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PETITIONER: STATE OF GUJARAT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHATRABHUJ MAGANLAL AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/04/1976

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1697            1976 SCR  (3)1076  1976 SCC  (3)  54  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1991 SC1289  (16)

ACT:      Suppression of  Immoral Traffic  in Women  & Girls Act, 1956, s.  2(c)-If notification empowering all Magistrates of First Class would make them "specially empowered".      Interpretation of statutes-Provision susceptible of two meanings-Choice of  meaning where provision confers power on Government for specific purpose.

HEADNOTE:      Section 2(c),  Suppression of  Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, defines a Magistrate to mean a District Magistrate, a  Sub-Divisional Magistrate  of the First Class specially empowered  by the State Government by notification in the  official Gazette, to exercise jurisdiction under the Act.      The appellant-State  issued a  notification  under  the section empowering  all the  Judicial Magistrates of the 1st Class to exercise jurisdiction to try certain offences under the Act.      The High  Court held that the notification did not have the effect  of making  a Magistrate  one specially empowered within the meaning of s. 2(c).      Allowing the appeal to this Court, ^      HELD: It  is not  necessary that  the State  Government should pick  and choose  individual Magistrates  and  confer special power  on them.  The notification  had the effect of making every  Judicial Magistrate  of the First Class in the State, within  the area  of his  respective jurisdiction,  a Magistrate  specially   empowered  to  try  those  offences. [1083E; 1084C]      Mohd. Qasim  & Anr.  v. Emperor,  AIR, 1918  Mad. 1159; Emperor v.  Udho  Chandumal,  AIR  1943  Sind  107;  Polubha Vajubha v.  Tapu Buda,  AIR 1956 Sau. 73 and Sabuddin Sheikh Mansur  v.   J.  S.  Thakkar  &  Anr.  ILR  [1968]  Guj.  4, disapproved.      K. N.  Vijayan v. State, AIR 1953 Tr. Co. 402. State v. Judhabir Caetri  AIR 1953  Assam 35; (F.B.); State of Mysore v. Kashambi & Anr: [1963] 2 Cr. L.J. 226; Ashaq Hussain Khan v. S.D.O.  Manghir. ATR  1965 Pat  446  and  C.  V.  Madhava

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Mannadiar v.  Distt. Collector  & Ors.,  AIR 1970 Kerala 50. approved.      (1) Where  the language  of a  statutory  provision  is susceptible of  two interpretations,  the one which promotes the object  of the provision. comports best with its purpose and preserves  its  smooth  working,  should  be  chosen  in preference to  the other  which introduces inconvenience and uncertainty in  the working  of the  system. This  rule will apply in  full  force  where  the  provision  confers  ample discretion on  the Government  for  a  specific  purpose  to enable it to bring about an effective result. [1079G-1080A]      (2) The  word "specially"  has reference to the special purpose of the empowerment and is not intended to convey the sense  of   a  "special"  as  Contrasted  with  a  "general" empowerment. "Specially"  qualifies the word "empowered" and not the  person on whom the power is conferred. In this view the State  Government is  within its  competence  to  confer powers under  the section  on some or all of the Magistrates of the First Class in the State in any of the modes known to law and the Magistrate or Magistrates. On whom Powers are so conferred, will  be "specially empowered" within the meaning of the  section. This  broad view keeps in focus the special purpose of  the empowerment  and must  be preferred  to  the narrow view,  namely. That  the word  "specially" stands  in contrast to the word "generally". According to 1077 the narrow  view if  powers  to  try  certain  offences  are conferred on  a class  of officials by their official title, they are  "generally  empowered’;  but  if  the  powers  are conferred on  particular individuals by name or by virtue of their office,  as a  result of  selection by the Government, they are  ’specially empowered".  This view which reads into the expression "specially empowered" a restriction as to the mode or  manner of  empowerment, is neither congenial to the special purpose  of the provision, nor conducive to the main object of  the Act,  and tends to reduce its efficacy and to impede the  exercise of  the discretionary  power which  the legislature  has   confided   in   full   measure   to   the Government.[1079B-D, E-G; 1080B-C, H; 1082G]      (3) The  word "specially"  signifies the  investment of some or  all the  Magistrates of the First Class with powers which are  "special’ and  are not  part of the "ordinary" or "additional" powers  which can  be conferred on a Magistrate of the First Class under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The fallacy in  the narrow  view stems  from the undue stress it lavs on  the mode  empowerment at  the cost  of the  special purpose of the empowerment ignoring the fact that the Act is a code  by itself which creates new offences triable only by those Magistrates  of the  First  Class  who  are  specially empowered under  s. 2(c)  of the Act, and not under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Power may be conferred under s. 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, corresponding to s. 32 of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure,  1973,  on  any  person either by  name or  in virtue of his office or on classes of officials generally  by their  official title.  The  special mode or  the general mode of conferring the power applies to the conferment  of power  both for  a general  purpose or  a special purpose.  The mode  of conferring power is not to be confused with the purposes of the power. [1082H; 1083B-D]      (4) A  person can be specially empowered even by virtue of his office. If empowering a Magistrate of the First Class to try  offences under  the Act  by  virtue  of  his  office satisfies the requirement of s. 2(c), there is no reason why the empowerment of all the Magistrates of the First Class in the State  under the  notification by virtue of their office

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to try  offences  under  the  Act  in  the  areas  of  their respective jurisdictions  should not  be held  to be special but treated  as general.  The Government  could have  issued separate notifications for each Magistrate. Instead of doing so if one notification were to be issued authorising each of them to  perform those  functions, there  could be  no valid objection. [1081F-G; 1083E-F, G-1084B]      Sindhi Lokana  Chajthram v.  State of Gujarat, [1967] 3 S.C.R. 351  and Abdul  Hussain Tayabali and ors. v. State of Gujarat and ors. [1968] 1 S.C.R. 597, followed.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal Nos. 212- 213/71.      Appeal from  the Judgment  and  order  dated  the  21st November,  1970  of  the  Gujarat  High  Court  in  Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 321 and 322 of 1969.      S. N. Anand and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant.      N.  H.  Hingorani  and  (Mrs.)  K.  Hingorani  for  the Respondent      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SARKARIA, J. Controversy in these appeals centres round the  interpretation   of  the  words  "specially  empowered" appearing in  s. 2(c)  of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (to be (hereinafter referred to as the Act).      The facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows:      Chaturbhuj Maganlal and Bai Sabita, respondents herein, are husband  and wife  residing together  at Parvati Bhuvan, Rajkot. Both 1078 of them together with Bai Hamida Basi Mohammed, respondent 3 herein, are  accused 1, 2 and 3 respectively, in a trial for offences punishable  under ss. 5 and 6 of the Act before the Judicial Magistrate,  First Class  Rajkot in  Cr. Cases Nos. 1372 and  1404 of 1968. When the trial was about to commence in these  cases, the  accused moved  applications raising an objection that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offences  as  he  had  not  been  "specially  empowered"  as required by  s. 2(c)  of the  Act. The  Magistrate  rejected those applications  whereupon the  accused went  in revision before the Sessions Judge, Rajkot who dismissed the same.      Aggrieved, the  accused filed two revisions (Cr. R. 321 and 322  of 1969)  in the  High Court  of Gujarat. A learned Judge of  the High Court allowed the revisions on the ground that Mr.  Modha, Magistrate  1st Class  Rajkot, before  whom these cases  were pending,  had no  jurisdiction to  try the same  because   the  State  Government  notification,  dated February 19,  1959 did  not have  the effect of making him a "Magistrate of  the first  class specially empowered" within the  meaning  of  s.  2(c)  of  the  Act.  Accordingly,  the Magistrate was  directed to  drop  the  proceedings  pending against the revision-petitioners.      Against that  decision of the High Court, the State has now filed these appeals on a certificate granted by the High Court under Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution.      Section 2(c) of the Act defines a "Magistrate" to mean           "a   District    Magistrate,   a    Sub-Divisional      Magistrate of  the First  Class specially  empowered by      the State  Government, by  notification in the Official      Gazette, to exercise jurisdiction under the Act".      Section 22 further says:           "No court  inferior to  that of  a  magistrate  as

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    defined in  Clause (c)  of  Section  2  shall  try  any      offence under  Section 3, Section 4, Section 5, Section      6, Section 7 or Section 8".      The State  Government Notification No. PPA/1257/84187/X of July 22, 1958, published in the Bombay Government Gazette of July  31, 1958,  purporting to  have been issued under s. 2(c), runs as follows:           "In the  exercise of  the powers  conferred by  s.      2(c) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and      Girls  Act,  1956,  the  Government  of  Bombay  hereby      empowers all  the Judicial  Magistrates  of  the  First      Class to  exercise jurisdiction  under  the  said  Act,      except under ss. 12(1), 18(1), 19, 20(1) and (3) of the      Act."      The question  is, whether  this  notification  has  the effect of  making every  Judicial Magistrate  of  the  First Class in  the  State  within  the  area  of  his  respective jurisdiction, a  Magistrate competent  to  try  any  offence under ss. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and or 8 of the Act? 1079      Answer  to   this  question   depends  on   a   correct interpretation of  the expression  "specially empowered"  in Section 2(c).  There has  been a  sharp conflict of judicial opinion in regard to the meaning of this expression.      One line  of decisions  has taken  the view  (hereafter referred to us the narrow view) that the word "specially" in this  expression   has  reference   only  to   the  mode  of empowerment as indicated in s. 39(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. According to this view the word "specially" stands in  contrast to  the word  "generally". Therefore, if powers to  try certain  offences are conferred on a class of officials by  their  official  title,  they  are  "generally empowered"; but  if the  powers are  conferred on particular individuals by  name or  by virtue of their office, they are "specially empowered".  On this reasoning it is deduced that the words  "specially  empowered"  imply  "the  exercise  by Government of  a  certain  selection  or  discrimination  as regards an  individual on  whom the  special power  is to be conferred". Some  of the  cases in  which this view has been expounded are:  Mohd. Qasim  and anr. v. Emperor; Emperor v. Udho Chandumal;  Polubha Vajubha  v. Tapu Ruda; and Sabuddin Sheikh Mansur v. J. S. Thakkar and anr.      A different  view (hereafter  referred to  as the broad view) has  been taken  in these  decisions: K. N. Vijavan v. State; State v. Judhabir Caetri; State of Mysore v. Kashambi and anr.;  Ashaq Hussain  Khan v.  S. D.  O. Monghir,  C. V. Madhava Mannadiar  v. District  Collector and ors. According to this  view, the  word "specially"  has reference  to  the special purpose  of the  empowerment and  is not intended to convey the  sense  of  a  "special"  as  contrasted  with  a "general"  empowerment.   "Specially"  qualifies   the  word "empowered"  and  not  the  person  on  whom  the  power  is conferred. In  this view, the State Government is within its competence to confer powers under s. 2(c) of the Act on some or all  the Magistrates  of the First Class in the State, in any of  the modes  known  to  law,  and  the  Magistrate  or Magistrates whom  powers are so conferred will be "specially empowered" within the meaning of s. 2(c).      In our  opinion, this broad view rightly keeps in focus the special purpose of the empowerment and must be preferred to the narrow view.      It is  will recognised  that where  the language  of  a statutory provision  is susceptible  of two interpretations, the one which promotes the object of the provision, comports best with  its purpose  and preserves  its  smooth  working,

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should be chosen in preference to the other which introduces inconvenience and  uncertainty in the working of the system. This rule  will apply  in full  force  where  the  provision confers ample 1080 discretion on  the Government  for  a  specific  purpose  to enable it to bring about an effective result.      The Act  has been enacted to suppress a special kind of mischief. With that end in view it creates new offences, and confers wide  powers on the Government to constitute special machinery for  its enforcement.  Th narrow view taken in the decision led  by  Mohd.  Qasim’s  case,  which  reads,  with external aid,  into the  expression "specially  empowered" a restriction as  to the  mode or  manner of  empowerment,  is neither congenial  to the  special purpose of the provision, nor conducive  to the  main object  of the  Act. It tends to introduce unnecessary inconvenience, friction, confusion and artificiality in the working of the provision. It also tends to reduce  its efficacy  and  impede  the  exercise  of  the discretionary  power  which  the  Legislature  has,  in  its wisdom, confided  in full  measure to the Government. In the context of  s. 2(c)  of  the  Act,  therefore,  the  narrow, restrictive  interpretation  of  the  expression  "specially empowered" has to be eschewed.      Incidently,  it   may  be  noticed  that  none  of  the decisions expounding the narrow view, was concerned with the interpretation of  the expression  "specially empowered"  in the context  of the  Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls  Act. In  Mohammed Qasim v. Emperor, (supra) which leads the  exponents of this view, the Madras High Court was concerned with  the construction  of this expression as used in s. 3 of the Opium Act. Similarly, the Full Bench decision of the  Gujarat High  Court in  Sabuddin’s case (supra) (the ratio of  which has  been followed  by  the  Judgment  under appeal), turns  on an  interpretation of  this expression in the context of s. 56 of the Bombay Police Act.      On the  other hand,  in State of Mysore v. Kashambi and anr. (supra)  which is  a prominent  exponent of  the  broad view, the construction of s. 2(c) of the Act was directly in issue  before   the  Mysore   High  Court.   Therein,  by  a notification, the  State Government  conferred powers on all First Class  Magistrates to  try cases  under the  Act.  The accused, Kashambi  and Mohadinbi were being prosecuted under s. 8(a) of the Act in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Saundatti.  The accused  raised an objection that the Magistrate had  no jurisdiction to try the cases because the aforesaid notification was invalid and ineffective to confer the  jurisdiction   on  him   as  it  did  not  satisfy  the requirement of  s.  2(c)  regarding  "special  empowerment". Hegde, J., who spoke for the Bench, expressly dissented from the view  taken in  Polubha Vajubha v. Tepu Buda (supra) and Mohammed Qasim v. Emperor (supra) and held that the language of s.  2(c) of  the Act does not justify the contention that such a  notification amounts  to general conferment of power as opposed  to special conferment of power as required by s. 2(c) and  therefore enlarges  the scope  of that section. In the opinion  of  the  Bench,  the  word  "specially"  is  an adjective (adverb  ?) to  the verb  "empowered" and  not  an adjective to  the noun "Magistrate" and that this word means "specifically" or  "for a particular purpose". The Bench did not accept  the contention that the word "specially" conveys the idea  of picking  and  choosing  of  the  Magistrate  or Magistrates for the purpose 1081 of conferring  the additional powers. It was emphasised that

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the conferment of power under s. 2(c) of the Act is not made by having recourse to s. 39, Cr. Procedure Code.      In our opinion, the view taken by the Mysore High Court in Kashambi’s  case is  the correct one. It seems to be more in accord  with the  trend of  the recent  decisions of this Court, in which such an expression came up for construction. In this  connection, the  first case to be noticed is Sindhi Lohana Chaithram v. State of Gujarat. Therein the meaning of the expression  "specially empowered" occurring in s.6(1) of the Bombay  Prevention of  Gambling Act,  1887 came  up  for consideration. By  a notification,  dated January  22, 1955. the  Saurahtra   Government  empowered   specially   certain Assistant  Superintendents  and  Deputy  Superintendents  of Police, Porbander Division, Porbander, to authorise by issue of special warrants in each case, a police officer not below the rank  of Sub-Inspector of Police to do the Varios things necessary in  order to  raid a house when the police officer suspected gaming  to be  carried on and which house, room or place was  suspected us being used as a common gaming house. The appellant’s  house was  raided  by  a  Sub-Inspector  of Police,and  on  the  basis  of  incriminating  evidence  the appellant and  six others  were charged under ss. 4 and 6 of the Act.  At the  trial  the  accused  contended  that  Shri Pandhya, the  Deputy Superintendent  of Porbander who issued the search  warrant, was not authorised to do so because the aforesaid  notification   did  not  specially  empower  Shri Pandhya within the contemplation of s. 6.      This Court  expressed that  in view  of  the  principle embodied in  s. 15  of the  Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 when power is conferred on a person by name or by virture of his office,  the individual  designated by  name or  as  the holder of  the  office  for  the  time  being  is  empowered specially. Judging  by this  test, the  Court held  that the notification, dated  January 22, 1955, "specially empowered" Shri Pandhya,  holder of the office of the Dy.Superintendent of Police,Porbander  to issue the search warrant under s. 6. The Court  noticed the  conflict of  judicial opinion on the question whether  a notification  empowering all Magistrates of certain  class to  try certain  class, can  be said to be empowered specially  every Magistrate  of that  class to try those cases,but  left that question open.However, it settled that a  person can  be specially empowered even by virtue of his office.      Again, in  Abdul Husein  Tayabali and  ors. v. State of Gujarat  and   ors.  decided  on  September  20,  1967,  the construction of  the expression "specially appointed" within the meaning  of s.  3(c) of  the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 read with  r. 4  of the  Land Acquisition (Company’s) Rules, came  up   for  consideration   before  this   Court.  By  a notification, dated October 1, 1963, issued under s. 3(c) of the Land  Acquisition Act,  the State  Government authorised all Special  Land  Acquisition  Officers  in  the  State  to perform the functions of 1082 Collectors  under   that  Act   within  the  area  of  their respective  jurisdiction.   Question  arose   whether   that notification satisfied  the requirements  of s. 3(c) and had the effect  of specially empowering all the Land Acquisition Officers as  a class  to perform  the duties  under the Act. Shelat, J.,  speaking for  a Bench  of three learned Judges, answered this  question in  the affirmative  and made  these apposite observations:           "In our  view, these  words (specially  appointed)      simply mean  that as such an officer is not a Collector      and cannot  perform the  functions of a Collector under

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    the Act,  he has  to be ’specially appointed’, that is,      appointed for  the specific purpose of performing those      functions. The  word specially’has  therefore reference      to the  special purpose  of appointment and is not used      to convey  the sense  of a special as against a general      appointment. The  word "specially"  thus  connotes  the      appointment  of  an  officer  or  officers  to  perform      functions which  ordinarily a  Collector would  perform      under the  Act. It  qualifies the  word "appointed" and      means no  more than  that he  is appointed specially to      perform the  functions entrusted  by  the  Act  to  the      Collector. It  is the  appointment therefore  which  is      special and  not the  person from  amongst several such      officers. Besides  sec. 15  of the  General Clauses Act      provides that where a Central Act empowers an authority      to appoint  a person to perform a certain function such      power can  be exercised  either by name or by virtue of      office."      There  would   therefore  be   no  objection   if   the      appointment is  made of  an officer  by virtue  of  his      office and not by his name."      The  above   observations  are  an  apt  guide  to  the interpretation of the expression "specially empowered" in s. 2(c) of  the Act  with which  we are concerned. Although the word  in   s.  3(c)   of  the   Land  Acquisition  Act,  the construction of  which was  considered  in  Abdul  Hussain’s case, were  "specially appointed",  their connotation is the same as conveyed by the expression "specially authorised" or "specially empowered"  (see Oxford  Dictionary according  to which the  word "authorised" means "empowered" "appointed"). In constructing  the expression "specially empowered" in the instant case, therefore,we can safely adopt the reasoning in Abdul Hussain’s  case. Thus considered, the term "specially" must be  taken to  have reference  to the special purpose of the empowerment.  Even according  to Oxford  Dictionary, one sense of this word is "of special purpose". It qualifies the word "empowered".  It is  used in  an attributive  sense  to highlight the  special nature  of the  power.  It  does  not convey the  sense of a contradistinction or contrast between "special" empowerment  and "general"  empowerment. All  that this word  signifies is  the investment  of some  or all the Magistrates  of  the  First  Class  with  powers  which  are ’special’and   are   not   part   of   the   ’ordinary’   or ’additional’powers which can be conferred on a Magistrate of the First  Class under  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure. In short, the word "specially" 1083 cannotes that it is the empowerment which is special and not the person.Thus  considered, special  empowerment  does  not necessarily involve  selection of individuals by name or ex- offico from the Magistrates of the 1st Class.      The fallacy  in the  narrow view  stems from  the undue stress it lays on the mode of empowerment at the cost of the special purpose  of the empowerment, forgetting that the Act is a code by itself which creates new offences triables only by those  Magistrates of  the 1st  Class who  are  specially empowered under s. 2(c) of the Act,and not under the Code of Criminal Procedure.      Be  that  as  it  may,s.39  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1898   and  s.32   of  the   Code  of   Criminal Procedure,1973, are  concerned with  the mode  of conferring power. "Power  may be conferred on any person either by name or in  virtue of  his office",  or "on  classes of  official generally by  their official title". The special mode or the general  mode   of  conferring  the  power  applies  to  the

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conferment of  power both for a general purpose or a special purpose. The  mode of conferring power is not to be confused with the  purpose of the power,as seems to have been done in the cases taking the narrow view.      The narrow  view can  be tested yet from another angle. According to it if a Magistrate of the 1st Class is selected by name  or by  virtue of his office and invested with these powers to  try offences under the Act,he would be "specially empowered". If  no such pick and chose is made and the power is conferred  on all the Magistrates of the same class, they would be "generally empowered". This distinction if taken to its logical  and, breaks  down,  and  exposes  the  inherent artificiality of  the proposition.  If the  empowering of  a Magistrate of  the First  Class to  try offences  under this Act, by  virtue of his office, satisfies the requirements of s. 2(c), it is not understood how the empowerment of a whole class of  Magistrates of  the First  Class by  the same mode becomes ultra vires the section.      In Abdul  Hussain’s case,  the contention canvassed for the narrow  view was  considered from  this aspect, also. It was observed:           "...even if  the meaning  of the  word ’specially’      were to  be that which is canvassed (by the appellant),      the Government  could have issued separate notification      for each  of the  Sp. L.  A. Officers  authorising them      individually to  perform the functions of the Collector      within their  respective area  of jurisdiction. Instead      of doing  that, if  one notification  were to be issued      authorising each  of them  to perform  those  functions      there could  be no valid objection. Such a notification      would have the same force as a separate notification in      respect of  each individual  Sp. L.  A. Officer. Such a      notification would  mean that  the  Government  thereby      appoints each  of the  existing Sp.  L. A.  Officers to      perform the  functions of  the Collector  within  their      respective areas." 1084      On parity  of  reasoning  ,it  can  be  said  that  the empowerment of  all the  Magistrates of  the First Class, in the State  under one notification ,by virtue of their office to  try  offences  under  the  Act  in  the  area  of  their respective jurisdiction,  must be  held to  be "special" and not "general".      It will  not be out of place to mention here that Abdul Hussain’s case  was decided  by this  Court on September 20, 1967, that  is, about  four and  half months  after the Full Bench decision  of the Gujarat High Court in Sabuddin’s case (supra), Consequently,  the Bench did not have the advantage of the guidance furnished by Abdul Hussain’s case.      In the  light of  the construction  put by  us  on  the expression "specially  empowered" as  used in s. 2(c) of the Act,  we  hold  that  by  virtue  of  the  State  Government Notification dated  July 22,  1958, the  Judicial Magistrate First Class  Rajkot has the jurisdiction to try the offences under the  Act. Accordingly,  we allow  these  appeals,  set aside the  judgment of the High Court. The cases will now go back to  the Judicial  Magistrate, First  Class, Rajkot  for further proceedings in accordance with law. The cases, being very old,  it is  directed that  they be disposed of on top- priority basis,  with utmost expedition, if possible, within three months from today. V.P.S.                                      Appeals allowed. 1085

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