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PETITIONER: STATE OF BIHAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UMA SHANKAR KETRIWAL & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/12/1980

BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1981 AIR  641            1981 SCR  (2) 402  1981 SCC  (1)  75  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1992 SC1701  (30)

ACT:      Criminal trial-Prosecution  commenced in the year 1963- Continuing in  1979-High Court  quashing proceedings  as  an abuse of  the process of court- Order whether valid-Limit to period for  criminal litigation  to continue at trial stage- Necessity of.

HEADNOTE:      A case  was initiated  through a report lodged with the police on the 9th April, 1960 that the respondent’s firm had misappropriated a  large quantity  of G. C. Sheets meant for distribution  to   quota  and   sub-quota   holders.   After investigation, a  police report  was submitted  on the  23rd December 1962  to the Magistrate, who took cognizance of the case on  the 25th January, 1963. Charges were framed against the respondents under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act on  15th September,  1967.  The  progress  of  the  case thereafter was very tardy.      In 1979,  the respondents  made two applications to the High Court  for quashing  the proceedings  initiated against them. The  High Court  allowed them  on the  ground that the police report  did not  disclose any  offence against any of the respondents and that as the prosecution commenced in the year 1963  was still  going on in 1979, it would be an abuse of the  process of  the Court  to allow  the prosecution  to continue any further.      In the  appeal by  the State  to  this  Court,  it  was contended that  the finding  about  the  police  report  not disclosing any  offence was  erroneous and that the delay in the conclusion  of the  trial was  not a  justification  for quashing the proceedings.      Dismissing the appeal ^      HELD: 1.  There has  to be  a limit  to the  period for which criminal  litigation is  allowed to go on at the trial stage. [404D]      2.  The   present  case   is  not   a  proper  one  for interference  inspite  of  the  fact  that  the  allegations disclose  the  commission  of  an  offence  which  is  quite serious. [404E]

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    In the instant case the trial has not made much headway even though  no less  than  20  years  have  gone  by.  Such protraction itself  means  considerable  harassment  to  the accused not  only monetarily  but also  by way  of  constant attention to  the case  and repeated  appearances in  court, apart from anxiety. [404C-D]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 699 of 1980.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 6-11-1979  of Patna  High Court in Criminal Misc. Nos. 3679 and 3913/79. 403      K. G. Bhagat and D. Goburdhan for the Appellant.      S.  C.  Misra,  M.  P.  Jha  and  A.  K.  Jha  for  the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KOSHAL, J.  This is  an appeal by special leave against an order  dated the  6th November,  1979 of a learned Single Judge  of   the  Patna   High  Court   quashing  the  entire proceedings in a criminal case against the 7 respondents who were facing  a charge  under  section  7  of  the  Essential Commodities Act in the Court of a Magistrate at Bhagalpur.      2. The  case was initiated through a report lodged with the police on the 9th of April 1960 with the allegation that the respondents’  firm which  held a  licence for dealing in iron and  steel had misappropriated a large quantity of G.C. sheets  meant   for  distribution  to  quota  and  sub-quota holders. After  investigation a  police report was submitted on the 23rd December 1962 to a Bhagalpur Magistrate who took cognizance of  the case  on the  25th January 1963. However, the charge  against the  respondents was  framed as  late as 15th September  1967 and since then the progress of the case was very  tardy as the orders passed therein were challenged in appeals  or on  the revisional  side from  time to  time. Ultimately in  1979 the respondents made two applications to the High  Court praying that the proceedings against them be quashed and  the same  were accepted  through  the  impugned order. The  High Court  held for  various reasons  that  the police report  did not  disclose any  offence against any of the  respondents.  Another  reason  for  accepting  the  two applications may  be stated  in the  words  of  the  learned Single Judge:           "Another important  aspect of  the matter  is that      the prosecution  commenced in  the year  1963 and it is      still going  on in  1979. It  is true  that the accused      persons themselves  are partly  blamed for  this  delay      because several  revision applications  have been filed      at their instance in the High Court and in the district      court.  The   situation,  however,   continues  to   be      unjustified because  the last  revision application was      some time  disposed in 1973 and the record was returned      in 1974.  This fact  has been  stated  by  the  learned      counsel for the petitioners and five years have elapsed      since then.  I am  told that  four witnesses  have been      examined and  the last  witness was  examined in April,      1979 and  after that  no witness  has been examined. It      has been  stated in the order sheet that prosecution is      not in  a position to know the address of the witnesses      who  are   mostly  Government   Officials.  Luxury   of      protracted trial cannot be allowed to the 404

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    prosecution. If  they did not know the address of their      own witnesses  and if  the prosecution  was  not  in  a      position to  conclude its evidence by now it will be an      abuse  of  the  process  of  the  court  to  allow  the      prosecution go on any further."      3.  Learned   counsel  for   the  appellant  State  has challenged the  impugned order  not only  on the ground that its finding  about the  police  report  not  disclosing  any offence against  the respondents was erroneous but also with the argument  that the  delay in the conclusion of the trial was not  a justification  for quashing  the proceedings.  We have heard  him at  length and  although there is much to be said against  the impugned  order in  so far  as the finding about the  police report  is concerned, we cannot lose sight of the  fact that  the trial  has not made much headway even though no  less than 20 years have gone by. Such protraction itself means considerable harassment to the accused not only monetarily but also by way of constant attention to the case and repeated  appearances in  court, apart  from anxiety. It may well be that the respondents themselves were responsible in a large measure for the slow pace of the case inasmuch as quite a  few  orders  made  by  the  trial  magistrate  were challenged in  higher courts,  but then  there has  to be  a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed to go  on at  the trial stage. In this view of the matter we do not  consider the  present case  a  proper  one  for  our interference in  spite of  the fact  that we  feel that  the allegations disclosed  the commission of an offence which we regard as quite serious.      4. For the reasons stated we dismiss the appeal. N.V.K.                                     Appeal dismissed. 405