REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 386   OF 2002

State of A.P.  ..Appellant

Versus

M. Radha Krishna Murthy  ..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge

of the Andhra Pradesh High Court directing acquittal of the respondent who

was  convicted  by  a  learned  Special  Judge  for  SPE and  ACB Cases  for

offence punishable under Section 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the ‘Act’). The respondent

was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a

fine of Rs.2,000/- with default stipulation.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The  accused  was  working  as  Excise  Inspector,  Jogipet,  Medak

District and joined in Government service as L.D.C. on 27-12-1962 in the

office of Excise Superintendent. Medak District. Later he was promoted as

Excise Sub-Inspector on 2-11-1971 and as Excise Inspector on 9-7-1985.

He worked as Excise Inspector at Jogipet, Medak District from 8-4-1987 to

15-7-1989. He held Additional charge of the post of Tekmal Excise Range.

Thus, he is a “public servant” within the meaning of Section 2 (c)(i) of the

Act.  One Sri Goundla Joginath Goud, son of Yella Goud is a resident  of

Muslapur village. He and his father were running a toddy shop. On 12-6-

1989  the  accused  searched  the  cattle  shed  of  one  Burra  Narsimlu  of

Muslapur village, situated adjacent to their toddy shop and seized 1 kg. of

Chloral  Hydrate,  On 13-6-1989  the accused  called  Joginath  Goud  to  his

office and demanded a bribe of Rs.5,000/- stating that he would drop action

and threatened that if they do not pay the monthly mamools regularly, cases

would be booked against them. Then the complainant pleaded that he  has

no connection with his father and/or nor with the said case and requested

not to book a case against them. After some bargaining the amount of bribe

was  reduced   to  Rs.4,000/-  and  accused  asked  him  to  pay  Rs,2,000/-

immediately. Accordingly he paid Rs.2,000/- as part payment on the same

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day and the balance was to be paid on 19-6-1989. Since the complainant

was not willing to pay the balance of Rs.2,000/- he approached the DSP,

ACB, Nizamabad Range on 16-6-1989 and lodged a complaint on which the

DSP, Nizamabad Range, registered it as a case in Crime No:5 ACB-NZB/89

Under Sections 7 & 11 and Section 13 (1)(d) of the Act. The investigation

disclosed  that  the  accused  drafted  a  panchanama  for  the  proceedings

conducted in the house of Sri Burra Narsimhulu and seized a plastic bag of

1 Kg of Chloral  Hydrate on 12-6-1989 and registered it  as a case in Cr.

No:40/88-89   under  Section  34  (a)  of  A.P.  Excise  Act  against  Burra

Narsimhulu  and  also  against  the  father  of  the  complainant.  Further

investigation disclosed that the accused after demand and part payment sent

up a preliminary report on grave crime part-I showing that accused is not

traceable and he showed official favour by not mentioning the name of the

father  of  the  earlier  demand,  the  accused  demanded  and  accepted  the

balance of Rs.2,000/- as gratification other than legal remuneration on 19-6-

1989  at  about  3.40  p.m.  from  the  complainant  Joginath  Goud   at  his

residence at Jogipet. Medak District in the presence of G. Anjaiah Goud and

the  accused  was  caught  red-handed  by  the  ACB in  the  presence  of  the

mediators at 3.50 p.m. on 19-6-1989. The fingers of both the hands of the

accused yielded positive results when subjected to Sodium Carbonate test.

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The  tainted  amount  was  recovered  from the  cot  in  the  presence  of  the

mediators.  Therefore,  the  Government  accorded  sanction  for  prosecution

vide G.O. Ms. No:757, dated 29-8-1991 Revenue (Excise I) Department and

accordingly the accused was held liable for punishment under the abovesaid

sections of law.

Copies of documents relied on by the prosecution were furnished to

the accused. The accused was examined and charges under Sections 7 and

13(2) read with  Section 13(1)(d) of the Act  were framed, read over and

explained to him for which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

The prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 7 and filed Exs.P.1 to P.15 and

marked M.Os.1 to 10.

The trial Court found the evidence to be acceptable and directed the

conviction. In appeal the High Court held that since part of the prosecution

version about demand and acceptance has not been proved, the remaining

part of the case cannot be accepted.  It was pointed out  that according to the

prosecution an amount of Rs.4,000/- was demanded and accepted and the

first  vital  part  of the prosecution version was that  payment of Rs.2,000/-

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said to have been accepted by the respondent is not proved, therefore, when

the part of the same is not accepted  the remaining part of the case shall also

not be accepted.  Placing reliance on a decision of this Court in Hari Dev

Sharma v.  State  (Delhi  Admn.)  (1977  (3)  SCC 352)   the  conviction  as

recorded was set aside. The High Court found that the prosecution case was

that there was demand  and an amount of Rs.2,000/- was paid on 13.6.1989

which has not been proved and with regard to the trap conducted by the

prosecution  while  the  accused  was   receiving  Rs.2,000/-  from P.W.1 on

19.6.1989.   Even  if  the  trap  is  proved  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt,  the

prosecution version cannot be upheld in view of the aforesaid decision of

this court.  

3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted

that the conclusions of the High Court are without any foundation and legal

basis.  

4. Learned  counsel  for  the  accused  on  the  other  hand  supported  the

judgment of the High Court contending that  the decision of this Court in

Hari Dev Sharma’s case (supra) is clearly applicable.  

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5. On a bare reading of the judgment in Hari Dev Sharma’s case (supra),

it is clear that no rule of universal application was laid down that whenever

a part of the case relating to demand and acceptance  is not acceptable, the

whole case would fail even if the case relating to trap, recovery of money

and  chemical  test  by  the  prosecution  is  established.  When  part  of  the

prosecution version relating to demand and acceptance of bribe  stands by

itself, the ratio of the decision does not  apply. Unfortunately, in the instant

case the High Court has lost sight of the aforesaid aspects and by placing

reliance on the aforesaid decision has directed acquittal.  

6. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to

how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on

which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as

Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of

their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they

appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as

statutes.  To  interpret  words,  phrases  and  provisions  of  a  statute,  it  may

become necessary for  judges  to  embark  into  lengthy discussions  but  the

discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes,

they  do  not  interpret  judgments.  They  interpret  words  of  statutes;  their

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words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In  London Graving Dock Co.

Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

“The  matter  cannot,  of  course,  be  settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge.”

7. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid

said,  “Lord  Atkin’s  speech.....is  not  to  be  treated  as  if  it  was  a  statute

definition It will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry, J in

(1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: “One must not, of course, construe even a

reserved judgment of even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.”

And, in  Herrington v.  British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord

Morris said:

“There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in  a  legislative  enactment,  and  it  is  to  be remembered that judicial  utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.”

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8. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a

world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by

blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.  

9. The  following  words  of  Lord  Denning  in  the  matter  of  applying

precedents have become locus classicus:

“Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not  enough  because  even  a  single  significant detail  may  alter  the  entire  aspect,  in  deciding such  cases,  one  should  avid  the  temptation  to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the  colour  of  one  case  against  the  colour  of another.  To decide  therefore,  on which  side  of the  line  a  case  falls,  the  broad  resemblance  to another case is not at all decisive.”

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“Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you  will  find  yourself  lost  in  thickets  and branches. My plea is  to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.”   

10. In that view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is clearly

unsustainable and is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored.  

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11. The appeal is allowed.    

………………………………….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………………………….J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi, March 06, 2009  

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