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PETITIONER: STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PARSHOTTAMDAS RAMDAS PATEL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/11/1987

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR  220            1988 SCR  (1) 997  1988 SCC  (1) 132        JT 1987 (4)   323  1987 SCALE  (2)1141  CITATOR INFO :  F          1989 SC1796  (5,12)

ACT:      Urban Land  (Ceiling and  Regulation) Act, 1976 Section 2(q)(i)-’Vacant land’-What is-Applicability of Act to ’land’ which is subject matter of land Acquisition proceedings.

HEADNOTE: %      The State  Government of  Gujarat-Appellant,  issued  a Notification dated March 31,1976 published in the Government Gazette dated  April 8,  1976 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition  Act,   1894  stating  that  the  Lands  of  the respondents were  likely to be needed for the public purpose of providing  housing accommodation for the employees of the Municipal Corporation,  and that  after  making  an  enquiry under section  5-A of  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894  the State Government had issued a declaration under section 6 of the said  Act declaring  that the aforesaid lands along with other lands were needed for the said public purpose.      In the  meanwhile the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 came into force with effect from 17.2.1976.      The respondents  filed statements  before the Competent Authority under  section 6  of the  1976 Act  including  the lands to  be acquired  which were  in excess  of the ceiling limit which  each of  the respondents could retain after the coming into force of the 1976 Act.      Thereafter,  the   respondents  filed   writ  petitions contending that  the acquisition  proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act,  1894 should  be  proceeded  with  and  the acquisition proceedings  to the  extent it  related  to  the surplus land  under the  ceiling law  should be dropped. The applicability of  the provisions  of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)  Act, 1976  insofar as  they were applicable within  the   limits  of   the  Municipal  Corporation  were questioned contending  that: (i)  the  Act  was  beyond  the legislative competence  of Parliament  insofar as  the State Government of  Gujarat was concerned; (ii) that the lands in question were  not ’vacant lands’ as defined in the Act and, therefore the  proceedings instituted  in  respect  of  them under the  Act were liable to be quashed, and (iii) that the

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land acquisition proceedings under the Land 998 Acquisition  Act   1894  which   were  initiated  should  be completed,  and  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  should  be directed to  pass awards in favour of the respondents. These writ petitions were contested by the appellants-State.      The High Court though negativing the contentions of the respondents  regarding   the   legislative   competence   of Parliament  to   pass  the   Urban  Land  Act,  quashed  the proceedings instituted  under the Act. It, however, declined to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Land Acquisition  Officer   before  whom   the  proceedings  were commenced under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as he was not made a party to the writ proceedings, but made a declaration that the  land acquisition  proceedings did  not suffer from any infirmity.      The State  Government aggrieved  by the judgment of the High Court filed Special Leave Petitions to this Court.      On the  question whether;  the lands of the respondents are lands  to which  the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would apply.      Allowing the Appeals, ^      HELD: 1.  The finding  of the High Court that by virtue of section  29(1)(a) of  the Bombay  Town Planning Act, 1954 the lands  fell outside  the definition  of ’vacant land’ in the Urban  Land Act,  1976 is  unsustainable. The High Court omitted to notice that the owners were entitled to construct buildings on  the lands after the permission was accorded by the local authority. [1005C]      2. The object of the Urban Land Act, 1976 is to provide for the  imposition of  a ceiling  on ’vacant land’ in urban agglomerations for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling  limit  and  to  regulate  the  construction  of buildings on  such land  and to  bring  about  an  equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. [1000G]      3. The  question whether  a piece  of land is a ’vacant land’ or not does not depend upon the fact whether a prudent man would  put up  a building  on that land or not after the issue of  a notification  under section  4(1)  of  the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Nor a land will cease to be a ’vacant land’ merely  because the  permission of certain authorities is to be taken to put up a building thereon. [1006G-H] 999      4. The proceedings under the land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot have any bearing on the question whether the lands in question are  ’vacant lands’  or not for the purposes of the ceiling law  contained in the Urban Land Act, 1976. When the lands in  question or bulk of them are likely to be acquired under the  ceiling law  by paying a compensation as provided therein, it  would not be proper to compel the Government to acquire them under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. [1007D]      5. Sub-clause  (i) of  clause (q)  of section  2 of the Urban Land  Act 1976  does not  provide that a land on which the owner  cannot construct  a building  will  cease  to  be ’vacant land’ for the purposes of the Act. [1007F]      6. As long as construction of a building can be done on a land  by some  person or  authority, the land does not get excluded from the definition of the expression ’vacant land’ under the Act. The lands in the instant case, therefore, are ’vacant lands.’ [1007G]      Smt. Shanti  Devi v. The Competent Authority under U.L. (C.R.) Act,  1976 Delhi  and others,  AIR  1980  Delhi  106, overruled.

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    Prabhakar Narhar  Pawar v.  State  of  Maharashtra  and Another, AIR  1984 Bombay  122 and  The State  of  U.P.  and another  v.  Radha  Raman  Agarwal  and  another,  AIR  1987 Allahabad 272, approved.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 635-642 of 1981.      From the  Judgment and  order dated 19/22.9.1980 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 3295, 3480, 3481, 3648, of 1979, 668, 669,889and 1205 of1980.      G. Ramaswamy,  Additional Solicitor General, G.A. Shah, Hameed Qureshi and M.N. Shroff for the Appellants.      B.K. Mehta,  M.N.  Goswami,  P.V.  Nanavathy  and  H.S. Parihar, for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  These appeals  by special  leave are filed against the common judgment in eight writ petitions on the file  of the  High Court  of Gujarat. The respondents in these appeals i.e. the 1000 petitioners  in  the  said  writ  petitions  questioned  the applicability of  the provisions  of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)  Act, 1976  (Act 33  of  1976)  (hereinafter referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’)  to  several  pieces  of  land belonging  to   them  situated  within  the  limits  of  the Ahmedabad   Municipal   Corporation.   They   raised   three contentions before  the High  Court-(i)  that  the  Act  was beyond the  legislative competence  of Parliament insofar as the State  of Gujarat  was concerned; (ii) that the lands in question were  not vacant  lands as  defined in the Act and, therefore, the  proceedings instituted  in respect  of  them under the  Act were liable to be quashed; and (iii) that the land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which  had been  initiated in  respect of  the lands in question  should  be  completed  and  the  Land  Acquisition Officer should  be directed  to pass awards in favour of the respondents. The  writ petitions  were resisted by the State of Gujarat  and  despite  such  opposition  the  High  Court allowed the  writ petitions.  The High  Court negatived  the contention of  the  respondents  regarding  the  legislative competence of  Parliament to  pass the  Act in  view of  the decision  in  Union  of  India  etc.  v.  Valluri  Basavaiah Chaudhary etc  etc. [1979]  3 S.C.R.  802. The  High  Court, however, quashed the proceedings instituted under the Act in respect of the aforesaid lands which were pending before the Additional Collector and the Competent Authority, Ahmedabad. While the  High Court declined to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus  directing the  Land Acquisition Officer, before whom the  proceedings commenced  under the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894  were pending  as he  had not been made a party to the writ petitions, it, however, made a declaration that the land  acquisition   proceedings  did  not  suffer  from  any infirmity. Indirectly the High Court indicated that the land acquisition proceedings  should be proceeded with. Aggrieved by the  judgment of the High Court the appellants have filed these appeals by special leave.      The principal  question which  arises for consideration in this  case is whether the lands in question are the lands to which  the Act  would apply. The Act came into force with effect from 17.2.1976. The object of the Act, as can be seen from its  preamble, is  to provide  for the  imposition of a ceiling on  vacant land  in urban  agglomerations,  for  the

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acquisition of  such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the constructions of buildings on such land and for matters connected  therewith, with  a view to preventing the concentration of  urban land  in the  hands of a few persons and speculation  and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about  an equitable  distribution of  land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. Section 3 of the Act, which  may be  considered to  be the key section of the Act, pro- 1001 vides that  except as  otherwise provided in the Act, on and from the  commencement  of  the  Act,  no  person  shall  be entitled to  hold any  vacant land  in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which the Act applies under sub- section (2) of section 1. The State of Gujarat is one of the States to  which the  Act has been made applicable by virtue of the  provisions in  sub-section (2)  of section  1 of the Act. The  ceiling limit  is prescribed  by section  4 of the Act. The expression ’vacant land’ is defined in section 2(q) of the Act thus:           "2(q) ‘Vacant  land’ means  land, not  being  land           mainly used  for the purpose of agriculture, in an           urban agglomeration, but does not include-                (i) land  on which construction of a building           is not  permissible under the building regulations           in force  in  the  area  in  which  such  land  is           situated;                (ii) in  an area  where  there  are  building           regulations, the  land occupied  by  any  building           which has  been constructed  before, or  is  being           constructed  on,   the  appointed   day  with  the           approval of the appropriate authority and the land           appurtenant to such building; and                (iii) in  an area where there are no building           regulations, the  land occupied  by  any  building           which has  been constructed  before, or  is  being           constructed on,  the appointed  day and  the  land           appurtenant to such building:                Provided that  where  any  person  ordinarily           keeps his  cattle, other  than for  the purpose of           dairy farming  or for  the purpose  of breeding of           live-stock, on  any land  situated  in  a  village           within an  urban  agglomeration  (described  as  a           village in  the revenue  records), then,  so  much           extent of the land as has been ordinarily used for           the keeping  of such cattle immediately before the           appointed day  shall not  be deemed  to be  vacant           land for the purposes of this clause."      Section 6  of the  Act requires  every  person  holding vacant  land   in  excess   of  the  ceiling  limit  at  the commencement of  the Act  to file  a  statement  before  the competent authority having jurisdiction on the area in which the land  is situated.  Section 7 of the Act is ancillary to section 6  of the Act. Section 8 of the Act provides for the preparation of  the draft  statement as  regards the  vacant land held by any person in 1002 excess of  the ceiling  limit and for calling for objections from the  owner to  the said statement. It also empowers the competent authority to consider the objections raised by the owner of  the land  and to  pass such order as it deems fit. After the disposal of the objections the competent authority is required  by section  9 of  the Act to make the necessary alterations in  the draft  statement in  accordance with the orders passed  on the  objections aforesaid and to determine

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the vacant  land held  by the  person concerned in excess of the ceiling  limit. A  copy of  the draft  statement  as  so altered as  the final  statement under section 9 of the Act. After the  service of  the final  statement  prepared  under section 9  of the  Act on the person concerned the competent authority is required to acquire the land held by the person concerned in  excess of the ceiling limit in accordance with the procedure  prescribed therein.  Section 11  of  the  Act provides for  payment of compensation in accordance with the principles contained  therein. The  Act contains  provisions regarding the  constitution of  the Urban  Land Tribunal and makes provisions  for appeal  to the Urban Land Tribunal and also a  second appeal  to the  High Court. Section 19 of the Act provides  that subject  to the provisions of sub-section (2) thereof nothing in Chapter III of the Act would apply to vacant lands  held by  the Central  Government or  any State Government or  any local  authority or  corporation or other institution specified therein. Section 15 of the Act imposes ceiling limit on future acquisition of vacant lands also. It is not necessary to refer to the several other provisions in the Act  except section  42 thereof.  Section 42  of the Act provides that  the provisions  of the  Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for  the time  being in  force or  any custom,  usage or agreement or  decree or  order of a court, tribunal or other authority. Thus the Act is given an overriding effect.      We have  already given the definition of the expression ‘vacant land’  found in  section 2(q)  of the  Act.  ‘Vacant land’ means  any land which is not being used mainly for the purpose of  agriculture. But it does not include (i) land on which construction  of a  building is  not permissible under the building  regulations in force in the area in which such land is  situated; (ii)  in an area where there are building regulations, the  land occupied  by any  building which  has been constructed  before, or  is being  constructed on,  the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the  land appurtenant  to such building; and (iii) in an area where  there  are  no  building  regulations  the  land occupied by  any building which has been constructed before, or is  being constructed  on, the appointed day and the land appurtenant to  such building. The proviso to the definition in section 2(q) of the Act 1003 provides that  where any person ordinarily keeps his cattle, other than  for the  purpose of  dairy farming  or  for  the purpose of breeding of live-stock, on any land situated in a village  within  an  urban  agglomeration  (described  as  a village in the revenue records), then, so much extent of the land as  has been  ordinarily used  for the  keeping of such cattle immediately  before the  appointed day  shall not  be deemed to  be vacant  land for  the purposes of this clause. The expression ‘appointed day’ is defined in section 2(a) of the Act. Under that clause ‘appointed day’ means in relation to any State to which the Act applied in the first instance, the date  of introduction  of the  Urban Land  (Ceiling  and Regulation) Bill, 1976 in Parliament, and in relation to any State which  adopts the  act under clause (1) of Article 252 of the  Constitution, the  date of  such adoption. So far as the State of Gujarat is concerned, the appointed date is the date  of   introduction  of  the  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and Regulation) Bill,  1976 in  Parliament since  the Act became applicable to  the State of Gujarat at the first instance by virtue of section 1(2) of the Act.      The first contention raised by the respondents, namely, that the lands in question were agricultural lands under the

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Bombay Land  Revenue Code,  1879, and,  therefore, they were not vacant  lands under  the Act  was rejected  by the  High Court itself  and we  need not  dwell on it in these appeals since the said contention has not been raised before us.      The second  contention raised  by the  respondents  who were petitioners before the High Court was that the lands in question were  lands on  which the construction of buildings was not  permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which the lands were situated and, therefore, they were outside the scope of the expression ‘vacant land’. In other  words the  contention was  that as  the  lands  in question were  lands which  came within  the scope  of  sub- clause (i) of clause (q) of section 2 of the Act, they could not be  treated as vacant lands. Three grounds were urged in support of  the above  contention and they were based on the existence of  a  town  planning  scheme,  namely,  the  Town Planning Scheme  No. 29  framed by  the Ahmedabad  Municipal Corporation under  the Bombay  Town Planning Act, 1954 which was in force at the relevant time. The first ground urged in this behalf  by the  respondents before  the High  Court was that permission  to build on the lands in question could not be granted  by the  authorities concerned  as they  had been included  within   the  ‘green  belt’  around  the  city  of Ahmedabad under the Town Planning Scheme and hence they were not vacant lands. This plea was not accepted by the 1004 High Court  because the  proposal to retain the ‘green belt’ had been  abolished in the year 1975 and the restrictions on building, if  any, on  those lands  on that  account were no longer in existence. The second ground urged before the High Court was that on the coming into force of the Town Planning Scheme No.  29 framed  under the  Bombay Town  Planning Act, 1954 no  building activity  was permissible on the aforesaid lands because  the said lands had been reserved for a public purpose, namely,  construction of Government staff quarters. In support of this submission reliance was placed on section 29 of  the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. The relevant part of section 29 of the Bombay Town Planning Act,-1954 reads as follows:                "Restriction  after   declaration  for   town           planning scheme.                29(1). On  or after  the date  on  which  the           local authority’s declaration of intention to make           a scheme  under section  22  or  the  notification           issued by the State Government under section 24 is           published in the Official Gazette,-                (a) no  person shall within the area included           in the  scheme erect  or proceed with any building           or  work   or  remove,   pull  down,  alter,  make           additions to or make any substantial repair to any           building, part  of a  building, a compound wall or           any drainage  work or  remove any  earth, stone or           material, or  sub-divide any  land, or  change the           user of  any land  or building  unless such person           has  applied   for  and   obtained  the  necessary           permission  which   shall  be   contained   in   a           commencement  certificate  granted  by  the  local           authority     in      the     form      prescribed           ................."      The High  Court treating section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning  Act, 1954 as a building regulation within the meaning of  that expression used in sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of  section 2  of the  Act was  of the view that the ban contained in  clause (a) of section 29(1) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 brought the lands in question within sub-

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clause (i)  of clause  (q) of section 2 of the Act. Assuming for purposes of argument that section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 amounted to a building regulation it cannot be  said that  the construction  of buildings  on the land  in  question  was  not  permissible  at  all.  Section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 only required a person who owned a piece of land situated within an 1005 area included  in the  scheme to  obtain the permission from the local  authority before  erecting  or  constructing  any building  or  pulling  down  or  altering  any  building  as provided therein.  Merely because  section 29(1)(a)  of  the Bombay Town  Planning Act, 1954 requires a person owning the land to  which a  scheme applied to obtain permission of the local authority  to construct a building on it, it cannot be said that the land was one on which construction of building was not  permissible. The embargo in question was not total. It was only where the ban was complete it could be said that no construction  was permissible on the land. The High Court omitted to notice that the owners were entitled to construct buildings on  the lands after the permission was accorded by the local  authority. The  finding of the High Court that by virtue of  section 29(1)(a) of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 the  lands fell outside the definition of ‘vacant land’ in the Act is, therefore, unsustainable.      It was  no doubt  true that  the State  Government  had issued a  notification dated March 31, 1976 published in the Gujarat Government Gazette dated April 8, 1976 under section 4(1) of  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894 stating  that  the lands in  question were  likely to  be needed  for a  public purpose, namely, for providing housing accommodation for the employees of  the Ahmedabad  Municipal Corporation  and that after making  an enquiry  under  Section  5-A  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act,  1894  the  State  Government  had  issued declaration under  section 6  of that Act declaring that the aforesaid lands  along with  other lands were needed for the public purpose  referred to  above. In the meanwhile the Act came into  force with effect from 17.2.1976. The respondents filed  statements   before  the  competent  authority  under section 6  of the  Act including the lands in question which were in excess of the ceiling limit which each of them could retain after  the coming  into force  of the Act. Thereafter they filed  the above  writ petitions  out  of  which  these appeals arise  contending that  the acquisition  proceedings under the  Land Acquisition  Act, 1894  should be  proceeded with and  the acquisition of proceedings of the surplus land under the  ceiling law should be dropped. In this connection the respondents  relied upon  the  provisions  contained  in section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in which clause ‘seventhly’ stated  that any  outlay or  improvements on, or disposal of  the land  acquired, commenced, made or effected without the  sanction of  the Collector  after the  date  of publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1) of  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894 should not be taken into consideration  by the  Court at the time of determining compensation payable under the said Act. The argument of the respondents was that 1006 clause ‘seventhly’  in section  24 of  the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894  again amounted  to an  embargo on construction of buildings on  the lands  which attracted  sub-clause (i)  of clause (q) of section 2 of the Act and, therefore, the lands were  not   vacant  lands.   Reliance  was   placed  by  the respondents on  the decision  of the  High Court of Delhi in Smt. Shanti Devi v. The Competent Authority under U.L. (C. &

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R.) Act, 1976, Delhi and others, AIR 1980 Delhi 106 in which the High  Court of  Delhi had  taken the view that a land in respect of  which a  notification under  section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition  Act, 1894  had been  issued was  a land on which construction  of buildings was not permissible and was thus outside  the definition of the expression ‘vacant land’ in section  2(q) of  the Act.  The reason given by the Delhi High Court  for reaching  the above conclusion is set out in para 12 of the said decision. It reads thus:-                "12. It is pertinent to note that the land in           Sant Nagar is under threat of acquisition by issue           of S.  4 notification of the Land Acquisition Act,           1894. This  is not  denied by  the respondents. In           this view  of the  matter also  building  activity           would not  be permissible  as  no  prudent  person           would construct  on land already notified under S.           4  of   the  said  Act  because  he  will  get  no           compensation for  it unless  the  construction  is           made with  the permission  of the Land Acquisition           Collector. For all intents and purposes the effect           of S.  4 notification, therefore, is that building           activity is  not permissible  in Sant  Nagar. This           would also  result in  excluding  the  Sant  Nagar           plots from the total holding of the petitioner for           the purposes  of computing  vacant land  under the           Act."      With great respect to the High Court of Delhi it has to be stated that the view taken by it is wholly incorrect. The High Court  of Delhi  omitted to  notice that  in  order  to exclude a  land from  the definition  of  ‘vacant  land’  it should be  shown that it was a land on which construction of a  building   was  not   permissible  under   the   building regulations in  force in  the area  in which  such land  was situated. The  question whether  a piece of land is a vacant land or  not does not depend upon the fact whether a prudent man would  put up  a building  on that land or not after the issue of  a notification  under section  4(1)  of  the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894. Nor a land will cease to be a vacant land merely  because the  permission of certain authority is to be  taken to put up a building thereon. It may be further seen that  what clause ‘seventhly’ in section 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides is that any 1007 outlay or improvements on, or disposal of the land acquired, commenced, made  or effected  without the  sanction  of  the Collector  after   the  date   of  the  publication  of  the notification under  section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act shall  not   be  taken  into  consideration  while  awarding compensation. It  does  not  ban  the  construction  of  any building on the land which is so notified. The High Court of Gujarat against whose judgment these appeals have been filed also committed  an error  in accepting  a similar contention which was  urged before  them. The  declaration made  by the High  Court   in  these  cases  that  the  land  acquisition proceedings  did   not  suffer   from  an   infirmity  which indirectly suggests  that the  proceedings should  go on  is again erroneous.  It is open to the State Government to drop the land  acquisition proceedings  and to withdraw the lands from acquisition  under section  48 of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.  We are informed that the State Government has in fact subsequently  withdrawn these  lands from  acquisition. The proceedings  under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot therefore have any bearing on the question whether the lands in question  are vacant  lands or  not for  purposes of  the ceiling law contained in the Act. When the lands in question

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or bulk  of them are likely to be acquired under the ceiling law by paying compensation as provided therein, it would not be proper to compel the Government to acquire them under the provisions of  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894. As  already stated the Act has the overriding effect on all other laws.      It was, however, urged before this Court by the learned counsel  for  the  appellants  that  because  the  lands  in question have  been reserved  under the Town Planning Scheme for purposes  of building staff quarters the lands could not be treated  as vacant lands. We do not find any substance in this submission because the construction of buildings on the lands in question is permissible though not by the owners of land. Sub-clause  (i) of  clause (q) of section 2 of the Act does not  provide that  a land  on which  the  owner  cannot construct a  building will  cease  to  be  vacant  land  for purposes of the Act. As long as construction of building can be done on a land by some person or authority, the land does not get  excluded from  the  definition  of  the  expression ‘vacant  land’   under  the  Act.  The  lands  in  question, therefore, are vacant lands.      Before concluding  our judgment we wish to refer to the decision of  the Full  Bench of  the High Court of Bombay in Prabhakar Narhar  Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and another, AIR 1984  Bombay 122  in which the following passage appears at page 130: 1008                "Reliance was  placed on  the decision of the           Delhi High  Court  in  Shanti  Devi  v.  Competent           Authority, (AIR 1930 Delhi 106). In that decision,           the learned  Judges of  the Delhi  High Court took           the view that S. 2(q) of the Act contemplated that           the activity of building is not permissible on the           date when  the land is sought to be dealt with and           not at  any future  time and  the possibility that           such activity could come to be permitted in future           or that  there are  buildings constructed  in  the           area or  that there is no prohibition to construct           in an  unapproved  colony  or  that  there  is  no           permanent prohibition  to construct  would not  be           sufficient to  treat the  land  as  ‘vacant  land’           within the meaning of the provision. So far as the           decision  holds   that  the   relevant  date   for           determination for the purpose of S. 2(q)(i) of the           Act is  the date on which the land is sought to be           dealt  with,   that  is,   the  commencement  date           referred to  in S. 3 there can be no dispute. In a           part of  the decision, the Division Bench seems to           have  taken   the  view  that  land  notified  for           acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act must be           held to  be one on which construction of buildings           was not  permitted. We  are really  not  concerned           with that  view, so  far as  the present petitions           are concerned,  but it  is sufficient to point out           that the  correctness of  that view  has not  been           accepted by  this Court  in Dattatraya v. State of           Maharashtra, [1981] Mah LJ 764; (AIR 1981 Bom 326)           and in  an unreported  decision of  this Court  in           D.P. Dani  v. State  of Maharashtra (Writ Petition           No. 1650  of 1979  decided on 31st January, 1983).           In  Dattatraya’s  case  the  contention  was  that           certain plots  of land  which  were  reserved  for           various public  activities, such  as buildings  of           primary school,  high school,  civil hospital, bus           terminus  etc.  under  the  Town  Planning  Scheme           should be  excluded for the purpose of computation

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         of  vacant   land,  because,   according  to   the           petitioners, in that case no building activity was           permitted on those lands so far as the petitioners           were concerned. The Division Bench after referring           to the primary object of the Act as set out in the           case  of  Union  of  India  v.  Valluri  Basavaiah           Choudhary,  (AIR   1979  SC   1415)  rejected  the           contention that merely because the petitioners are           prohibited from  constructing any  building  under           the building  regulations contained  in  the  Town           Planning Scheme  the land should not be treated as           vacant land.  The Division Bench found that if the           regulations allowed the 1009           building activity  not to  a person who holds that           land but  by public bodies or the State Government           then  certainly   construction  of   building   is           permitted either  by  an  individual  or  even  by           public authority  and cannot  be taken  out of the           definition."      We agree  with the observations made in the above case. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court has in The State of U.P. and  another v.  Radha Raman  Agarwal and  another, AIR 1987 Allahabad  272 also  taken the  view that  a land  will cease to  be a  ‘vacant land’  for purposes  of the Act only where the  construction  of  a  building  on  it  is  wholly impermissible. We agree with the views expressed by the High Courts of Bombay and Allahabad.      In the  result we  allow these  appeals, set  aside the judgment of  the High  Court and  dismiss the writ petitions filed in the High Court. There will, however, be no order as to costs. N.V.K.                                      Appeals allowed. 1010