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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  359 of 2004

PETITIONER: IP,Vigilance & Anti-Corruption,Tiruchirapalli  

RESPONDENT: V. Jayapaul

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/03/2004

BENCH: RUMA PAL & P. VENKATARAMA REDDI.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 426 of 2002)

P.VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.

Leave granted.

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the  criminal proceedings on the ground that the police officer,  who laid/recorded the FIR regarding the suspected  commission of certain cognizable offences by the respondent  should not have investigated the case and submitted the  final report?  That is the  question which arises for  consideration in this appeal filed by the State. On 9.9.1996, the Inspector of Police (Vigilance & Anti-  Corruption), Tirucharapalli on the basis of the information  received that the respondent-accused was indulging in  corrupt practices by extracting money from the drivers and  owners of the motor vehicles while conducting check of the  vehicles and making use of certain bogus notice forms in the  process, prepared the First Information Report, registered  the crime under Sections 420, 201 IPC and Section 13(2)  read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption  Act.  A copy of the FIR  was submitted to the Court of CJM- cum-Special Judge, Tirucharapalli.  He then proceeded to  take up investigation, gathered information, examined the  witnesses and filed the charge-sheet in the Court together  with a list of documents including the police notice books  and hand-writing experts’ reports. The respondent was  implicated for the offences under Sections 465, 468 IPC and  Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act.  The  respondent-accused then moved the High Court of Madras to  quash  the proceedings.  The learned Judge of the High  Court, relying on the decision of this Court in Megha Singh   vs. State of Haryana  [(1996) 11 SCC  709] and two other  decisions of the Madras High Court, allowed the application  and quashed the proceedings. This is what the learned  Judge observed: "In view of the consistent rulings of the Supreme  Court and of this Court, I am obliged to hold that  the very same police officer who registered the  case by lodging a first information ought not to  have investigated the case and that itself had  caused prejudice to the accused. "

We have no hesitation in holding that the approach of  the High  Court  is erroneous and its conclusion legally

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unsustainable.  There is nothing in the provisions of the  Criminal Procedure Code which precluded the appellant  (Inspector of Police, Vigilance) from taking up the  investigation.  The fact that the said police officer prepared  the FIR on the basis of the information received by him and  registered the suspected crime does not, in our view,  disqualify him from taking up the investigation of the  cognizable offence.  A suo motu  move on the part of the  police officer to investigate a cognizable offence impelled by  the information received from some sources is not outside  the purview of the provisions contained in Sections 154 to  157  of the Code or any other provisions of the Code. The  scheme of Sections 154,156 and 157 was clarified thus by  Subba Rao, J. speaking for the Court in  State of U.P.  vs.   Bhagwant Kishore  [AIR 1964 SC 221].  "Section 154 of the Code prescribes the  mode of recording the information  received orally or in writing by an officer  in charge of a police station  in respect  of the commission of a cognizable  offence.  Section 156 thereof authorizes  such an officer to investigate any  cognizable offence prescribed therein.   Though ordinarily investigation is  undertaken on information received by a  police officer, the receipt of information  is not a condition precedent for  investigation.  Section 157 prescribes  the procedure in the matter of such an  investigation which can be initiated  either on information or otherwise.  It is  clear from the said provisions that an  officer in charge of a police station can  start investigation either on information  or otherwise."  

In fact, neither the High Court found nor any argument  was addressed to the effect that there is a statutory bar  against the police officer who registered the FIR on the basis  of the information received taking up the investigation. Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on  which the High Court quashed the proceedings was that the  investigation by the same officer who ’lodged’ the FIR would  prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating officer  cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no  principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the  competent police officer, on the basis of information  received, makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the  informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such  investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or  real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer.  The question of bias would depend on the facts and  circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down  a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which  it has been done by the High Court, that whenever a police  officer proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR on  his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or  biased. In the present case, the police officer received  certain discreet information, which, according to his  assessment, warranted a probe and therefore made up his  mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the FIR in  which he records the factum of having received the  information about the suspected commission of the offence  and then taking up the investigation after registering the  crime, does not, by any semblance of reasoning, vitiate the

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investigation on the ground of bias or the like factor. If the  reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground  to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation  conferred on the police officers would be unduly hampered  for no good reason. What is expected to be done by the  police officers in the normal course of discharge of their  official duties will then be vulnerable to attack. There are two decisions of this Court from which  support was drawn in this case and in some other cases  referred to by the High Court. We would like to refer to  these two decisions in some detail. The first one is the case  of Bhagwan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1976 SC  985). There, the Head Constable to whom the offer of bribe  was allegedly made, seized the currency notes and gave the  first information report. Thereafter, he himself took up the  investigation. But, later on, when it came to his notice that  he was not authorized to do so, he forwarded the papers to  the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The DSP then  reinvestigated the case and filed the charge sheet against  the accused. The Head Constable and the accompanying  Constables were the only witnesses in that case. This Court  found several circumstances which cast a doubt on the  veracity of the version of the Head Constable and his  colleagues. This Court observed that "the entire story  sounds unnatural". While so holding, this Court referred to  "a rather disturbing feature of the case" and it was pointed  out that "Head Constable Ram Singh was the person to  whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been made by  the appellant and he was the informant or complainant who  lodged the first information report for taking action against  the appellant. It is difficult to understand how in these  circumstances, Head Constable Ram Singh could undertake  investigation?\005.. This is an infirmity which is bound to  reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case". It is not clear as to why the Court was called upon to  make the comments against the propriety of the Head  Constable\027informant investigating the case when the  reinvestigation was done by the Deputy Superintendent of  Police. Be that as it may, it is possible to hold on the basis of  the facts noted above, that the so called investigation by the  Head Constable himself would be a mere ritual. The crime  itself was directed towards the Head Constable which made  him lodge the FIR. It is well nigh impossible to expect an  objective and undetached investigation from the Head  Constable who is called upon to check his own version on  which the prosecution case solely rests. It was under those  circumstances the Court observed that the said infirmity "is  bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case".  There can be no doubt that the facts of the present case are  entirely different and the dicta laid down therein does not fit  into the facts of this case. Now, we may turn our attention to the case of Megha  Singh Vs. State of Haryana [(1996) 11 SCC 709] on  which reliance was placed by the High Court. In Megha Singh’s case,  PW3, the Head Constable,  found a country-made pistol and live cartridges on search of  the person of the accused.  Then, he seized the articles,  prepared a recovery memo and a ’rukka’ on the basis of  which FIR was recorded by the S.I. of police. However,  P.W.3\027the Head Constable himself, for reasons  unexplained, proceeded to investigate and record the  statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The  substratum of the prosecution case was sought to be proved  by the Head Constable. In the appeal against conviction  under Section 25 of the Arms Act and Section 6(1) of the

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TADA Act, this Court found that the evidence of PWs 2 & 3  was discrepant and unreliable and in the absence of  independent corroboration, the prosecution case cannot be  believed. Towards the end, the Court noted "another  disturbing feature in the case". The Court then observed: "PW 3, Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the  accused and on search being conducted by him a  pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the  accused. It was on his complaint a formal first  information report was lodged and the case was  initiated. He being complainant should not have  proceeded with the investigation of the case. But  it appears to us that he was not only the  complainant in the case but he carried on with the  investigation and examined witnesses under  Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such practice, to say the  least, should not be resorted to so that there may  not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial  investigation".

The conviction was set aside by this Court for the  above reasons. At first blush, the observations quoted above might  convey the impression that the Court laid down a proposition   that a Police Officer who in the course of discharge of his  duties finds certain incriminating material to connect a  person to the crime, shall not undertake further  investigation if the FIR was recorded on the basis of the  information furnished by him. On closer analysis of the  decision, we do not think that any such broad proposition  was laid down in that case. While appreciating the evidence  of the main witness, i.e., the Head Constable (PW3), this  Court referred to this additional factor\027namely, the Head  Constable turning out to be the investigator.  In fact, there  was no apparent reason why the Head Constable proceeded  to investigate the case bypassing the Sub-Inspector who  recorded the FIR. The fact situation in the present case is  entirely different. The appellant\027Inspector of Police, after  receiving information from some sources, proceeded to  investigate and unearth the crime. Before he did so, he did  not have personal knowledge of the suspected offences nor  did he participate in any operations connected with the  offences. His role was that of investigator\027pure and simple.  That is the obvious distinction in this case. That apart, the  question of testing the veracity of the evidence of any  witness, as was done in Megha Singh’s case, does not arise  in the instant case as the trial is yet to take place. The High  Court has quashed the proceedings even before the trial  commenced. Viewed from any angle, we see no illegality in the  process of investigation set in motion by the Inspector of  Police (appellant) and his action in submitting the final  report to the Court of Special Judge. In the written submissions filed after the conclusion of  hearing, it is contended that the Inspector of Police had no  jurisdiction to investigate the offence under the Prevention  of Corruption Act without the order of a Magistrate  of 1st   Class and it was only the Deputy Superintendent of Police  who was competent to investigate.  Section 17 of the  Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 has been adverted to in  this connection.  That is not the ground which was urged  before the High Court or even in the SLP or in the  arguments advanced at the time of hearing. It is not even  the case of the Respondent-accused that the Inspector of  Police (Vigilance & Anti-Corruption) has not been authorized

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under the proviso to Section 17. We are therefore not  inclined to deal with that question in this appeal. In the result the impugned order of the High Court is  set aside and the appeal is allowed. No costs.