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PETITIONER: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: P.V. PAVITHRAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/03/1990

BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR 1266            1990 SCR  (1) 746  1990 SCC  (2) 340        JT 1990 (2)    43  1990 SCALE  (1)418  CITATOR INFO :  E          1992 SC1701  (39)

ACT:     Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1973:  Sections  173  and Investigation--Inordinate delay--Whether ipso facto a ground quashing of F.I.R.--Factors to be considered for determining delay-Speed.,v investigation and trial--Necessity for.     Constitution  of  India,  1950.’  Article  21--Right  to speed), investigation and fair trial--Delayed or  protracted investigation--Whether  causes grave prejudice or  disadvan- tage to accused.

HEADNOTE:     A case was registered against the respondent, an officer of  the Indian Police Service, under Section 5(2) read  with Section  5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  1947, on  8.3.1984 but the investigation report was  submitted  to the Government on 17.9.1987. In November, 1987, the respond- ent filed a criminal petition for quashing further  proceed- ings  pursuant to the registration of the First  Information Report  contending that there had been inordinate  delay  in the investigation and that the prosecution had not filed the report  as contemplated under Section 173 Cr. P.C.  till  he filed  the petition. The appellant contended that the  delay was occasioned on account of dilatory tactics adopted by the respondent  and  that the case was a complicated  and  time- consuming one. The High Court quashed the First  Information Report  and observed that wherever there was  an  inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in  completing investigation, the case merited quashing of the First Infor- mation Report even.     The  State preferred an appeal in this Court  contending that the High Court’s observation was too wide a proposition and  it  would be detrimental to the prosecution  in  future under all circumstances, regardless of reasons therefor. Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD: 1.1 No general and wide proposition of law can  be formulated  that wherever there is inordinate delay  on  the part of the 747 investigating  agency in completing the investigation,  such

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delay,  ipso  facto, would provide ground for  quashing  the First  Information Report or the proceedings arising  there- from. [750H, 751A]     1.2  A lethargic and lackadaisical manner of  investiga- tion over a prolonged period makes an accused in a  criminal proceeding to live every moment under extreme emotional  and mental  stress and strain and to remain always under a  fear psychosis. Therefore, it is imperative that if investigation of a criminal proceeding staggers on with tardy pace due  to the  indolence and inefficiency of the investigating  agency causing  unreasonable  and substantial  delay  resulting  in grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused, the Court as the  protector  of  the right and personal  liberty  of  the citizen  will  step in and resort to the drastic  remedy  of quashing further proceedings in such investigation. However, there are offences of grave magnitude which would necessari- ly  involve considerable time for unearthing the crimes  and bringing the culprits to book. Therefore, it is not possible to  formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid  principles  of uniform application for speedy investigation or to stipulate any  arbitrary period of limitation within which  investiga- tion in a criminal case should be completed. [750B-F]     1.3  The determination of the question whether  the  ac- cused  has been deprived of a fair trial on account  of  de- layed  or  protracted investigation would  also,  therefore, depend  on various factors including whether such delay  was unreasonably long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper  the defence of the accused or whether it was due  to the  dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. The Court,  in addition, has to consider whether such delay on the part  of the  investigating  agency  has caused  grave  prejudice  or disadvantage to the accused. The assessment of these factors necessarily vary from case to case. [750G-H] Raghubir  Singh v. State of Bihar, [1986] 4 SCC 481,  relied on.     Bell  v. Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica  and another, [1985] 2 All England Law Reports 585, referred to.     The Power of the Courts to stay a Criminal Prosecution,’ 1985 Criminal Law Review 175, referred to.     In  the  instant case, the respondent was  placed  under suspension  pending enquiry but was reinstated on the  basis of  enquiry report and further action was stopped.  However, by a subsequent order dated 5th July, 1985 the earlier order was cancelled and a show cause notice for 748 his  compulsory reitrement was issued. The Central  Adminis- trative  Tribunal held that the order dated 5th  July,  1985 was illegal and beyond the powers of State Government.  This Court  dismissed  State’s  Special Leave  Petition.  In  the meantime,  the  respondent was allowed by the  appellant  to retire  peacefully  from  service on attaining  the  age  of superannuation  and the First Information Report and  conse- quent  proceedings were quashed by the High Court. In  these circumstances,  this  is not a fit  case  for  interference. [751D, E, G, 752A, C-E]

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 359 of 1989.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  29.7.1988  of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Crl. Petition No. 1023 of 1987. K. Madhava Reddy and G. Prabhakar for the Appellant.     H.S. Gururaj Rao, Subodh Markandeya, Mrs. C. Markandeya,

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W.A. Nomani and G. Seshagiri Rao for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     S.  RATNAVEL  PANDIAN, J. The State  of  Andhra  Pradesh represented by the Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hydera- bad has filed this criminal appeal challenging the  correct- ness  of  the  Order dated 29.7.1988 of the  High  Court  of Andhra  Pradesh in Crime No. 7/ACB/Cr. II/84 dated  8.3.1984 on the file of the Special Judge for ACB & SPE quashing  the First Information Report in exercise of its inherent  powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A few facts relevant to decide this case may be stated:     The respondent was selected to the Indian Police Service in  the  year 1953 and he worked in  various  capacities  at different  places. While he was working as  Commissioner  of Weights  &  Measures,  Government of Andhra  Pradesh,  on  a report dated 7.3. 1984 submitted by the Deputy  Superintend- ent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, a case was registered against him on 8.3. 1984 in Crime No. 7/ACB/Cr. II/84  under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the prevention  of Corruption Act, 1947 on the allegations that while function- ing as Commissioner of Police and later as Vice-Chairman  of Andhra  Pradesh Housing Board during the years  1978-82,  he ingulged in corrupt practices and acquired immovable  assets either in his name or 749 in  the name of his wife. The Anti-Corruption  Bureau  after completing   its  investigation  submitted  its  report   on 22.4.1987  to its DirectorGeneral who in turn sent the  same to the Government on 17.9. 1987. The Government accorded the necessary  sanction for prosecution in G.O.Ms. Nos. 525  and 526 dated 16.9. 1988. In the meantime, the respondent  filed the  criminal  petition  for  quashing  further  proceedings pursuant  to the registration of the First  Information  Re- port, inter alia, contending that there had been lull in the investigation for fairly long spell causing inordinate delay and  that the prosecution had not filed its  report  contem- plated under Section 173 Cr.P.C. till he filed the  petition for  quashing  the proceedings in November 1987  though  the case was registered even in March 1984.     The  plea of the respondent was stoutly resisted by  the appellant  stating that the delay was occasioned on  account of  the dilatory tactics adopted by the respondent  and  the case was a complicated and timeconsuming one.     The High Court has quashed the First Information  Report on the ground that there was inordinate delay in the  inves- tigation.  Aggrieved  by that judgment, the State  has  pre- ferred this Criminal appeal.     Mr.  Madhava Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing  on behalf of the appellant took an exception to the observation of the learned Single Judge of the High Court reading: "   ..........  I hold that wherever there is an  inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in  completing investigation, the case merits quashing of the First  Infor- mation Report even  ................  Generally. this  Court will not quash the F.I.R. because it amounts to stopping  of investigation,  but where there is an inordinate delay,  the same is a ground to quash even the F.I.R." and  contended  that  the above observation is  too  wide  a proposition and it will be detrimental to the prosecution in future  under all circumstances, regardless of  the  reasons therefor.     Though we have decided to dispose of this appeal on some other  ground,  the submission of Mr. Madhava Reddy  on  the above  extracted  observation  of the High  Court  makes  it necessary to examine the ques-

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750 tion whether a mere delay in the investigation of a criminal proceeding  will by itself serve as a sufficient ground  for quashing the proceedings in pursuance of the registration of the case notwithstanding whatever may be the reasons for the delay.  This  question has come up for  determination  in  a number of cases wherein this Court has examined the right of an accused for a speedy investigation and trial in a  crimi- nal  case in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution  of India.     There is no denying the fact that a lethargic and lacka- daisical  manner  of investigation over a  prolonged  period makes  an  accused in a criminal proceeding  to  live  every moment under extreme emotional and mental stress and  strain and  to remain always under a fear psychosis. Therefore,  it is imperative that if investigation of a criminal proceeding staggers on with tardy pace due to the indolence or  ineffi- ciency of the investigating agency causing unreasonable  and substantial delay resulting in grave prejudice or  disadvan- tage to the accused, the Court as the protector of the right and personal liberty of the citizen will step in and  resort to  the  drastic remedy of quashing further  proceedings  in such investigation.     While so, there are offences of grave magnitude such  as diabolical  crimes of conspiracy or clandestine crimes  com- mitted  by  members of the underworld with  their  tentacles spread over various parts of the country or even abroad. The very  nature  of  such offences  would  necessarily  involve considerable time for unearthing the crimes and bringing the culprits to book. Therefore, it is not possible to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of uniform  appli- cation  for speedy investigation or to stipulate  any  arbi- trary  period of limitation within which investigation in  a criminal case should be completed.     The  determination of the question whether  the  accused has  been deprived of a fair trial on account of delayed  or protracted  investigation would also, therefore,  depend  on various factors including whether such delay was  unreasona- bly  long or caused deliberately or intentionally to  hamper the defence of the accused or whether such delay was  inevi- table  in the nature of things or-whether it was due to  the dilatory  tactics  adopted  by the accused.  The  Court,  in addition, has to consider whether such delay on the part  of the  investigating  agency  has caused  grave  prejudice  or disadvantage to the accused.     The  assessment  of the above factors  necessarily  vary from  case  to  case. It would, therefore,  follow  that  no general and wide proposition 751 of  law can be formulated that wherever there is  inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in  completing the  investigation,  such delay, ipso facto,  would  provide ground  for  quashing the First Information  Report  or  the proceedings arising therefrom.     Our above view is supported by a decision of this  Court in  Raghubir  Singh  v. State of Bihar, [1986]  4  SCC  481. Reference  may  also be had to Bell v.  Director  of  Public Prosecutions  of Jamaica and another, [1985] 2  All  England Law Reports 585 and the article in 1985 Criminal Law  Review 175  captioned ’The Power of the Courts to stay  a  Criminal Prosecution.’     It  follows from the above observations that no  general and wide proposition of law can be formulated that  wherever there is any inordinate delay on the part of the investigat- ing agency in completing the investigation, such delay is  a

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ground to quash the F.I.R.     Reverting to the present case, the respondent was placed under suspension pending enquiry into certain irregularities in  the purchase of land as pointed out in the earlier  part of  this judgment. The State Government on the basis of  the enquiry report passed orders for stopping further action and directed re-instatement of the respondent into service  with immediate effect by Order dated 5th September 1984.  Accord- ingly,  he was re-instated and allowed to function  as  Con- troller,  Weights  & Measures, Andhra Pradesh.  However,  by subsequent  order dated 5th July 1985, the appellant  (State Government) cancelled the aforesaid order dated 5th  Septem- ber 1984 and directed the respondent to show cause as to why the  penalty of compulsory retirement should not be  imposed on  him. Thereupon, the respondent filed Writ  Petition  No. 10670  of  1985  before the High Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh, seeking  a  writ  of mandamus declaring the  orders  of  the appellant contained in G.O. Rt. No. 2930, GA (SC. C) Depart- ment dated 5th July 1985 as arbitrary and  unconstitutional, and  consequently to set aside the same by holding that  the appellant  was bound to give effect to the Orders  contained in  G.O. Rt. No. 4572, GA (SC. C) Department dated 5th  Sep- tember  1984.  This  writ petition was  transferred  to  the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench. The Tribu- nal allowed the petition holding that the impugned order  in G.O.Rt.  No. 2930 dated 5th July 1985 is illegal and  beyond the powers of the State Government.     Aggrieved by the judgment of the Tribunal, the State  of Andhra  Pradesh preferred a Special Leave  Petition  (Civil) No. 405 of 1987 752 before  this  Court,  and  this Court  by  its  Order  dated 16.11.1988  dismissed  the  same. The said  order  reads  as follows: "Having  regard to the facts and circumstances of  the  case and  specialty in view of the facts that the respondent  has retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation, we  do  not consider it a fit case for-interference.  It  is accordingly dismissed."     Admittedly,  the appellant notified the date of  retire- ment of the respondent w.e.f. 30th April 1988 by G.O.Rt. No. 866  dated 10th March 1988. Accordingly, the respondent  was allowed  to retire peacefully from service on  attaimng  the age of superannuation. The First Information Report and  the consequent proceedings on the registration of the case  were quashed  by the High Court on 29.7.1988.  Surprisingly,  the appellant accorded sanction for prosecution in G.O.Ms.  Nos. 525  & 526 dated 16.9.1988 i.e. after nearly 50 days of  the quashing of the First Information Report.     In  view  of the above facts and circumstances  and  the various  events following the suspension of  the  respondent culminating in his being allowed to retire on attaining  the age  of superannuation, we are of the view that it is not  a fit case for interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. N.P.V.                                          Appeal  dis- missed. 753