REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1678 OF 2002

State of Himachal Pradesh ...Appellant(s)

- Versus -

Narain Singh     ...Respondent(s)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1679 OF 2002

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. These  appeals  are  directed  against  the  

judgment  dated  17.4.2000  of  the  High  Court  of  

Himachal  Pradesh  at  Shimla  whereby  the  Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  disposed  of  C.W.P.  1

No.851/96  alongwith  C.W.P.  No.1192/96,  as  common  

questions of law and facts arose in those cases.  

C.W.P. No. 851/96 was filed by Narain Singh while  

C.W.P. No.1192/96 was filed by three persons namely  

Shri Surat Singh, Shiv Singh Tegta and Murki Lal  

and  in  both  the  writ  petitions,  the  respondents  

were the same  

2. In  both  these  cases,  the  constitutional  

validity  of  the  Himachal  Pradesh  Land  Revenue  

(Amendment and Validation) Act, 1996 (hereinafter  

called ‘the amendment Act’) was challenged as being  

in  conflict  with  the  original  provisions  of  the  

various  sections  of  the  Himachal  Pradesh  Land  

Revenue Act, 1953 (Act No.6 of 1954) (hereinafter  

called ‘the Principal Act’).  

3. It was also contended in the writ petition  

that  the  amendment  is  violative  of  the  basic  

structure of the Constitution.  

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4. The petitioners of C.W.P. No. 1192/96 and  

six other land owners of Tehsil Rohru and Chirgaon,  

District Shimla had earlier filed a C.W.P. No.206  

of 1998 titled as Thakur Gyan Singh and others Vs.  State of Himachal Pradesh and others wherein the  petitioners sought the following relief:-  

“(i) complete  the  on  going  land  revenue  settlement  operations  as  second  Revised  Settlement  strictly  in  accordance with the intent of the  two  notifications  one  pertaining  to  the  special  revision  of  the  existing  records of right under Section 33 of  the H.P. Land  Revenue Act, 1953 and  the  other  for  general  assessment  of  land revenue under Section 53  of the  said Act;

ii) withdraw  Instruction  Nos.  2,  4  and  supplementary instruction Nos. 2, 23 and  32 of Compendium of Instructions, issued by  the 4th respondent (Settlement Officer);

iii) bring  up-to-date  at  re-settlement  the  field map of the previous settlement without  recourse to re-measurement and preparation  of  the record of rights including wazib- ul-urs  etc.  strictly  in,  accordance  with  Instructions contained in Para 222 of the  Settlement  Manual read with Appendix XXI  thereunder  and  consequently  directing  the  deletion  of  Naksha  Bartan  illegally  prepared  and  not  to  convert  the  

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Classification of the government waste land  recorded in the revenue records as also in  occupation  of  the  estate-right  holders  into  various  lands  and  directing  the  modification of the government policy with  respect  to  regularisation  of  encroachment  detected during the settlement proceedings;  and  

iv) direct  the  respondents  not  to  hand  over/deliver  the  revenue  records  to  the  revenue mohal staff till the completion of  the settlement including assessment of land  revenue, incorporated in the jamabandies."

5. The said writ petition was disposed of by  

a reasoned and detailed judgment of the Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  on  13/01/1994.  While  

accepting  the  writ  petition,  the  Division  Bench  

issued the following directions:-  

“1. The  respondents  are  directed  to  complete  the  on  going  land  revenue  settlement operations in the area in  question  as  "second  revised  settlement” in accordance with the  instructions  contained  in  Paragraph  222  and  Appendix  XXI  of  the  Punjab  Settlement Manual.  

2. The compendium of instructions (P- 21) be amended in consonance with and  

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pertaining to  the  procedure  applicable  to  special  revision  of  record-of-rights.  Resultantly,  instructions  continuing  to  be  contained in P-21, contrary to letter  June, 1986  (P-22)  are ordered  to  be  deleted.   

3.  The new record-of-rights pertaining to  the areas in question, prepared in the  current  settlement  in  relation  to  'Mohal-Bandi',  'Naksha  Bartan',  `Wazib-ul-urs',  classification  of  land, proposed DPFs and UPFs etc., be  ignored  and  re-settlement  be  started  subsequent  to  the  stage  of  Forecast  Report.”

6. Aggrieved  by  the  abovementioned  judgment  

dated 13/01/1994 of the Division Bench in C.W.P.  

No.206/1988,  the  State  filed  a  Special  Leave  

Petition before this Court.  Leave was granted and  

the Civil Appeal No. 6025 of 1994 was admitted for  

hearing by this Court. This Court while granting  

the leave ordered a stay on the judgment of the  

High Court dated 13/01/1994.   

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7. It was contended by the respondents herein  

while the said special leave petition was pending  

before this Court, the State, in order to nullify  

the judgment of the High Court, dated 13/01/1994,  

enacted the amendment Act of 1996, whereby Sections  

4, 16, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 47, 117 and 171 of the  

Principal Act were amended. The specific challenge  

to the amendment Act of 1996 is that by amending  

the Sections 32, 33, 34, 36, 38 and 47 contained in  

Chapter IV of the Principal Act, the whole scheme  

of  Chapter  IV  of  the  Principal  Act  has  been  

disturbed and arbitrary powers have been conferred  

on  the  Collector  (Revenue).   Such  conferment  of  

arbitrary  power,  it  is  alleged,  is  

unconstitutional.  

8. Thus, those provisions of the Act of 1996,  

introduced  by  way  of  amendment  in  the  Principal  

Act,  were  challenged  as  being  ultra  vires the  

Constitution of India and mala fide and also as a  

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piece of colourable legislation on the following  

grounds:-  

“(a) That the impugned legislation has been  intended  to  nullify  the  judgment  of  this  Court in C.W.P. No. 206  of  1988  dated  13.1.1994.  In  support  of  this  ground, it  has  been  stated  that the  apex Court has held that a legislature  has  no  power  to  render  ineffective  earlier  judicial  decision by making a  law.  Such  powers  if  exercised  would  not be legislative power but a judicial  power  exercised  by  it,  which  encroaches upon the  judicial  powers  of  the  State  exclusively  vested in  Courts.  (See:  case  reported  in  1995  (5) S.C.C. 96).  

(b) That  the  impugned  legislation  apparently  seeks  to  validate  the  record of  rights prepared after 1976,  which  is  opposed  to rule  of  law  and  natural  Justice.  This  ground  is  purported  to  be  supported  by  stating  that  in  the  earlier  writ  petition,  there was a challenge to the errors in  the  field  maps  and  jamabandies  prepared during the settlement,  which  cannot be validated as has been done  by the  impugned  legislation,  this  amounts to  denial of opportunity and  equal protection of law under Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  According to the petitioners, if the  impugned legislation stands, the land  owners  will  be  rendered  without  any  remedy  to  redress  their  grievances,  hence the same is against the rule of  

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law.  

(c) That  by  making  the  impugned  legislation i.e. Act of 1996 effective  retrospectively from 1976, the same is  liable  to  be  struck  down  as  unreasonable and arbitrary. Moreover,  it  has  been  stated  that  the  said  validation is bad  in law inasmuch as  the  executive  instructions  earlier  issued  by  the  Settlement  Officer,  Shimla  and  Kinnaur  Districts,  respondent  No.4,  were  held  to  be  without any authority of law by this  Court in its earlier decision because  the  same  were  inconsistent  with  the  provisions of the Principal Act.

(d) That  the  Act  of  1996  being  retrospective  in  its  application  adversely affects the rights of estate  right holders of Rohru and  Chirgaon,  which  is  unconstitutional.  It  has  also been highlighted in this ground  that the retrospective effect given to  the Act of 1996 is from the year 1976,  being for a period of about 20 years,  which itself is illegal.

(e) That  there  are  inherent  conflicts  between the original Sections of the  Principal  Act  and  the  amended  Sections  of  the  Act  of  1996.  Moreover,  the  same  suffer  from  the  vice of excessive delegation and is  against the  Scheme of the Principal  Act.  This  is  sought  to be shown by  giving the example that prior  to the  amendment, only the State Government  and Financial Commissioner had the  rule  making  powers  under  the  

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Principal Act,  whereas now by virtue  of Sections  4(5),  34-A  and  47-A  the  respondent-State  has  descended  down  by one step whereby the Collector has  been  empowered  to  issue  executive  instructions, which are in the nature  of  the  delegated  legislation.  This  delegation of  powers to the Collector  has  been  challenged  as  being  against  the basic Scheme of the Principal Act.  It  has  also  been  stated  that  the  powers  so  delegated  to  the  Collector  are  unfettered  and  unguided  and  are  capable of being abused.  

(f) That by virtue of the amendments made  by the Act of 1996, the sub-division of  estates styled as 'Upmahal' are sought  to be regularised and validated, which  has been questioned as being an act of  illegal  splitting  ab  initio,  making  the same illegal.

(g) Despite the directions of this Court  in  the  earlier  case  that  fresh  measurement should be carried out, the  earlier  incorrect  measurement and  assessment of land revenue, which was  held  to  be  so  by  this  Court,  have  been declared as having been validly  prepared    by       the Act of 1996. It has  been  stated  that  the  petitioners  have  apprehensions  that  respondent  No.4.  Settlement  Officer,  will  go  ahead with the assessment of the land  revenue  of this area on the basis of  invalid  records  and  complete  the  settlement  operations.  This  will  result  in  irreparable  injury  to  the  rights of the petitioners.  

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(h) That  the  Act  of  1996  takes  away  the  remedy  of  review under Section 16 of  the Principal Act,  thus debarring the  Financial Commissioner to review the  order passed by him in revision.  In  this manner, the impugned amendment in  Section 16 of the Principal Act has  deprived the public at large from one  channel from remedy of review, and on  the other hand, the  highest authority  under  the  Principal  Act  has  been  debarred  from  reviewing  the  order  passed  in  revision.  The  amendment  in  question  is  against  the  principle  of  natural justice  besides  being  against  the  basic  structure  of  the  Constitution  of  India  and  the  Principal Act, as per the petitioners.

(i) Lastly, that the impugned amendments  by  way  of  the  Act  of  1996  are  in  direct  conflict  with  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Principal  Act,  if  they are allowed to stand, it will  result in changing the basic structure  of the Principal Act.”

9. Thus, the writ petition prayed before the  

High Court for:-  

“(i) Issuance  of  an  order,  writ  or  direction declaring the Act of  1996  as  ultra vires the law and as also  being  violative  of  the  basic  structure  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  

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(ii) For issuing a writ of mandamus directing  the  respondents/State  not  to  give  effect to  Sections 2-B, 2-C, 3 to 6,  9, 10, 12 and 13 of the Act of 1996.   

(iii) To declare the aforesaid Sections as  bad, in  law, they being  in direct  conflict  with  the  original  Sections/provisions  of  Sections  4,  16,  32  to  35,  38  and  47  of  the  Principal  Act  and  as  also  being  against the basic Scheme of the said  Act.”

10. Same  relief  was  also  prayed  for  in  the  

other  connected  writ  petition,  namely,  C.W.P.  

No.851/1996.  

11. In  the  impugned  judgment,  the  Division  

Bench of the High Court did not uphold all the  

contentions mentioned above but came to a finding  

that the Amendment Act of 1996 is ultra vires to  

the  extent  that  it  has  sought  to  nullify  the  

earlier  decision  of  this  court  rendered  in  CWP  

No.206/1988  dated  13.01.1994  between  Thakur  Gian  Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.  

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12. It  may  be  noted  that  in  the  impugned  

judgment there is no finding that the amendment Act  

enacted suffers from lack of legislative competence  

of the State.   

13. It  is  nobody’s  case  that  the  State  

legislature  is  incompetent  to  enact  the  said  

amended  Act.   There  is  also  no  finding  in  the  

impugned judgment that the amendment Act in any way  

infringes or abridges any fundamental right of the  

petitioner.

14. Normally  the  restrain  on  the  sovereign  

power  of  legislation  of  a  State  legislature  is  

limited.  The  legislature  has  to  exercise  its  

legislative power, which is otherwise plenary, in  

accordance  with  the  distribution  of  legislative  

power  under  Chapter  Part  XI  Chapter  I  of  the  

Constitution and it has also to exercise such power  

consistent  with  the  mandate  of  Part  III  of  the  

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Constitution and other Constitutional limitations.

15. Learned High Court did not find that the  

impugned amendment Act transgresses either of these  

limitations in any way.  But the High Count found  

that the impugned amendment Act is ultra vires the  

Constitution as it seeks to nullify the previous  

judgment.

16. This Court is not called upon to pronounce  

on  the  correctness  or  otherwise  of  the  previous  

judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High  

Court dated 13.01.1994. The appeal from the said  

judgment, being Civil Appeal 6025 of 1994, came to  

be heard by this Court and  was disposed of by a  

judgment  and  order  dated  16.07.1996  to  the  

following effect:-

“Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submits  that  the  Himachal  Pradesh  Land  Revenue  (Amendment  and  Validation)  Act,  

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1996  (Act  No.3  of  1996)  has  further  amended the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue  Act,  1954  and  validated  certain  actions  taken in relation to the making or special  revision of record-of-rights in the State.  Learned counsel adds that the revision of  record-of-rights  in  the  State  is,  therefore, to be made in accordance with  the  law  so  amended  with  retrospective  effect; and the directions to the contrary  in the impugned judgment of the High Court  rendered prior to enactment of Act No. 3  of 1996 have become infructuous. Learned  counsel  also  submits  that  no  specific  relief has been granted to any individual  by  the  impugned  judgment  which  merely  gives  some  directions  regarding  the  general revision of record-of-rights. For  this reason, learned  counsel submits that  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  State  Government to pursue this appeal.  

Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents,  while  conceding  that  the  effect  of  the  aforesaid Act No. 3 of 1996 is to 'amend  the law relating to revision of record-of- rights,  further  submits  that  the  effect  thereof is not to render infructuous all  the  directions  given  in  the  impugned  judgment. According to learned counsel for  the  respondents,  some  part  of  these  directions  remains  effective  even  after  the  enactment  of  Act  No.  3  of  1996.  He  also states that the validity of Act No. 3  of  1996  has  also  been  challenged  by  a  separate writ petition in the High Court  of Himachal Pradesh.  

In view of the common ground emerging  from the above submissions, it appears to  us  that  it  is  needless  to  consider  the  merits of the points raised in the appeal  

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since  even  according  to  the  appellant  -State of Himachal Pradesh the directions  given  in  the  impugned  judgment  are  no  longer  effective  having  been  rendered  infructuous  by  the  subsequently  enacted  Act No. 3 of 1996. Moreover, there is no  relief granted to any specific individual  and the directions relate to the general  revision of record-of-rights in the state  which obviously has to be governed by the  existing  law  applicable  at  the  time  of  performance  of  the  exercise.  If  any  grievance is made of non-compliance of any  of the al1eged surviving directions by the  State Government before the High Court, it  would be open to the State Government to  show that the same have become infructuous  for the reason given by them and in that  situation it would be for the High Court  to decide the contention on merits.  

In  view  of  the  statement  made  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  that  the  directions given in the impugned judgment  have  become  infructuous,  the  appeal  is  disposed of accordingly, without deciding  any point on merits.”  

17. The  said  order  was  passed  after  hearing  

learned  counsel  for  both  the  parties.   From  a  

perusal of the aforesaid order, it is clear that  

the  appeal  was  disposed  of  as  it  was  contended  

before this Court by the learned counsel for the  

State that in view of the subsequent amendment of  

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the  law,  the  contentions  of  the  appellant  have  

become infructuous.  This court recorded the said  

submissions  and  disposed  of  the  said  appeal  as  

such.   

18. Therefore,  the  only  question  which  

survives in this case is whether the State can in  

exercise of its sovereign legislative power enact  

an amendment Act seeking to remove and cure the  

defects in the previous law despite there being a  

judgment on the previous law.

19. In  the  instant  case  before  we  examine  

these questions it would be appropriate to consider  

the statement of objects and reasons for enacting  

the amendment act.  The statement is as under:-

“The volume of land records in each  

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revenue estate has considerably increased  due to the increase in number of holdings  partially  on  account  of  increase  in  population  and  partially  on  account  of  decrease of extent of land holdings under  the agrarian reforms, to bring the volume  of  the  land  records  maintained  in  each  revenue estate within manageable size, it  has  become  essential  to  create  more  estates or sub-estates.  Apart from this,  with  the  enactment  the  Standards  of  Weights and Measures Act, 1976, it is now  mandatory  to  convert  the  non-metric  measurements  into  metric  measurements.  Due  to  different  scales  of  measurements  prevalent in various parts of the State,  the conversion to metric system involves  the  complete  remeasurements  of  all  the  revenue estates in the State.  There is no  provision either in the Himachal Pradesh  Land Revenue Act, 1954 or in the Punjab  Settlement  Manual,  as  applicable  to  Himachal  Pradesh,  for  the  creation  of  estates/sub-estates  by  the  Collectors  or  for  the  complete  remeasurements  of  the  estates.   In  the  absence  of  these  statutory  provisions  of  the  creation  of  more estates or sub divisions of estates  and  the  complete  remeasurement  of  the  estates  for  conversion  into  metric  measurements  and  the  instructions/  directions given by the Collectors, during  the  settlement   operations  are  not  sustainable  in  the  eyes  of  law.  Consequently  the  settlement  operations  already  carried  out  in  various  parts  of  the State are likely to become infructuous  and resettlement operations are likely to  cause great public inconvenience and loss  to  the  State  Exchequer.   Besides  this  certain other minor amendments in the Act  

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are  essential  in  the  changed  circumstances.   It  is  also  essential  to  validate  the  action  of  the  Collector  already  taken  by  him  during  the  special  revision  of  record-of-rights  in  relation  to the creation of estates/sub-division of  estates,  complete  remeasurement  of  all  estates based upon metric system, giving  directions/issuing  instructions  to  carry  out the settlement operations and for the  effective implementation of the provisions  of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act,  1954.

This  Bill  seeks  to  achieve  the  aforesaid objectives.”

20. From a perusal of the aforesaid statement  

of  objects  and  reasons  it  is  clear  that  the  

amendment has been necessitated in view of certain  

factors which are predominantly in public interest  

and the said amendment has been made in view of the  

interest of land revenue, land settlement and for  

the purpose of updating the same.

21. In fact the amendments have been made for  

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an effective implementation of the provisions of  

the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954.

22. It  is  provided  in  sub-section  (2)  of  

section  1  of  the  amendment  Act  that  the  said  

amendment  shall  come  into  force  at  once  except  

section 2 (b), 5, 6 and 10 which shall be deemed to  

have come into force on the 23rd of September 1976.  

Section 13 of the said act provides for validation.  

The said section runs as follows:-

”13. Notwithstanding anything contained  in the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act,  1954  and  rules,  instructions,  notifications  made  or  issued  thereunder,  or in any law for the time being in force  or in any judgment, decree or order of any  court  or  other  authority,  where  at  any  time after the 23rd day of September, 1976  and  before  the  commencement  of  the  Himachal  Pradesh  Land  Revenue  (Amendment  and Validation) Act, 1996, if any record- of-rights or special revision of record- of-rights has been made in respect of the  lands, situated in the State of Himachal  Pradesh, such making or special revision  of  record-of-rights  shall,  and  shall  be  

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deemed always to have been valid and shall  not be questioned on the ground that the  amendments made vide sections 2 (b), 5, 6  and 10 of this Act were not in force at  that time when such record-of-rights were  made or specially revised.”

23. An argument was, however, made before the  

High Court that the aforesaid amendment is actuated  

by a mala fide motive and is a piece of colourable  

legislation.   The  aforesaid  contention  was,  

however,  not  accepted  by  the  High  Court  in  the  

impugned judgment.  In fact such contention is not  

tenable on principle.   

24. Reference in this connection be made to a  

decision of this Court in the case of K. Nagaraj &  others Vs.  State of Andhra Pradesh and another –  1985 1 SCC 523, wherein Chief Justice Chandrachud,  

speaking  for  a  three-Judge  Bench  said  that  the  

legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having  

passed a law for an extraneous purpose.  Learned  

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Chief Justice held that the concept of “transferred  

malice”  is  unknown  in  the  field  of  legislation  

provided the legislature enacts the law within its  

powers.  

25. The  aforesaid  principle  in  K.  Nagaraj  (supra) has been accepted by this Court in many  

cases and a reference in this connection may be  

made to a decision of this Court in  G.C. Kanungo  Vs. State of Orissa – (1995) 5 SCC 96.  

26. The power of the Sovereign legislature to  

legislate within its field, both prospectively and  

retrospectively cannot be questioned. This position  

has been settled in many judgments of this Court.  

Some of them may be considered below.

27. In  Bhubaneshwar Singh & another Vs. Union  of India & others -  (1994) 6 SCC 77, the Court  

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expressly approved the aforesaid position in Para 9  

at page 82-83. In so far as validating Acts are  

concerned, this Court in Bhubaneshwar Singh (supra)  also considered the question in para 11 and held  

that the Court has the powers by virtue of such  

validating  legislation,  to  “wipe  out”  judicial  

pronouncements of the High Court and the Supreme  

Court  by  removing  the  defects  in  the  statute  

retrospectively  when  such  statutes  had  been  

declared  ultra  vires  by  Courts  in  view  of  its  

defects. This Court has held that such legislative  

exercise  will  not  amount  to  encroachment  on  the  

judicial power. This Court has accepted that such  

legislative  device  which  removes  the  vice  in  

previous  legislation  is  not  considered  an  

encroachment on judicial power. In support of the  

aforesaid proposition, this Court in  Bhubaneshwar  Singh  (supra) relied on the proposition laid down  by the Chief Justice Hidayatullah, speaking for the  

Constitution  Bench  in  Shri  Prithvi  Cotton  Mills  Ltd. and another Vs.  Broach Borough Municipality  

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and others -(1969) 2 SCC 283.  

28. Again  in  the  case  of  Indian  Aluminium  Company etc. etc. Vs.  State of Kerala and others  -AIR 1996 SC 1431, this Court while summarizing the  

principle held that a legislature cannot directly  

overrule a judicial decision but it has the power  

to make the decision ineffective by removing the  

basis on which the decision is rendered, while at  

the  same  time  adhering  to  the  constitutional  

imperatives and the legislature is competent to do  

so [See para 59 sub-para (9) at page 1446.]

29. In  the  case  of  Comorin  Match  Industries  (Pvt.) Limited Vs. State of Tamil Nadu – AIR 1996  SC 1916, the facts were that the assessment orders  

passed under Central Sales Tax Act were set aside  

by the High Court and the State was directed to  

refund the amount to the assessee. As the State  

failed  to  carry  it  out,  contempt  petitions  were  

filed but the assessment orders were validated by  

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passing  the  amendment  Act  of  1969  with  

retrospective effect and the Court held that the  

tax  demanded  became  valid  and  enforceable.   The  

Court held that in such a situation the State will  

not  be  precluded  from  realizing  the  tax  due  as  

subsequently the assessment order was validated by  

the amending Act of 1969 and the order passed in  

the contempt proceeding will not have the effect of  

the writing off the debt which is statutorily owed  

by the assessee to the State.  The learned Judges  

held  that  the  effect  of  the  amending  Act  is  

retrospective validation of the assessment orders  

which  were  struck  down  by  the  High  Court.  

Therefore,  the  assessment  order  is  legislatively  

valid  and  the  tax  demands  are  also  enforceable.  

[See paras 33 and 35 at page 1925]

30. It  is  therefore  clear  where  there  is  a  

competent  legislative  provision  which  

retrospectively  removes  the  substratum  of  

foundation of a judgment, the said exercise is a  

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valid  legislative  exercise  provided  it  does  not  

transgress  any  other  constitutional  limitation.  

Therefore, this Court cannot uphold the reasoning  

in  the  High  Court  judgment  that  the  impugned  

amendment is invalid just because it nullifies some  

provisions of the earlier Act.

31. The  aforesaid  principles  have  been  

reiterated  by  a  three-Judge  Bench  in  Meerut  Development  Authority  etc. Vs.  Satbir  Singh  and  others –  AIR  1997  SC  1467,  Justice  Ramaswamy  speaking for the Court summed up the position in  

para 10 as follows:-

“10.  It  is  well  settled  by  catena  of  decisions  of  this  Court  that  when  this  Court  in  exercise  of  power  of  judicial  review, has declared a particular statute  to  be  invalid,  the  Legislature  has  no  power to overrule the judgment; however,  it has the power to suitably amend the law  by use of appropriate phraseology removing  the defects pointed out by the Court and  by amending the law inconsistent with the  law  declared  by  the  Court  so  that  the  defects which were pointed out were never  on  statute  for  effective  enforcement  of  

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the  law.   This  Court  has  considered  in  extenso the case law in a recent judgment  in Indian Aluminium Co. V. State of Kerala  (1996) 2 JT (SC) 85: (1996 AIR SCW 1051)  had held that such an exercise of power to  amend a statute is not an incursion on the  judicial  power  of  the  Court  but  is  a  statutory  exercise  of  the  constituent  power  to  suitably  amend  the  law  and  to  validate  the  actions  which  have  been  declared to be invalid…”

32. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the  

case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Arooran Sugars  Limited – AIR 1997 SC 1815, reiterated the same  principle  after  analyzing  several  cases  on  the  

point.  The Court has summed up the position as  

follows:-

“16.  ...It is open to the legislature to  remove the defect pointed out by the court  or to amend the definition or any other  provision  of  the  Act  in  question  retrospectively. In this process it cannot  be  said  that  there  has  been  an  encroachment by the legislature over the  power  of  the  judiciary.  A  court's  directive  must  always  bind  unless  the  conditions  on  which  it  is  based  are  so  fundamentally  altered  that  under  altered  circumstances  such  decisions  could  not  

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have been given. This will include removal  of the defect in a statute pointed out in  the  judgment  in  question,  as  well  as  alteration  or  substitution  of  provisions  of the enactment on which such judgment is  based, with retrospective effect...”

33. In Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India – AIR  2000 SC 498, Justice Jagannadha Rao speaking for a  

three-Judge Bench explained the position by saying  

that it would be permissible for the legislature to  

remove  the  defect  which  is  the  cause  for  

discrimination and which defect was pointed out by  

the Court.  The learned Judge made it very clear  

that  this  defect  can  be  removed  both  

retrospectively  and  prospectively  by  legislative  

action and the previous actions can be validated.  

But where there is a mere validation without the  

defect being legislatively removed the legislative  

action will amount to overruling the judgment by a  

legislative fiat and that will be invalid.  In the  

instant  case  the  amendment  Act  has  removed  the  

defect  of  the  previous  law  and  therefore,  the  

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validation exercise is perfectly sound and cannot  

be faulted with.   

34. In  Rai  Ramkrishna  and  others  etc. Vs.  State of Bihar – AIR 1963 SC 1667, a Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  speaking  through  Justice  

Gajendragadkar, as His Lordship then was, explained  

the principle with characteristic clarity, which is  

reproduced hereinbelow:-

“10.   The other point on which there  is  no  dispute  before  us  is  that  the  legislative  power  conferred  on  the  appropriate  Legislatures  to  enact  law  in  respect of topics covered by the several  entries in the three Lists can be exercised  both  prospectively  and  retrospectively.  Where the Legislature can make a valid law,  it may provide not only for the prospective  operation of the material provisions of the  said law but it can also provide for the  retrospective  operation  of  the  said  provisions.  Similarly, there is no doubt  that  the  legislative  power  in  question  includes  the  subsidiary  or  the  auxiliary  power  to  validate  laws  which  have  been  found to be invalid.  If a law passed by a  legislature is struck down by the Courts as  being invalid for one infirmity or another,  it would be competent to the appropriate  Legislature to cure the said infirmity and  

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pass a validating law so as to make the  provisions  of  the  said  earlier  law  effective from the date when it was passed.  This  position  is  treated  as  firmly  established  since  the  decision  of  the  Federal  Court  in  the  case  of  United  Provinces  v.  Mst.  Atiqa  Begum,  1940  FCR  110: (AIR 1941 FC 16).”

35. See the decision of this Court in  Satnam  Overseas (Export) and others Vs.  State of Haryana  and  another –  (2003)  1  SCC  561,  para  52  where  reference was made to the ratio in  Rai Ramkrishna  (supra).

36. Recently in the case of State of Bihar and  others Vs.  State Pensioners Samaj – (2006) 5 SCC  65,  this  Court  reiterated  the  same  position  in  

paragraph  16  at  page  71,  which  is  reproduced  

below:-

”16. ……It  is  always  open  to  the  legislature  to  alter  the  law  retrospectively  as  long  as  the  very  premise  on  which  the  earlier  judgment  declared  a  certain  action  as  invalid  is  removed. The situation would be one of a  fundamental  change  in  the  circumstances  

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and such a validating Act was not open to  challenge on the ground that it amounted  to usurpation of judicial powers.

37. For  the  reasons  aforesaid,  this  Court  

finds that in the instant case the amending Act  

read with its validation clause correctly passed  

the tests laid down by this Court.  The appeals are  

allowed.  The judgment of the High Court is thus  

set aside with no orders as to costs.   

.................J. (MARKANDEY KATJU)

.................J. New Delhi   (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) July 8, 2009

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