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PETITIONER: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S.   M. K. PARASURAMA GURUKUL

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1973

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. PALEKAR, D.G.

CITATION:  1973 AIR 2237            1974 SCR  (1) 191  1973 SCC  (2) 252

ACT: Andhra  Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious  Institutions and  Endowments Act, 1966, Ss. 6, 15, 16 and  82-Appointment of trustee-If quasi-judicial function.

HEADNOTE: Under s. 15(1)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious  Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 in  respect of  a  charitable  or  religious  institution  or  endowment included  in the list published under s. 6(a), whose  annual income ’exceeds Rs. 2 lacs, the Government may, in the  case where there is a hereditary trustee, and shall in any other, constitute  a Board of trustees.  The respondent applied  to be  appointed as a trustee of a temple covered by  s.  15(1) (a), but was not appointed.  Instead, a board of 9 trustees. was  appointed.  The High Court quashed the  appointment  on the  ground  that  the authorities under  the  Act  exercise quasi-judicial functions and that the order appointing  the Board was not a speaking order. Allowing the appeal to this Court, HELD  : (1) The tests for determining whether a derision  is administrative  or quasi-judicial are : (a) there must be  a lis; (b) the opinion of the tribunal should be formed on the objective  and  not on the subjective  satisfaction  of  the tribunal;  and (c) there must be a duty on the  tribunal  to act judicially.                                      [193B-D] Province  of Bombay v. K. S. Advani & Ors. [1950]  1  S.C.R. 621,  Sliri Radheshyam Khare & Anr. v. The State  of  Madhya Pradesh  & Ors. [1959] S.C.R. 1440, R. v.  Manchester  Legal Aid Committee, [1952] (2) Q.B. 413, and Gullapal,  Nageswara Rao   &  Ors.  v.  Andhra  Pradesh  State   Road   Transport Corporation & Anr. [1959] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 319, referred to : (2)  In the present case, neither the respondent nor any  of those  appointed had a right to be appointed as  a  trustee. There  was no proposition or opposition and hence there  was no  between  the  parties.  Nor was there  any  question  of contest  between the authority proposing to do the  act  and the subject opposing it. [196D] (3)  Further,  none of the other tests is satisfied in  this case.  The legislature has left the matter to the discretion of  the appointing authority subject to the guidelines  laid

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down  in Ss. 15 and 16.  Normally the  appointing  authority would  exercise his own discretion as to who is best  fitted to  discharge  the duties and functions of a  trustee.   But that  is not to say that the appointing authority  must  set out the reasons or record a speaking order as to why he  has appointed a particular person as a trustee and not  somebody else.  The fact that under s. 82 the Commissioner has  power of revision in respect of orders passed by his  subordinates and  the  Government,  in respect of orders  passed  by  the Commissioner  as well as his subordinates, does not  in  any way  limit the powers of the appointing authority  under  s. 15. [176E to 197P] Commissioner,  H. R. & C.E. v. B.E.V. Venkatachalapathi,  85 L.W. 349 approved.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 796 of 1971. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated December  31,  1969  of the Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 366 of 1969. P.   Ram Reddy and P. Parameshwararao, for the appellant. A.   Subbarao, for the respondent. 192 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- ALAGIRISWAMI,  J.This  is an appeal by the State  of  Andhra Pradesh  against the judgment of the Division Bench  of  the High Court of Andhra Pradesh holding that the appointment of nine trustees to the Kalahastiswara Swami Temple in the town of Kalahasti in the Chittoor district of Andhra Pradesh  was liable to be, quashed on the short ground that the  impugned order was not a speaking order.  For this purpose the  Bench relied  upon its own judgment in Writ Petition No. 2536  of- 1967  that  the,  functionaries  under  the  Andhra  Pradesh Charitable  and Hindu Religious Institutions and  Endowments Act,  1966, though administrative tribunals, are  exercising quasi-judicial   functions   in   appointing   nonhereditary trustees.  By the time this. appeal came up for hearing the, period  of  office of the trustees,  whose  appointment  was challenged  by the respondent, was over and the  respondent, therefore, contended that the appeal should be dismissed  as having become infructuous.  On behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh.   it  was  urged  that  the  question  is  one   of considerable  importance  to  it- and  that  appointment  of trustees  to  a  number of institutions  is  being  held  up because  of the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh  High  Court. We,  therefore, indicated that we would be prepared to  hear the  appeal but would make it conditional on the  respondent getting  his  costs from the appellant irrespective  of  the result.  The State of Andhra Pradesh has no objection. It  appears  that  the  respondent has  also  filed  a  suit claiming  that  the temple in question is either  a  private family temple not falling within the definition of the  term temple,  in  the  Act or at least that he  is  a  hereditary trustee thereof.  That suit is still pending.  The  decision in this appeal therefore, simply proceeds on the basis  that the respondent was one of the persons who had applied to  be appointed  as a trustee of the temple in question.  We  are, therefore,  concerned  only  with the  question  whether  in appointing  trustees under section 15(1)(a) of the  Act  the Government acts as a quasi-judicial tribunal.  That  section provides  that  in  respect of  a  charitable  or  religious institution  or  endowment included in the  list  published under clause (a) of section 6 (there is no dispute that  the

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temple  in  question  falls under  it)  whose-annual  income exceeds  rupees two lakhs, the Government may, in  the  case where there is a hereditary trustee, and shall in any  other case, constitute a Board of Trustees consisting of not  less than  seven  and not more than eleven persons  appointed  by them.  This Court has held in K. A. Samajam v. Commer, H. R. & C.E. (1) dealing with this very section 15, that the power to  appoint  non-hereditary trustees or  executive  officers under  ss.  15  and  27,  even  where  there  is  already  a hereditary  trustee or trustees, notwithstanding that  there is  no mismanagement. is only for the purposes  of  ensuring better  and efficient administration and management  of  the institution  or  endowment.   It also pointed  out  that  in making the appointment of trustees it has been enjoined that due regard should be given to the religious denomination  or any section thereof to which the institution belongs or  the endowment  is  made and the wishes of the founder  and  held this section valid.  While Aft.  Subba Rao appearing for the respondent  wanted  to  contest  the  correctness  of   this decision and argued that it (1)  [1971] (2) S.C.R. 878.  193 should be reconsidered, we indicated that we do not  propose to do so and that if and when he succeeds in the, suit he is said to ’have filed in establishing that he is an hereditary trustee  it  may be open to him to urge this  point  at  the appropriate time.  We, therefore, proceed on the basis  that section 15 is valid. The   test  for  determining  whether  a  decision  is   ’an administrative  one  or  quasi-judicial  has  been   clearly specified in a number of decisions of this Court. Essentially, they are three in number 1.   There must be a lis between the two parties; 2.   the  opinion should be formed on the  objective  satis- faction  and  should not depend upon the  subjective  satis- faction of the tribunal; and 3.   there must be a duty to act judicially. In  Province of Bombay v. K. S. Advani & Ors.(1) Kania  C.J. with whom Patanjali Sastri, J. agreed, said               "The respondent’s argument that whenever there               is a determination of a fact which affects the               rights  of  parties, the  decision  is  quasi-               judicial, does not appear to be sound.               Furtheron the learned Chief Justice said               "It  is broadly stated that when the fact  has               to be determined by an objective test and when               that  decision affects rights of someone,  the               decision or act is quasi-judicial.  This  last               statement  overlooks  the  aspect  that  every               decision  of  the  executive  generally  is  a               decision of fact and in most cases affects the               rights  of someone or the other.   Because  an               executive  authority has to determine  certain               objective facts as a preliminary step in  the               discharge  of $in executive function, it  does               not follow that it must determine those  facts               judicially.  When the Executive authority  has               to form an opinion about an objective.  matter               as  a preliminary step to the exercise  of  a’               certain    power   conferred   on   it,    the               determination  of the objective fact  and  the               exercise of the power based thereon are  alike               matters of an administrative character and are               not amenable to the writ of certiorari."

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             To the like effect is the observation of  Fazl               Ali, J. in the same case               "The mere fact that an executive authority has               to decide something does not make the decision               judicial.   It  is  the manner  in  which  the               decision has to be arrived at which makes  the               difference,  and the real test is :  Is  there               any  duty  to decide judicially ?  As  I  have               already   said,  there  is  nothing   in   the               Ordinance   to  show  that   the’   Provincial               Government  has to decide the existence  of  a               public    purpose   judicially    or    quasi-               judicially." (1) [1950] (1) S.C.R. 621. -L944 Sup.C.I./73 194 Dealing  with  the  essential characteristics  of  a  quasi- judicial  act as opposed to an administrative act,  Das,  J. (as he then was) observed               "........  the,  two kinds of acts  have  many               common  features.  Thus a person entrusted  to               do   an  administrative  act  has   often   to               determine  questions of fact to enable him  to               exercise his power.  He has to consider  facts               and  circumstances and to weigh pros and  cons               in  his  mind before he makes up his  mind  to               exercise his power just as a person exercising               a  judicial or quasi-judicial function has  to               do.   Both have to act in good faith.  A  good               and  valid  administrative  or  executive  act               binds  the- subject and affects his rights  or               imposes a liability on him just as effectively               as a quasi-judicial act does.  The exercise of               an administrative or executive act may well be               and  is  frequently  made  dependent  by   the               Legislature  upon a condition  or  contingency               which may involve a question of fact, but  the               question   of   fulfilment   of   which   may,               nevertheless be left to the subjective opinion               or  satisfaction of the. executive  authority,               as  was  done’  in  the  several   Ordinances,               regulations  and  enactments  considered   and               construed  in  the several cases  referred  to               above..   .   .   .  The   real   test   which               distinguishes  a  quasi-judicial act  from  an               administrative  act is...... the duty  to  act               judicially.. . .               What are the principles to be deduced from the               two  lines of cases I have referred to  ?  The               principles, as I apprehend them, are               (i)   that if a statute empowers an authority,               not  being a Court in the ordinary  sense,  to               decide disputes arising out of a claim made by               one  party  under the statute which  claim  is               opposed by another party and to determine  the               respective  rights of the. contesting  parties               who are opposed to each other, there is a  lis               and  prima  facie  and  in,  the  absence   of               anything in the statute to the contrary it  is               the  duty of the authority to  act  judicially               and  the-decision of the authority is a  quasi               judicial act; and               (ii)  that if a statutory authority has power               to do any act which will prejudicially  affect               the subject, then, although there are not  two

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             parties apart from the authority proposing  to               do  the act and the subject opposing  it,  the               final determination of the authority will  yet               be a quasi-judicial act provided the authority               is required by the statute to act judicially.               In  other  words, while the  presence  of  two               parties  besides the deciding  authority  will               prima  facie and in the absence of. any  other               factor  impose upon the authority the duty  to               act  judicially,  the  absence  of  two   such                             parties  is not decisive in taking the   act  of               the  authority out of the category  of  quasi-               judicial act if the, authority is nevertheless               required by the statute to act judicially."  195 The observations in Advard’s case were quoted with  approval by Das, C.J. in Shri Radeshywn Khare & Anr. v. The State  of Madhya  Pradesh  &  Ors. (1) S. K. Das, J.  who  in  general agreed with the learned Chief Justice in that case  observed :               "To  get to the bottom of the distinction,  we               must  go a little deeper into the  content  of               the  expression ’duty to act judicially’.   As               has  been repeated so often, the question  may               arise in widely differing circumstances and  a               precise, clear-cut or exhaustive definition of               the  expression  is  not  possible.   But   in               decisions  dealing with the  question  several               tests have been laid down; for example-               (i)   whether there is a lis inter partes,               (ii)  whether    there   is   a   claim    (or               proposition) and an opposition;               (iii) whether the decision is to be founded on               the taking of evidence or on affidavits;               (iv)  whether  the  decision  is  actuated  in               whole  or  in part by questions of  policy  or               expediency, and if so, whether in arriving  of               the  decision,  the  statutory  body  has   to               consider  proposals  and objections  and  evi-               dence; and               (v)   whether in arriving at its decision, the               statutory body has only to consider policy and               expediency and at no stage has. before it  any               form of lis. Subba  Rao,  J.,  who  differed  from  the  majority,  after referring to the, formulation of the principles in  Advani’s case,  earlier referred to, as unexceptionable and  also  to the  discussion in R. v. Manchester Legal Aid  Committee(2), stated the principles in his. own words thus :               "Every  act of an administrative authority  is               not an administrative or ministerial act.  The               provisions  of  a  statute may  enjoin  on  an               administrative  authority to  act  administra-               tively or to act judicially or to act in  part               administratively  and in part  judicially.  if               policy and expediency are the guiding  factors               impart  or  in  whole  throughout  the  entire               process  culminating in the final decision  it               is an obvious case of administrative act.   On               the  other  hand,  if  the  statute  expressly               imposes  a duty on the administrative body  to               act judicially, it is again a clear case of  a               judicial act.  Between the two there are  many               acts,  the  determination of  whose  character

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             creates  difficult  problems  for  the  court.               There  may be cases where at one stage of  the               process   the  said  body  may  have  to   act               judicially and at another stage ministerially.               The rule can be broadly stated thus : The duty               to   act  judicially  may  not  be   expressly               conferred  but  may  be  inferred  from’   the provi sions   of  the  statute..  it  may   be               gathered  from  the cumulative effect  of  the               nature  of  the rights  affected,  the  manner               disposal provided, the objective criterion to (1) [1959] S.C.R.1440.        (2) [1952] (2) Q. B 413. 196               be  adopted, the phraseology used, the  nature               of the power conferred or the duty imposed  on               the  authority and other indicia  afforded  by               the  statute.   In short a duty to  act  judi-               cially   may   arise   in   widely   different               circumstances  and  it  is  not  possible   or               advisable to lay down a hard and fast rule  or               an inexorable rule of guidance." In  Gullapalli  Nageswarg Rao & Orv.  Andhra  Pradesh  State Road’  Transport Corporation & Anr.(1) Subba Rao, J.,  after referring to the various decisions on this subject held :               "........  whether an administrative  tribunal               has  a  duty  to  act  judicially  should   be               gathered from the provisions of the particular               statute  and  the rules made  thereunder,  and               they  clearly  express  the view  that  if  an               ’authority is called upon to decide respective               rights of contesting parties or, to put it  in               other  words,  if there is a  lis,  ordinarily               there  will be a duty on the part of the  said               authority to act judicially." It  is  hardly  necessary  to say  that  in  this  case  the respondent  had no right to be appointed a trustee; nor  had any of the other persons who were appointed trustees.  There was  no question of a proposition and an opposition.   There is,  therefore,  no question of any lis.  Nor  is  here  any question  of contest between the authority proposing  to  do the  act and the subject opposing it.  Such a question  will arise  only ’If any right of the subject is affected.   None of  the  other tests laid down above are satisfied  in  this case. An examination of the provisions of the statute, which is an Act  to  consolidate  and  amend the  law  relating  to  the administration  and  government  of  charitable  and   Hindu religious institutions and endowments does not show that  in appointing  trustees  to temples the  concerned  authorities have to act judicially.  Nor is the appointment of  trustees under  section  15  left  to  the  administrative  authority without  any  guidelines laid down by  the  Legislature  for being  followed.  Section 16 lays down the  disqualification for being appointed a trustee.  Section 15(4) lays down that in  making the appointment of trustees due regard  shall  be had to the religious denomination or any section thereof  to which  the institution belongs or the endowment is made  and the wishes of the founder. in the appointment satisfies  the above tests and if the person appointed is not  disqualified under any of the clause& of section 16, the appointment will not  be affected in any way.  The  administrative  authority concerned  does  not have to weight the relative  merits  of various  candidates in making the appointment  of  trustees. Normally  it would exercise its own discretion as to who  is best  fitted  to  discharge the duties  and  function  of  a

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trustee.   But that is not to say that it must set  out  the reasons I as to why it has appointed somebody as trustee and not appointed somebody else as a trustee.  The  Legislature- has  left  the matter to the discretion  of  the  appointing authority subject to the guidelines that it has laid down in sections  15 and 16, We do not consider that the  fact  that under  section  82 of the Act the Commissioner has  got  the power of revision in respect of (1)  [1959] (Suppl.) 1 S.C.R. 319. 197 orders  passed  by his subordinates and  the  Government  in respect of orders passed by the Commissioner as well as  his subordinates  (there  is  no  provision in  the  Act  for  a judicial  review  in  respect of the orders  passed  by  the Government)  in  any way limits their powers  under  section 15(1) (a).  We are of opinion that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error insofar as the implication of their observation  is  that  in  exercising  their  powers   under section’s  15 the administrative authorities  concerned  are exercising   quasi-judicial  functions  and  that   it   was necessary to have a speaking order.  We find that the madras Court  in Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. v. B.  R.  Venkatachala- pathi after a very elaborate and instructive discussion  has taken a similar view in respect of the powers of appointment of  non-hereditary trustees under section 47 of  the  Madras Hindu  Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959,  which more or less corresponds to section 15 of this Act. The  appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment  of  the Andhra pradesh High Court set aside.  The appellant Will pay the respondent’s costs. H.P.S.                         Appeal allowed. (1) 85 L.W. 349. 198