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PETITIONER: STATE OF BIHAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/09/1969

BENCH: MITTER, G.K. BENCH: MITTER, G.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) SHAH, J.C. RAMASWAMI, V. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1446            1970 SCR  (2) 522  1970 SCC  (1)  67  CITATOR INFO :  O          1977 SC1361  (153)  R          1984 SC1675  (6)  D          1986 SC1571  (48)

ACT:     Constitution  of India, Art. 131--Private party  whether can  be impleaded in a suit under Article--Article is  meant to  settle only disputes between parties mentioned  in  cls. (a)   (b)  and  (c)   Court  can  give  declaratory   decree simpliciter.

HEADNOTE:    The State of Bihar filed a number of suits in this  Court under  Art. 131 of the Constitution in connection  with  the delayed delivery of iron and steel materials for its  Gandak project.  In six of the suits the defendants were: The Union of  India  (Defendant  No.  1 )  and  Hindustan  Steel  Ltd. (Defendant No. 2).  In six other suits the defendants  were: The  Union of India (Defendant No. 1) and The Indian Iron  & Steel  Co. Ltd. (Defendant No. 2).  The prayers in  all  the suits were that decrees for specific sums of money be passed either  against the Union of India or the second  defendant. Identical preliminary issues were set down for consideration in all the suits, namely: (1) whether the cause or causes of action in this suit are within the scope of Art. 131 of  the Constitution?  (2) Whether the suit is within the  scope  of Art.  131  of the Constitution in view of a  non-State  viz. defendant No. 2,  having been made a party to the suit ? (3) Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of s. 80 C.P.C. for want of notice to defendant No. 1.     HELD:  (i) The specification of the parties in Art.  131 is  not  of the inclusive kind.  The express words  in  cls. (a),  (b)  and  (c) of the Article exclude  the  idea  of  a private  citizen,  a  firm or a corporation  figuring  as  a disputant  either alone or even along with a State  or  with the  Government of India in the category of a party  to  the dispute.  The contents of the corresponding section, of  the Government  of  India  Act,  1935  namely s.  204,  and  the

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legislative history culminating in the adoption of Art.  131 of  the Constitution support the conclusion that so  far  as the  parties to a dispute are concerned, the framers of  the Constitution  did  intend  that  they  could  only  be   the constituent  units of the Union of India and the  Government of  India  itself arrayed on one side or  the  other  either singly  Or  jointly with another unit or the  Government  of India.  For other types of controversies or disputes special provision has been made in the sonstitution e.g. in Art. 143 257,  262  and 290  A dispute in which a private  party,  is involved  must  be brought before a court  other  than  this Court  having jurisdiction over the matter. [52.6 D--F;  530 B; 531 C, F, H; 532 C]     The  United  Provinces   v.   The  Governor-General   in Council,   [1939]  F.C.R. 124 and State  of  Seraikella  and Others v.  Union  of  India  and another, [151] S.C.R.  474, referred to.     The  enlarged definition of ’State’ given in  Parts  III and  IV of the Constitution is not attracted to Art. 131  of the  Constitution and a body like the Hindustan  Steel  Ltd. could  not be considered to be "a State" for the purpose  of Art. 131 of the Constitution. [532 G]     Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, [1967] 3 S.C.R. 377, distinguished. 523     In  view of the above finding on issue No. 2  the  suits did not lie in this Court under Art. 131 of the Constitution and  the  plaints  must  be  returned;  it  was  accordingly unnecessary to decide issues Nos. 1 and 3. [532 H]     Article 131 does not prescribe that a suit must be filed in  the Supreme Court for the complete adjudication  of  the dispute envisaged therein or the passing of a decree capable of execution in the ordinary way as decrees of other  courts are.  Once this Court has given a declaration of its  rights to the aggrieved party the function of the Court under  Art. 131 is over. [525 C--F]

JUDGMENT:     ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION: Civil Misc. Petitions Nos.  512, 513, 574 & 575, 578 & 579, 581 & 582, 583 & 584, 587 &  588, 605 & 606, 609 & 610 and 1466 and 1467 of 1969.     Applications by defendant No. 1 for rejection of plaints and for stay of the hearing of the suits. Original suits Nos. 3 of 1967, 1 and 3 to 9 of 1968. Petitions under Art. 131 of the Constitution of India.     Niren De, Attorney-General, V.A. Seyid Muhammad and B.D. Sharma, for respondent No. 1 (in all the suits).     D.N.  Gupta, for defendant No. 2 fin suits 968 ).Nos.  3 to 8  of     D.N. Mukherjee, for defendant No. 2 (in suits Nos. 3  of 1967, 1 and 9 of 1968).     D.P. Singh, for the plaintiff (in suits Nos. 3 of  1967, 1, 3, 5 and 6 of 1968).     D.  Goburdhun, for the plaintiff (in suits Nos. 4 and  7 of 1968). U.P. Singh, for the plaintiff (in suit No. 8 of 1968). R.C. Prasad, for the plaintiff (in suit No. 9 of 1968). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Mitter,  J.  This group of applications can  be  divided into  two  parts.   The object of one group is  to  get  the plaints  in  nine suits filed in this Court  rejected  while that of the other group is to stay the hearing of the suits. The  suits are all of the same pattern in each of which  the

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State of Bihar figures as the plaintiff. The Union of  India is  the  first  defendant in all of them  while  the  second defendant in six is Hindustan Steel Ltd. and in three others the Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd.   The cause of action in all the suits is of the same nature.  Briefly stated  the plaintiffs  case  in  all  the suits is  that  "due  to  the negligence  or  deliberate action of the  servants  of  both defendants  there  was a short delivery of  iron  and  steel material  ordered by the plaintiff to various sites  in  the State of Bihar in connection with the 524 construction work of the Gandak Project".  As the goods were in  all  cases booked by rail for despatch  to  the  project site, both defendants are sought to be made liable for short delivery,  the first defendant as the owner of the  railways and the second defendant as the consignor of the goods under contract with the State of Bihar for supply of the material. In  each case there is a prayer for a decree for a  specific sum of money to be passed either against the first defendant "or  alternatively against the second defendant".   Normally all  suits  of this kind are instituted all  over  India  in different  courts  beginning from the courts of  the  lowest jurisdiction   to  the  High  Courts   exercising   original jurisdiction.   The  only  distinguishing  feature  of  this series  of  suits  from others  of  everyday  occurrence  in different  courts is that a State is the plaintiff  in  each case.   In all suits of a similar nature which are filed  in courts  other than this Court,   a notice under s. 80 of the Code  of Civil Procedure is an essential  prerequisite.   No such  notice  has  been served in any of  these  cases.  The applications were set down for trial of three issues  sought to  be raised by way  of preliminary issues.  They  are   as follows :--                   1. Whether the alleged cause or causes  of               action  in this suit are within the  scope  of               Art. 131 of the Constitution ?                   2.  Whether this suit is within the  scope               of  Art. 131 of the Constitution in view of  a               non-State,  viz, defendant No. 2, having  been               made a party to the suit ?                   3.  Whether  the  suit is  barred  by  the               provisions of s. 80 C.P.C. for want of  notice               to defendant No. 1 ?     The  question before this Court is, whether the  dispute in these cases is within the purview of that article (quoted in the foot-note.  It must be noted that the article confers jurisdiction  on  this  Court  to  the  exclusion   of   all other    courts   in  any  dispute  between   the    parties mentioned   therein.   There is   however   an   over-riding provision   that   such   jurisdiction  is  subject  to  the provisions  of the Constitution and our attention was  drawn to  a few of these provisions where the  disputes  specified are to be adjudicated upon in entirely different     *Art.    131.   Subject  to  the  provisions   of   this Constitution,  the Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion  of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute-- (a) between the Government and one or more States; or (b) between the Government of India and any State or  States on one side and one or more other States on the other; or (c) between two or more States, 525 manner.   The most important feature of Art. 131 is that  it makes  no mention of any party other than the Government  of India or any one or more of the States who can be arrayed as a  disputant. The other distinguishing feature is  that  the

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Court  is  not required to adjudicate upon the  disputes  in exactly the same way as ordinary courts of law are  normally called  upon to do for upholding the rights of  the  parties and  enforcement of its orders and decisions. The  words  in the  article "if and in sO far as the dispute  involves  any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence  or extent of a legal right depends" are words of limitation  on the  exercise  of that jurisdiction.  These  words  indicate that  the disputes should be in respect of legal rights  and not disputes of a political character.  Moreover this  Court is  only concerned to give its decision on questions of  law or of fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right claimed depends.  Once the Court comes to its conclusion  on the  cases  presented  by  any  disputants  and  gives   its adjudication  on the facts or the points of law raised,  the function  of  this Court under Art. 131 is over.   Art.  131 does not prescribe that a suit must be filed in the  Supreme Court for the complete adjudication of the dispute envisaged therein  or the passing of a decree capable of execution  in the ordinary way as decrees of other courts are.  It is open to  an aggrieved party to present a petition to  this  Court containing  a  full  statement of  the  relevant  facts  and praying  for the declaration of its’ rights as  against  the other  disputants.  Once that is done, the function of  this Court  under  Art.  131 is at an end.  The  framers  of  the Constitution   do  not  appear  to  have  contemplated   the contingency  of  a party to an adjudication  by  this  Court under  Art.    31 not complying with the  declaration  made. Our law is not without instances where a court may be called upon to make an adjudication of the rights of the parties to an  agreement or an award simpliciter on the basis  of  such rights without  passing a decree.  A case in point is s.  33 of the Indian Arbitration Act. Further, all adjudications by a  court  of  law even under a decree in  a  suit  need  not necessarily  be capable of enforcement by way of  execution. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 now replaced  by s. 34 of the new Act enables a person entitled to any  legal character or to any right as to any property to institute  a suit  against any person denying or interested to  deny  his title  to  such character or right without  asking  for  any further relief subject to the limitations prescribed by  the section.  We If  and  in  so far as the  dispute  involves  any  question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends:        Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not  extend to  a  dispute  arising out     of  any  treaty,  agreement, covenant,  engagement,  sanad or  other  similar  instrument which  having  been entered into or  execucated  before  the commencement of     the construction, continues in operation after  such commencement, or which provides that  the   said jurisdication shall not extend to such a dispute. 526 need not however lay much stress on this aspect of the  case as  we are only concerned to find out whether the suits  can be entertained by this Court.     Clauses  (a),  (b) and (c) of the  article  specify  the parties  who  can appear as disputants  before  this  Court. Under cl. (a) it is the Government of India and one or  more States  under cl. (b) it is the Government of India and  one or  more States on one side and one or more other States  on the  other,  while under cl. (c) the parties can be  two  or more  States without the Government of India being  involved in the dispute.  The specification of the parties is not  of an  inclusive kind.  The express words of cls. (a), (b)  and

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(c)  exclude  the  idea of a private citizen, a  firm  or  a corporation  figuring  as a disputant either alone  or  even along  with a State or with the Government of India  in  the category  of a party to the dispute.  There is no scope  for suggesting  that a private citizen, a firm or a  corporation can  be arrayed as a party by itself on one side and one  or more States including the Government of India on the  other. Nor is there anything in the article which suggests a  claim being  made by or preferred against a private party  jointly or  in  the alternative with a State or  the  Government  of India.   The framers of the Constitution appear not to  have contemplated  the  case  of a dispute  in  which  a  private citizen a firm or a corporation is in any way involved as  a fit  subject  for  adjudication  by  this  Court  under  its exclusive original jurisdiction conferred by Art. 131.     Like  many  of the provisions of our  Constitution  this article  had a fore-runner in the Government of  India  Act, 1935.  Section  204 of that Act provided for  conferment  of original jurisdiction on the Federal Court of  India.   That section  ran  as follows :--                   "(1)  Subject  to the provisions  of  this               Act, the Federal Court shall, to the exclusion               of   any   other  court,  have   an   original               jurisdiction in any dispute between any two or               more of the following parties, that is to say,               the  Federation, any of the  Provinces or  any               of the Federal States, if and in so far as the               dispute involves any question (whether of  law               or fact) on which the existence or extent of a               legal right depends:               Provided that the said jurisdiction shall  not               extend to--                   (a) a dispute to which a State is a party,               unless the dispute-                   (i)  concerns the interpretation  of  this               Act or of an Order in Council made thereunder,               or the extent of the               527               legislative  or executive authority vested  in               the Federation by virtue of the Instrument  of               Accession of that State; or                   (ii) arises under an agreement made  under               Part  VI  of  this  Act  in  relation  to  the               administration  in that State of a law of  the               Federal  Legislature,  or  otherwise  concerns               some matter with respect to which the  Federal               Legislature  has power to make laws  for  that               State; or                   (iii) arises under an agreement made after               the establishment of the Federation,  with the               approval  of His Majesty’s Representative  for               the exercise of the functions of the Crown  in               its relations with Indian States, between that               State and the Federation or a Province,  being               an agreement which expressly provides that the               said  jurisdiction  shall  extend  to  such  a               dispute;                   (b) a dispute arising under any  agreement               which   expressly  provides  that   the   said               jurisdiction  shall  not  extend  ’to  such  a               dispute.                   (2)  The Federal Court in the exercise  of               its original jurisdiction shall not  pronounce               any   judgment   other  than   a   declaratory               judgment."

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Clause  (a)  of  the proviso. to  the  section  defined  the categories  of  disputes which might be  raised  before  the Federal  Court  while clause (b) permitted  the  parties  to provide  for  the  exclusion of  such  jurisdiction  in  the agreement in respect whereof the dispute arose.  It will  be noted that the scope of the dispute under subcl. (i) of  cl. (a)  was limited to the interpretation of the Government  of India  Act  or  Order  in  Council  or  to  the  extent   of legislative or executive authority vested in the  Federation while  under sub-cl. (ii) the dispute had to relate  to  the administration  in  a State  of  a  law   of   the   Federal Legislature   or   otherwise  concerned  with  some   matter relating   to  the  legislative  competency  of   the   said legislature.   Under  sub-cl. (iii) the  dispute could  only be  one under an agreement made after the  establishment  of the  Federation  between the State and the Federation  or  a Province  subject  to the condition  therein  specified.   A dispute  of the nature which is raised in this scries  of  a case  was  outside the ken of s. 204 of  the  Government  of India Act.     It  may  not be out of place to trace the origin  of  s. 204.   The  proceedings  of the Joint  Committee  on  Indian Constitutional Re- 528 form,  Session 1933-34, Vol. 1, Part II, paragraph 309  read as follows:                   "A  Federal Court is an essential  element               in a Federal Constitution.  It is at  once the               interpreter  and guardian of the  Constitution               and  a  tribunal  for  the  determination   of               disputes between the constituent units of  the               Federation.   The establishment of  a  Federal               Court  is part of the White Paper scheme,  and               we approve generally the proposals with regard               to it.  We have, however, certain comments  to               make upon them, which we set out below." The  report of the Joint Committee on Indian  Constitutional Reform,  Session  1933-34,  Vol. 1,  Part  1  contained  two paragraphs  bearing  on this matter.  Paragraph  322  was  a reproduction  of paragraph 309 quoted above.  Paragraph  324 ran as follows:                   "324.  It  is proposed  that  the  Federal               Court shall have an original jurisdiction in--                   (i)     any    matter    involving     the               interpretation of the Constitution Act or  the               determination  of  any rights  or  obligations               arising  thereunder, where the parties to  the               dispute  are (a) the Federation and  either  a               Province  or a State, or (b) two Provinces  or               two States, or a Province and a State;                   (ii)    any    matter    involving     the               interpretation  of,  or  arising  under,   any               agreement  entered into after the commencement               of the Constitution Act between the Federation               and  a Federal Unit or between Federal  Units,               unless the agreement otherwise provides.                   This  jurisdiction is to be  an  exclusive               one,  and in our opinion rightly so, since  it               would    be   altogether   inappropriate    if               proceedings could be taken by one Unit of  the               Federation  against another in the  Courts  of               either  of  them.  For that  reason  we  think               that,  where  the  parties are  Units  of  the               Federation  or  the  Federation  itself,   the               jurisdiction  ought to include  not  only  the

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             interpretation  of the Constitution  Act,  but               also  the interpretation of Federal  laws,  by               which we meant any laws enacted by the Federal               Legislature."     It  is  clear  from the above that the  framers  of  the Government of India Act, 1935 thought that the Federal Court should 529 be  the tribunal for the determination of  disputes  between the constituent units of the Federation and it sought to lay down the exact nature of the dispute which that Court  could be called upon to examine and decide.     The Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee show that  they had the said report’and the said  proceedings  of the  Committee  in  their  mind  when  they  advocated   the strengthening of the position of the Federal Court in  India and widening its jurisdiction both on the original side  and the appellate side but maintaining at the same time that  it should   "act  as  an  interpreter  and  guardian   of   the Constitution,   and as a tribunal for the  determination  of disputes between the constituent units of the Federation."     It  is  also  to  be noted that  under  s.  204  of  the Government   of   India  Act,  1935  the   Federal   Court’s jurisdiction   was  limited  to  the  pronouncement   of   a declaratory judgment.     Art. 109 of the Draft Constitution of India prepared  by the  Constituent Assembly was in the same terms as Art.  131 of  the  Constitution as it came into force  in  1950.   The proviso  to the original article was substituted by the  new proviso  in  the  year  1956. as a  result  of  the  Seventh Amendment  by reason of the abolition of the Part  B  States and the changes necessitated thereby. Reference was made  at the   Bar  in  this  connection  to  the  Debates   in   the Constituent  Assembly,  Vol. IV,  13th  July  1947  to  21st July, 1947.  They however do not throw any additional light.     So  far  as the proceedings of the  Joint  Committee  on Indian Constitutional Reform and the report of the Committee on  the  same  are concerned, they make it  clear  that  the object of conferring exclusive original jurisdiction on  the Federal  Court was that the disputes of the kinds  specified between the Federation and the Provinces as the  constituent units of the Federation, should not be left to be decided by courts  of law of a particular unit but be adjudicated  upon only  by  the highest tribunal in the land  which  would  be beyond the influence of any one constituent unit.     Although  Art.  131  does not define the  scope  of  the disputes which this Court may be called upon to determine in the same way as section 204 of the Government of India  Act, and  we  do  not find it necessary to do so,  this  much  is certain that the legal right which is the subject of dispute must  arise  in  the context of  the  Constitution  and  the Federalism it sets up.  However, there can 530 be  no doubt that so far as the parties to the  dispute  are concerned,  the framers of the Constitution did intend  that they  could  only be the constituent units of the  Union  of India and the Government of India itself arrayed on one side or  the other either singly or jointly with another unit  or the Government of India.   There is no decision either of the Federal Court of  India or  of  this Court which throws much light on  the  question before us. Reference was made at the Bar to the case of  The United   Provinces  v. The  Governor-General  in  Council(1) where  the  United  Provinces  filed  a  suit  against   the

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Governor-General  in Council for a declaration that  certain provisions of  the  Cantonments  Act. 1924, were ultra vires the then Indian Legislature.  A claim was also made that all fines  imposed and realised by criminal courts for  offences committed   within  the  cantonment  areas  in  the   United Provinces  ought to be credited to the  provincial  revenues and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover and  adjust all  such  sums wrongly credited to Cantonment  Funds  since 1924.  The Governor-General in Council contended inter  alia that  the dispute was not one which was  justifiable  before the Federal Court.  On  the question of jurisdiction. Gwyer, C.J. was not inclined to think "that the plaintiffs would in any event have been entitled to  the declarations for  which they originally asked, in proceedings against the  Governor- General  in  Council".  According  to   the   learned  Chief Justice  "their  proper  course  would  have  been  to  take proceedings  against a name’ Contouring Board, though   .... such proceedings could not have been brought to this Court." He  was of the view that it was competent for the  court  to entertain  a suit for a declaration "that s. 106 of the  Act of  1924  was  ultra vires," and said that  as  the  dispute between  the  parties  depended upon  the  validity  of  the assertion of the Province to have the fines under discussion credited  to provincial revenues and not to  the  Cantonment funds the dispute involved a question of the existence of  a legal right.  According to him the question might have  been raised  in  proceedings to which a Cantonment  Board  was  a party but "it was convenient to all concerned that it should be disposed of in the proceedings before the court."   The  only  other  Indian case cited at  the  Bar  in  this connection was that of the State of Seraikella and others v. Union  of  India and another(2) where Mahajan, J.  expressed the view that s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not affect suits instituted in the Federal Court under s. 204 of the Government of India               Act. (1) [1939]   F.C.R, 124.             (2) [1951] S.C.R. 474. 531     Our  attention  was  drawn to  some  provisions  of  the American  Constitution  and  of  the  Constitution  Act   of Australia    and   several   decisions   bearing   on    the interpretation  of provision which are somewhat  similar  to Art. 131.  But as the similarity is only limited, we do  not propose to examine either the provisions referred to or  the decisions to which our attention was drawn.  In interpreting our Constitution we must not be guided by decisions which do not  bear  upon  provisions  identical  with  those  in  our Constitution .     The Constitution makes special provisions for settlement of  certain  disputes in a manner different from  that  laid down  in  Art. 131.  For instance, Art. 143 gives  an  over- riding  power  to  the President of  India  to  consult  the Supreme Court when he is of the view that the question is of such  a  nature  and of such public importance  that  it  is expedient  to  do  so.  Under el. (1) of  that  Article  the President is empowered to obtain the opinion of the  Supreme Court  upon any question of law or fact which has arisen  or is.  likely  to arise and is of such a nature  and  of  such public importance that the President considers it  expedient to  obtain  such opinion.  In such a case  the  Court  after giving  such hearing as it thinks fit has to report  to  the President  its opinion thereon.  Clause (2) of  the  article shows  that  this  power of  the  President  over-rides  the proviso to Art. 131.     Art.  257  provides for control of the  Union  over  the States  in  certain  cases.  Under clause  (2)  thereof  the

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executive  power of the Union also extends to the giving  of directions to a State as to the construction and maintenance of means of communication declared in the direction to be of national  or military importance.  Under cl (4)  where  such directions are given and "costs have been incurred in excess of those which would have been incurred in the discharge  of the  normal  duties of the State if such direction  had  not been  given," the Government of India must pay to the  State such  sum as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement,  as may  be determined by an arbitrator appointed by  the  Chief Justice  of  India,  in respect of  the   extra   costs   so incurred by the State,     Again, when there is a dispute or complaint with  regard to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any  interState  river or river valley cl. (2) of  Art.  262 gives  Parliament the power by law to provide  that  neither the  Supreme  Court  nor  any  other  court  shall  exercise jurisdiction  in respect of such dispute or complaint as  is referred  to  in  clause  (1  ).   Such  a  law  ousts   the jurisdiction of the court which would normally be  attracted by 532 Art. 131.  Art. 290 contains a provision somewhat similar to Art. 257(4) with regard to certain expenses and pensions and makes the same determinable by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India.     Apart  from  these special provisions  a  dispute  which falls within the ambit of Art. 131 can only be determined in the  forum mentioned therein, namely, the Supreme  Court  of India,  provided  there has not been impleaded in  any  said dispute  any private party, be it a citizen or a firm  or  a corporation  along  with a State either jointly  or  in  the alternative.   A  dispute in which such a private  party  is involved  must  be brought before a court, other  than  this Court,  having  jurisdiction  over  the matter.     It was argued by counsel on behalf of the State of Bihar that so far as the Hindustan Steel Ltd., is concerned it  is ’State’ and the suits in which the Government of India along with  Hindustan Steel Ltd. have been impleaded are  properly filed  within Art. 131 of the Constitution triable  by  this Court  in its original jurisdiction. Reference was  made  to the  case  of  Rajasthan State Electricity  Board  v.  Mohan Lal(1).  There the  question  arose between certain  persons who were permanent employees of the Government of the  State of  Rajasthan and later placed at the disposal of the  State Electricity  Board and one of the questions was whether  the appellant  Board could be held to be ’State’ as  defined  in Art.  12.  This Court by a majority held that the Board  was "other  authority"  within  the  meaning  of  Art.  12   and therefore  was  a ’State’ to  which  appropriate  directions could be given under Arts. 226 and 227 of the  Constitution. It  will  be  noted that under Art. 12 all  local  or  other authorities  within  the  territory of India  or  under  the control of the Government of India are ’States’ for purposes of  Part  III which defines and deals with  the  Fundamental Rights  enshrined in the Constitution.  The expression  "the State"  has the same meaning in Part IV of the  Constitution under  Art. 36. No reason was shown as to why  the  enlarged definition  of  ’State’  given in Parts III and  IV  of  the Constitution   would  be  attracted  to  Art.  131  of   the Constitution  and in our opinion a body like  the  Hindustan Steel  Ltd.  cannot be considered to be "a  State"  for  the purpose of Art. 131 of the Constitution.     In the result we hold that the suits do not lie in  this Court  under  Art. 131 of the Constitution and issue  No.  2

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must  be answered in the negative.  It is not  necessary  to give  any answer to issue No. 1 nor to issue No. 3.  On  the view we take the [1967] 3 S.C.R.  377. 533 plaints must be returned for the purpose of presentation  to courts  having  jurisdiction  over the  disputes.   Let  the plaints  be  returned for presentation to the  proper  court after  endorsing  on them the date of  presentation  of  the plaints  in  this  Court and the date  on  which  they  were returned.    We  make  no  order  as  to  costs   of   these applications. G.C. 534