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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  827 of 2002

PETITIONER: STATE OF A.P.

RESPONDENT: SINGIREDDY RAMULU & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/2007

BENCH: DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT & P. SATHASIVAM

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.         Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the learned Single Judge  of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the Civil Revision Petition filed under  Section 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings)  Act, 1973(in short the ‘Act’).  Challenge in the Civil Revision is to the Order passed  by the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Karimnagar (in short the ‘Appellate  Tribunal’).         Background facts in nutshell are as follows:One Maqbool Alam surrendered  11 acres and 07 guntas of land in Nanvath village (survey No.4/B) in lieu of excess  land of the declarant.  The respondent No.1 contended that said Maqbool Alam had  transferred ownership of the land under an agreement of sale dated 19.1.1971 and  since then he was in continuous possession of the land by paying land revenue  and without considering the relevant materials the Land Reforms Tribunal,  Adilabad, had accepted the surrender of the land even ignoring the objection filed  by the applicant dated 26.9.1978.  Reference was made to Section 10(5)(a)(ii) to  substitute the stand.  It is not be noted that the Land Reforms Tribunal proceeded  on the basis as if no objection was filed by anybody.  The Appellate Tribunal was of  the view that in view of what is stated in Section 10(5)(a)(ii) and in view of the fact  that the appellant was in possession since 1971, the surrender to the extent of 11  acres and 07 guntas of land is set aside and rest of the order was upheld. The Land  Reforms Tribunal was directed to receive the recovery proceedings against  Maqbool Alam for the balance area as per law.         There was no challenge to the order by Maqbool Alam but the State of  Andhra Pradesh, the present appellant filed a Revision as noted above.  The High  Court found that respondent No.1 was in possession of the land before the notified  date and possession of the the land was with him on the notified ate and, therefore,  the finding of the Land Reforms Tribunal could not be sustained.  Therefore, it was  held that the order of the Tribunal did not suffer from any infirmity.         The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of what has  been stated by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Yedida Chakradhararao Vs.  State of Andhra Pradesh [1990 (2) SCC 523] the view of the Appellate Tribunal and  the High Court cannot be maintained.         Stand of the respondent was that since effect of Section 10(5)(a)(ii) was not  considered, the Appellate Tribunal directed exclusion of the land in possession of  respondent No.1 and there is nothing wrong in such direction.  It was, therefore,  submitted that the High Court was justified in dismissing the Revision Application.         The learned counsel for the appellant, in reply, had submitted that the land  purportedly transferred on the basis of unregistered agreement with no validity in  law.  Section 10(5)(a)(ii) reads as follows:         \023Section 10(5)(a) Notwithstanding anything in the Section, it shall be  open to the Tribunal to refuse or to accept the surrender of any land--         (ii) the surrender of which is not acceptable on account of a  dispute as to the title to the land or an encumbrance on the land or  on account of the land being in the possession of any person  mentioned in 1[x x x] item (v) of Clause (i) of Section 3 or on  account of the land proposed to be surrendered becoming

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inaccessible by reason of its severance from the remaining part of  the holding; and the Tribunal shall, in every such case, serve a  notice on the person concerned requiring him to surrender any  other land in lieu thereof; and thereupon the provisions of sub- section (3) and (4) shall, mutatis mutandis apply to such surrender  :\024         \023The provision comes into operation when a land holder refuses to accept  the surrender of any land.  Clause (i) shows that notwithstanding anything  contained in the section it shall be open to the  tribunal to refuse to accept the  surrender of any land.         Clause (2) provides that it is permissible to the tribunal not to accept any  surrender if there is a dispute as to the title or on account of land being in  possession of any person mentioned in item (4) of clause (i) of Section 3 or on  account of land proposed to be surrendered becoming inaccessible by reason of  its severance from the remaining part of the holding.\024         The specific case of respondent No.1 is that he is in possession.  In fact he  had produced certain matters which were noted by the Appellate Tribunal.  The  High Court, in the impugned order, also noted that respondent No.1 was in  possession of land before the notified date.         The question that was considered in Yedida Chakradhararao (supra) was  the interpretation of the expression ‘held’.  In the present case the basic issue was  really the applicability of Section 10(5)(a)(ii).  The judgment relied upon by the  learned counsel for the State, inter alia, noted as follows:         \023The main submission of learned counsel for the appellants is that the  express ‘holding’ has been defined in sub-section (i) of Section 3 of the said  Act, the definition section set out earlier, as meaning the entire land held by  a person (emphasis supplied) and that the use of the said word \023held\024 in the  definition indicates that the person who is supposed to hold the land, must  necessarily be the person in possession of the said land; and hence where,  in part performance for an agreement of sale or under a lease, the  purchaser or lessee has been put in possession of any land, the owner of  the said land cannot any longer be regarded as holding the said land and it  cannot be said that the said land is held by him.  It was submitted by learned  counsel that in view of this context although the Explanation to sub-section  (i) of Section 3 is very widely worded, its meaning cannot be so extended as  to cover a case where the  owner of the land is no longer in possession of  the land and has parted with the possession thereof under an agreement  creating a right, legal or equitable, in the land concerned.  We find it difficult  to accept this contention.  Clauses (i) to (v) of sub-section (i) of Section 3  set out the various capacities in which a person can be said to \023hold\024 land  for the purposes of the said Act and among these capacities are \023as a  usufructuary mortgagee, as a tenant and as one who is in possession by  virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a  contract of sale\024. The very language of sub-section (i) of Section 3 indicates  that land can be held as contemplated in the said sub-section by persons in  a number of capacities.  the Explanation in plain language states that the  same land can be held by one person in one capacity and by another person  in a different capacity and provides that such land shall be included in the  holdings of both such persons.  The Explanation thus clearly contemplates  that the same land can be held as contemplated under sub-section (i) by  one person as the owner and by another person as his lessee or as a  person to whom the owner has delivered possession of the land in part  performance of an agreement to sell.  On a plain reading of the language  used in the Explanation, we find it that it is not possible to accept the  submission that only where the land is in possession of a person can that  land be regarded as held by him.         Apart from what we have pointed out earlier we find that the question  which arises before us in this appeal is already covered by the decision of  this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Mohd. Ashrafuddin. The facts of  the case were that out of the total holding of his land the respondent  transferred some land to another person under two unregistered sale deeds  pursuant to an agreement for sale and gifted away some land to his son.  In  the return submitted by him under the said Act the respondent did not  include in his holding the area transferred under the unregistered sale  deeds of the land gifted by him which was in the possession of the

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purchase and donee respectively.  the Land Reforms Tribunal ignoring the  two transfers computed his holding at 1.7692 standard holding and called  upon him to surrender land equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding.  In  revision, the High Court held that the land transferred under the two sale  deeds could not be included in the holding of the respondent for  ascertaining the ceiling area.  In coming to this conclusion, the High Court  gave the benefit of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act to the  person in possession of the plot pursuant to the contract for sale and  treated the land as a part of his holding.  On appeal to this Court, a Division  Bench comprising three learned Judges of this Court reversed the decision  of the High Court and held that the High Court was in error in holding that  the land in the possession of the transferee cannot be taken to be a part of  the holding of the respondent.  It was held by this Court that the expression  \023held\024 connotes both ownership as well as possession.  In the context of  the definition it is not possible to interpret the term \023holding\024 only in the  sense of possession.  The Explanation to the definition of the term  \023holding\024 clearly contemplates that the same land can be the holding of two  different persons holding the land in different capacities (See page 486:  SCC p.4).  The Court went on to state that: (SCC p.4 para 9)

       \023It is by now well settled that a person in possession pursuant to a  contract for sale does not get title to the land unless there is a valid  document of title in his favour.  In the instant case it has already been  pointed out that the transferee came into possession in pursuance of an  agreement for sale but no valid deed of title was executed in his favour.   Therefore, the ownership remained with the respondent-transferor.  But  even in the absence of a valid deed of title the possession pursuant to an  agreement of transfer cannot be said to be illegal and the transferee is  entitled to remain in possession\024. The Court went on to observe that : (SCR headnote)         \023There may conceivably be cases where the same land is included in  holding of two persons in different capacities and serious prejudice  might be caused to one or both of them of they were asked to surrender  the excess area.  To safeguard the interests of the owners in such a case  the legislature has made a provision in Section 12(4) and (5) of the Act.   Even so there might be cases where some prejudice might be caused to  sosme tenure holders.\024 The court further observed that : (SCR headnote)         \023But if the definition of the terms ‘holding’ is couched in clear and  unambiguous language the court has to accept it as it stands.  So  construed the same land can be a part of the holding of various persons  holding it in different capacities.  When the terms of the definition are  clear and unambiguous there is no question of taking extraneous aid for  construing it.\024

       The question raised for our determination in this appeal is directly  covered against the appellant by the decisions of this Court in two cases  just referred to by us.  In these circumstances, even assuming that there is  another equally plausible view regarding the construction and the legal  effect of Section 3(i) of the said Act read with Explanation, that would not  necessarily justify our reconsidering the question which has already been  decided by this Court, although the decision was rendered by a bench  comprising only three learned Judges of this Court. In our opinion, unless  we find that the decisions in the aforesaid cases are erroneous, it would not  be proper on our part to reconsider the same.  Apart from this, as we have  pointed out earlier, in our view, considering the clear language of Section  3(i) of the said Act read with Explanation to that section, the view taken in  Mohd. Ashrafudding case is, with respect, the correct view, and we are  inclined to take the same view on the construction and legal effect of that  provision.’         Therefore, the matter is remitted to the Land Reforms Tribunal to consider  the case of respondent No.1 in the background of his claim for possession with  reference to Section 10(5)(a)(ii) of the Act.  It has to be decided as to whether the  said provision has any application to the facts of the case.  After that determination  is done, the parameters set out by the Constitution Bench of this Court has to be

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applied.  It is ordered accordingly.         The appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs.