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PETITIONER: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHITRA VENKATA RAO

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/08/1975

BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 2151            1976 SCR  (1) 521  1975 SCC  (2) 557  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1991 SC1070  (6)  RF         1991 SC2251  (8)

ACT:      Constitution of  India, 1950, 226-Scope of High Court’s power in  relation to  departmental enquiries  to  guilt  of government servants.

HEADNOTE:      (1) The  jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari  under Art. 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction, and not  as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by  an   inferior  court   or  tribunal  as  result  of  the appreciation of  evidence are  not reopened or questioned in these proceedings.  An error of law which is apparent on the face of  record can  be corrected  but not an error of fact, however grave  it may  be. In  regard to  a finding  of fact recorded by  a tribunal  a writ can be issued if it is shown that  the   tribunal  had   erroneously  refuged   to  admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence  which  has  influenced  the  impugned finding. Again,  if a  finding  of  fact  is  based  on  the evidence, that  would be  regarded as  an error of law which can be  corrected be  a writ of’ certiorari, but if there is some evidence  which may  reasonably support the conclusion, its adequacy  or sufficiency  and  the  inference  of’  fact drawn,  are   within  the   exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the tribunal. The  Court is  concerned to  determine whether the inquiry is  held by  an authority  competent in that behalf, and according  to the  procedure prescribed  in that behalf, and whether  the rules  of natural justice are not violated. Therefore, in departmental enquires relating to the guilt of delinquent officers, the High Court may interfere only where the  departmental  authorities  have  held  tax  proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the  rules  of  natural  justice  or  in  violation  of  the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the authorities have  disabled themselves  from reaching  a fair decision by  some considerations  extraneous to the evidence and the  merits of the case, or by allowing themselves to be influenced  by   irrelevant  considerations   or  where  the

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conclusion, on  the very  face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious  that no  reasonable person  could ever  have arrived at that conclusion.                                                 [525-E-527B]      State of  Andhra Pradesh  v. S.  Sree Rama Rao [1963] 3 S.C.R. 25;  Railway Board,  representing the  Union of India New Delhi  & Anr.  v. Niranjan Singh [1969] 3 S.C.R. 548 and Syed Yakoob  v. K.  S. Radhakrishnan  & Ors. [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64, referred to.      (2)  There   is  no   warrant  for  the  view  that  in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against  him the  rule followed  in criminal trials, namely, that  an offence  is not  established unless  proved beyond reason able doubt, must be applied. [525F G]      In  the  present  case,  charges  that  the  respondent fraudulently claimed travelling allowance were inquired into by the Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal. The Tribunal found him guilty  and recommended dismissal. The Government accept ed the  recommendation and  dismissed the  respondent. In  a writ petition  challenging the  order of dismissal, the High Court equated  the charge  of mis  conduct to a charge under s.5(1)(d)  of   the  Prevention   of  Corruption  Act,  1947 discussed the  evidence and findings of the Tribunal on that basis and  held that the prosecution did not adduce material and essential  evidence namely;  the conductor’s chart which would show  whether the respondent travelled on a particular day,  that   a  statement  made  by  the  respondent  during investigation was  not admissible  in evidence,  that it was not safe to rely on it and set aside the order of dismissal.      Allowing the appeal to this Court. ^      HELD .  (a) The  High Court  was not correct in holding that the  domestic inquiry  before the Tribunal was the same as prosecution is a criminal case.                                                     [525C-D] 3-L925SupCI/75 522      (b)  The  respondent  was  given  full  opportunity  to explain the  statement A  made by  him during investigation. Further, the Tribunal did not base its findings only on that statement. It  had given  its reasons for its conclusion and it is  not possible  for the  High  Court  to  say  that  no reasonable person could have arrived at that conclusion. The High Court had accepted the explanation that the conductors’ charts were  destroyed and  therefore could not be Produced. Moreover, the  conductor’s chart would not show the names of the persons  paying the  money. The  High Court reviewed and re-assessed the  evidence and  then rejected  evidence as no evidence, and  this is  precisely what  the High  Court,  in exercising  jurisdiction  under  Art  226,  should  not  do. [525SC; 527B-D]      (c)  The  respondent’s  contention  that  the  Tribunal relied upon  certain reports which were not available to the respondent is not correct. A reference to the inquiry report of the  Tribunal shows that the Tribunal had not relied upon those documents  for finding  the respondent  guilty. [527G- 528B]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2040 of 1974.      Appeal by  special leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated the  13th June,  1974 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court

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in W.P. No. 2145 of 1972.      Niren De,  Attorney-General of India and P. P. Rao, for the appellant. r      A. Subba Rao for the respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      RAY, C.J.  This appeal  is by  special leave  from  the judgment dated  13 June,  19?4 of  the Andhra  Pradesh  High Court quashing an order of dismissal. The principal question canvassed by  the Attorney  General is  that the  High Court should  not   have  interfered  with  the  findings  of  the Tribunal.      The State  Government in the year 1964 received certain complaints alleging  misconduct against  the respondent. The Director of  Anti Corruption Bureau was asked to inquire and make a  report.  The  Government  in  the  light  of  advice tendered by  the Vigilance Commission referred the matter to the Tribunal constituted under Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Act, 1960.      Three  charges  were  framed  against  the  respondent. Broadly stated  the charges were that the respondent claimed false travelling  allowance on certain days in the months of January, April  and September,  1964. The  respondent denied the charges and submitted a written statement on 4 November, 1968. The  Tribunal made  inquiries and  on 9 December, 1968 recommended dismissal of the respondent from the service.      The  Government   thereafter  gave   a  notice  to  the respondent on  22 February,  1969  to  show  cause  why  the penalty of  dismissal from  service should not be imposed on him. On  20 March, 1969 the respondent submitted his written explanation.   The    Government   after   considering   the explanation of  the respondent,  by an  order dated  24 May, 1969 dismissed the respondent from service. 523      The respondent challenged the order of dismissal in the Andhra Pradesh  High Court. The High Court by judgment dated 27 July, 1970 set aside the order of dismissal on the ground that  the   recommendations  of   the  tribunal   were   not communicated  to   the  respondent   alongwith  the   notice regarding the  proposed punishment  of dismissal.  The  High Court observed  that it  was open to the punishing authority to issue  a fresh  show cause  notice regarding the proposed punishment after  communicating the  enquiry report  and the recommendations of  the Tribunal  The Government  thereafter complied  with   the  directions  of  the  High  Court.  The Government cancelled  the order  of dismissal  dated 24 May, 1969. The  Government, however,  ordered that the respondent shall be  deemed to  have been under suspension from service from 21  May,  1969  until  further  orders.  The  order  of suspension was challenged by the respondent and set aside by the Andhra Pradesh High Court on 22 March, 1970.      The Government  then  issued  fresh  notices  dated  16 September, 1970  and 25  September, 1970  to the resplendent and  communicated   the  report  of  the  Tribunal  and  the recommendations of the Tribunal and the Vigilance Commission regarding the proposed penalty. The respondent submitted his explanation on  6  and  23  October,  1970.  The  Government considered the  same. The  Commerce Department thereafter by an order  dated S  May, 1972  dismissed the  respondent from service.      The charges  against the  respondent were  that he made three  false  claims  for  travelling  allowance  for  three journeys. The  first journey  was on  3 January,  1969  from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad The second journey was on 19 April, 1964  from   Rajamundry  to   Hyderabad  and   Hyderabad  to Rajahmundry on  24 April,  1964. The  third journey was from

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Rajahmundry to  Guntur on  13 September,  1964 and Guntur to Rajahmundry on 16 September, ]964.      The respondent  in his  written statement  filed before the Tribunal  denied the  charges  and  maintained  that  he travelled by  first class on the days mentioned in the claim for travelling  allowance. He  stated that  he travelled  by first class from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad on 3 January, 1964 in accordance  with  his  tour  programme  and  claimed  the travelling allowance.  He also  said that  he  travelled  by first class  from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad on 19 April, 1964 and from  Hyderabad to  Rajahmundry on  24 April,  1964  and claimed travelling allowance.      In Exhibit  P-45 which was his signed statement dated 8 January, 1967,  he stated  that on  3 January,  1964 he went with his Joint Director from Vijayorgram from Rajahmundry in a car. In that statement he said that he went from Hyderabad to Waltair  on 7  January, 1964  and he  claimed  travelling allowance from  Vijayawada to  Hyderabad. In Exhibit P-45 he said that on 19 April, 1964 he travelled from Rajahmundry to Vijayawada by  first class and he went to Hyderabad by first class on 19 April, 1964. In Exhibit P-45 he said that he did not 524 travel on  24 April,  1964  from  Hyderabad  to  Rajahmundry because.  A   there  was  no  accommodation.  He  waited  at Hyderabad.  On   28  April,  1964  he  got  reservation  and travelled to Rajahmundry.      The Tribunal  on enquiry found the respondent guilty of charges 1  and 2.  In the  Enquiry Report  dated 9 December, 1968, the Tribunal recommended dismissal of the respondent.      The respondent  in the  High Court challenged the order of  dismissal.  The  High  Court  set  aside  the  order  of dismissal on the grounds that the prosecution did not adduce every material  and  essential  evidence  to  make  out  the charges and  that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal was not based on evidence. The High Court held that Exhibit P-45 was not admissible in evidence according to the Evidence Act and it  was not safe to rely on such a statement as a matter of prudence.      The High Court said that corruption or misconduct under rule 2(b)  of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Service (Disciplinary Proceedings  Tribunal)   Rules,  has  the  same  meaning  as criminal misconduct  in the  discharge of official duties in section 5(1)  of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The High Court  in that  background discussed  the evidence  and findings of  the Tribunal  as  to  whether  the  prosecution placed evidence  in respect of the ingredients of the charge under section  5(1)(d) of  the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947      The High  Court referred to these features in regard to the finding  of the Tribunal. Four years elapsed between the journeys forming  subject  matter  of  the  charge  and  the framing of  the charge.  The respondent in his evidence said that he secured accommodation through the Conductor incharge of the  first class  compartment after  the arrival  of  the train. It  was  possible  that  the  respondent  might  have converted his  ticket to  first class one once he found that first class  accommodation was  available on  the train even though he  had purchased a ticket of lower denomination. The conductor’s chart  is the  only basis  for showing whether a particular person  travelled by  first class by a particular train and not by a copy of the reservation chart kept at the starting station.  Though the  prosecution produced evidence to show  that the  respondent did  not purchase  or  reserve first class accommodation in advance, the prosecution failed

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to produce  the Conductor’s charts relating to the trains in question. According  to  the  High  Court  "The  prosecution utterly failed  to adduce  any  evidence  to  exclude  these possibilities".      The High  Court  said  that  it  was  doubtful  whether Exhibit P-45  was admissible  in evidence. It was said to be taken during  the course  of investigation.  The High  Court said that  even if  the statement is accepted, it only shows that the  respondent did  not actually  travel on  the  days mentioned  in   the  tour   programme  according   to  which travelling allowance was paid.      The respondent  made the  statement marked Exhibit P-45 on 8  January, 1967.  The  charge-sheet  was  framed  on  17 November, 525      1967. The  respondent filed  the written statement on 2 August, 1968.  He filed an additional written statement on 4 November, 1968.  It is  apparent that the charge-sheets were framed after investigation.      It transpired  on evidence before the Tribunal that one first  class   ticket  bearing  No.03834  was  collected  at Hyderabad on  4 January"  1964. The  further evidence  about ticket  No.   03834  was  that  it  was  issued  to  one  P. Ramachandra Raju who travelled from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad on the night of 3 January, 1964. The further evidence before the Tribunal  was that  one first  class ticket  bearing No. 04049 for the journey from Rajahmundry to Hyderabad was sold to one A. S. Murty for the journey an 19 April, 1964.      The Tribunal  examined the  respondent. The  respondent was given full opportunity to deal with Exhibit P-45.      The High  Court was  not correct  in holding  that  the domestic  enquiry  before  the  Tribunal  was  the  same  as prosecution in  a criminal  case. The High Court was also in error in  holding that  Conductor’s chart would show whether the respondent travelled or not. The High Court accepted the explanation  that   Conductor’s  charts   were  burnt   and, therefore, they could not be produced. Further, Conductor’s. chart could  not show  the name  of the  persons paying  the money. There  was positive  evidence before  the Tribunal of tickets being  purchased by persons other than respondent on 3 January,  1964 and  19 April, 1964. These features figured prominently before the Tribunal.      The High  Court  all  throughout  treated  the  enquiry before the Tribunal as a criminal prosecution.      The scope  of Article  226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has  come up  before this  Court. Two propositions were laid  down by  this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao(1). First, there is no warrant for the view that in  considering whether  a public  officer is guilty of misconduct  charged  against  him,.  the  rule  followed  in criminal trials  that an  offence is  not established unless proved  by   evidence  beyond   reasonable  doubt   to   the satisfaction of  the Court  must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic Tribunal o Inquiry the High Court in a  petition under  Article-226 of the Constitution is not competent to  declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry  invalid. The High Court is not a Court of Appeal  under  Article  226  over  the  decision  of  the authorities holding  a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The  Court is  concern ed  to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to  the procedure  prescribed in  that behalf, and whether the  rules of  natural  justice  are  not  violated. Second, where  there is  some evidence which the authorities entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and

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which evidence  may reason  ably support the conclusion that the delinquent  officer is  guilty of  the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence      (1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 25. 526 and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High  A   Court  may   interfere  where   the   departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a  manner inconsistent  with the rules of natural justice or in  violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from  reaching   a  fair  decision  by  some  considerations extraneous to  the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing  themselves   to  be   influenced   by   irrelevant considerations or  where the  conclusion on the very face of it is  so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could  ever have  arrived  at  that  conclusion.  The departmental authorities  are, if  the enquiry  is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence  on which  their findings  can be  based, the adequacy or  reliability of  that evidence  is not  a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.      Again, this  Court in  Railway Board,  representing the Union of  India, New  Delhi &  Anr v. Niranjan Singh(1) said that the  High Court  does not interfere with the conclusion of the  disciplinary authority  unless the  finding  is  not supported by  any  evidence  or  it  can  be  said  that  no reasonable person  could have  reached such  a  finding.  In Niranjan Singh’s  case (supra) this Court held that the High Court exceeded  its powers  in interfering with the findings of  the  disciplinary  authority  on  the  charge  that  the respondent was  instrumental in  compelling the shut-down of an air  compressor at  about 8.15 a.m. On 31 May, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two  persons that  the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled  them to close down their compressor could not be accepted  at its  face value. The General Manager did not agree with  the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted  the evidence.  This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion  reached by  the Committee.  This Court  held that the  conclusion reached  by the  disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion.      The jurisdiction  to issue  a writ  of certiorari under Article  226   is  a  supervisory  jurisdiction.  The  Court exercises it not as an Appellate Court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the. appreciation of  evidence are  not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.  An error  of law which is apparent on the face of  the record  can be  corrected by a writ, but not an error of  facts however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a  finding of  fact recorded by a Tribunal, a writ can be issued if  it is  shown that  in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence,  or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding  of fact  is based  on no  evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorary.  A finding  of fact  recorded by the Tribunal cannot be chal      (1) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 548. 527 lenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence

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adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a  finding. The  adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on  a point  and the  inference of fact to be drawn from the said  finding are  within the  exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  See Syed  Yakoob v.  K.  S.  Radhakrishnan  & ors(1).      The High  Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and  came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified  to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does  not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence  is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned  by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is  no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that  the respondent  did not make the journey. The Tribunal  gave  reasons  for  its  conclusions.  It  is  not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have  arrived at  these conclusions.  The  High  Court reviewed the  evidence, re-assessed  the evidence  and  then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do.      The respondent raised another contention that the State did not  give the  respondent a  document described  as  ’B’ Report and  Investigation  Report  of  the  Anti  Corruption Bureau.  The  ground  advanced  by  the  respondent  in  the petition before  the High  Court was  that  ’B’  Report  and Investigation Report  to which  the reference is made by the Tribunal in  its report  and which  are relied on to support the charges,  were not made available to the respondent. The High Court  did not  express any  opinion on  this  question because the High Court set aside the dismissal in the ground that there  was no evidence for the Tribunal to come to that conclusion. The  State in  the affidavit  filed in  the High Court in  answer to  the respondent’s petition said that ’B’ Report and Investigation Report are secret reports which are intended for  the reference  of the Tribunal of Disciplinary Proceedings and the Government and, therefore, these reports are not  supplied, to  the officers. We need not express any opinion on  that answer  of the  State in the affidavit. The respondent in answer to the affidavit of the State said that the Tribunal  used the  ’B’  Report  and  the  Investigation Report against  the respondent and did not supply copies. It is because  the respondent alleged in the writ petition that the Tribunal  relied on ’B’ Report and Investigation Report, we looked  into the  Inquiry Report  of the Tribunal to find out whether that was a correct statement. We find that there is a  reference to  ’B’ Report  by the Tribunal only because the respondent  challenged the  genuineness and authenticity of Exhibit P-45. The respondent’s case was that if he made a statement like Exhibit P-45, the Investigating Officer would have sent it along with his report. The Inquiry Officer says that the Investigating officer recorded the statement of the respondent. The  Tribunal has  not relied  on ’B’  Report or Investigation Report. The      (1) [1964] 5 S.C.R 64. 528 respondent  never  demanded  ’B’  Report  and  Investigation Report. The  A respondent was interested before the Tribunal to displace  Exhibit P-45  by doubting  its genuineness. The Tribunal found  that Exhibit  P-45 was  genuine  and  was  a statement made  and signed by the respondent in the presence of the  Investigating Officer.  It does  not appear that the Tribunal based its finding only on Exhibit P-45.      For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court

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was wrong  in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and re-assessing  the evidence.  The appeal is accepted. The judgment of  the High  Court is  set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. V.P.S                                        Appeal allowed. 529