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PETITIONER: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: N. RADHAKISHAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       07/04/1998

BENCH: SUJATA V. MANOHAR, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                  THE 7TH DAY OF APRIL, 1998 Present:               Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Sujata V. Manohar               Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.P. Wadhwa Ms.K. Amareshwari,  Sr. Adv.,  V.R. Anumolu,  T.Anil  Kumar, Advs. with her for the appellant H.s. Gururaja  Rao, Sr. Adv., T.V. Ratnam, Adv. with him for the Respondent                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: WADHWA,J.      Against the  judgment dated  December 12,  1996 of  the Andhra Pradesh  Administrative Tribunal,  Hyderabad, in O.A. No. 2239/96  filed by  the respondent,  the State  of Andhra pradesh has  come up in appeal. By the impugned judgment the Tribunal allowed the petition of the respondent and directed that the  respondent be promoted to the category of Director of Town  and Country  Planning,  in  the  existing  vacancy, ignoring the  charge memos -- (1) Memo No. 2732/FL/87/27/MA, dated July  31, 1995;  (2) memo  no. 145/B2/93-19/MA,  dated October 27, 1995; and (3) Memo No. 898/B.2/94/M.A dated June 1, 1996,  if  the  respondent  is  otherwise  eligible.  The Tribunal found  that the  Departmental  Promotion  committee met on  August 16, 1995 and prepared the panel for the panel year 1994-95,  which was approved by the State Government in October, 1995.  One of the persons included in the panel was promoted to  the category  of Director  of Town  and Country Planning by  G.O.M. dated  November 14,  1995. The  Tribunal observed that  the panel  itself  having  been  prepared  on August 16,  1995 should lapse only on  December 31, 1996 and not on  December 31, 1995 as was contended by the State. The name of  the respondent  was  included  in  the  panel.  The Tribunal, therefore,  held that  since the panel would lapse only on  December   31, 1996 the respondent was entitled for promotion before  that date.  The Tribunal also noticed that the objection of the State that the panel lapsed on December 31, 1995  was never  raised either before it or in the State against an interim order earlier made by the Tribunal.      Tribunal was  concerned with  the question if promotion of the respondent could  be denied to him after his name had

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been included in the panel prepared by the DPC on the ground that the  disciplinary inquiry initiated against him had not yet been terminated. The respondent had submitted before the Tribunal that the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 was served upon him  just before the meeting of the DPC only to deprive him his claim of promotion and further that the charge memos dated October  27, 1995 and June 1, 1996 being subsequent to the  date  of  meeting  of  DPC  could  not  be  taken  into consideration for  promoting him  to the  post of  Director, Town and  Country Planning.  Tribunal noticed  that the memo dated July  31, 1995  related to the incidents that happened in the  years 1978,  1979 and  1984,  which  were  also  the subject-matter of the memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987. While the memo No. 1412 had been issued under Rule 19 of the Andhra Pradesh  Civil Services  (CCA) Rules, 1963 (for short "1963 Rules") that dated July 31, 1995 was issued under Rule 20 of  the Andhra  Pradesh Civil  Services (CCA) Rules, 1991 (for short  "1991 Rules"). Earlier memo No. 1412 was neither cancelled nor  annulled before  issuance of  memo dated July 31, 1995  and the  Tribunal was  of the view that because of this circumstance  memo dated  July 31,  1995 could not have been issued  and inquiry should have proceeded under the old Rules after the Inquiry Officer had been appointed.      State has contended before us that the Tribunal wrongly assumed that  the charges  communicated to the respondent on July 31, 1995 were belated and not only that it quashed that charge memo  but also  other charge  memos when there was no challenge to  that.  Merely  on  the  ground  of  delay  the Tribunal should  not have conferred unwanted benefits on the respondent. It  was submitted that the whole approach of the Tribunal in giving relief to the respondent has been the the delay in  not concluding  the inquiry  in furtherance to the charge memo. It may, however, be noticed that the respondent did seek  setting aside  of the memo dated July 31, 1995 and that dated  October 27, 1995. The Tribunal only quashed memo dated July  31, 1995  and as regards memos dated October 27, 1995 and  June 1, 1996, it said that the State might proceed against the  respondent for taking action as per law but the only rider  which the  Tribunal put was that these two memos could not  be taken   into consideration in implementing the recommendation of the DPC.      Whether  the   delay  did  vitiate    the  disciplinary proceedings and  if the Tribunal was justified in giving the directions aforesaid  we may  refer to  the sequence  of the events.      The respondent was appointed as Asstt. Director of Town Planning in  the year  1976.  He  worked  in  the  Municipal Corporation  of   Hyderabad  (hereinafter   referred  to  as ‘Corporation’) in  1979. He  was  posted  as  City  Planner, Municipal Corporation  of Visakhapatnam  in 1981.  A  report dated November  7, 1987  was sent  by the  Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau,  Andhra Pradesh,  Hyderabad, to  the Secretary   to    the   Government,    Housing,    Municipal Administration  &   Urban  Development   Department,  Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad,  about the  irregularities in deviations and unauthorised constructions in multi-storied complexes in twin cities  of Hyderabad and Secunderabad in collusion with Municipal authorities.      In  this   report  four  multi-storied  buildings  were mentioned,   viz.,   chandralok   Complex,   chenoy   market Commercial  Complex,  Shajahan  Apartments  and  Progressive Towers. It was stated that in September, 1987 these premises were  inspected   and  irregularities   in  deviations   and unauthorised construction  were  noticed  and  the  relevant files of  the Corporation  were also  perused. Town planning

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staff of  the Corporation  in collusion  with  the  builders permitted them  to flout  building bye-laws  and  the  staff abused  their   official  position  or  obtaining  pecuniary advantage for  themselves and  the builders  causing loss of revenue to  the Corporation  in the  shape  of  house-taxes. Eleven officers  were named  including the  respondent,  who were said  to be responsible for the abnormal deviations and unauthorised constructions.      On the  basis of  the report  the State issued two both dated December  12, 1987  (1) in respect of three officials, viz., Radha  Krishna, the  then  Asstt.  City  Planner,  the respondent, (2) P.V. Janaki Raman, the then City Planner and (3) A.  Ram Reddy,  the then  Asstt. City  Planner.  In  the second memo  seven other  officers of  the rank  of  Section Officers and one Assistant City Planner were named. The memo respecting the  respondent and  two others  said that  under Rule 19(2)  of  1963  Rules  one  sri  N.  Venugopal  Reddy, Director of  Town  and  country  Planning,  Andhra  Pradesh, Hyderabad, was  appointed as  Inquiry Officer  to conduct  a detailed inquiry  against them,  who were allegedly involved and found  responsible for  the irregularities.  The Inquiry Officer was directed to complete his inquiry within a period of two  months and  to submit  his report  to the Government with specific  findings. As  we see  this memo  is  entirely based on the report of the director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau. In  one of  the letters  dated January 7,1988 of the Director General  Anti-Corruption Bureau,  it  is  mentioned that during  the course  of the  checking of  the  buildings witnesses were  neither examined  nor their  statements were recorded and  as such  there was  no  part-B  file.  It  was suggested that  action be  taken on  the basis of the report already sent to the Government. Rule 19(2) of the 1963 Rules requires that when it is proposed to impose on a member of a service any of the penalties specified therein the authority competent to  impose the  penalty shall  appoint an  inquiry officer or  itself hold  an inquiry.  In every such case the ground on  which it  is proposed  to take  action  shall  be reduced to  the form  of definite  charges, which  shall  be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the  allegations on which each charge is based and any of other  circumstance  which  it  is  proposed  to  take  into consideration in  passing orders  in the  case. the  charged employee shall  be required within a reasonable time to file a written  statement of  his defence and to state whether he desires an oral inquiry or to be heard in person or both. It is not  necessary to  refer  to  further  steps  whether  he desires an oral inquiry or to be heard in person or both. It is not  necessary to  refer to  further steps in the inquiry proceedings as  in the  present case  we find that till July 31, 1995  article of  charges had  not been  served  on  the respondent by  which time  1991 Rules had come into force in supersession of  the earlier  1963 Rules.  Rule 45  of  1991 Rules provided  that repeal  shall not  affect the  previous operation of  1963 Rules, or any notification or order made, or anything  done, or  any action  taken thereunder,  in any proceeding under  those Rules pending at the commencement of 1991 Rules  and shall be continued and disposed of as far as may be  in accordance  with the provisions of 1991 Rules. In 1991 Rules procedure for imposing penalties had been changed by Rules  20 and  21. Now,  the Inquiry  Officer is  top  be appointed after  written statement  of the  defence  of  the charged employee  has been  received. When it is proposed to hold inquiry  against a Government servant, the disciplinary authority is  required to  draw  up  the  substance  of  the imputations of  misconduct or misbehaviour into definite and

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distinct article  of charge;  a statement of the imputations of misconduct  or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge containing  (a) a statement of all relevant facts (b) list of  documents and (c) list of witnesses. These shall be served upon the Government Servant, who shall be required to submit written  statement in defence and to state whether he desires to  be heard in person. If on receipt of the written statement of  the defence  the disciplinary  authority finds that it  is necessary  to inquire  into the charges, it hall appoint an  Inquiry officer  of the purpose , Of course, the disciplinary authority  can itself  inquire into the article of charges,  if it  so chooses or thinks to do so. Again, we are not  concerned as  to how  the  inquiry  officer  is  to proceed further in the matter as per 1991 Rules as after the article of  charge was  served upon  the respondent  and his statement of  defence was received there was no progress and he moved the Tribunal.      Coming back  to the  state when Shri N. Venugopal Reddy was appointed  as Inquiry  Officer we find from the official file produce  before us  that he sent various communications to the  Secretary  to  the  Government,  Housing,  Municipal Administration &  Urban Development  Department, to send him the relevant  files. This he went on writing but without any response from  the State  Government till  Shri N. Venugopal Reddy retired  on attaining  the age  of  superannuation  on September 30,  1991. As  to why  there was  no  response  to various letters  of  the  Inquiry  Officer  from  the  State Government the  file does  not  reveal  anything.  Meanwhile respondent was  promoted  as  Joint  Director  of  Town  and Country Planning  on September  10,  1991.  Thereafter,  the State Government appointed Sri P.B. Chowdhary, O.S.D. (legal cases), Municipal  Corporation of  Hyderabad,    as  Inquiry Officer by order dated September 7, 1992. Shri Chowdhary did not submit  the inquiry  report and  his term  of office  as O.S.D. (legal  cases) expired  on November  20, 1992. Again, orders were  issued on  March 6,  1993  appointing  Shri  A. Vidyasagar,   I.A.S.,   Additional   Commissioner   of   the Corporation as  Inquiry Officer. He was transferred from his post on  May 25,  1993. Yet again orders mere issued on June 17, 1993  appointing Shri  Adityanath Dass,  IAS, Additional Commissioner (Genl.) of the Corporation, as Inquiry Officer. On August  16,  1994  Shri  Dass  informed  the  authorities concerned  that   connected  files  and  records  have  been received  from  the  appropriate  authority  "recently"  and promised that  he  would  submit  his  report  as  early  as possible.  No   report  was  submitted  and  Shri  DAss  was transferred   from the  post. Thereafter, orders were issued on march  20, 1995  appointing Shri  M.Veerahhadraiah,  IAS, O.S.D. of the Corporation, as Inquiry Officer. At this stage it was  observed that  procedure as  contained  i 1991 Rules had not  been followed. therefore, the order dated March 20, 1995 appointing  Shri M.  Veerahhadraiah as  Inquiry Officer was cancelled  by order  dated June 16, 1995. It was at this stage that  articles of  charges dated  July 31,  1995  were issued to the respondent.      The Tribunal  did not  go into  the culpability  of the respondent with  respect to the charges as contained in memo dated July  31, 1995 and did not record any finding of guilt or otherwise  on those  charges. The Tribunal, however, said that the  memo dated  July 31, 1995 related to the incidents that happened  ten years  or more  prior to  the date of the memo and  that there  was absolutely  no explanation  by the Government for  this inordinate delay in framing the charges and conducting  the  inquiry  against  the  respondent.  The explanation given  by the  State that for some reason or the

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other the  Inquiry Officer  was being  changed from  time to time and on that account inquiry could not be conducted, did not find  favour by  the Tribunal. it said that there was no justification on  the part  of the State now conducting  the inquiry against  the respondent  in respect of the incidents at this  late  stage.  The  Tribunal  noticed  that  in  the meanwhile respondent  had  been  promoted  as  Senior  Joint Director of  Town and  Country Planning  notwithstanding the appointment of  Inquiry Officer  one after  the other  after memo No.  1412 dated December 22, 1987 and plea of the State the when respondent was promoted as Senior Joint Director of Town and  Country Planning  his  file  relating  to  inquiry against  him   was  not   brought  to   the  notice  of  the administrative section  in the  year 1991  at  the  time  of convening the  DPC  and  which  resulted  in  promoting  the respondent, also  did not find favour with the Tribunal. The Tribunal  said  that  both  the  sections  were  within  the Municipal Administration  and this explanation, now offered, was without  any any merit. The Tribunal while quashing memo dated July  31, 1995  did not  quash the memos dated October 27, 1995  and June  1, 1996  and said  that the State, if so advised, might  proceed against  the respondent according to law for  taking action  against him.  What the Tribunal said about the  later two memos was that they should not be taken into  consideration   while  promoting   the  respondent  in pursuance to  the recommendations  of DPC  which was held on August 16, 1995.      A letter  dated  March  27,  1995  from  the  Vigilance Commissioner  to  the  Principal  Secretary  to  Government, Municipal Administration  and Urban  Development  Department has been brought to our notice. In this letter the Vigilance Commissioner writes that after consideration of the facts it is observed  that there  was abnormal and avoidable delay in taking disciplinary  action against  various  categories  of officers,  who   are  alleged   to  have  committed  several irregularities  in   the  matter  of  permission  given  for construction of  multi-storied complexes  in the Twin Cities of Hyderabad  and Secunderabad.  The letter  says  that  the Inquiry Officer has now been appointed without following the procedure under  Rule 20  of 1991  Rules. The Department was asked to  verify if  the earlier Inquiry Officers and if not to take  immediate action  to frame  the charges,  first  as provided  under   Rule  20  of  1991  Rules.  The  Vigilance Commissioner advised  that the draft charges may be shown to him before  issuance. A  reminder was  sent by the Vigilance Commissioner on  April 26,  1995.  It  was  thereafter  that charges dated  July 31,  1995 were framed ad served upon the respondent and others.      Four articles  of charges have been set out against the respondent, now  working as  Joint Director,  Office of  the Director of Town and Country Planning, which are as under:-      "ARTICLES OF CHARGES      1)  That   Sri  N.  Radha  Krishna,      formerly  Assistant  Town  Planner,      Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad,      Secunderabad, and presently working      as Joint  Director, Directorate  of      Town  Planning,  Hyderabad,.  While      working as  Assistant Town  Planner      during  the   year  1978  committed      misconduct in as much as he has put      up  misleading  note  with  certain      omissions and  commissions  to  the      City Planer recommending permission      for construction  of 4th floor, 5th

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    floors and  pa subject  to  certain      conditions at  Chandralok  Complex,      Secunderabad  in   favour  of  M/s.      Swastik  Builders   in   File   No.      234/241/7/1/B4/78 in  violation  of      Building   Bye-laws    and   Zoning      Regulations. He  thereby  exhibited      his conduct  which is unbecoming on      the part  of a  Government  servant      and  failed  to  maintain  absolute      integrity  and  devotion  to  duty.      Thereby the  said  Sri  N.    Radha      Krishna, contravened  rule 3 of the      Andhra   Pradesh   Civil   Services      (Conduct) Rules, 1964.      2)  Sri   N.  Radha  Krishna  while      working as  such has also committed      misconduct in  allowing the  Cellar      of   Chenoy    Market    Commercial      complex, Secunderabad  for using as      godowns by various concerns such as      ELCOM     ENGINEERING      COMPANY,      HYDERABAD PUMPS  LIMITED, E.T. & T.      LIMITED by  converting  the  Cellar      portion as Garrages when the Cellar      was actually  meant for parking and      he has  also allowed the North-East      Corner  of  Cellar  to  convert  as      Strong Room for Lockers occupied by      Suman Safe  Deposit Lockers Private      Limited. he  has further  committed      misconduct in allowing to raise the      height of the building to 130’ - 8"      instead of  the  permitted  average      height of  the  building  92’  wide      whereas  permit   No.  92/84  dated      11.7.1985 and  the sanctioned  plan      permitted the average height of the      building is only 92’ i.e., Ground +      7 floors.  He thereby exhibited his      conduct which  is unbecoming on the      part of  a Government  servant  and      failed   to    maintain    absolute      integrity  and  devotion  to  duty.      Thereby  the   said  Sri  N.  Radha      Krishna contravened  rule 3  of the      Andhra   Pradesh   Civil   services      (Conduct) Rules, 1964.      3) Sri  N Radha  Krishna  has  also      committed mis-conduct  in  allowing      the Cellar  of Shahjahan Apartments      bearing   premises    No.   6-2-94,      Khairatabad for being used as shops      and  office  godowns  when  it  was      supposed to  be used as Car Parking      as per Permit No. 24/15 of 1979 dt.      30.3.1979. He thereby exhibited his      conduct which  is unbecoming on the      part of  a Government  Servant  and      failed   to    maintain    absolute      integrity  and  devotion  to  duty.      Thereby  the   said  Sri  N.  Radha      Krishna, contravened  rule 3 of the      Andhra   Pradesh   Civil   Services      (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

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    4) Sri  N. Radha  Krishna has  also      committed   misconduct    in    not      insisting to  erect railings on the      eastern side  of Progressive Towers      abutting the  Rajbhavan  Road  even      though the condition was stipulated      that no  opening should be provided      towards  Rajbhavan   road  as   per      permit No.  145/42,  dt.  19.3.1981      read with  G.O. MS.  No. 1065, M.A.      dated 16.9.1981,  thus he failed to      maintain  absolute   integrity  and      devotion  to   duty   and   thereby      contravened Rules  3(1)  of  Andhra      Pradesh  Civil  Services  (Conduct)      Rules, 1964." It is  interesting to  note that same Articles of Charges in verbatim have  been served upon Sri A. Sree Rami Reddy also, now working  as Joint  Director, office of Director Town and Country Planning  and also 8 other named in the report dated November 7,  1987 of  the Director  General, anti corruption Bureau.      By letter  dated August 3, 1995 respondent informed the disciplinary authority,  who issued the Articles of charges, that he  worked as Assistant City Planner in she corporation from December  6, 1977  to February  16, 1979  in  different circles and that from that it could be seen that only charge No. 1 related to his period when he was working as Assistant City Planner in that circle. The respondent wanted copies of the relevant  records in respect of charges contained in the memo to facilitate him to submit detailed written statement.      In his  written statement  dated September 25, 1995 the respondent explained  as to how charges 2, 3 and 4 could not relate to  him and  subsequently also  in his  letter to the Chief Secretary  to the government of Andhra Pradesh he said that charges  2 and  4 related  to the  period when  he  was working in  Andhra Pradesh State Scheduled Castes and Tribes CO- operative  Housing Society  Federation from  February 9, 1979 to  September 30,  1981. During the period charge No. 3 related to, the respondent said that he was on deputation at oxford Polytechnic  in United  Kingdom from October 11, 1984 to September 26, 1985 for his post-graduation course. On the first charge his statement of defence was as under :-      "1. With  reference to  the  Charge      No. 1, I submit that I have perused      the      file       bearing      No      234/241/7/1/B4/78 belonging to M/s.      Swastik   Constructions    in   the      Chambers  of  Deputy  Secretary  to      Government, M.A.  & U.D. Department      on 20.9.1995. As seen from the file      that  M/s.   Swastik  Constructions      have applied  for the  construction      of 4th  5th and 6th floors over the      existing ground,  1st, 2nd, and 3rd      floors vide  their application  dt.      18.9. 1978. The proposals have been      examined in detail in pages 6 and 7      of note  file  at  paras  1  to  27      giving clear statement of the F.S.I      permissible and  also  other  Rules      and Regulations  for  the  proposed      construction in  the light  of  the      material available  in the file. At      para  23rd   the   proposals   were

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    submitted for  consideration to the      Higher Authorities as per corrected      plan       subject    to    certain      conditions. As  it can be seen from      the endorsement  of the  then  City      Planner sri P.V. Janakiraman on the      right hand side margin "This may be      restricted to  4th and  5th  floors      only, let  us delete  part  of  6th      floor. The  Then City  Planner  has      approved the  proposed construction      of 4th  and 5th  floors and part of      6th    floor    regularising    the      deviation  imposing   the  compound      fee of  Rs. 1000/-  on  1.1.79  and      marked  the   file  to  the  Deputy      Commissioner.      The       Deputy      Commissioner in  burn approved  the      proposal on  10.1.1979. It is clear      from the  above note that I did not      put up  any misleading note and did      not   recommend    the    proposals      irregularly against  any  rule  and      regulation  as   alleged   in   the      charge. The  Higher  Officers  have      also not  pointed out any lapses in      the submitted  note before approval      of  the  said  proposals  and  also      regularised the  offence by levy of      compounding fee.      Hence, I  submit that  since I have      not   recommended   the   proposals      irregularly, the  charge may kindly      be dropped." As a  matter of fact the disciplinary authority got verified the facts  that what  the  respondent  had  said  about  the article of  charges 2, 3 and 4 was correct and that he could not  be   concerned  with  any  deviations  or  unauthorised constructions in respect of the buildings mentioned in those charges. This  is by  letter dated October 10, 1995 from the Director of  Town and  Country   Planning to  the  Principal Secretary to  the Government,  Municipal Administration  and Urban Development  Department, and  was in answer to a query raised by  the disciplinary  authority from  the Director of Town and  Country Planning.  On  March  15,  1996  Vigilance Commissioner advised  the disciplinary authority "to Process the explanations  of the  Accused Officers with reference to the connected  files returned  by the A.C.B. vide its report dated  7.11.1987  and  then  refer  the  file  to  Vigilance commissioner   for   further   advice".   Nothing   happened Everything was at standstill.      It is  in April,  1996 that respondent moved the Andhra Pradesh Appellate Tribunal for relief.      It would,  therefore, appear  that  charges  have  been farmed against  the respondent  merely on  the basis  of the report dated  November 7,  1987 from  the director  General, Anti-Corruption  Bureau,  which  is  of  general  in  nature raising accusing  finger on  the  various  officers  of  the corporation, but without any reference to the relevant files and pin pointing if respondent or any other official charged was  at  all  concerned  with  the  alleged  deviations  and unauthorised construction in multi-storied complexes.      It would  not be  necessary for  us  to  refer  to  the charges issued  by the memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996  as that  was not  the subject-matter  for  quashing

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either in the Tribunal or before us.      One of  the grounds  on which the Tribunal quashed memo dated July  31, 1995,  issued under  1991  Rules,  was  that without cancelling  the earlier memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987, issued under 1963 Rules, the latter memo could not be issued. We have seen that under rule 45 of 1991 Rules the inquiry proceedings  initiated under  1963  Rules  could  be continued even  after coming into force of 1991 Rules. it is correct that inquiry proceedings did progress after issuance of memo  No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987 to the extent that n  inquiry  officer  was  appointed  and  should  have  been concluded under  1963 Rules.  If memo  of  charge  has  been served for  the first time before 1991 there would have been no difficulty. However, in the present case it could be only an irregularity  and not an illegality vitiating the inquiry proceedings  inasmuch  as  after  the  Inquiry  Officer  was appointed under memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987, there had not  been any progress. If a fresh memo is issued on the same charges  against the  delinquent   officer it cannot be said that any prejudice.      In State  of Punjab  and others  vs. Chaman  Lal  Goyal (1995 (2)  SCC 570),  state of  Punjab was  aggrieved by the order of  the High Court of Punjab and Haryana quashing memo of charges  against Goyal  and  also  the  order  appointing Inquiry Officer  to inquire into those charges. In this case the  incident,  which  was  the  subject-matter  of  charge, happened in  December, 1986 and in early January, 1987, when Goyal was  working as supdt. of Nabha High Security Jail. It was only  on July 9, 1992 that memo of charges was issued to Goyal. He  submitted his  explanation  of  January  4,  1993 denying the  charges. Inquiry  Officer was appointed on July 20, 1993  and soon  thereafter Goyal  filed writ petition in the High  Court on  august 24,  1993. The High Court quashed the memo of charges on the principal ground of delay of five and a  half years  in serving the memo of charges, for which there was no acceptable explanation. This Court examined the factual position  as to  how the delay occurred and if Goyal had been  prejudiced in  any way  on account  of delay. This Court relied on the Principles laid down in A.r. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak  (1992 (1)  SCC 225),  and said, that though that case  pertained   to  criminal  prosecution  the  principles enunciated therein  were broadly  applicable to the pleas of delay  in  taking  the  disciplinary  proceedings  as  well. Referring to decision in a.r. Antulay case this Court said:-      "In paragraph  86 of  the judgment,      this    Court     mentioned     the      propositions  emerging   from   the      several    decisions     considered      therein    and     observed    that      "ultimately  the   court   has   to      balance  and   weigh  the   several      relevant factors  - balancing  test      or   balancing    process   -   and      determine in  each case whether the      right  to  speedy  trial  has  been      denied in  a given  case."  It  has      also  been  held  that,  ordinarily      speaking, where  the court comes to      the conclusion that right to speedy      trial  of   the  accused  has  been      infringed,  the   charges,  or  the      conviction, as  the  case  may  be,      will be  quashed. At the same time,      it has  been  observed that that is      not the   only  course open  to the

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    court and that in a given case, the      nature of  the offence   and  other      circumstances  may   be  such  that      quashing the proceedings may not be      in the interest of justice. In such      a case, it has been observed, it is      open to  the  court  to  make  such      other appropriate order as it finds      just   and    equitable   in    the      circumstance of the case." In that  case this  Court said  that it was more appropriate and in  interest of  justice as  well as  in the interest of administration that  inquiry which  has proceeded to a large extent be  allowed to  be completed.  At the  same time  the Court directed that Goyal should be considered forthwith for promotion without  reference  to  and  without  taking  into consideration the charges or the pendency of the inquiry, if he is found fit for promotion.      It is  not possible  to  lay  down  any  pre-determined principles applicable  to all  cases and  in all  situations where  there   is  delay   in  concluding  the  disciplinary proceedings.  Whether   on  that   ground  the  disciplinary proceedings are  to  be  terminated  each  case  has  to  be examined on  the facts  and circumstances  in that case. the essence of  the matter  is that  the court  has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight them to  determine if  it is  in the  interest of  clean and honest  administration  that  the  disciplinary  proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The  delinquent  employee  has  a  right  that  disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he s not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are  unnecessarily prolonged  without any fault on his part in  delaying the  proceedings. In  considering  whether delay has  vitiated the  disciplinary proceedings  the Court has to  consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account  the  delay  has  occurred.  if  the  delay  is unexplained prejudice  to the  delinquent employee  is  writ large on  the face  of it.  It could  also be seen as to how much disciplinary  authority  is  serious  in  pursuing  the charges against  its employee.  It is the basic principle of administrative justice  that an  officer enterusted  with  a particular  job   has  to   perform  his   duties  honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this  path  he  is  to  suffer  a  penalty  prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course  as per  relevant rules  but then  delay  defeats justice. Delay  causes  prejudice  to  the  charged  officer unless it  can be  shown that  he is  to   or when  there is proper  explanation   for  the   delay  in   conducting  the disciplinary  proceedings.   Ultimately,  the  court  is  to balance these two diverse consideration.      In the  present case we find that without any reference to records  merely on  the report  of the  Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau,  charges  were  framed  against  the respondent and  ten others,  all  in  verbatim  and  without particularizing the  role played  by each  of  the  officers charged. There  were four  charges against  the  respondent. With  three  of  them  he  was  not  concerned.  He  offered explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary authority did  not examine  the same  nor did  it choose  to appoint any  inquiry officer  even assuming  that action was validly being  initiated  under  1991  Rules.  There  is  no explanation whatsoever  for delay  in concluding the inquiry

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proceedings all  these years.  The case  depended on records of the Department only and Director General, Anti Corruption bureau had  pointed out  that no  witnesses ad been examined before he  gave his  report. The  Inquiry Officers,  who had been appointed  on after  the other, had just to examine the records to  see if  the alleged deviations and constructions were illegal  and  unauthorised  and  then  as  to  who  was responsible for  condoning or approving the same against the bye-laws. It  is nobody’s  case that respondent at any stage tried to  obstruct or  delay the  inquiry  proceedings.  The Tribunal rightly  did not  accept the  explanations  of  the state as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth  consideration. In  the circumstances  the Tribunal was  justified in  quashing the  charge memo  dated July 31,  1995  and  directing  the  state  to  promote  the respondent as  per recommendation  of the DPC ignoring memos dated October  27, 1995  and  June  1,  1996.  the  Tribunal rightly did not quash these two later memos.      Accordingly we  do not find any merit in the appeal. It is dismissed with costs.