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PETITIONER: SRIRAM PASRICHA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JAGANNATH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/08/1976

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2335            1977 SCR  (1) 395  1976 SCC  (4) 184  CITATOR INFO :  R          1977 SC1599  (7)  R          1978 SC 835  (2)  F          1982 SC  25  (7)  C          1991 SC1966  (2)

ACT:             Indian  Evidence Act 1872 Sec. 116--Whether  tenant  can         deny the landlord’s title.             West    Bengal   Premises   Tenancy    Act    1956--Sec.         13(1)(f)--Whether  one of the co-owners can file a suit  for         eviction  without impleading other co-owners--Whether a  co-         owner,  an owner for the purpose of an eviction  suit--Stage         for raising objection about frame of suit.

HEADNOTE:             The plaintiff respondent is one of the co-owners of  the         premises  which  were let out to the appellant  tenant.  The         plaintiff filed a suit for eviction under s. 13(1)(f) of the         West  Bengal  Premises Tenancy Act 1956.   The  grounds  for         eviction were the non-payment of the rent and the reasonable         requirement  of  the premises for the landlord.   The  trial         court held that the plaintiff being only a co-sharer  cannot         be  said to be the owner within the meaning of s.  13(1)(f).         The trial court, however, held that the plaintiff  succeeded         in  proving  the reasonableness of the  requirement  of  the         members  of the family for whose benefit the  premises  were         held  by him and, therefore, granted a decree for  eviction.         An  appeal  filed by the appellants failed.  In  the  second         appeal  filed  by the appellants it was contended  that  al-         though  reasonable requirement of the premises  were  estab-         lished,  the  respondent was not entitled to  a  decree  for         eviction  since he was only a co-sharer and, therefore,  not         the  owner  of the premises.  The single Judge of  the  High         Court held that it will not be sufficient if the  reasonable         requirement  is of all the members of the family of the  co-         owners but such owners must again be the landlords who  only         are  entitled  to a decree for recovery  of  the  possession         under s. 13(1)(f).  A Division Bench set aside the  decision         of the Single Judge on the ground that a co-owner is as much         as  absolute  owner as a sole owner.  In appeal  by  special         leave, the appellant contended:

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             A landlord to be able to evict a tenant under  Section         13(1)(f)  must  be an absolute owner of  the  premises  from         which eviction is sought.         Dismissing the appeal,             HELD: The contention of the appellant that the co-sharer         plaintiff  must be the absolute owner and a co-owner  cannot         without  impleading all the owners of the premises  ask  for         eviction  cannot be accepted because the plea pertaining  to         the domain of the frame of the suit should have been  raised         at the earliest opportunity and it was not done.   Secondly,         the relation between the parties being that of landlord  and         tenant  only  the landlord could terminate the  tenancy  and         institute the suit for eviction.  The tenant in such a  suit         is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under         s.  116  of the Evidence Act.  Under the general law,  in  a         suit between the landlord and tenant, the question of  title         to the lease property is irrelevant. The plaintiff is one of         the  co-owners of the premises.  The other co-sharers  being         his mother and married brother who reside in the same  prem-         ises  along with him.  Jurisprudentially, it is not  correct         to  say that a co-owner of a property is not an  owner.   He         owns every part of the composite property along with  others         and  it  cannot be said that he is only a part  owner  or  a         fractional owner of the property.  The position will  change         when partition takes place.  It is, therefore, not  possible         to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admitted-         ly  the  landlord and co-owner of the premises  is  not  the         owner of the premises within the meaning  of  s.   13(1)(f).         [399 A--C. 401 B & 402 A-B]             Bollye Satee and Anr. v. Akram Ally and Anr. [1879]  ILR         (4)  Calcutta 961; Kattusheri Pishareth Kanna  Pisharody  v.         Vallotil Manakel Narayan Somayajipad and Ors., [1878] 81 ILR         (3) Madras 234; Balkrishna Sakharam v. Moro Krishna         396         Dabholkar [1897] ILR (21) Bombay 154; and Dwarka Nath Mitter         and Ors. v. Tara Prosunna Roy & Ors. [1890J/LR (27) Calcutta         160, distinguished.             Mclntyre and Anr. v. Hardcctstle; [1848] (1) All England         Law Reports 696; followed.             Kanika Devi and Ors. v. Amarendra Nath Roy Choudhury and         Ors; 65 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1078; Tarak Chandra  Mukherjee         v. Ralanlal Ghosal; 1959 CLJ 136; Taherbhai Hebtullabhai and         Anr.  v. Ambalal Harilal Shah and Anr.; 1966(7) Gujarat  963         LLR;  and Deb Ranjan Chatterjee v. Swarnarani Biswas &  Anr.         78 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1034; approved.             Nanalal  Girdharlal  and Anr. v.  Gulamnablti  Jamalbhai         Motorwala and Ors. A.I.R. 1973 Gujarat 131; distinguished.

JUDGMENT:             CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal  No.   1223         1975.             From the Judgment and Order dated 4-3-75 of the Calcutta         High Court in I.,.P.A. No. 74/74.         V.N. Tarkunde, and H.K. Puri, for the appellant.             V  S.  Desai, 1). N. Mukherjee and N.R.  Choudhary,  for         respondent No. I.         A.K. Sen and 5. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 2.          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             GOSWAMI, J.  This is an appeal by  the  defendant-tenant         by certificate from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court.         The question that arises for decision is whether a  landlord         who is a co-owner of the premises with others is "the owner"         within the  meaning  of section 13(1)(f) of the West  Bengal

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       Premises  Tenancy   Act,  1956 (briefly the Act).   It  will         turn  on the interpretation of the expression "if he is  the         owner" under section 13(1 )(f) of the Act.         Briefly the facts are as follows :--             The plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter to be referred  to         as the plaintiff)  is  admittedly  the  landlord of one late         Bhagat  Ram Pasricha predecessor-in-interest of the  present         appellant  and  respondents 2 and 3 (hereinafter to  be  re-         ferred to as the defendants).  The tenancy was in respect of         a  part of the premises No. 221/1, Rash Behari Avenue,  Cal-         cutta,  being the entire second floor of the building.   The         tenancy commenced some time in 1946 and Bhagat Ram  Pasricha         promised  to vacate the said premises within March 31,  1947         and  positively after March 31, 1948.  Bhagat Ram  Pasricha,         however,  did   not vacate and died on  February  18,  1960,         leaving  behind the defendants as his heirs.  The  plaintiff         is only a co-sharer owner of the suit premises being one  of         the  heirs of his father late Motilal Sen   who,  originally         owned the property.             The  plaintiff  instituted a .suit for eviction  of  the         defendants  in December 1962 on the twin pleas of default in         payment of rent  and reasonable  requirement  of  the  prem-         ises   for  his    own  occupation  as  well   as   for  the         occupation   of   the      members   of the   joint   family         consisting  of  his  mother  and  his married brother.   The         suit  was  contested  by the defendants.   The  trial  court         decreed  the suit on both the grounds.  On the  question  of         reasonable         397         requirement  the trial court held that the  plaintiff  being         only   a   co-sharer owner cannot be said to  be  the  owner         within  the  meaning of  section 13(1)(1) of the  Act.   The         trial  court, however, held that the plaintiff succeeded  in         proving the case of reasonable requirement of the members of         the  family  "for whose benefit the premises  were  held  by         him"  within the meaning of  the  second  part  of   section         13(1) (f).             On  appeal by the defendants the lower  appellate  court         did  not accept the plea of default but affirmed the finding         of   reasonable requirement although the learned  Judge  was         not  specific as to which the two material parts of  section         13(1)(f) would  govern  the case.              In  the  second  appeal by the  defendants  before  the         learned  single  Judge  of the High Court  the  question  of         factual  existence of reasonable requirement was  not   dis-         puted.  It was, however, contended before the learned single         Judge that even though  the  actual  reasonable  requirement         of  the  premises was established the  plaintiff   was   not         entitled to a decree for eviction being only a co-sharer and         as such not "the owner" of the premises within the   meaning         of  section 13(1) (f).  It was submitted that a co-owner was         only a part-owner and was not entitled to an order of  evic-         tion under section 13(1)(f) of the Act.  The learned  single         Judge  accepted the contention  of the defendants  and  dis-         missed the suit observing :--         "it will not be sufficient if the reasonable requirement  is         of all members, of the family of the co-owners but such  co-         owners  must again be the landlords who only  are       made         entitled to a decree for recovery of the  possession   under         section 13 (1) (f).            In  the letters patent appeal before the  Division  Bench         the  High Court did not agree with the single judge and  set         aside  the decision and decreed the suit for eviction.   The         ’Division Bench held:             In  our opinion a co-owner is as much an absolute  owner

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       as a sole owner is with reference to the interest  held   by         him".              Mr.  Tarkunde, the learned counsel appearing on  behalf         of  the appellant submits that the decision of the  Division         Bench  is erroneous   and we should accept the views of  the         single  Judge.  He  submits  that a landlord in order to  be         able  to evict a tenant under  section 13(1)(f) must  be  an         absolute  owner  of  the premises from   which  eviction  is         sought.  A co-owner landlord without impleading all the own-         ers  of the premises is not entitled to ask   for   eviction         under  section 13 (1)(f) of the Act.  Mr. A.K. Sen, who  ap-         pears  on behalf  of the sisters of the appellant  (respond-         ents  2  and 3) also emphasised upon this part of  the  case         while adopting the  arguments  of    Mr. Tarkunde.              Mr. Desai, on the other hand. contests this proposition         and      submits that the decision of the Division Bench  is         correct.         398             Mr.  Tarkunde referred to certain decisions  in  support         of  the submission that a suit by one of the co-sharers  for         eviction  of  a tenant has always been held to  be  incompe-         tent.  Counsel  relied upon  the  decision  in Bollye  Satee         and another v. Akram, Ally and other. C)  This was a case in         which it was held that a lessee of a jalkar cannot be eject-         ed by a suit brought by one only of the several  proprietors         all of whom had granted the lease.  This case, with its  own         facts, is, therefore, of no aid in the present controversy.             In  Kattusheri Pishareth Kanna Pisharody   v.   Vallotil         Manakel  Narayanan Somayajipad and others,(2) the  suit  was         brought  by  the  plaintiffs on  behalf  of  an  association         (sabha)  to recover certain lands demised by the sabha.   It         was  held  that  all the co-owners must join in  a  suit  to         recover  property  unless the law otherwise  provides.  This         decision will again be of no assistance to the appellant.           In Balakrishna Sakharatm v. Moro Krishna Dabholkar(3)   it         was a case of one of the co-sharer-jagirdars who as a manag-         er  filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 99/- being the  balance         due   to  him  on account of the highest rate of  assessment         for  the  three  years preceding the  suit.   The  defendant         disputed the plaintiff’s right to demand the highest rate of         assessment     and    contended    that    the     plaintiff         had no right to sue alone as he and his co-sharers owned the         jagir and the defendant cultivated the land in that  village         by paying the jagirdars something less than the full assess-         ment prior to the years in the suit. It was in that  context         that     the     following    observation     appears     in         the judgment which is relied upon by counsel:                      "We  must, therefore, treat it as  settled  law                  that  a  co-sharer  who is manager  even  with  the                  consent of his co-sharers can   not maintain a suit                  by  himself  and  in his own  name   to    eject  a                  tenant  who has failed to comply with    a   notice                  calling on him to pay enhanced rent".         This  proposition of law also purports to be in  line   with         the  two earlier decisions relied upon by counsel and is  of         little aid to him.             In  Dwarka Nath Mitter and others vs. Tara Prosunna  Roy         and  others,(4)  the objection of the defendant was  to  the         form of the suit and it was pressed from the very  commence-         ment  by the  defendant. This was a suit by  the  plaintiffs         for  balance of arrears of rent making other  co-sharers  as         defendants.   The court held  that  unless   the  co-sharers         had  refused  to  join in the suit or  had  otherwise  acted         prejudicially  to  their interests the plaintiffs  were  not         entitled  to sue alone. In this view of the matter the  suit

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       was dismissed.  We do not see how this decision can come  to         the assistance of the appellant.             It  is  strenuously  submitted  by  Mr.  Tarkunde   that         unless   the  landlord  is also the absolute  owner  of  the         premises, he cannot evict the tenant under section 13(1)(f).         Landlord  means  landlords  under  the  appropriate  General         Clauses Act and, therefore, since there are         (1)  (1879) I.L.R. 4 Cal. 961.       (2) (1878-81) I.L.R.  3         Mad. 234.         (3)  (1897)  I.L.R. 21 Bom. 154.      (4) (1890)  I.L.R.  17         Cal. 160.         399         other co-sharers the plaintiff alone could not file the suit         for  eviction.             There  are two reasons for our not being able to  accept         the  above submission.   Firstly, the plea pertains  to  the         domain  of the  frame of the suit as if the suit is bad  for         non-joinder  of  other  plaintiffs. Such a plea should  have         been raised, for what it is worth,  at  the earliest  oppor-         tunity.   It was not  done.   Secondly,  the   relation  be-         tween the parties being that of landlord  and  tenant,  only         the  landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute  the         suit  for eviction.  The tenant in such a suit  it  estopped         from   questioning  the title of the landlord under  section         116 of the  Evidence  Act.  The tenant cannot deny that  the         landlord  had title to the premises at the  commencement  of         the  tenancy.   Under the general law, in  a   suit  between         landlord and tenant the question  of  title  to the   leased         property is irrelevant.  It is, therefore, inconceivable  to         throw  out  the suit  on  account of non-pleading  of  other         co-owners as such.             Being  faced  with this position counsel  submits   that         since   the requirements are found to be of  the  co-owners,         the  suit  cannot  be decreed in their absence.  This  is  a         repetition  of  the first submission in  a  different  form.         Counsel  relied upon Mclntyre and another v.  Hardcastle(1).         The English rule laid down in that decision  is  that if two         or  more  landlords institute a suit for possession  on  the         ground  that a dwelling house is required for occupation  of         one  of  them as a residence the suit would fail.   The  re-         quirement,  according to  the decision, must be of  all  the         landlords.             The  High Courts of Calcutta and Gujarat have  dissented         from the rule of English law in Mclntyre’s case (supra) (See         Kanika  Devt and Ors. v. Amarendra Nath Roy  Choudhuri   and         Ors,(2)  Tarak Chandra vs.  Ratanlal  Ghosal;(3)   Taherbhai         Hebtullabhai  and another v. Ambalal Harilal Shah & Ant.(4).         Deb Ranjan Chatterjee v. Swaranarani Biswas & another(5).             Indeed the rule in Mclntyre’s case (supra) is  abhorrent         to   the Indian conception and structure of social  life  of         our  country  with its benign sensitivity  and  ties,  which         is  not based on pure individualism. A widowed sister,  sud-         denly shipwrecked in the mid-stream of married life, with no         other  help,  returns to parental home or to  her  brothers’         where sympathetic and affectionate shelter is readily avail-         able  to her. In such a case the additional  requirement  of         the widowed sister and her children may furnish a reasonable         requirement of the father or the brothers for the purpose of         eviction of their tenant.  It is enough if the  requirements         are of any one of the members of the family or of dependents         to  furnish a reasonable plea for eviction on the ground  of         personal  requirement.. We endorse the parting of  the  ways         from  the English rule on this aspect of the matter  by  the         High   Courts. This is in accord with healthy Indian  tradi-         tion.

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       (1) (1848) 1 All E.R. 696.           (2) 65 C.W.N. 1076.         (3) 1959 G.L.J. 136.         (4) I.L.R. [1966] 7 Guj.-963         (5) 78 C.W.N. 1034.         400             Keeping in the forefront the observations of the  Bombay         High  Court  in Vagha jesing v.  Manilal  Bhagilal  Desai(1)         (at  page  252) where reference has been made to  the  land-         lords’  rights   belonging jointly to  several  persons  and         hence  warranting a suit by all the coowners,  Mr.  Tarkunde         drew our attention to the admission of  the plaintiff in his         deposition  regarding  the death of his father in  1949  and         that  Bhagat Ram Pasricha was inducted by him as  instructed         by his father to do so.  From this he submitted that all the         heirs   of late Motilal Sen were the landlords  and,  there-         fore,  they should have been impleaded as plaintiffs in  the         suit.  We are unable to give effect to this submission taken         for  the first time in this Court in view of the  clear  ac-         knowledgement  and admission of the defendants and   concur-         rent  findings  of the courts that the  plaintiff  is  their         landlord.            Mr. Tarkunde also relied’ upon a Full Bench decision   of         the Gujarat High Court in Nanalal Girdharlal and another  v.         Gulamnabi  Jamalbhai Motorwala and others(") and read to  us         the  following passage at page 146:                       "It is, therefore, clear that the rule that  a                  co-owner   may maintain an action to eject a  tres-                  passer   without  joining other co-owners  in  such                  action  can have no  application where  a  co-owner                  seeks to evict a tenant who is in possession of the                  property after determination of the lease.  Such  a                  tenant  can be evicted only by an action  taken  by                  all  co-owners"         But this rule is not applicable in the present case as would         appear  from the decision itself.  The Gujarat  decision  at         para 10  of  the judgment excludes two categories  described         therein  and  the rule of estoppel  applies  to   these  two         categories.  The present case, even according to this  deci-         sion, fails under the excepted category.              Before  we come to the real  question at issue  we  may         turn  to section 13(1)(f) of the Act as it was at the  mate-         rial time:         Sec. 13. protection of tenant against eviction-                      (1)  Notwithstanding anything to. the  contrary                  in   any  other  law, no order or  decree  for  the                  recovery   of possession of any premises  shall  be                  made   by   any  Court in favour  of  the  landlord                  against   a   tenant except on one or more  of  the                  following  grounds, namely --                         (f)  where the premises are  reasonably  re-                  quired  by  the  landlord either  for  purposes  of                  building  or  rebuilding  or  for  making   thereto                  substantial additions or alterations or for his own                  ’occupation  if he is the owner or for the  occupa-                  tion  of any person for whose benefit the  premises                  are held".         (1) 37 Born. L.R. 249.             (2) A.I.R.1973 Guj. 131.         401             This is not a case attracting the second part of section         13(1)(f),  that  is  to say, the clause  providing  for  the         occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises  are         held.   We will not,  therefore, refer to the submission  of         the  appellant  and to the decisions  relied . upon  by  him         with reference to that clause.         The  present  case, on the facts found, is  covered  by  the         first  part of section 13(1 )(f), namely, where the premises

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       are reasonably  required by the landlord for his own occupa-         tion if he is the owner.             There is no dispute that the plaintiff is the  landlord.         It  is,  however, found that he is one of the  co-owners  of         the   premises   the other co-sharers being his  mother  and         married brother, who reside in the Same premises along  with         him.   The premises m suit, namely, the second floor of  the         building  in  occupation of the tenant is  required  by  the         plaintiff for occupation of the members of the joint  family         and for their benefit.  A major portion of the ground  floor         of  the building accommodates the joint family business  and         the first  floor  is found by the court to be inadequate  to         the  requirements  of the large family of  eighteen  members         including the widowed mother.             That  the  particular requirement is  reasonable  is  no         longer   in  controversy.  The only question  is  whether  a         decree  can   still  be passed in favour  of  the  plaintiff         since he is not the absolute and full owner of the premises,         sharing, as he does, the interest in the premises along with         other co-sharers.             The principal question, therefore, is whether the plain-         tiff   being a co-owner landlord can be said  to  reasonably         require  the  premises  for his own  occupation  within  the         expression "if he is the owner"  in section 13 ( 1 ) (f).          Mr. V.S. Desai reads to us from Salmond  on          Juris-         prudence (13th edition) and relies on the following  passage         in  Chapter 8  (Ownership), paragraph 46 at page 254:                           "As a general rule a thing is owned by one                  person  only at a time, but duplicate ownership  is                  perfectly  possible. Two or more persons may at the                  same  time have ownership of the same thing  vested                  in  them.  This  may  happen  in  several  distinct                  ways,  but the simplest and most  obvious  case  is                  that of co-ownership.  Partners, for example,   are                  co-owners  of the chattels which constitute   their                  stock-in  trade  of the lease of  the  premises  on                  which their business is conducted, and of the debts                  owing  to  them by their customers.   It   is   not                  correct to say that property owned by co-owners  is                  divided  between them, each of them owning a  sepa-                  rate  part.   It is an undivided unity,  which   is                  vested    at  the  same  time  in  more  than   one                  person   ......      The   several ownership  of  a                  part is a different thing from  the    co-ownership                  of the whole.  So soon as each of two     co-owners                  begins to own a part of the thing instead  of   the                  whole  of it, the co-ownership has  been  dissolved                  into sole                  402                  ownership  by the process known as partition.   Co-                  ownership involves the undivided integrity of  what                  is owned".             Jurisprudentially  it is not correct to say that  a  co-         owner  of  a property is not its owner.  He owns every  part         of  the  composite property along with others and it  cannot         he  said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional  owner         of the property.  The position will, change only when parti-         tion takes place.  It is, therefore, not possible to  accept         the  submission that the plaintiff who  is  admittedly   the         landlord  and co-owner of the premises  is not the owner  of         the premises within the meaning of section 13(1)(f).  It  is         not  necessary to establish that the plaintiff is  the  only         owner of the property for the purpose of section 13(1)(f) as         long  as  he is a  co-owner  of  the property being  at  the         same time the acknowledged landlord of  the defendants.

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           Mr. Tarkunde also submitted that since the Calcutta High         Court has held in  Yogamaya Pakhira  v.  Santi Subha Bose(1)         that a permanent lessee is not an owner within the   meaning         of   section 13 (1)(f) a co-owner would not be in  a  better         position.   We are of opinion that a co-owner is as much  an         owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property         is.   We,  however, express no opinion about the case  of  a         permanent  lessee as this point does not arise in  this  ap-         peal.             As all the submissions of the appellant fail, the appeal         is  dismissed.  We will, however, make no order as to costs.         P.H.P.                                         Appeal   dis-         missed.         (1) I.L.R. (1968) 2 Cal. 70.         403