not  have  ventured  to  assume jurisdiction  for  the  purposes  of  conferring  the  State largess  of  public money, upon an unscrupulous litigant who preferred his claim on his proclaimed assumption of being as important as the Government of the State and equal  thereto. Despite  holding that the High Court had wrongly assumed the jurisdiction in the facts of the case, as  earlier  noticed, we  are  not  inclined  to  dismiss the writ petition of the respondent No.1 on this ground at this stage because that is likely to result in miscarriage of justice on account of the lapse of time which may now result in the foreclosure of all other remedies which could be availed of by  the  respondent in the  ordinary course.  The alternative remedies available to the respondent admittedly not being efficacious  at  this stage has persuaded us to decide the claim of the respondent on merits.

       To justify the claim of the  respondent  based  upon the  decision  of  the Pricing Committee, the learned senior counsel Dr.  L.M.    Singhvi,  has  submitted  that  as  the Pricing    Committee   was   the   quasi-judicial   tribunal constituted by the  State  Government  in  exercise  of  its statutory  as  well as plenary power, the respondents in the writ petition were bound to abide by  its  decision  and  in case  of  their failure to perform the obligations, the writ petitioner was justified in approaching the Court by way  of writ  petition  to seek the enforcement of rights arising on account of the decision of  the  alleged  statutory  Pricing Committee, it is not disputed that the Pricing Committee was constituted by   a   Notification  No.    10-26/72-SP  dated 18.5.1974 which was initially presided  over  by  the  Chief Secretary  and  later  on  by the Minister of Forests, it is also not disputed that the said Committee was established to determine the terms and conditions for the supply of  resin, resin  biases, standing trees and other forest produce to be handed over by the Himachal Pradesh Forest Department to the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation Ltd.  from time to time.  However, there is nothing on the  record  to  suggest that  the  said committee was constituted in exercise of any statutory power.  Despite mentioning the provisions of State Forest Corporation Act of 1974, the learned counsel for  the respondent  No.1 could not refer to any statutory obligation under the said Act requiring the appointment of the  Pricing Committee.   The  argument  appears  to  be afterthought and contradictory to the pleadings.  In his writ  petition,  the respondent  No.1  referred to Clause 51 of the Memorandum of Association of Articles of Association and submitted:-

       "That  in exercise of the powers conferred by clause 51 of the Memorandum, the  Government  of  Himachal  Pradesh vide   Notification   No.10-26/72-SF,   Shimla   dated16.5J4 constituted a committee of officers to determine  the  price and  terms  and  conditions  for  the supply of resin, resin

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blazes, standing trees and other forest produce to  be  sold to the  Himachal  Pradesh Forest Corporation Ltd.  from time to time.  A copy of the said notification is annexed to this petition as Annexure C

       That this notification was subsequently  amended  in the year  1986 vide notification No.  Fts (B) (A) 4-14/84-11 dated 28.11.88.     By   this   notification   the   earlier notification of 1974 was partially modified so as to include the  State  Minister  for  Forests,  Himachal Pradesh as the Chairman of the said Committee.

       That   the  aforesaid  Committee  has  been  holding meetings from time to time and  taking  decisions  regarding the  prices  at  which  the  Corporation  would purchase the forest produce from the Forest Department."

The petitioner further submitted that the State and all  its functionaries  were  duty bound to act fairly and reasonably in the discharge of their official functions.   The  conduct of  the  respondent-corporation  in allegedly denying to the writ petitioner the benefit of the Pricing  Committee  which was  stated  to  be  otherwise binding on the corporation in accordance  with  the  Clause  51  of  the   Memorandum   of Association, was alleged to be amounting to actionable wrong which entitled the petitioner to seek appropriate directions from  the Court to direct the respondent-corporation to give effect to the said  decision  and  the  appellant  to  issue direction to the Corporation to carry out all the directives of  the  Pricing Committee in relation to the forest produce sold in favour of the corporation by the writ petitioner out of Kutlehar  forest.    A  Committee  constituted  for   the purposes  of settling the matters between the Government and the Forest Corporation in pursuance  of  Clause  51  of  the Memorandum  of Association could not be termed to be a quasi judicial tribunal the decision of  which  could  be  binding upon  the  State  for  the purpose of the writ petitioner as well.  Clause 51 authorises the Stete  Government  to  issue appropriate  directions,  from  time  to  time,  as might be considered  necessary  in  regard  to   the   exercise   and performance  of  the  function  of  the  Corporation  in the matters involving substantial public interest  and  in  like manner   might   vary   and  annul  any  earlier  direction. Directions thus issued are required to be duly complied with and given immediate effect to.  Memorandum and  Articles  of Association  regulated  the  conduct  of  the  appellant and respondent Nos.   2  herein,  which  was  not  in  any  way, intended  to be made applicable to other persons such as the respondent No.1 herein.

       The submission that  the  Pricing  Committee  was  a quasi-judicial  tribunal constituted by the State Government in exercise of its statutory as welt  as  plenary  executive powers  can  also  not  be  accepted  in  the  light  of the functions assigned to the Committee.    Quasi-judicial  acts are  such  acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it  specially  directs out after  a  discretion,  in  its  nature  judicial.    The exercise of power by such tribunal or authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claims of the persons by an act of the mind or judgment upon the proposed  course  of  official action  as  to  an  object  of  the corporate power, for the consequences  of  which  the  office  will  not  be  liable, although his  act  was  not  well-judged.    A quasijudicial function has been termed to be one  which  stands  midway  a

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judicial and  an  administrative function.  The primary test is  as  to  whether  the   authority   alleged   to   be   a quasi-judicial,  has  any  express  statutory  duty  to  act judicially in arriving at the decision in question.  If  the reply is in affirmative, the authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial,  and  if  the  reply  is in the negative, it would not be.  The dictionary meaning of  the  word  ’quasi’ Is, "not exactly".

       It   follows,   therefore,   that  an  authority  Is described  as  quasi-judicial  when  it  has  some  of   the attributes  or trappings of judicial functions, but not all. This Court In Province of Bombay  vs.Khusaldas  S.    Advani (1950  SCR 621) dealt with the actions of the statutory body and laid down tests  for  ascertaining  whether  the  action taken   by   such  body  was  a  quasi-judicial  act  or  an administrative act.    The  Court  approved  the  celebrated definition  of  the quasi-judicial body given by Atkin L.J,, as he then was in Rex Vs.  Electricity Commissioners (1924-1 KB 171 in which it was held:

       "Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting  rights  of  subjects,  and having  the  duty  to  act judicially act In excess of their legal  authority  they  are  subject  to   the   controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs."

The  aforesaid definition was accepted as correct in Rex Vs. London County Council (1931-2KB  215)  and  many  subsequent cases both  in  England  and  in India.  Again this Court in Radeshyam Vs.  State of M.P.  (AIR 1959 SC 107) relying upon its earlier decision held:-

       "It  will  be noticed that this definition insets on three requisites each of which must be  fulfilled  in  order that  the act of the body may be quasi judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have legal authority,  (2) to  determine questions affecting the rights of parties, and (3) must have the duty lo act judicially.  Since a  writ  of certiorari  can  be  issued  only to correct the errors of a court or a quasi judicial body, it  would  follow  that  the real  and  determining  test for ascertaining whether an act authorised by a statute  is  a  quasi  judicial  act  or  an administrative  act  is whether the statute has expressly or impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the  duty  to  act judicially  as  required  by  the  third  condition  in  the definition given by Atkin L.J.  ......

       Relying on paragraphs 114 and 115 of Halsbury’s Laws of England 3rd Edition Volume 11 at pages 55-58  and  citing the case of  R.   Vs.  Manchester Legal Aid Committee 1952-2 QB 413 learned counsel  for  the  appellants  contends  that where  a  statute  requires decision to be arrived at purely from the point of view of policy or expediency the authority is under no duty to act judicially.  He urges that where, on the other hand, the order  has  to  be  passed  on  evidence either  under  an  express  provision  of  the statute or by implication and determination of particular facts  on  which its  jurisdiction  to exercise its power depends or if there is a proposal and an opposition the  authority  is  under  a duty to  act  judicially.    As  stated  in paragraph 115 of Halsbury’s Laws of England Volume 11 page 57,  the  duty  to act  judicially  may arise in widely differing circumstances which  it  would  be  imposible   to   attempt   to   define

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exhaustively.  he question whether or not there Is a duty to act  judicially must be decided in each case in the light of the  circumstances  of   the   particular   case   and   the construction  of  the particular statute with the assistance of  the  general  principles  laid  down  in  the   judicial decisions.    The  principles  deducible  from  the  various judicial decisions considered by this Court in 1950 SCR  621 :  (AIR 1950 SC 222 ) at page 725 (of SCR) :  (at p.  260 of AIR) were thus formulated namely:-

               "(i) that if a statute empowers an                 authority not being a Court in the                 ordinary sense, to decide disputes                 arising out of a claim made by one                 party   under  the  statute  which                 claim is opposed by another  party                 and  to  determine  the respective                 rights of the  contesting  parties                 who  are  opposed  to  each  other                 there is a lis and prima fade  and                 in  the absence of anything in the                 statute to the contrary it is  the                 duty   of  the  authority  to  act                 judicially and the decision of the                 authority is a quasi judicial act;                 and

               (ii) that if a statutory authority                 has power to  do  any  act,  which                 will   prejudicially   affect  the                 subject, then, although there  are                 not  two  parties  apart  from the                 authority  and  the   contest   is                 between the authority proposing to                 do   the   act   and  the  subject                 opposing     it,     the     final                 determination   of  the  authority                 will yet be a quasi  judicial  act                 provided the authority is required                 by the statute to act judicially."

In  the  instant  case  the  order  appointing  the  Pricing Committee  which  was  amended  on   26.11.86   specifically provided:

       "The  aforesaid Pricing Committee was established to determine (not merely to advise on) the price and terms  and conditions  for  the supply of resin, resin blazes, standing trees and other foreign produce to be handed over by the  HP Forest  Department  to  the  HP State Forest Corporation Ltd from time to time."

       Applying the tests noticed hereinabove, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the  said  committee was or intended to be a quasi-judicial tribunal as argued on behalf of  the respondent No.1.  This Committee can also not be stated to  have  been  constituted  in  exercise  of  the plenary administrative power of the appellant-state.  It has been  conceded  before  us  that  the said Committee was not constituted in terms of Section 6 of  the  Himachal  Pradesh Forest Produce  (Regulation  of  Trade) Act, 1982.  No other statutory provision has been relied either.   The  Committee appears  to  have  been  constituted  for  settlement of the claims and disputes  between  the  appellant-state  and  the

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respondent-corporation.  The decisions of the Committee were applicable  to  the parties to the said Committee and not to any third person.  The said Committee had no source  of  its constitution   in  any  statutes  nor  was  it  intended  to determine or adjudicate the claims of parties  with  respect to  the matters referred to it for opinion and suggestion or even for settlement between  the  parties  concerned.    The decision  of  the Committee, not being statutory, thus could not be given effect to by the High Court.

       Assuming  that the Committee was of a quasi-judicial character,  it  has  to  be   seen   as   to   whether   its decisions/recommendations  were applicable to the respondent No.1 in so far as Kutlehar Forest  was  concerned.    It  is admitted  that  the  Committee  dealt  with various items of disputes between the  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh  and  the Forest  Corporation  such  as  handing  over  of charging of extension fee, fixation of rates for resin  blazes  for  the year 1988-89.   1989-90, adjustment of rebate, royalty rates for timber Sots  (deodar,  kail  fir  and  chil,  sat  lots, Eucalyptus   Lots,  shisham,  sain  and  tuni,  khair  lots, interest  on  belated  payments,  damages  in  geltu   lots, interest  on interest, royalty for private trees and levy of extension fee.  it is not disputed before  us  that  on  the basis  of  the arrangement prevalent before the constitution of the corporation, respondent No.1 was entitled to a  share of 75 per cent of the sale profits of the forests.  In other words,  it  is conceded that respondent No.1 was entitled to 75 per cent  of  the  royalty  received  from  the  Kutlehar Forest.   It  is  also not disputed that respondent No.1 has already been paid his due share of royalty on the  basis  of the  price fixed by the Pricing Committee from time to time. The dispute is with respect to item Nos.  XI, pertaining  to interest  on  belated  payments,  item NoXII damage in geltu lots, item XIII interest on interest and item  No.XVII  levy of  extension  fee,  mentioned  in  the  Proceedings  of the Pricing Committee dated 6.10.1990 (Annexure C).    To  claim the share in the aforesaid items, the respondent No.1 relied upon  the decision of the Policing Committee meeting held on 16.5.1988 which inter alia provided:

       "It was decided and clarified that the royalty  will be  charged  for Kutlehar Forests on the same lines as fixed for Govt.    lots  linked  with  the  nature  of  trees  and intensity of  marking.   No differential rates or system can be fixed for Kutlehar Forest."

       It is contended  that  the  words  "no  differential rates  or  system"  mentioned  in  the aforesaid item of the decision of the Pricing Committee  entitled  the  respondent No.1  to  a share in all types of charges received/recovered by the Government from the State Forest  Corporation.    The submission  is  superficial  having  no  foundation to stand inasmuch as it ignores  the  heading  of  the  item  No.VIII dealing with "charging of royalty for Kutlehar Forest".  The reference to the words, "no differential rates or system" is relatable   only  to  the  royalty  and  not  to  the  other recoveries which the appellant-State was entitled to recover as a sovereign being admittedly the owner of the forest  and its produce.    The  High  Court appears to have committed a mistake in reading something between the lines which in fact did not exist.    Finding  difficult  with  the  conclusions arrived  at  by  the  High Court, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondent  No.1  vehemently  urged  that  the items  regarding which the respondent No.1 had preferred his

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claim, in fact, were the  attributes  of  the  royalty,  the payment  of  which the appellant-State could not have denied to his client.  In support of his submission he has referred to various judgments.

       Whatever be the meaning of the word  "royalty",  its connotation  and  use  in  the context of the case has to be understood in the light of the peculiar facts and  attending circumstances.   The  practice prevalent for exploitation of the forest  produce,  cannot  be  ignored,  which  generally authorised  the  owner  of the forest to recover the royalty for the felling of trees and extraction and  utilisation  of the other  forest  produce.    The  extension fee, interest, interest on interest, payment for out shaped illicit blazes, and damages cannot  be  held  to  be  covered  by  the  term "royalty"  as used in item No.VIII of the proceedings of the Pricing Committee.  The respondent No.1 as  already  noticed could  not  be equated with the State Government of Himachal Pradesh, and had no basis to  claim  the  ownership  in  the trees  grown  in  the  Kutlehar forest after he accepted his appointment as a Forest  Superintendent  in  the  year  1958 under Section 2(2) of the Forest Act.  The acceptance of his position  as  a  Forest  Superintendent  in  law,  ’a forest officer’ appointed under Section  2(2)  of  the  Forest  Act clearly  established  that  the respondent No.1 had accepted the  State  Government  to  be   dominant   owner   of   the property-and  that he was merely an officer appointed by the Government in exercise of its sovereign power.  But for  his position as a forest Officer, he had no jurisdiction to deal with the  forest  or  even enter into ’it.  The arrangements made earlier in the form of conferment of  rights  upon  his forefather  stood  extinguished and merged with his position as a Forest  Officer  of  the  State  Government.    He  was entitled  only  to such benefits to which the forest officer is entitled.   His  entitlement  in  the  present  case  was restricted  only to the extent of sharing of the royalty and not for anything more.  Even in  the  settlement  report  of 1916  which  was  amended  on  30.7.1945  regarding Kutlehar Forest it  was  provided  that  all  trees  growing  in  the protected  forest subject to the rights of Burtandars and to the  other  conditions  and  exceptions  specified   therein belonged  to  the Government which were assigned to the Raja so long as he abides the conditions of  management  or  such other  conditions  as  were  specified  at the time or which might be substituted by other terms at any time.

       Reliance upon the judgment of this Court in State of Orissa and Ors.  Vs.  Titaghur Paper Mills Co.   Ltd.    and Anr.   (AIR  1985  SC 1293) is also of no help to respondent No.  1.  In that case it was observed that royalty is not  a term used in legal parlance for the price of goods sold." It was observed that the royalty was defined to mean, a payment reserved  by  the  grantor  of  a patent, lease of a mine or similar right, and payable proportionately to the  use  made of  the  right  by  the  grantee,  which shall on payment of money, but may be a payment in kind being the part  of  the produce of   the  exercise  of  the  right.    The  judicial Committee of the Privy  Council  in  Raja  Bhadur  Kamakshya Narain Singh  Vs.    Commissioner  of  Income  Tax Bihar and Orissa (AIR 1943 PC 153) had held that royalty was an Income flowing from the covenant in the lease.  While dealing  with the question of royalty.  It was held:

       "These  are  periodical  payments, to be made by the lessee under; his covenants in consideration of the benefits

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which he is granted by the lessor.  What these benefits  may be  is  shown  by  the  extract from the lease quoted above. which illustrates how inadequate and  fallacious  it  is  to envisage  the  royalties  as  merely the price of the actual tons of coal.  The tonnage royalty is  indeed  only  payable when the coal or coke is gotton and despatched ; but that is merely the last stage.  As preliminary and ancillary to that culminating  act, liberties are granted to enter on the land and search, to dig and  sink  pits,  to  erect  engines  and machinery,  coke ovens furnaces and form railways and roads. All these and the like liberties show how fallacious  it  is to  treat  the  lease as merely one for the acquisition of a certain number of tons  of  coal,  or  the  agreed  item  of royalty as merely the price of each ton of coal ^

Neither the Judicial Committee of the Privy council nor this Court  had  held or referred to that the item like extension fee, interest, interest on interest, and payment for  damage caused  could  be  included  within  the  ambit  of the term ’royalty’.  The aforesaid  payments  were  thus  recoverable only   on  the  basis  of  the  contract  or  the  statutory provisions.

       In Inderjeet Singh Sial and  Anr.    Vs,  Karamchand Thapar and Ors.  (1995) 6 SCC 166 it was held:

               "In its primary and natural sense ’royalty’, in   the   legal  world,  is  known  as  the  equivalent  or translation of jura regalia or jura regia.  Royal rights and prerogatives of a sovereign are covered thereunder.  In  its secondary  sense  the  word  ’royalty’  would signify, as in mining leases, that part of the reddendum, variable  though, payable in cash or kind, for rights and privileges obtained. It  is  found in the clause of the deed by which the grantor reserves something to himself out of that which  he  grants. But "What  is  In  a  name?   A rose by any other name would smell as sweet." So said Shakespeare."

       The  Court  further  held that the commodity goes by its value and not by the wrapper in which it is packed.   If the  thought  is  clear, its translation in words, spoken or written, may more often than not, tend to be  faulty.    The same substance under the facts of the particular case has to be understood  before  applying  it  in  legal manner.  This Court has very clearly held that royalty in general connotes the State’s share in the goods upon which the rights of  its exploitation  are  conferred upon any person or the group of persons.   If  the  royalty  cannot  be   claimed   by   any individual,  much  less  the  controvercial  items being its attribute, even if assumed, can be claimed by a citizen.

       The subjects covered by item Nos, XI, XII, XIII  and XVII  have thus to be understood in this context which leave no doubt in our mind that the said claims against the forest corporation covered by the aforesaid items owed their origin to the exercise  of  the  sovereign  rights  vested  in  the appellant State.    No  private  citizen,  unless  specially authorised in the behalf under the provisions of  law  could prefer such  claims.    The  High  Court was, therefore, not justified in allowing the aforesaid claims in favour of  the respondent No.1.    The  observations  in  Para No.21 of the impugned  judgment  are,  therefore,  bereft  of  any  legal substance and thus cannot bo upheld.

       We, are,  therefore,  satisfied  that  the  impugned

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judgment  of  the  High  Court  cannot  be sustained even on merits and is liable to be quashed inasmuch as no  statutory right  enforceable  under  law  existed  in  favour  of  the respondent No.1 regarding the enforcement of which a command could have been issued in the form of a  writ  of  mandamus. The  appeal  of  the  State  is  accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside dismissing the  writ petition filed by  respondent  No.  1.  interim order issued in the case shall stand vacated and the respondent No.1 held liable to refund ail the sums of money which he has received in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court  and  interim order of this Court dated 16.10.95.  The excess amount shall be refunded  within  a period of three months.  In case, the excess amount is not refunded within the time specified, the respondent No.1 shall be liable for its  refund  along  with interest  at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of this order till the actual payment is made.    Respondent No.1  is  also  held  to  pay  costs  which  we  quantify at Rs.5,000/- .  The  amount  of  costs  be  deposited  in  the Registry  for  the Funds of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.