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PETITIONER: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S. SREE RAMA RAO

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/1963

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1723            1964 SCR  (3)  25  CITATOR INFO :  R          1965 SC1103  (8)  RF         1969 SC 983  (4)  RF         1970 SC1334  (11)  F          1975 SC2151  (25)  RF         1980 SC1896  (180)  R          1983 SC1102  (6)  RF         1986 SC 995  (16)

ACT:     Public  Servant--Disciplinary   action--Writ   Petition- Interference  by  High  Court--Principles--Constitution   of India, Art.  226.

HEADNOTE:     The  respondent was a Sub-Inspector of Police in  charge 01  a police station.  One D, suspected of having  committed an  offence, was apprehended by the village Munsif  and  was sent  to  the  police station.  He was handed  over  to  the respondent.  The  respondent  declined  to  give  a  written acknowledgment  of having received 1)and made no entries  in the  station  diary regarding him.  D was  confined  in  the police  station   for several days  without  being  produced before  a  Magistrate.  A departmental inquiry  was  started against   him  for  reprehensible  conduct   in   wrongfully confining D.  The defence set up by him was that D had never been handed over to him because he had escaped while on  his way  to  the police station.  The Deputy  Superintendent  of Police,  who  held  the enquiry, found  him  guilty  of  the charge.   The Deputy Inspector-General of Police gave him  a show  cause  notice and after  considering  his  explanation ordered  that he be dismissed from service.  On appeal,  the Inspector-General of Police modified the order of  dismissal and  converted  it into one for removal  from  service.  The respondent  filed  a  writ petition before  the  High  Court challenging  the  validity of the order and the  High  Court quashed the orders.     Held   that  the  High  Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to interfere with the orders.  The High Court was wrong in  its view  that in a departmental enquiry the rule followed in  a criminal  trial that  an  offence is not established  unless proved   by   evidence  beyond  reasonable  doubt   to   the

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satisfaction of the court must be applied and that if such a rule  was  not applied the high court could  set  aside  the order  of  the  departmental authority in  exercise  of  its power  .under Art. 226 of the constitution.  The High  Court does  not sit as a court of appeal over the decision of  the authority holding a departmental enquiry: 26 it  has only to see whether the enquiry has been held  by  a competent   authority   and  according  to   the   procedure prescribed  and  whether the rules of natural  justice  have been  observed.  Where  there is  some  evidence  which  the authority  has  accepted and which evidence  may  reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the  function of the High Court exercising its  jurisdiction under Art.  226 to review the evidence and to arrive at   an independent   finding on the evidence.  If the  enquiry  has been  properly held the question of adequacy or  reliability of  the evidence cannot be convassed before the High  Court. In the present case, the proceedings before the departmental authorities  were regular, no rules of natural justice  were voilated, the conclusions were borne out by the evidence and the  respondent  had  ample  opportunity  of  examining  his witnesses.   Therefore,  the conclusions  of  the  punishing authority  were  not open tO be questioned before  the  High Court.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  626  of 1961.     Appeal  by  special leave from the  judgment  and  order dated November 18, 1959, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 922 of 1956. T.V.R. Tatachari and P.D. Menon, for the appellants. K. Bhimasankaram and T.  Satyanarayana, for the respondent. 1963. April 10.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SHAH J.--On March 10, 1955, the Deputy Inspector General of  Police, State of Andhra, passed an order dismissing  the respondent  (who was a sub-inspector of police appointed  on probation) from service. On appeal to the Inspector  General of  Police, the order was altered into one of  removal  from service.   The  respondent  then. moved the  High  Court  of Andhra  pradesh  by  a  petition  under  Art.  226  of   the Constitution for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate 27 writ or direction quashing the proceedings of the  Inspector General  of Police including his  order dated September  24, 1955,  and the order of the Deputy  Inspector    General  of Police   dated March 10, 1955, and for such other orders  as the  Court  may deem fit.  The High Court  quashed  the  two impugned  orders.   Against  the order passed  by  the  High Court, this appeal is preferred with special leave.     It  is  necessary to set out in some  detail  the  facts which gave rise to the departmental proceedings against  the respondent  resulting  in  his removal  from  service.   The respondent was at the material time in charge of the  police station  Kodur,  Visakhapatnam District.   On  February  18, 1954, an offence of house-breaking and theft was reported at the  police station and was registered on February  19,1954. It  was  recited  in the report of  the  Village  Munsif  of Vechalam  that  one  Durgalu who  was  then  absconding  was suspected to be-the offender.  This Durgalu was  apprehended by the Village Munsif of Kalogotla on March 5, 1954, and was handed  over to the Village Munsif of Vechalam, who  in  his

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turn  sent  Durgalu  to Kodur police  station  with  village servants  V.  Polayya, Vechalapu  Simhachalam,  Kodamanchali Simhachalam  and  Koduru Sumudram.  It is the  case  of  the State that Durgalu was handed over to the respondent on  the night  of  March 5, 1954, but no written  acknowledgment  in token  of having received Durgalu from the village  servants was given by the respondent, nor was any entry posted in the station  diary, and Durgalu was thereafter confined  in  the police station from the night of March 5, 1954, without  any order from a Magistrate remanding him to police custody.  On March   7,  1954, the’ respondent entrusted  charge  of  the police station to a head constable and left for Kakinada  on casual leave for  five   days.   He  returned  to  Kodur  on March 12, 1954. After the departure of the respondent, 28 some   constables   arrested  one  Reddy   Simhachalam   and brought him to the police station in the evening of March 7, 1954.   It  is  the case of the State that as  a  result  of torture   by  police  constables Nos. 1199,  363   and  662, Reddy   Simhachalam became unconscious.   The dead  body  of Reddy  Simhachalam  was found floating in a  well  near  the police  station  on  the morning of March 9,  1954,  and  an enquiry into the circumstances in which the death took place was   commenced   by   the   Revenue   Divisional   Officer, Narsipatnam.  In the enquiry, Durgalu made a statement  that he  had witnessed the torture of Reddy Simhachalam,  in  the police station, by the three constables.  Police  constables Nos.  1199, 363’ and 662 were then charged before  the  Sub- Magistrate,  Chodavaram, for offences under ss.  304(2)  and 201  read  with s. 114 I.P. Code, for causing the  death  of Reddy  Simhachalam   by   torturing  him   and  for  causing disappearence of the evidence of his death. Before the  Sub- Magistrate,  Durgalu  retracted his  earlier  statement  and stated  that the statement that he was  an  eye-witness   to the torture of Reddy Simhachalam was untrue and that he  was induced  to make that statement by the police.   He  deposed that he had escaped from the custody of the village servants before he reached the police-station Kodur on March 5, 1954, and  that  he was re-arrested on March 8, 1954.   The   Sub- Magistrate   discharged the police constables  holding  that once Durgalu the only eye-witness turned hostile, there  was no direct evidence on which even a prima facie case could be made  out against them.  The record of the case  before  the Sub-Magistrate   was   called   by   the   Sessions   Judge, Visakhapatnam,  suo motu.  The Sessions Judge held it proved on  the evidence that Durgalu was arrested on March 5,  1954 and was taken to the police-station Kodur and was wrongfully confined  since  that date in the police  station,  and  the story of Durgalu before the Sub-Magistrate that after he was arrested on March 5, 1954 and was taken to the 29 Kodur  village on that very day he had escaped from  custody and  that he remained in his village Vechalam could  not  be believed.     A  departmental  enquiry  was  commenced  in  May  1954: against  the  respondent.  The charge  in  the  disciplinary proceedings against the respondent after it was amended  ran as follows :--               "Reprehensible conduct in wrongfully confining               a   K.D,  Chandana  Durgalu  accused  in   Cr.               No.17/54:  of  Kodur Police Station  from  the                             night of  5-3-54: to 7-3-1954: in the Police               Station  when  he went on  five   days  casual               leave.’ ’

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To  the charge was appended a "statement of facts"  reciting inter  aria,  that Durgalu was apprehended  by  the  Village Munsif, Kaligotla and was handed over to the Village Munsif, Vechalam,  that  Durgalu  was sent by the  latter  with  the written report with the assistance of village servants, that on  the  same night the latter handed over  Durgalu  to  the respondent  in  the police station Kodur at  about  12  mid- night,  with the report of the Village Munsif and   demanded acknowledgment  but  the  acknowledgment  was refused by the respondent,  and that the respondent did not  mention  these facts in any of the station records and wrongfully  confined Durgalu  in the police station till March 7, 1954:, when  he proceeded  on  casual  leave  for  five  days.   This, the "statement   of   facts"  added,   constituted   grave   and reprehensible conduct and hence the charge.  The  respondent submitted an explanation in which he submitted that  Durgalu was   not   handed   over  to him  on  March  S,  1954:,  as alleged  nor  at any time before he proceeded  on  March  7, 1904:, on casual leave. His plea was that when he  proceeded on  leave he entrusted charge of the police station  to  the head constable leaving instructions to trace Durgalu and  to take action. 30     The   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police   held   the departmental enquiry and submitted his report on October 27, 1954, setting out the evidence of the witnesses examined  on behalf  of the State and the respondent, and summing up  the conclusion by reciting that the evidence in the case for the State made out a strong case against the respondent, that it was established that Durgalu was arrested on March 5,  1954, and  was sent  by the  Village Munsif to Vechalam who in his turn  sent  him  with the village  servants  to  the  police station Kodur, and Durgalu was handed over to the respondent on  the night o.f March 5, 1954, that the story  of  Durgalu that after he was arrested on March 5, 1954, he escaped from the  custody of the village servants and was again  arrested on March 8, 1954, was false.  The report then concluded "All these  facts  go  to show that he was arrested  on  the  5th without  a  shadow  of doubt, but if  the  judgment  of  the learned Court which is based on the  retracted statement  of Durgalu is considered the ’sacred truth’ the delinquent  may have benefit  of doubt."  This report was considered by  the authority  competent to impose punishment and a  provisional conclusion   that  the  respondent  merited  punishment   of dismissal for the charges held established by the report was recorded.   A copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer  was sent to the respondent and he was called upon to submit  his representation  against the action proposed to be  taken  in regard to him.  The respondent submitted his  representation which  was  considered by the Deputy Inspector  General   of Police, Northern Range, Waltair.   That Officer referred  to the evidence of witnesses for the State about the arrest  of Durgalu on March 5, 1954, and the handing over of Durgalu to the  respondent  on  the same day.   He  observed  that  the evidence of Durgalu ’that after he was arrested on March  5: 1954, he had made good his escape and was again arrested  on March  8,  1954, could  not be accepted.  Holding  that  the charge 31 against  the respondent was serious and had on the  evidence been  adequately  proved, in his view  the  only  punishment which  the  respondent deserved was of  dismissal  from  the police force.-     In   appeal  the Inspector General of   Police  accepted the evidence of the witnesses who had deposed that they  had

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handed  over Durgalu to the respondent  on March  5,   1954. In his view the respondent  had "betrayed gross   dishonesty and lack of character in falsifying the records by  omitting to  write what he had done and what happened in  the  police station, thereby .proving himself thoroughly dishonest   and untrustworthy,"  and  "showing  himself unfit  to  hold  the responsible post of a SubInspector of police," and that "his records  as  a probationary  Sub-Inspector  of  police   are generally  unsatisfactory.  and he has earned  a  reputation for  inefficiency and lack of interest in work for  weakness in  dealing with his subordinates, which are all  attributes that  militate against his becoming useful  SubInspector  of Police."  But taking into consideration his  young age   and inexperience,   the Inspector General of Police reduced  the order of dismissal into one for removal from service.     In  the  departmental  proceeding  a simple question  of fact  fell  to  be  determined--viz.  whether  Durgalu   was arrested  on  March 5, 1954, and was delivered over  by  the village  servants to the respondent at police station  Kodur on  the  night of March 5, 1954.  There is no  dispute  that Durgalu  was arrested on March 5, 1954, and was sent by  the Village  Munsif,  Vechalam with  his report  to  the  police station  Kodur.   The only question in dispute  was  whether Durgalu was handed over to the respondent on March 5,  1954, as  stated by the witnesses for the State.  The case of  the State  was  accepted by the Deputy  Inspect.or  .General  of Police who passed the order of dismissal and the Inspector 32 General of Police in appeal.  But the High Court declined to accept this view of the evidence.  In so doing, with respect it  must  be  observed, the High  Court  assumed  to  itself jurisdiction  which it did not possess.  The High Court  was of  the  view  that  the  conclusion   of  the  departmental authorities  was vitiated, because the Enquiry Officer dealt with  the  evidences  of witnesses for the  State,  and  the witnesses  for the respondent  separately,  and  the  Deputy Inspector  General  of Police and the Inspector  General  of Police  did not in recording their orders refer to  all  the evidence led before the Enquiry Officer and they "failed  to appreciate the full significance of the rule concerning  the onus  of proving.  The rule meant that everything  essential to  the  establishment of a charge lies on the  person,  who seeks  to establish the charge.  It further means  that  the two  sets  of  evidence in the case  must  not  be  examined separately  in  order to ascertain first whether  those  for establishing  the charge have proved it and then to  examine the  defence  in order to see how far  the  conclusions  are unjustified.  The  better approach, which has been described as  the  golden  thread in the web of  criminal  law  is  to examine the law,  the  whole evidence in order to  ascertain how  far the liability of the person proceeded  against  has been  established beyond reasonable doubt".  The High  Court then  observed that ordinarily the conclusions on  questions of fact by a body or tribunal in a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution are accepted by the High Court but  that general rule does not apply "whenever an important principle of  jurisprudence is discarded in reaching  such  findings", and  since  the  fundamental rule that a  person  should  be punished only after the entire evidence in the case had been considered  and he is found liable beyond reasonable  doubt, had  not been followed, the conclusions of the  departmental authorities  were vitiated.  The High Court  again  observed that the orders passed by the departmental authorities  were vitiated because of two 33

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other  matters:   (i) that the Enquiry Officer  declined  to summon and examine two witnesses for the defence even though a  request in that behalf was made; and (ii) that there  was no  charge against the respondent of "falsifying the  record by  omitting to write what he had done or what  happened  in the   police  station",  and  he  had  not  been  given   an opportunity  of  meeting  such a charge  and  therefore  the respondent   had  no  fair  hearing  consistent   with   the principles of natural justice.     There  is no warrant for the view expressed by the  High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed  in criminal  trials that an offence is not  established  unless proved   by   evidence  beyond  reasonable  doubt   to   the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Art,  226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities  holding a departmental  enquiry  invalid.   The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Art. 226 of  the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision  of the  authorities holding a departmental enquiry   against  a public  servant:   iris concerned to determine  whether  the enquiry  is held by an authority competent in  that  behalf, and  according to the procedure prescribed in  that  behalf, and  whether the rules of natural justice are not  violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority  entrusted with  the  duty to hold the enquiry has accepted  and  which evidence  may  reasonably support the  conclusion  that  the delinquent  Officer is guilty of the charge, it is  not  the function  of the High Court in a petition for a  writ  under Art.  226  to  review  the evidence  and  to  arrive  at  an independent  finding  on the evidence.  The High  Court  may undoubtedly  interfere  where the  departmental  authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the 34 rules  of natural justice or in violation of  the  statutory rules   prescribing  the  mode  of  enquiry  or  where   the authorities  have disabled themselves from reaching  a  fair decision  by some considerations extraneous to the  evidence and  the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to  be influenced  by  irrelevant  considerations  or  ;where   the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at  that  conclusion,  or  on  similar  grounds.   But   the departmental  authorities are, if the enquiry  is  otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal  evidence  on which their findings can be  based,  the adequacy  or  reliability of that evidence is not  a  matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in   a  proceeding  for  a  writ  under  Art.  226  of   the Constitution.     The  Enquiry  Officer  had  accepted  the  evidence   of witnesses  for the Sate that Durgalu was handed over to  the respondent  on March 5, 1954, and the observation  that  the respondent may have the benefit of doubt if the judgment  of the Magistrate is considered "sacred truth" appears to  have been  made in a somewhat sarcastic vein, and does  not  cast any doubt upon the conclusion recorded by him.  The  Enquiry Officer  appears  to have stated that the  judgment  of  the Magistrate   holding  a  criminal  trial  against  a  public servant  could  not  always  be regarded  as  binding  in  a departmental  enquiry  against that public servant.   in  so stating, the Enquiry Officer did not commit any error.   The first  ground  on which the High Court interfered  with  the

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order  of  the punishing authorities is   therefore   wholly unsustainable.     The two other grounds on which the High Court also based its  conclusion,  namely,  refusal  to  summon  and  examine witnesses  for  the respondent and  holding  the  respondent guilty of a charge of which he had no 35 notice are equally  without substance.  It appears that  the respondent  desired to examine police constables  Nos.  178, 506  and  569 to prove that Durgalu was not in  the  lock-up till March 8, 1954.  Police constable  No. 506 was  examined as  a witness for the  respondent, and the  Enquiry  Officer has not accepted his evidence.  The other two witnesses were neither  summoned  nor examined,  but it appears  from   the record  that on September 20, 1954, the respondent  promised to  produce the witnesses whom he had cited in his  defence. At  the  hearing dated September 26, 1954,  three  witnesses were examined by the respondent and the respondent was given another opportunity to secure the presence of the  remaining defence  witnesses.  On September 27, 1954  police constable 506   was  examined  and  it  appears  that  the  respondent expressed  his desire not to examine any more witnesses.  In the  proceeding of the Enquiry Officer there is a note  that "your  defence   witnesses   have  been  examined  and  such documents  you required have been produced  and  exhibited". The respondent subscribed his signature in acknowledgment of the  correctness  of  that recital. He  did  not  raise  any objection  in  the  representation made by  him  before  the Deputy Inspector General of Police when notice was issued on him  to  show cause why he should not be punished.   In  the memo  of appeal to the Inspector General of Police,  it  was submitted  by the respondent that the police witnesses  were to  be summoned by the Enquiry Officer, and that he did  not summon them. It was also submitted that the statement signed by the respondent was only in respect of private  witnesses, and  not police witnesses.  But the endorsement made by  the Enquiry   Officer   is   not   susceptible   of   any   such interpretation,  which  refers to all   witnesses  for   the respondent. The record does not show that an application for summoning  the  police witnesses was made  and  the  Enquiry Officer in breach of the rules declined to summon them.   We are in the light of this evidence 36 of  the  view  that  the  respondent  did  not,  after   the examination  of police constable No. 506, desire to  examine the  two  police  constables  Nos. 178  and  569,  whom  he. originally wanted to examine.     It was next urged that the findings recorded were not in respect  of the charge which the respondent was called  upon to answer. The charge against the respondent was that he had wrongfully  confined Durgalu on March 5,  1954, to March  7, 1954,  in  the  police  station.   In   the   statement   of facts  which accompanied the charge-sheet it was  stated  in express  terms that the respondent had not recorded in   any of  the   diaries  of the police station  that  Durgalu  was handed  over  to him on  March 5, 1954. The charge  and  the "statement  of facts" form part of a single document on  the basis   of  which  proceedings  were  started  against   the respondent and it would be hypercritical to proceed’ on  the view  that though the respondent  was expressly told in  the statement  of facts which formed part of  the  charge-sheet, that he had failed to record that Durgalu was handed over to him, that ground of reprehensible conduct’ was not  included in the charge, and on that account the enquiry was vitiated. No  objection appears to have been raised before the  Deputy

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Inspector  General  or   even  the   Inspector  General   of police,  that  there  was infirmity in the  charge  on  that account, and that infirmity had prejudiced the respondent in the  enquiry.  The respondent had full notice of the  charge against  him,  and he examined witnesses in support  of  his defence  and  made  several  argumentative   representations before the  Deputy  Inspector General, the Inspector General of Police and the Government of Andhra Pradesh.     In our Judgment the proceedings before the  departmental authorities were regular and were not vitiated on account of any breach of the rules of natural justice.  The conclusions of the departmental 37 officers  were fully borne out by the evidence  before  them and  the  High Court had no jurisdiction to  set  aside  the order  either  on  the  ground that  the  "approach  to  the evidence was not consistent with the approach in a  criminal case,"  nor on the ground that the High Court would have  on that   evidence  come  to  a  different   conclusion.    The respondent  had  also  ample opportunity  of  examining  his witnesses  after he was informed of the charge against  him. The  conclusion  recorded  by the  punishing  authority  was therefore not open to be canvassed, nor was the liability of the  respondent to be punished by removal from service  open to question before the High Court.     The  appeal is allowed and the order passed by the  High Court is set aside. The petition filed by the respondent  is dismissed.   There will be no order as to costs.  The  order as to costs passed by the High Court will stand.                           Appeal allowed. 38