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PETITIONER: STATE BANK OF BIKANER & JAIPUR & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI PRABHU DAYAL GROVER

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/09/1995

BENCH: MUKHERJEE M.K. (J) BENCH: MUKHERJEE M.K. (J) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  320            1995 SCC  (6) 279  JT 1995 (7)   207        1995 SCALE  (5)574

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                              WITH                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.8739 OF 1995          (arising out of S.L.P. (C) NO.10790 of 1992) Prabhu Dayal Grover                            Versus State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur & Ors.                       J U D G M E N T M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.      Leave  granted.  Heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the parties.      While working as the Manager of the Ridmalsar Branch of the State  Bank of  Bikaner and  Jaipur (‘Bank’  for short), Prabhu  Dayal   Grover  (‘Grover’for  short)  was  proceeded against departmentally  for accepting bribe from one Maniram and removed  from service  on May  27, 1983.  As the  appeal preferred by  him before the Executive Committee of the Bank proved abortive he instituted a civil suit in the Additional Court of  the Munsif  at Jaipur  for a  declaration that the orders  passed   by  the   Disciplinary  Authority  and  the Appellate  Authority   were  illegal   and  void   and   for consequential reliefs. The trial Court decreed the suit with the following findings:      "i)   the   provisions   of   Regulation      68(2)(iii) of  the State Bank of Bikaner      and Jaipur Officers’ Service Regulations      1979 (‘Regulations’  for  short),  which      governed the  departmental  enquiry  had      been violated in as much no definite and      distinct charges had been framed against      the plaintiff  (Grover) and  he had been      punished on  the basis  of a  show cause      notice   only.    Even   statement    of      allegations had  not been  furnished  to      him;      ii) a  copy of  the enquiry  report  was

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    also not made available to Grover before      the order of removal was passed;      iii) the  Disciplinary Authority had not      applied its  mind,  before  passing  the      order of punishment and it merely agreed      with the findings of the Enquiry Officer      and      iv) the  Appellate  Authority  had  also      dismissed   the    Departmental   Appeal      without giving any reason."      The appeal  preferred by  the Bank against the judgment and  decree   of  the  trial  Court  was  dismissed  by  the Additional District  Judge, Jaipur  and the  above  findings were affirmed. The Appellate Court, however, granted liberty to the  Bank to  institute a fresh departmental enquiry with the stipulation  that the  liberty must  be exercised within two months.  The Bank then filed a second appeal in the High Court which was dismissed in limine. Grover also preferred a second appeal  assailing the  liberty granted to the Bank to hold a  fresh enquiry  which was also dismissed. Hence these two appeals,  one at  the instance of the Bank and the other by Grover.  Of them we first proceed to deal with the merits of the  former for  in case the same succeeds, the other has got to be dismissed.      Mr.  Altaf  Ahmad,  the  learned  Additional  Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Bank first contended that the finding of the trial Court that the order of removal was bad as  the report  of the Enquiry Officer was not furnished to Grover  before it was made, was liable to be set aside in view of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Managing  Director ECIL vs. B. Karunakar 1993 (4) SCC 727 wherein it  has been  held that  orders of punishment passed prior to  the date  on which  the decision in Union of India vs. Mohd.  Ramzan (1991)  1 SCC  588 was  made, that  is  on November 30, 1990 should not be disturbed for non-furnishing of the enquiry report and the disciplinary proceedings which gave rise  to such  orders should  not be  reopened on  that account. As  regards the  finding of the trial Court that no definite and  distinct charge had been framed against Grover and even  statement of allegations had not been furnished as required  under  Rule  68  of  the  Regulations,  Mr.  Ahmad contended that  the enquiry  was not and could not have been held under  the said Regulations as they came into effect on and from  April 30,  1980  that  is,  after  the  proceeding against Grover  was initiated.  According to  Mr. Ahmad, the enquiry in  question was  governed by  and held  strictly in accordance with  the procedure laid down by the Bikaner Unit of the  Bank in  its Circular  No.46 of  1961 dated March 6, 1961. He  drew our  attention to  the following paragraph of the circular:      "Before it  is  decided  to  dismiss  an      officer or  to  require  an  officer  to      resign from  the service or to reduce an      officer to  a lower grade for an offence      of which he has been found guilty, he be      called upon  to show  cause by such date      as be  fixed by  the General Manager why      such action  should not be taken against      him." to contend  that the  charge-sheet was  submitted  in  terms thereof He  next submitted  that even if it was assumed that the Regulations were applicable still the failure to furnish a statement  of allegations  in support  of the charge would not make  the enquiry,  and, for  that matter,  the order of punishment bad,  for along  with the  charge sheet a copy of

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the complaint  received from Maniram, and lists of witnesses and statements  and documents by which charges were proposed to be sustained were furnished to Grover. Besides, Mr. Ahmad submitted, at  no  stage  of  the  departmental  proceedings Grover asked  for the  statement of  allegations nor  did he raise any  grievance on  that  score  before  the  Appellate Authority which necessarily meant that he was not in any way prejudiced in  his defence  thereby. Regarding the other two findings of  the trial Court Mr. Ahmad’s submission was that the  orders  themselves  would  show  that  they  were  well reasoned and  speaking. This apart, Mr. Ahmad contended that when the  disciplinary authority  agreed with the finding of the Enquiry  Officer it  was not  necessary to  discuss  the evidence and  give reasons  for the  findings. In support of this contention  he relied  upon the judgments of this Court in Ram  Kumar vs.  State of  Haryana AIR  1987 SC 2043, S.N. Mukherjee vs.  Union of  India (1990) 4 SCC 594 and Som Datt vs. Union of India (1969) 2 SCR 177.      In responding  to the  above contentions  of Mr. Ahmad, Mr. Dutta  appearing for  Grover fairly conceded that he was unable to sustain the finding of the learned Courts below as regards the non-furnishing of the copy of the enquiry report in view  of the  judgment of this Court in ECIL (supra). He, however, strenuously  urged that  the other  findings of the trial Court  and the  Appellate Court  were unassailable. In elaborating his  contentions he  first  submitted  that  the departmental enquiry  in the  instant case could have been - and indeed was - held in accordance with the Regulations and as admittedly  the requirement  of Regulation 68(2)(iii) was not complied with, the departmental proceedings must be said to be  void ab  initio. To reinforce his submissions he drew our attention  to the  judgments of  this  Court  in  Surath Chandra vs. State of West Bengal AIR 1971 SC 752 and Kulwant Singh Gill  Vs. State  of Punjab  1991  Supp  (1)  SCC  504. Similarly,  he   contended,  in   view   of   this   Court’s pronouncements in Ram Chander vs. Union of India & Ors. 1986 (2) SCR  980, M.P. Industries vs. Union of India 1966(1) SCR 466, A.L.  Kalra vs.  The Project & Equipment Corporation of India Ltd.  1984 (3)  SCR 646  and R.P.  Bhatt vs.  Union of India &  Ors 1985  (Supp) 1  SCR  947,  the  orders  of  the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority could not be legally sustained as neither of them had given any reason for their respective decisions.      In the  context of the respective stands of the parties the first  and the  foremost question  that  falls  for  our determination is  whether any  charge-sheet was drawn up and served in accordance with the extant rules and, if not, what would be the effect thereof. To answer this question it will be necessary  to first  quote in  extenso the  letter  dated April 3, 1980 served by the Bank upon Grover which according to it was the charge-sheet. It reads as under:      "Shri P.D. Grover,      C/o Regional Manager Sectt.,      State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur,      Head Office,      JAIPUR.                          VI/36/C/1050                          3.4.1980      Dear Sir,      1. DISCIPLINARY ACTION:           The following  act of misconduct is      alleged to  have been  committed by  you      during your incumbency as Manager of our      Ridmalsar, one  man office,  during  the      year 1978:-

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         "You demanded  and accepted a bribe           of Rs.300/-  from Shri  Maniram for           issuing   a    demand   draft    of           Rs.48,000/- on  account of the loan           amount sanctioned in favour of Shri           Maniram and  his  father  Shri  Ram           Rakh  Bishnoi   for  purchasing   a           tractor."      2.   You have  thus acted  in  a  manner      prejudicial to the interests of the Bank      and  apparently   failed   to   maintain      absolute integrity  and devotion to duty      quite apart  from abusing  your official      position. The  explanations you  have so      far offered  to the  Central  Bureau  of      Investigation   in    respect   of   the      aforesaid    misconduct     are    found      unsatisfactory      and,      therefore,      unacceptable to us.      3.   List of  witnesses by whom and list      of documents  by which  the  charges  as      proposed to  be sustained  are  enclosed      along  with   copies  of   the  relevant      statements and documents.      4.   Please note  that  if  you  do  not      comply with  the rules or the directions      issued to  you or do not co-operate with      the  disciplinary   authority  or  bring      external or  political pressure  on  any      superior  authority   to  further   your      interests in  the proceedings,  you will      render  yourself   liable  for   further      disciplinary action.      5.   In terms  of  paragraph  2  of  our      Private  &   Confidential  Circular  No.      SBBJ/16/65 dated  23.6.1965, please show      cause  in   writing  within  7  days  of      receipt of  this letter why disciplinary      action be  not taken against you stating      clearly whether  the charge  is admitted      by you or denied.      Yours faithfully,           Sd/-      Managing Director."      From a  bare perusal  of the above letter it is evident that it complies with the requirement of the circular quoted earlier and,  therefore, if  the circular had been operating in the field at the material time to govern the departmental proceedings  relating  to  the  Officers  of  the  bank,  as contended by  it, the finding of the learned Courts below in this regard  has got  to be  set aside. But then, as noticed earlier,  the   learned  Courts   below   found   that   the departmental enquiry  was, to be held in accordance with the Regulations. We  need not,  however, delve into the question as to  whether the above finding is correct or not, for even if we  proceed on  the  basis  thereof  we  reach  the  same conclusion.      Regulation 68  (2) (iii)  provides  that  where  it  is proposed to hold an enquiry the Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite  and distinctive  charges on the basis of the allegations against  the Officer and the articles of charge, together with  a statement  of the allegations on which they are based,  shall be communicated in writing to the Officer. Needless to say, the above Regulation seeks to fulfil one of the basic  postulates of the rules of natural justice that a

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fair, adequate  and reasonable  opportunity of  being  heard should be  given to  the person  arraigned which, obviously, would not  be possible unless he is specifically told of the accusations levelled  against him.  Judged in that light, we are unable  to hold,  in the facts of the instant case, that Grover was  not so  told. Of course, it may be said that the letter communicating  the  accusation  made  against  Grover which  we   have  reproduced   above  does  not  answer  the description of  a ‘formal chargesheet’ but then the contents thereof specifically  disclose the  charge levelled  against him, namely,  that of accepting a bribe of Rs.300/- from Sri Maniram in  the year  1978 for  issuing a  demand  draft  in favour of  him and  his father. It may also be said that the exact date  of acceptance of bribe was not disclosed therein but then  along with  the letter  was enclosed a copy of the complaint received  from Maniram  which not  only  discloses that date but also satisfied the requirement of a ‘statement of allegations’  envisaged in  Regulation 68 in that all the details regarding  the demand  and acceptance  of the  bribe have been  stated. It cannot, therefore, be said that Grover was not  fully apprised  of the  accusation levelled against him to  enable him  to effectively  reply thereto.  In other words,  the   provisions  of   the  Regulation   have   been substantially  complied  with,  though  not  formally.  This conclusion of  ours is strengthened by Grover’s reply to the chargesheet which clearly indicates that he fully understood the charge levelled against him. It reads as under:      "The Managing Director,      State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur,      Head Office,      Jaipur.      Dear Sir,           (THROUGH PROPER CHANNEL)      "DISCIPLINARY ACTION:           With reference  to your  letter no.      VI/36/C/1050 of  the  3rd  instant,  the      allegations made  in the charge sheet is      false and  is denied. Had there been any      truth or  substance in  the  allegation,      the  CBI,   the  highest   investigating      agency in the country by whom the matter      had  been   investigated,   would   have      registered a  suitable case  against me.      There is, therefore, no justification in      conducting departmental  enquiry against      me. I  request you  to kindly  drop  the      disciplinary action  against me  to meet      the ends of natural justice.                          Yours faithfully,                          Sd/- 14.4.1980                          (P.D. GROVER)                          Officer, Grade II"      While on  this point, it need also be stated that at no point of  time during  the departmental proceeding or before the Appellate  Authority  did  Grover  raise  any  objection regarding non  furnishing of  the statement  of  allegations much less that he was prejudiced thereby.      We may  now advert our attention to the cases of Surath Chandra (supra) and Kulwant Singh (supra) on which Mr. Dutta strongly relied  to contend that in case of disregard of any statutory rule  relating to holding of an enquiry the entire proceeding was  liable to  be quashed.  In Surath  Chandra’s case the  appellant,  who  was  an  employee  of  the  State Government, had received a communication containing a number of charges  but no  statement of  allegations on which those

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charges were  based was sent to him. In replying thereto the appellant stated, in categorical terms, that the charges and allegations were  vague, indefinite  and lacking in material particulars and  pointed out  that "unless  the charges  are made specific  to the  point and  contain full  details with date, time,  place and  person etc. it is impossible for him to meet  them properly".  Without complying  with  his  such request  the   Disciplinary  Authority  continued  with  the enquiry  proceeding  and  ultimately  he  was  removed  from service. Aggrieved thereby he filed a suit in the High Court and in  paragraph 19  of the  plaint he specifically alleged that the  enquiry was  vitiated because  under the rules and procedure for  holding such an enquiry he was entitled to be furnished  with   definite  charges   but  the  charges  and allegations made  against him  were  vague,  indefinite  and lacking in  material particulars  and in  spite of  repeated requests those  were  neither  made  specific  nor  material particulars  like   date,  time,   place  and  persons  were supplied. A  learned Single Judge of the Court who tried the suit found  that no  particulars and other necessary details were given  in the  charges and they were vague resulting in non-compliance  with   Rule  55   of  the   Civil   Services (Classification, Control  and Appeal)  Rules  and  that  the necessary particulars were not supplied in spite of repeated objections of  the appellant  to the charges being vague and indefinite. On  the above  and other  findings  the  learned Single Judge  decreed the  suit of  the appellant. In appeal the Division  Bench set  aside the  findings of  the learned Single  Judge   and  dismissed   the  suit   but  granted  a certificate  to  move  this  Court.  In  setting  aside  the judgment of  the Division  Bench this  Court first  observed that if  a person  was not  told clearly and definitely what the allegations  were on which the charges preferred against him were  founded, he  could not  possibly by projecting his own imagination,  discover all  the facts  and circumstances that might  be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against  him. This  Court further  observed that the whole  object of furnishing the statement of allegations was to  give all the necessary particulars and details which would  satisfy   the  requirement  of  giving  a  reasonable opportunity to  put up  defence. The  Court then illustrated the utter  vagueness of  the charges  levelled  against  the appellant therein  by referring to one of them and the reply of the  appellant thereto.  On such  consideration the Court held that each charge was so bare that it was not capable of being intelligently  understood  and  was  not  sufficiently definite to  furnish materials  to the  appellant to  defend himself. In  the context  of the  above facts the Court then observed that  the whole  object of furnishing the statement of allegations under Fundamental Rule 55 was to give all the necessary particulars  and details  which would  satisfy the requirement of  giving a  reasonable opportunity  to put  up defence. The Court lastly concluded:-      The entire  proceedings show  a complete      disregard of  Fundamental Rule  55 in so      far as  it lays down in almost mandatory      terms   that   the   charges   must   be      accompanied   by    a    statement    of      allegations. We  have no manner of doubt      that the  appellant was  denied a proper      and reasonable  opportunity of defending      himself by  reason of  the charges being      altogether vague  and indefinite and the      statement of  allegations containing the      material  facts   and  particulars   not

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    having been  supplied to  him.  In  this      situation, for  the above  reason alone,      the trial  Judge was  fully justified in      decreeing the suit." From the  above resume  it is  evident that in setting aside the order  of removal this Court was influenced primarily by the facts that the charges were totally vague and indefinite and that in spite of repeated requests made the disciplinary authority did  not furnish  the detailed particulars thereby depriving him  of his legitimate right to defend himself. It is in  resulting in non-compliance with Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules and that the necessary  particulars were  not supplied  in  spite  of repeated objections  of the  appellant to  the charges being vague and  indefinite. On  the above  and other findings the learned Single  Judge decreed  the suit of the appellant. In appeal the  Division Bench  set aside  the findings  of  the learned Single  Judge and  dismissed the  suit but granted a certificate  to  move  this  Court.  In  setting  aside  the judgment of  the Division  Bench this  Court first  observed that if  a person  was not  told clearly and definitely what the allegations  were on which the charges preferred against him were  founded, he  could not  possibly by projecting his own imagination,  discover all  the facts  and circumstances that might  be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against  him. This  Court further  observed that the whole  object of furnishing the statement of allegations was to  give all the necessary particulars and details which would  satisfy   the  requirement  of  giving  a  reasonable opportunity to  put up  defence. The  Court then illustrated the utter  vagueness of  the charges  levelled  against  the appellant therein  by referring to one of them and the reply of the  appellant thereto.  On such  consideration the Court held that each charge was so bare that it was not capable of being intelligently  understood  and  was  not  sufficiently definite to  furnish materials  to the  appellant to  defend himself. In  the context  of the  above facts the Court then observed that  the whole  object of furnishing the statement of allegations under Fundamental Rule 55 was to give all the necessary particulars  and details  which would  satisfy the requirement of  giving a  reasonable opportunity  to put  up defence. The Court lastly concluded:-      The entire  proceedings show  a complete      disregard of  Fundamental Rule  55 in so      far as  it lays down in almost mandatory      terms   that   the   charges   must   be      accompanied   by    a    statement    of      allegations. We  have no manner of doubt      that the  appellant was  denied a proper      and reasonable  opportunity of defending      himself by  reason of  the charges being      altogether vague  and indefinite and the      statement of  allegations containing the      material  facts   and  particulars   not      having been  supplied to  him.  In  this      situation, for  the above  reason alone,      the trial  Judge was  fully justified in      decreeing the suit." From the  above resume  it is  evident that in setting aside the order  of removal this Court was influenced primarily by the facts that the charges were totally vague and indefinite and that in spite of repeated requests made the disciplinary authority  did   not  furnish  the  deliquent  the  detailed particulars thereby depriving him of his legitimate right to defend himself.  It is  in that  context that the Court laid

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emphasis upon the requirement of furnishing the statement of allegations in  Fundamental Rule  55; but  it cannot be said that this Court laid down, as an abstract proposition of law in Surath  Chandra’s case that whenever there is a breach of any statutory  rule in  conducting a departmental enquiry it will render  the entire  proceeding bad, irrespective of the nature of the breach, as contended by Mr. Dutta.      In Kulwant  Singh’s case (supra) the question that fell for determination  by this  Court was whether an employee of the Government  of Punjab, whose service was governed by the Punjab Civil  Service (Punishment  and Appeal)  Rules,  1970 could be  visited with  a major  penalty without  holding  a regular enquiry in accordance with those Rules. The question arose in  the context of the fact that the major penalty was imposed solely  on the  ground that  the explanation  to the charge-sheet was  unsatisfactory. In  answering the question in favour  of the  employee this  Court held that if a minor penalty as  envisaged under  the Rules  was only  imposed  a regular enquiry  was not required to be gone into but as the impugned order was a major penalty a regular enquiry had got to be  held. Evidently, the above principle has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case.      Now that we have found that the departmental proceeding cannot be  faulted for purported breach of Regulation 68 (2) (iii), we have next to ascertain whether the findings of the learned  Courts   below  regarding   the   orders   of   the Disciplinary Authority  and the  Appellate Authority  can be sustained or  not. Before  considering them  in the light of their factual contents, it will be apposite to look into the law laid  down by this Court regarding furnishing of reasons by administrative  authorities for its decisions. As earlier noticed, the  learned counsel  for the parties referred to a number of  decisions of  this Court  on the  subject, but to avoid  prolixity  we  would  only  refer  to  that  in  S.N. Mukherjee’s  case   (supra),  as   it  was   rendered  by  a Constitution  Bench  of  five  Judges.  In  that  case,  the following two questions fell for determination:-      "(i) Is there  any general  principle of      law  which  requires  an  administrative      authority to  record the reasons for its      decision; and      (ii) If  so,  does  the  said  principle      apply  to   an  order   confirming   the      findings and sentence of a Court martial      and post-confirmation  proceedings under      the Act?" After referring  to the  earlier decisions of this Court and the relevant  law prevalent  in other  countries, this Court answered the first question-with which we are only concerned in these appeals as under:-      "For the  reasons aforesaid,  it must be      concluded that except in cases where the      requirement  has   been  dispensed  with      expressly or  by necessary  implication,      an administrative  authority  exercising      judicial or  quasi-judicial functions is      required to  record the  reasons for its      decision."      In view  of the  answer so given, it has to be now seen whether under the Regulations, the concerned authorities are required to  give reasons  for their  decisions.  Regulation 68(3) lays  down the procedure the Disciplinary Authority is required to  follow after it receives the proceedings of the enquiry including  the report  of the  Enquiry  Officer.  On careful perusal  thereof we  find that  only in  those cases

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where the  Disciplinary Authority  considers it necessary to direct fresh  or  further  enquiry  or  disagrees  with  the findings of  the Enquiry  Officer,  it  has  to  record  the reasons for  its such  directions,  but  there  is  no  such obligation if  it agrees  with the  findings of  the Enquiry Officer. It  can, therefore,  be legitimately  inferred that when express  provisions have  been made  in the Regulations for recording  reasons in  only the  first two  of the three fact situations  - and  not the  other - there is no implied obligation also to record the reasons in case of concurrence with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Even if we proceed on the  basis that such an obligation is implicit, still the order of the Disciplinary Authority cannot be held to be bad as, on  perusal thereof, we find that before concurring with the findings  of the Enquiry Officer it has gone through the entire proceeding  and applied  its  mind  thereto.  In  our considered opinion,  when the  Dispilinary Authority  agrees with the  findings of  the Enquiry  Officer and  accepts the reasons given  by him in support of such findings, it is not necessary for  the punishing  authority to  re-appraise  the evidence to  arrive at the same findings. We are, therefore, unable to  accept the contention of Mr. Dutta that the order of punishment  was liable to be struck down as it was a non- speaking order and did not contain any reason.      That brings us to the order of the Appellate Authority. Under Regulation  70(2), the Appellate Authority is required to  consider  whether  the  findings  recorded  against  the concerned officer  are justified  and/or whether the penalty is excessive  or  inadequate  and  pass  appropriate  orders confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting  the case  to the  authority which  imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such directions as it deems fit  in the circumstances of the case. This Regulation also does  not obligate  the Appellate Authority to give any reasons  for   its  order.   Assuming,  that   by  necessary implication this  Regulation  also  requires  the  Appellate Authority to  give the  reasons, still  its order  cannot be invalidated,  as   we  find   that  it  has  discharged  its obligation  by   considering  the  records  and  proceedings pertaining to  the disciplinary  action and  the submissions made  by   Grover.  In   other  words,   the  order  clearly demonstrates that  the Appellate  Authority had  applied its mind not  only to  the proceedings  of the enquiry, but also the grounds  raised by  Grover in  his appeal  and  on  such application found that there was no substance in the appeal.      On the conclusions as above, we allow the appeal of the Bank and  dismiss the  Writ Petition  filed by Grover in the High Court.  Consequently, the appeal filed by Grover stands dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.