STATE OF H.P. Vs MANOJ KUMAR @ CHHOTU
Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT,MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001549-001549 / 2008
Diary number: 5960 / 2007
Advocates: NARESH K. SHARMA Vs
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1549 OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.1546 of 2007
State of Himachal Pradesh …..Appellant
Versus
Manoj Kumar @ Chhotu ….Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division
Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court dismissing the
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application filed in terms of Section 378(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Code’). The
respondent faced trial for alleged commission of offence
punishable under Sections 376/511 and 506 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘IPC’). The Trial Court found that
the accusations were not established and directed his
acquittal giving him the benefit of doubt. An application for
grant of leave in terms of Section 378 of the Code was filed
which was dismissed summarily stating “Dismissed”.
3. According to learned counsel for the appellant-State it
was imperative on the High Court to indicate reasons as to
why the prayer for grant of leave was found untenable. In the
absence of any such reasons the order of the High Court is
indefensible.
4. Section 378(3) of the Code deals with the power of the
High Court to grant leave in case of acquittal. Section 378(1)
and (3) read as follow:
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“378(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub- section (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5),-
(a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an Appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence;
(b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an Appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court [not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946) or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, 3 [the Central Government may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an Appeal-- (a) to the Court of Session, from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence; (b) to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court [not being an order under clause (a)] or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.
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(3) No Appeal under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.”
5. The trial Court was required to carefully appraise the
entire evidence and then come to a conclusion. If the trial
Court was at lapse in this regard the High Court was obliged
to undertake such an exercise by entertaining the appeal. The
trial Court on the facts of the case did not perform its duties,
as was enjoined on it by law. The High Court ought to have in
such circumstances granted leave and thereafter as a first
court of appeal, re-appreciated the entire evidence on the
record independently and returned its findings objectively as
regards guilt or otherwise of the accused. It has failed to do
so. The questions involved were not trivial. The High Court
has not given any reasons for refusing to grant leave to file
appeal against acquittal, and seems to have been completely
oblivious to the fact that by such refusal, a close scrutiny of
the order of acquittal, by the appellate forum, has been lost
once and for all. The manner in which appeal against
acquittal has been dealt with by the High Court leaves much
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to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On
plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have
set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of
an application of its mind, all the more when its order is
amendable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of
reasons has rendered the High Court order not sustainable.
Similar view was expressed in State of U.P. v. Battan and Ors.
(2001 (10) SC 607). About two decades back in State of
Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan (AIR 1982 SC
1215) the desirability of a speaking order while dealing with
an application for grant of leave was highlighted. The
requirement of indicating reasons in such cases has been
judicially recognised as imperative. The view was reiterated in
Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh and Ors. (1987 (2) SCC
222). Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this
Court, cannot be forsaken, under any pretext by any authority
or Court, be it even the Highest Court in a State, oblivious to
Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the
‘Constitution’).
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6. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning
M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All
E.R. 1148) observed “The giving of reasons is one of the
fundamentals of good administration”. In Alexander
Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was
observed: “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of
justice”. Reasons are live links between the mind of the
decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision
or conclusion arrived at”. Reasons substitute subjectivity by
objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the
decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by
its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to
perform their appellate function or exercise the power of
judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right
to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system,
reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to
the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected
party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of
the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out
reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out.
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The “inscrutable face of a sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous
with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.
7. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the impugned
judgment of the High Court is unsustainable and is set aside.
We grant leave to the State to file the appeal. The High Court
shall entertain the appeal and after formal notice to the
respondent hear the appeal and dispose it of in accordance
with law, uninfluenced by any observation made in the
present appeal. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.
……………………….…………..J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
……………………………….…..J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi September 29, 2008
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