http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6  

PETITIONER: STATE OF GUJARAT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MOHAMMED ATIK AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       03/04/1998

BENCH: M.K. MUKHERJEE, K.T. THOMAS

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                      J U D G E M E N T Thomas J.      A Public  Prosecutor  moved  in  the  trial  court  for permission to  use a confessional statement recorded from an accused during investigation of another crime, but the trial judge investigation  of another  crime, but  the trial judge disallowed  the  motion  on  the  premise  that  unless  the confession was recorded during the investigation of the very offence under  trial it  cannot be  used in evidence of that case. The order thus passed by the trial court (A Designated Court under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987,  (TADAA as  acronym) is   now being  challenged by the State of Gujarat by special leave.      It is  not   necessary   to set  out facts  of the case which  is    now  pending    before  the  Designated  Court. Nonetheless, some  skeletal facts  necessary for disposal of these appeals  have to  be stated:  The three respondents in these appeals  were accused  in  some  cases  registered  by different police stations of Gujarat State following certain instances  of     bomb     blasts   at   different   places. Investigation  revealed   that  those   instances  were  the aftermath of  conspiracies hatched by different conspirators who operated  in different areas. Hence, offences came to be registered  at   different  police  stations  and  different investigating agencies  commenced investigation  in separate areas. Fourth  respondent (Abdul  Latif Abdul  Wahab Sheikh) was arrested in connection with Crime No.1/34 of 1993 of the Maninagar Police  station. During investigation of that case a Superintendent  of Police (Shri ashish Bhati) has recorded a confessional  statement from  the said  Abdul Latif  under Section 15  of the  TADAA.  Second  respondent  (Musakhan  @ Babakhan) was  arrested in  connection with  Crime 1/284  of 1993 of  Shahibag Police Station. His confessional statement was also recorded in the same manner.      In the meanwhile, police charge-sheeted the cases which were registered  at two  other police  stations (Kalupur and Karanj Police  Stations) as  against fourth respondent Abdul Latif and  some others.  The Designated  Court at  Ahmedabad began proceedings to try those cases. While the trial was in progress, the  Public Prosecutor in that Court felt that the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6  

confessional  statements   recorded  by  the  police  during investigation of  the case  registered at  Maninagar  Police Station under  Section 15  of the  TADAA have  to be used as prosecution evidence  as those  statements related to events which are  subject-matter of the cases registered in Kalupur and Karanj  Police Stations.   It  was then  that the Public Prosecutor filed  application for  permission  to  use  such confessional statements.  The application was opposed on the main ground  that the confession made in another case cannot be used in the crime registered by Kalupur and Karanj Police Stations. Learned  Judge of the Designated Court, thereupon, considered the following question:      "The question  therefore is whether      the  prosecution  be  permitted  to      introduce     and     prove     the      confessional   statement    of   an      accused alleged  to have  been made      during the investigation of another      offence committed  on  a  different      date,  during  the  trial  of  that      accused in another crime." Learned Judge  answered the  question in  the   negative  by upholding the objection raised by the respondent, as per the impugned order.      As  these  special  leave  petitions  were  pending  an important development  happened   - fourth respondent (Abdul Latif)  died   and  the   case  against   him  got   abated. Nevertheless the  question remains alive as the confessional statement attributed  to the  second respondent  Musakhan  @ Babakhan is  also sought  to be used in the cases registered by Kalupur  and Karanj  Police Stations. For considering the said question  we look  at Section  15(1) of the TADAA which reads thus:-      "15. Certain  confessions  made  to      police officers  to be   taken into      consideration- (1)  Notwithstanding      anything in  the  Code  or  in  the      Indian  Evidence  act  1872  (1  of      1872),   but    subject   to    the      provisions  of   this  section,   a      confession made  by a person before      a police  officer not lower in rank      than superintendent  of Police  and      recorded  by  such  police  officer      either  in   writing  or   on   any      mechanical device  like  cassettes,      tapes or  sound tracks  from out of      which  sounds   or  images  can  be      reproduced, shall  be admissible in      the trial  of such  person [or  co-      accused,  abettor  or  conspirator]      for an  offence under  this act  or      rules made thereunder."      It is  clear from the above section that a confessional statement  recorded  in  accordance  with  the  requirements contained in  the Section becomes admissible in spite of the ban contained  in Section  25 of the Evidence Act or Section 162 of  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure.  The  requirements stipulated in  Section 15(1)  of the TADAA for admissibility of a  confession made  to a   police  officer  are  (1)  The confession should  have  made to a police officer  not lower in ran  k than a Superintendent of Police (2) it should have been recorded by said police officer (3) the trial should be against the   maker  of confession   (4) such trial must  be for an  offence under  TADAA or the Rules thereunder. If the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6  

above requirements  are  satisfied  the  confession  becomes admissible in  evidence and  it is  immaterial  whether  the confession was  recorded in  one particular  case  or  in  a different case.      When there  is no  statutory inhibition  for using such confession on  the premise  that it was  not recorded during the investigation  of the  particular offence which is under trial there  is no need or reason for the Court to introduce a  further   fetter  against   the  admissibility   of   the confessional statement.  It often  happens that  a confessor would disclose very many acts and events including different facets of  his involvement  in the  preparation attempt  and commission  of   crimes  including   the  acts  of  his  co- participators   therein.    But   to   expel   every   other incriminating disclosures  than those under investigation of a particular  crime from  the ambit  of admissibility is not mandated by any provision of law.      We  have,   therefore,  absolutely   no  doubt  that  a confession, if  usable under  Section 15 of the TADAA, would not become  unusable merely because the case us different or the crime  is  different.  If  the  confession  covers  that different crime  in which  that crime  is under trial and it would then become admissible in the case.      In State  of Rajasthan  vs. Bhup  Singh - 1993 (10) SCC 675     a  similar  objection  raised  by  the  defence  was considered in the context of admissibility of a confessional statement under  Section 27  of the  Evidence Act.  In  that case, information  was  elicited  by  the  police  from  the accused during investigation in connection with a particular offence and  weapon of  offence was recovered in consequence thereto. That  information became  relevant in  a subsequent case, but the accused contended that the said information is not admissible  in evidence  in the  subsequent case.   This High Court over-ruled the objection on the ground that there is no such prohibition in Section 27 of the Evidence Act. It was observed  that "it is immaterial whether the information was  supplied  in  connection  with  the  same  crime  or  a different crime." The same principle applies to a confession recorded under Section 15 of the TADAA.      However, Shri  S.K.Dholakia, learned Senior Counsel who argued for the appellant State contended that the confession made by  the 4th  respondent-Abdul Latif  (who  died  during pendency of  these Special  leave petitions)  is useful  and relevant  in  evidence  to  prove  the  criminal  conspiracy involving the  remaining accused  as the  said  confessional statement relates  to the  role  played  by  such  remaining accused in  the crime.  Learned counsel  said that since the maker  of   the  confession   died,  the  relevancy  of  the confessional  statement  would  fall  within  the  ambit  of Section 32(3)  of the  Evidence Act. The sub-section renders the following  statement relevant if it was made by a person who is dead:      "(3) When  the statement is against      the pecuniary or propriety interest      of the  person making  it, or when,      if true,  it would  expose  him  or      would  have   exposed  him   to   a      criminal prosecution  or to  a suit      for damages."      Even if  the fourth respondent - Abdul Latif were alive his confession  could have  been  used  as  against  another person only under the strict parameters fixed in the proviso to Section  15(1) of  the TADAA.  The proviso  reads  thus:- "Provided that co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and tried  in the  same case together with the accused." But

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6  

the  moment   the  maker   of  the  confession  dies  before conclusion of the trial, the above proviso sinks into disuse because than  it would  be impossible to try the two persons together.      However, learned  counsel submitted  that what  becomes relevant under  Section 32(3)  of  the  Evidence  Act  would become relevant  under Section  10 of the Act  as well: That Section pertains  to  "Things  or  done  by  conspirator  in reference to common design.      It provides  that where  there is  reasonable ground to believe that  two or more persons have conspired together to commit an  offence "anything said, done or written by anyone of such persons in reference to their common intention" is a relevant fact.  So unless  what the  deceased accused (Abdul Latif)  disclosed   in  his  confessional  to  their  common intention," that  statement cannot  be  brought  within  the scope of Section 10 of the Evidence Act.      We have  to see  the amplitude  of the  expression  "in reference to  their common  intention" as used in Section 10 of the  Evidence Act. It was once considered that expression is  as   good  as  saying  "in  furtherance  of  the  common intention." Almost  seven decades  ago a  Full Bench  of the Patna High  Court had  held it  like that  in Indra  Chandra Narang and others vs. Emperor- AIR 1929 Patna 145:      "The object  of   this  section  is      merely to  assure that  one  person      shall  not be  made responsible for      the acts  or deeds of another until      some bond  in the  nature of agency      has been  established between  them      and the  act, words,  or writing of      another which  it  is  proposed  to      attribute vicariously to the person      charged must  be in  furtherance of      the common  design and  after  such      design was entertained."      But a three judge bench of this Court in Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Las and others vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1965 SC 682  said that  the expression  ("in reference  of  their common intention’  and is  very comprehensive and it appears to have  been designedly  used to give it a wider scope than the words ’in furtherance of’ in the English Law. Even if it is  wider,   would  its   width  go  beyond  the  period  of conspiracy? It  is well-neigh settled that Section 10 of the Evidence act is founded on the principle of law of agency by rendering the statement or act of one conspirator binding on the other  if it  was said  during subsistence of the common intention as  between the  conspirators.  If  so,  once  the common intention  ceased to  exist any  statement made  by a former conspirator  thereafter cannot  be  regarded  as  one made "in  reference to  their common  intention."  In  other words, a  post-arrest statement   made  to a police officer, whether it  is  a  confession  or  otherwise,  touching  his involvement in  the conspiracy,  would not  fall within  the ambit of Section 10 of the Evidence act.      Privy Council  has held  so in  Mirza  Akbar  vs.  King Emperor - AIR 1940 PC 176. The relevant observations of Lord Wright are the following:      "This being  the  principle,  their      Lordships think  the words  of S.10      must be  constructed in  accordance      with it  and  are  not  capable  of      being widely  construed  so  as  to      include   a    statement   by   one      conspirator in  the absence  of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6  

    other with  reference to  past acts      done  in   the  actual   course  of      carrying out  the conspiracy, after      it has  been completed.  The common      intention is  in the past. In their      Lordships,  judgement,   the  words      "common  intention"     signify   a      common intention  existing  at  the      time when  the thing was said, done      or written  by  the  one  of  them.      Things said,  done or written while      the  conspiracy  was  on  foot  are      relevant as  evidence of the common      intention, once  reasonable  ground      has been  shown to  believe in  its      existence. But  it would  be a very      different matter  to hold  that any      narrative or statement or statement      or confession    made  to  a  third      party after the common intention or      conspiracy was  no longer operation      and  had   ceased   to   exist   is      admissible against the other party.      There is  then  no common intention      of the  conspirators to  which  the      statement can  have  reference.  In      their  Lordships’   judgement  S.10      embodies this  principle.  That  is      the  construction  which  has  been      rightly   applied    to   S.10   in      decisions in  India, for instances,      in Emperor  v. Ganesh Raghunath (55      Bombay 839)  and Emperor  v.  Abani      (38 Cal  169). In  these cases  the      distinction   was   rightly   drawn      between   communications    between      conspirators while  the  conspiracy      was going  on with reference to the      carrying  out   of  conspiracy  and      statements   made, after  arrest or      after the  conspiracy has ended, by      way of  description of  events then      past."                (Emphasis supplied)      A three  judge bench  of this  Court has  also said  in Sardul Singh  Caveeshar and   others  vs The State of Bombay (AIR 1957 SC 747)      "The   principle   underlying   the      reception of evidence under S.10 of      the Evidence Act of the statements,      acts  and   writings  of  once  co-      conspirator as against the other is      on the  theory of  agency. The rule      in S.10 Evidence Act, confines that      principle  of  agency  in  criminal      matters to  the  acts  of  the  co-      conspirator   within   the   period      during which  it can  be said  that      the  acts  were  "in  reference  to      their common  intention" that is to      say, things  said, done or written,      while the  conspiracy was  on  foot      and in carrying out the conspiracy.      It would seem to follow that where,      the charge  specified the period is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6  

    not receivable in evidence."                     (Emphasis supplied)      Thus, the  principle is  no longer res integra that any statement made  by an accused after his arrest, whether as a confession or  otherwise, cannot  fall within  the ambit  of Section 10  of the Evidence Act. The corollary of it is that the confessional  statement of  4th respondent  (Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab  Sheikh) who  is no more alive now thus vanishes from the ken of evidentiary use.      In the  result we allow these appeals and set aside the impugned order  and permit  the prosecution  to  make use of the confessional  statement, recorded  under Section  15  of TADAA of the accused who are now facing trial.