REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.1453 OF 2003

State of A.P. ….Appellant

Versus

Guvva Satyanarayana ….Respondent                

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge  in  this  appeal  is  to  the  judgment  of  the

Division Bench of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court  directing

acquittal  of  the  respondent  (hereinafter  called  as  the

‘accused’).  The accused was convicted for offence punishable

under Sections 302 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(in  short  ‘IPC’)  and  sentenced  to  RI  for  life  and  two  years

respectively  and  a  fine  with  default  stipulation  by  the  trial

Court.  

2. Two  charges  were  framed  against  the  respondent.

Firstly, it was alleged that the accused on 11.4.1994 at about

8.30  p.m.  subjected  his  wife  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the

‘deceased’)  to  cruelty  and  thereby  committed  the  offence

punishable under Section 498A.  Second charge was that he

had committed the murder of his wife by causing her death.

Accused pleaded innocence and, therefore, trial was held.       

3. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:

Smt.  Guvva  Renuka  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the

‘deceased’)  was married to the accused 7 years prior to her

death at Bhongir.  At the time of marriage, the accused was

presented cash of  Rs.5,000/-  and 3 tolas of  gold.   For one

year, their marriage life went on happily.  Thereafter, accused

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began to demand his wife to get Rs.5,000/- from her parents,

and she could not comply the said demand. He began to ill-

treating  and  harassing  her  physically  and  mentally.   In  a

panchayat,  he  was  also  admonished.  However,  he  did  not

mend  his  ways  and  he  was  beating  Renuka,  coming  fully

drunk.   On  11.4.1994  at  about  8.30  p.m.  the  accused

quarrelled with Renuka, doused her with kerosene and set her

on  fire.   At  9.15  p.m.  Renuka’s  paternal  uncle  Pittala

Anjaneyulu  (PW-1)  lodged  report  with  Bhongir  town  police,

and Y.  Venkat  Reddy,  Sub-Inspector  (PW-11)  registered  the

case.  He rushed to the house of the deceased and prepared

Ex.P.3 scene of offence panchanama in the presence of Indla

Ramesh  (PW-6)  and  another.   He   seized  5  litre  kerosene

empty  tin  M.O.I.   He  also  prepared  a  rough  sketch  of  the

place. Renuka was shifted to Government Hospital, Bhongir,

and from there to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad.

Sri  K.  Seetharam  Naidu,  XIII  Metropolitan  Magistrate,

Secunderabad  (PW-9),  recorded  the  dying  declaration  of

Renuka on the same night, in the presence of Dr. I. Bhaskara

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Raju  (PW-12),  Casuality  Medical  Officer,  Gandhi  Hospital,

Secunderabad.

Renuka  succumbed  to  injuries  at  2.30  p.m.  on

23.4.1994.   On  receiving  the  intimation  the  Sub-Inspector

(PW-11) requisitioned M.R.O. PW-8 to conduct inquest, and it

has  been  conducted  in  the  presence  of  PW-7  and  another

panch.  Ex.P.4 is the inquest panchnamma.

Dr. N. Dudaiah (PW-10) conducted autopsy over the dead

body  of  the  Renuka  and  issued  Ex.P.8  Post-mortem

examination report.

Charge sheet was filed in the Court of Additional Judicial

Magistrate, 1st Class, Bhongir, who committed the case to the

Court  of  Sessions,  Nalgonda.   The  I  Addl.  Sessions  Judge,

Nalgonda, framed charges under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC.

The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

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4. The  trial  Court  relied  on  the  dying  declaration

purportedly to have been made by the deceased and recorded

conviction as noted above.  In appeal, the High Court set aside

the  conviction.   The  High  Court  found  that  the  charge  in

respect  of  Section  302  IPC  rests  on  dying  declaration

purportedly to have been made by the deceased at 5.40 a.m.

on 12.4.1994.   Offence  had taken place  on 11.4.1994 at  9

p.m.  The  High  Court  found  that  the  accusations  so  far  as

Section  302  IPC  cannot  be  established  and  the  dying

declaration was not free from suspicion.  However, the charge

relatable to Section 498A was held to have been proved.  For

the same, sentence of two years RI imprisonment enhanced to

three years RI.  

5. In  support  of  the  appeal,  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant submitted that the High Court was not justified in

discarding  the  dying  declaration.   In  the  dying  declaration

deceased stated her husband poured kerosene on her and set

fire.  He intended to kill  her. On asking why he did so, she

stated that he had asked her to bring money from her house

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sometime and she stated that her mother was widow and was

not in a position to pay amount demanded.  As noted by the

High  Court,  the  first  information  report  was  given  on

11.4.1994 at 2115 hrs. i.e. immediately after the occurrence.

In  this  report  the  informant  had  stated  that  the  accused

demanded dowry from the deceased and was beating her.  On

the date of incident he was drunk and demanded additional

dowry.   Unable  to  bear  the  agony,  the  deceased  poured

kerosene  over  her  and  set  herself  ablaze.  In  the  first

information report, therefore, the allegation was that deceased

committed  suicide  by  setting  herself  on  fire  after  pouring

kerosene. When the complainant was examined as PW-1, he

accepted the contents of the report and stated that the report

was on the basis of the information heard, given by a boy but

no enquiry was made from the deceased.  He also could not

talk to her.  The boy who had given the information and what

was  the  source  of  information  was  not  known  to  him.  He

stated  that  the  deceased  was  unconscious  and  regained

consciousness only the next day around noon.  The mother of

the deceased accompanied the deceased to the hospital also

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claimed  that  the  deceased  was  unconscious  and  regained

consciousness only on the second day.  As rightly noted by the

High Court, this was contrary to the evidence on record. The

Magistrate purportedly recorded the dying declaration of the

deceased at 5.40 a.m. on 12.4.1994. That means the deceased

was conscious at 5.40 a.m. and doctor certified that she was

conscious and coherent.   

6. To add to the vulnerability,  Ex.P/12 was record of the

case maintained by the hospital. When the doctor examined

the deceased she was conscious.  The doctor noted that the

deceased had stated to have sustained burns around 9 p.m.

at her residence.  She was given some treatment and referred

to the resident medical officer.  Here again the doctor noted

that the deceased alleged to have sustained burns accidentally

at her residence. It was further noted that she was conscious

and  coherent.   It  is,  therefore,  established  that  she  was

conscious  when she  was  admitted  to  the  hospital  at  11.45

p.m. on 11.4.1994. If the accused had poured kerosene and

set  her  on  fire  she  would  have  stated  the  same  in  normal

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course to the doctor.  Therefore, the factors highlighted by the

High Court appear to be on sound footing.   

7. That being so, the order of the High Court does not suffer

from any infirmity to warrant interference.

8. The appeal is dismissed.                                

……..…………………..….…….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…….……………………………..J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi, September 24, 2008    

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