REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.                      OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 3426 of  2007)

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH — APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

M. MADHUSUDHAN RAO — RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.:

Leave granted.   

2.Being aggrieved by the judgment and final order dated 12th

April, 2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra

Pradesh  at  Hyderabad,  setting  aside  the  conviction  of  the

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respondent–accused  A-1  in  Sessions  Case  No.129  of  1998

from the charge of offence punishable under Section 498-A of

the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘I.P.C.’) and acquitting

him, the State of Andhra Pradesh has preferred this appeal.

3.Brief facts, necessary for the disposal of the appeal, are as

follows:

Marriage between the  de facto  complainant (PW-1) and

the respondent (A-1) was solemnized on 24th November, 1993.

On 22nd May, 1996, the complainant sent a report (Ex.P-1) to

the Additional D.G.P., CID, Hyderabad, inter alia, alleging that

at the time of her marriage with A-1, on the insistence of A-1

and  his  mother  (A-2),  her  father  gave  her  one  house,

Rs.60,000/- in cash, six tolas of gold and household articles

worth  Rs.50,000/-.   Still  after  the  marriage,  her  husband,

working as Reserve Sub-Inspector (RSP) at Security Printing

Press,  was  pressurising  her  to  bring  Rs.50,000/-  more;  he

used to beat her up, scold, shout and threaten to kill her and

on certain occasions he had also pressed her neck saying that

he would kill her.  It was also alleged that her mother-in-law

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(A-2), her husband’s brother Prabhakar and his wife (A-4), and

the  second  sister-in-law  of  her  husband  (A-3)  and  her

husband’s  last  brother  also  used  to  help  her  husband  in

beating and harassing her.   It  was further alleged that one

Mrs.  Jalaja,  working  as  Telephone  Operator  in  the  Reserve

Bank of India, also used to threaten her by saying that her

husband (A-1)  had married her and he did not like  to stay

with her.  Branding her husband to be a gambler, drunkard

and  moving  around  with  anti  social  elements,  it  was  also

alleged  that  about  six  months  back  her  husband  and  his

family members had made the first attempt to eliminate her by

forcibly pouring poison into her throat and when her condition

became serious, they informed her parents that she had taken

poison.  However, then she had not made any complaint to the

police against her husband.  But again on 19th April, 1996 at

11.00 a.m., her husband (A-1), his mother (A-2), his second

brother’s  wife  (A-3)  and  her  husband’s  third  brother’s  wife

(A-4)  forced her  to consume poison and as a result thereof

she was admitted in the nursing home at about 2.30 p.m. in

an unconscious  state.   When she was in a semi  conscious

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state,  the  police  took  her  statement  but  she  did  not  know

what  statement  the  police  had  recorded.   Her  husband

informed her parents about the incident only in the evening

though she was admitted  in the  hospital  at  2.30  p.m.;  her

parents came later and although they had lodged a complaint

with the police but no action was taken against any person.

After being discharged from the hospital on 22nd April, 1996,

she  went  to  stay  with  her  parents  and  since  then  she  is

staying  with  them but  neither  her  husband  nor  his  family

members have come to see her.  As noted supra, the complaint

regarding the incident on 19th April, 1996 was lodged on 22nd

May, 1996.

4.The complaint was forwarded to the Senior Executive Officer,

CID, Hyderabad and consequently on 7th August, 1996 a case

was registered against accused A-1 to A-4 as also against the

said Mrs. Jalaja under Sections 498-A, 420, 494, 307 I.P.C.

After investigation, chargesheet was laid against accused A-1

to A-4 for offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 307

read with Section 34 I.P.C.   

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5.During the  course  of  trial,  the  prosecution examined  nine

witnesses.  No evidence was produced in defence.  The learned

Trial  Court,  on appreciation of evidence,  and relying on the

evidence of the father of the complainant (PW-3), nephew of

PW-3 (PW-4), a store clerk/colleague of PW-3 (PW-5), Security

Inspector/colleague of PW-3 (PW-6), and a neighbour of PW-1

and  PW-3  (PW-7),  came  to  the  conclusion  that  all  the

aforestated  items  had  been  given  as  consideration  for  the

marriage on demand of the accused though in the disguise of

being gifts to the bridegroom.  The Trial Court also inferred

that accused A-1, who had purchased a lorry in the name of

the  complainant—wife  (PW-1)  on  6th November,  1995  was

harassing  her  to  get  Rs.50,000/-  from her  parents  for  the

purchase  of  lorry.   Inter  alia,  observing  that  though  no

specific  instances of harassment  had come on record but

the long course of  conduct of accused A-1 showed that the

allegations of harassment were not totally baseless, the trial

judge  finally  found  accused  A-1  guilty  of  the  offence

punishable  under  Section  498-A  I.P.C.  and  accordingly

sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one year

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and to pay a fine of Rs.8000/- with default stipulation.  Out of

the fine amount, a sum of Rs.6000/- was ordered to be paid to

PW-1.   However,  he  did  not  find accused  A-1 guilty  under

Section 307 I.P.C. and accordingly acquitted him of the said

charge.  Accused   A-2 to A-4 were not found guilty of both the

charges framed against them and were acquitted accordingly.   

6.Aggrieved, the respondent (A-1) challenged his conviction by

preferring appeal before the High Court.  The High Court, as

stated above, on a re-appraisal of the entire evidence, has set

aside  the  conviction.   Against  this  judgment,  the  State  of

Andhra Pradesh is in appeal before us.

7.We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

8.Mrs. June Chaudhary, learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the State vehemently submitted that the High Court

has taken an unreasonable view in acquitting the respondent,

overlooking his conduct before and after the marriage.  It was

submitted  that  the  evidence  produced  by  the  prosecution

clearly proves that even before the marriage, the respondent

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(A-1) was insisting on transfer of the house in his name; even

on the  date  of  marriage  demand  for  money  was  made  and

though  the  lorry  was  purchased  in  the  name  of  the

complainant, it was not by way of any love and affection but to

extract more money from her parents.  Learned counsel, thus,

argued that in the light of these surrounding circumstances, a

clear case for conviction under Section 498-A I.P.C.  had been

made out against the respondent.

9.Mr. R. Venkatramani,  learned senior counsel  appearing on

behalf of the respondent, while supporting the view taken by

the High Court, submitted that the High Court having      re-

appreciated and carefully analyzed the entire evidence before

reaching  the  conclusion  that  no  case  for  conviction  of  the

respondent had been made out, this Court should be loathe to

exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.

It was argued that apart from the fact that in the light of the

evidence  on  record  no  illegality  can  be  attributed  to  the

conclusion recorded by the High Court, even otherwise, it is

well settled principle of law that where on an appraisal of the

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evidence, adduced in the case, the court below has taken a

plausible  view,  the  appellate  court  should  not  interfere,

particularly with an order of acquittal,  even if  different view

can possibly be taken. In support of the proposition, reliance

was placed on the decisions of this Court in Harbans Singh

&  Anr.  Vs.  State  of  Punjab1;  Shri  Gopal  &  Anr.  Vs.

Subhash & Ors.2, State of M.P.  Vs. Sanjay Rai3, Vijaybhai

Bhanabhai Patel Vs.  Navnitbhai Nathubhai Patel & Ors.4

and State of Goa Vs. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.5      

10.In order to appreciate the rival stands, it would be useful

to notice the statutory provisions.  Section 498-A I.P.C. makes

“cruelty” by husband or his relative a punishable offence.  The

word “cruelty” is defined in the Explanation appended to the

said  Section.   Section  498-A  I.P.C.  with  Explanation  reads

thus:

“498A.  Husband  or  relative  of  husband  of  a woman  subjecting  her  to  cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be

1  [1962] Supp 1 SCR 104 2  (2004) 13 SCC 174 3  (2004) 10 SCC 570 4  (2004) 10 SCC 583 5  (2007) 3 SCC 755

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punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation-For  the  purpose  of  this  section, “cruelty" means—

(a) Any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as  is  likely  to  drive  the  woman  to  commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life,  limb  or  health  (whether  mental  or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment  of  the  woman  where  such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her meet such demand.”

11.Thus,  providing  a  new  dimension  to  the  concept  of

“cruelty”,  clause  (a)  of  Explanation  to  Section  498-A  I.P.C.

postulates that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature

as  is  likely  to  drive  a  woman  to  commit  suicide  would

constitute “cruelty”.  Such wilful conduct,  which is likely to

cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether

mental  or  physical)  of  the  woman  would  also  amount  to

“cruelty”.   Clause  (b)  of  the  Explanation  provides  that

harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a

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view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any

unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on

account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet

such demand, would also constitute “cruelty” for the purpose

of Section 498-A I.P.C.  It is plain that as per clause (b) of the

Explanation,  which,  according  to  learned  counsel  for  the

State, is attracted in the instant case, every harassment does

not amount to “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498-A

I.P.C.  The definition stipulates that the harassment has to be

with a definite  object  of  coercing the woman or any person

related to her to meet an unlawful demand.  In other words,

for the purpose of Section 498-A I.P.C. harassment simpliciter

is not “cruelty” and it is only when harassment is committed

for  the  purpose  of  coercing  a  woman  or  any  other  person

related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property etc.,

that it amounts to “cruelty” punishable under Section 498-A

I.P.C.

12.Having noticed the basic ingredients which are required to

be proved in order  to bring home an offence  under  Section

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498-A I.P.C.,  at  this juncture,  we may also briefly  note  the

general  principles  to be kept  in view by the appellate  court

while dealing with an appeal against acquittal.

13.There  is  no  embargo  on  the  appellate  court  to  review,

reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order

of acquittal is founded.  Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is

not  interfered  with  because  the  presumption  of  innocence,

which  is  otherwise  available  to  an  accused  under  the

fundamental  principles  of  criminal  jurisprudence  that  every

person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved

guilty  by  a  court  of  law,  gets  further  reinforced  and

strengthened by his acquittal.  It is also trite that if two views

are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one

favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it

should not be disturbed.  Nevertheless, where the approach of

the  lower  court  in  considering  the  evidence  in  the  case  is

vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded

by the court below is such which could not have been possibly

arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and

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is, therefore, liable to the characterised as perverse, then, to

prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to

interfere.

14.All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one

of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of

Karnataka6.

15.Bearing  the  aforestated  broad  principles  in  mind  and

having  bestowed  our  anxious  consideration  to  the  facts  at

hand, in our judgment, the High Court has not committed any

error in dealing with the evidence, which could be said to be

patently  illegal  or  that  the  conclusion  reached  at  by  it  is

wholly untenable, warranting our interference.  

16.Though it is true the Trial Court has observed that there is

some evidence on record to show that there was a demand for

dowry even at the time of  marriage  but it  is  clear  that  the

foundation for action against the respondent was laid when

the complaint was lodged by the wife on 22nd May, 1996 and

the prosecution machinery was set into motion.  Again it is

6  (2007) 4 SCC 415

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true  that  in  the  complaint  there  is  a  reference  to  the  past

conduct of the respondent and his family members but from

the tenor of  the  complaint,  it  is  clear  that  the  allegation of

harassment including the alleged poisoning incident is linked

solely  with  her  failure  to  get  an  additional  amount  of

Rs.50,000/-  from  her  parents  for  the  purchase  of  lorry.

Furthermore,  though  the  Trial  Court  records  that  in  the

evidence there are no specific instances of harassment, yet

it has proceeded to presume that long course of conduct of the

respondent  is  indicative  of  the  fact  that  the  allegation  of

harassment is not totally baseless. Even the deposit of initial

amount of Rs.1,50,000/- by the respondent for the purchase

of lorry in the name of the complainant has been doubted by

the Trial Court.  It is pertinent to note that in so far as the

allegation of poisoning by the accused to kill the complainant

is concerned, the Trial Court has found the evidence of PW-3

—the  father  of  the  complainant  (PW-1)  to  PW-7  to  be

unreliable and has rejected the version of the prosecution to

that extent.  Adversely commenting on the conduct of PW-3,

the Trial  Court  has also observed that none of the accused

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attempted to escape after the incident which corroborates the

anxiety  of  accused  A-1  to  A-4  about  the  life  of  the

complainant.  Rejecting the prosecution version based on the

complaint,  accused  A-2 to  A-4 were acquitted  by the Trial

Court.  In the light of these circumstances, the learned Judge

of  the  High  Court  entertained  grave  doubts  about  the

correctness of the prosecution story.   

17.Analysing  and  re-appreciating  the  entire  evidence

threadbare,  in  particular  the  testimony  of  the  complainant

(PW-1) and her father (PW-3), the learned Judge has observed

that though as per her complaint (Ex.P-1), the respondent had

been  pressurising  her  to  bring  Rs.50,000/-  as  additional

dowry for purchase of lorry but her version was not supported

even by her father (PW-3).  The learned Judge, on an analysis

of the entire evidence, reached the conclusion that there is no

direct evidence, other than the self-serving testimony of PW-1

regarding alleged beatings or scolding; if really the version of

PW-1 that all  the  accused  attempted  to  kill  her  by  forcibly

pouring poison in her mouth, not once but twice, she would

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not have kept quiet without reporting the matter to the police;

even after the second incident she kept quiet for a period of

one month; the contents of the complaint clearly showed that

PW-1  (the  complainant)  wanted  to  see  that  the  respondent

loses his job in the police department and that merely because

PW-1  attempted  to  commit  suicide,  it  cannot  be  presumed

that only on account of harassment or cruelty meted out to

her that she made an attempt to commit suicide. Taking all

these  circumstances  into  consideration,  the  learned  Judge

held that it was not safe to rely on the evidence of PW-1, more

so,  when  her  relations  with  the  husband  were  very  much

strained and, therefore,  the Trial  Court ought to have given

benefit  of  doubt  to  the  respondent  also  while  acquitting

accused A-2 to A-4.

18.Having gone through the depositions of PW-1 and  PW-3,

to which our attention was invited by learned counsel for the

State,  we  are  convinced  that  in  the  light  of  the  overall

evidence, analysed by the High Court, the order of acquittal of

the  respondent  is  well  merited  and  does  not  call  for

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interference,  particularly  when  the  First  Information  Report

was lodged by the complainant more than one month after the

alleged  incident  of  forcible  poisoning.   Time  and again,  the

object  and  importance  of  prompt  lodging  of  the  First

Information Report has been highlighted.  Delay in lodging the

First  Information  Report,  more  often  than  not,  results  in

embellishment  and  exaggeration,  which is  a  creature  of  an

afterthought.   A  delayed  report  not  only  gets  bereft  of  the

advantage  of  spontaneity,  the  danger  of  the  introduction  of

coloured  version,  exaggerated  account  of  the  incident  or  a

concocted story as a result of deliberations and consultations,

also  creeps  in,  casting  a  serious  doubt  on  its  veracity.

Therefore, it is essential that the delay in lodging the report

should be satisfactorily explained.

19.In  the  present  case,  as  noted  supra,  First  Information

Report in regard to the alleged occurrence on 19th April, 1996

was lodged on 22nd May, 1996.  Admittedly after her discharge

from the hospital on 22nd April, 1996, the complainant went to

her parents’ house and resided there.  In her testimony, the

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complainant has deposed that since no one from the family of

the accused came to enquire about her welfare, she decided to

lodge the First Information Report.  No explanation worth the

name for delay in filing the complaint with the police has come

on record.  We are of the opinion that this circumstance raises

considerable  doubt  regarding  the  genuineness  of  the

complaint and the veracity of the evidence of the complainant

(PW-1) and her father (PW-3), rendering it unsafe to base the

conviction of the respondent upon it.  Resultantly, when the

substratum of the evidence given by the complainant (PW-1) is

found to be unreliable, the prosecution case has to be rejected

in its entirety.

20.For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the

judgment of the High Court, acquitting the respondent, does

not suffer from any infirmity, warranting our interference.  The

appeal is devoid of any merit and is dismissed accordingly.  

………………………………………….J.     ( C.K. THAKKER)

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                              ..….…………………………………….J.     ( D.K. JAIN)

NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 24, 2008.

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