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PETITIONER: SRINIVASA REDDIAR AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: N.   RAMASWAMY REDDIAR AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/12/1965

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. RAMASWAMI, V. SATYANARAYANARAJU, P.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  859            1966 SCR  (3) 120  CITATOR INFO :  E&D        1985 SC 821  (4,5)

ACT: Limitation  Act  (9  of  1908),  Art,.  134-B-Alienation  by manager of properties of religious endowment as his own-Suit for   declaration  of  title  by  alienee--If  governed   by article--starting point of limitation.

HEADNOTE: The  lands in dispute had been granted in inam to a  temple. By about 1929 the then manager of the temple disposed of all those  properties  under various  sale-deeds,  resigned  his position  and  left the village.  He was  therefore  removed from  the  management of the temple and  other  persons  had taken up the position as de facto managers from 1929.  As  a result  of  successive alienations of  the  properties,  the appellants   became   entitled  to  them.   In   1951,   the respondents were appointed trustees of The temple and  under the  Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable  Endowments  Act, 1951, they applied, to the Magistrate, for possession of the properties   and   the  Magistrate   ordered   delivery   of possession.    Before  the  order  could  be  executed   the appellants  filed  the suit in 1954, for  a  declaration  of their  title  to  the  properties  and  for  an   injunction restraining  the  respondents from  interfering  with  their possession.   The trial Court and the lower appellate  Court decreed  the  suit.  In second appeal, the High  Court  held that  the suit was governed by Art. 134-B of the  Limitation Act,, 1908, which was introduced into the Act on 1st January 1929;  and  that  the appellants’ claim  in  regard  to  the properties  covered  by  the sale-deeds of  1917  and  1926. should  be rejected, because, the alienees had not  acquired title by adverse possession by 1st January, 1929, and is the alienor  was  still alive, the plea  of  adverse  possession could not be sustained under that article. In appeal to this Court it was contended that article  134-B would not apply to the present case but that Art. 144  would apply,  because, the transfers were effected by the  alienor on the ’representations that the properties belonged to  him as  his  separate  property; and that even  if  the  article

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applied,  the  decision  of the High  Court  was  erroneous, because the transferor had been removed from management more than 12 years before the suit was filed. HELD  : Though Art. 134-B applied to the facts of the  case, since the appellants had acquired title to the properties by prescription, the decree passed by the High Court, in so far as it was against the appellants, should be set aside. Column  1 of the article provides for suits brought,,  inter alia,  by  the Tanager of a Hindu  religion;  or  charitable endowment  to  recover  possession  of  immovable   property comprised in the endowment, which has been transferred by  a previous  manager  for valuable consideration.   The  period Prescribed  for  such suits is 12 years, and the  time  from which the period begins to run is the death, resignation  or removal  of  the transferor.  The findings recorded  by  the High Court in the present case show that all the ingredients prescribed by the first column of the Article namely 121 (i)that the property belonged to the endowment, (ii) that it was  transferred by a previous manager; and (iii)  that  the transfer  was  for valuable Consideration,  were  satisfied. The  character of the representations made by  the  previous manager  in regard to his relation with the property  which is  the  subject-matter of transfer, is irrelevant  for  the purpose  of the Article.  But if a suit had been brought  by the  respondents  on  the  date  when  they  were  appointed trustees,  it  would  have been barred  under  the  Article, because more than 12 years had elapsed since the date of the removal  of  the previous manager who  had  transferred  the properties;  and  therefore, the trial Court and  the  lower appellate  Court  were right in decreeing  the,  appellants’ suit in its entirety. [129 C-D, H; 132 H] Mahant  Sudarsan Das v. Mahant Ram Kirpal Das & Ors.  L.  R. 77 I.A. 42, applied.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 801 of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated September 2, 1959 of the Madras High Court in Second  Appeal No. 774 of 1957. T.   V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants. P.   Raghaviah and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, C.J. The present appeal has been brought  to this Court by special leave and it arises from a suit  filed by the appellants against four respondents.  The  properties involved in the suit consist of agricultural lands  situated in Eragudi village, Musiri taluk, Tiruchirappalli  district. According to the appellants, the said lands had been granted in  Inam to the ancestor of one Ambalathadum  Pachai  Kandai Udayavar  by  the Carnatic Rulers before the advent  of  the British  power  in India.  The original grantdeeds  are  not available; but at the time of the settlement of the Inams in the  sixties  of  the last century, Inam  title  deeds  were issued  in favour of the family of Pachai  Kandai  Udayavar. The  appellants averred that the properties covered  by  the grant  bad  been  granted in Inam to  the  original  grantee burdened with the obligation of performing certain  services in a Matam.  The said properties were alienated from time to time, and as a result of the last alienation, the appellants became  entitled  to them.  The appellants  in  the  present litigation  claimed a declaration about their title  to  the properties  in suit and a permanent  injunction  restraining

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respondents  1  to 3, who claimed to be the trustees  of  an alleged  Pachai  Kandai  Udayavar Temple  at  Eragudi,  from interfering  with their possession of the same.   Respondent No.  4  is  the Deputy  Commissioner,  Hindu  Religious  and Charitable Endowments, L9Sup.  CI/66  9 122 Tiruchirappalli,  and he has been impleaded because  he  has purported  to appoint respondents 1 to 3 as trustees of  the said alleged Temple on the 7th March, 1951.  This suit  (No. 103  of  1954) was instituted on the 13th  September,  1954, under  S. 87 of the, Madras Hindu Religious  and  Charitable Endowments  Act (No.  XIX of 1951) (hereinafter called  ’the Act’), in the Court of the District Munsif at Turaiyur. Respondents  1 to 3 who have been appointed as  trustees  of the said temple by respondent No. 4, obtained a  certificate from  him  that the properties in question belonged  to  the Temple;  and on the basis of the said certificate, they  had filed   an   application  before   the   Magistrate   having jurisdiction  in  the  area  under s.  87  of  the  Act  for possession.   Notice of this application was served  on  the appellants   and  they  pleaded  their  own  title  to   the properties.   The Magistrate, however, over-ruled the  claim made  by  the  appellants  and  directed  them  to   deliver possession  of the properties to respondents 1 to 3.  Before this  order  could be executed and possession  delivered  to respondents  1 to 3, the appellants instituted  the  present suit. Respondents 1 to 3 resisted this suit and contended that the properties  in suit had not been granted to the  predecessor of  Pachai  Kandai Udayavar as alleged  by  the  appellants. Their case was that the said properties had been granted  to the  Pachai  Kandai Udayavar Temple and formed part  of  its properties.  As trustees appointed by respondent No. 4, they claimed  that  they were entitled to the possession  of  the properties. On  these pleadings, four substantive issues were framed  by the  learned trial Judge; they were : whether the  grant  of the Inam was a personal Inam; whether the grant of the  Inam was a religious endowment; whether plaintiffs have title  to the  suit properties; and whether plaintiffs  have  acquired title  by prescription ? On the first two issues,  oral  and documentary  evidence  was  adduced  by  the  parties.   The learned trial Judge examined the whole evidence and came  to the  conclusion  that the grant of the Inam was  a  personal Inam, and that it was not a grant in favour of the religious endowment  within the meaning of the Act.  That is  how  the first two issues were answered in favour of the  appellants. In  consequence, the learned trial Judge also held that  the appellants  had proved their title to the  suit  properties. The  alternative plea made by the appellants that  they  had acquired  title to the properties by prescription, was  also upheld  by the trial Judge.  In the result, the  appellants’ suit was decreed on the 14th February, 1955. 123 Respondents 1 to 3 preferred an appeal (No. 129 of 1955)  in the  Court  of  the Subordinate  Judge  at  Tiruchirappalli, challenging  the correctness of the said decree.  The  lower appellate  Court considered three main points; they  were  : whether  the  grant  was in favour  of  Ambalathadum  Pachai Kandai Udayavar; whether there is a temple; and whether  the plaintiffs had prescribed their title to the suit properties by  adverse  possession.  The lower appellate Court  made  a finding  against respondents 1 to 3 on point No. 2. It  held that  the evidence adduced by the respondents did not  prove

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the existence of any temple in favour of which the  original grant had been alleged to have been made according to  them. On  that  view, it thought it unnecessary  to  consider  the first  point.   In regard to the third point  based  on  the appellants’  claim that they had acquired title  by  adverse possession,  the  lower appellate Court found that  "it  was evident that from the very beginning, Pachai Kandai Udayavar and his family had been claiming beneficial interest in  the property  and they were not holding the same as managers  of the  trust.   The alienations must, therefore,  be  regarded only as repudiation of the trust." In the result, the  lower appellate  Court’s  finding  was  that  the  appellants  had established  their claim of prescriptive title.  The  appeal preferred  by respondents 1 to 3, therefore, failed and  was dismissed with costs on March 29, 1957. This decision was challenged by respondents 2 & 3 before the Madras  High  Court  in Second Appeal  (No.  774  of  1957). Subrahmanyam,  J.,  who  heard this appeal,  held  that  the original grant had been made in favour of the Temple.  There was evidence to show that the properties originally  granted had  been  resumed by the Collector; but the  learned  Judge took  the  view  that the said resumption was  only  of  the melwaram  or assessment, and that since the lands  had  been granted  in Inam to the deity and its matam, their title  to the lands remained unaffected by the resumption proceedings. In other words, he negatived the appellants’ claim that  the original grant was in favour of their predecessors  intitle, though burdened with an obligation to render service to  the matam.  The learned Judge reversed the finding of the  lower appellate  Court  that the existence of the Temple  had  not been proved. Having thus held that the properties belonged to the Temple, the  learned  Judge proceeded to consider  the  question  of limitation  by  reference to the  several  alienations  with which the present litigation is concerned.  In dealing  with the question of limitation, the learned Judge took the  view that the present suit would be governed 124 by Article 134-B of the Indian Limitation Act.  This article has  been  introduced in the said Act by Amending Act  1  of 1929  and  came  into force on 1-1-1929.   It  was  conceded before  the lower appellate Court that the new  article  was not retrospective in operation and that if the title of  the alienees  in  regard to ’dharmadlayam  properties  had  been acquired  by adverse possession prior to 1-1-1929, it  would not  be  affected  by the provisions of  Art.  134-B.   Thus considered, the alienations in regard to items 1, 2, part of item  3,  items 7 & 8, and a portion of the well in  item  5 sold  under  Ext.  A-2 in 1914 were held to be  outside  the mischief  of  Art. 134B. The possession of  the  vendees  in regard  to the properties covered by the said sale deed  was held to have conferred title on them.  Similarly, item 4 and a part of item 6 which had been sold in auction in execution of  a  decree in 1927 (vide Exts.  A-7 and A-8),  were  also held  to  be outside the scope of Art. 134-B, because  the said article does not cover auction sales. That left the alienations covered by Exts.  A-3, A-6 and  A- 12 to be considered.  These three alienations were effected on  the  7th October, 1917, 2nd July, 1926, and  2nd  July, 1926 respectively.  The High Court held that the  properties covered by these sale-deeds fell within the purview of  Art. 134-B, and the appellants’ title in respect thereof was open to  challenge.   In  the result, the  appellants’  claim  in regard  to the properties covered by these three  sale-deeds was  rejected,  whereas their claim in regard to  the  other ,prop

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erties.   was  upheld.   In  consequence  the   appeal preferred  by respondents 2 & 3 was partly allowed  and  the decree  passed  by the lower appellate court  in  regard  to Exts.   A-3, A-6 and A-12 was set aside.  This judgment  was pronounced  on the 2nd September, 1959.  It is against  this decision  that  the appellants have come to this  Court  by special leave. Mr.  Tatachari  for the appellants has raised before  us  an interesting  question of law.  He contends that  Art.  134-B would not apply to the present case, because the alienations evidenced by Exts.  A-3, A-6 and A-12 show that the alienors purported  to  transfer the properties not  as  Poojaris  or managers  of a temple, but in their individual character  as owners  of the said properties.  The documents  recite  that the  properties belonged to the alienors as  their  separate secular  properties, though burdened with an  obligation  to render  service  to  the  Matam; and  that  shows  that  the transfer was effected not by the Poojaris of the temple, but by persons who claimed that the properties belonged to them. Such a case falls outside the purview of Art. 134-B and must be  governed  by  Art.  144 of the  First  Schedule  to  the Limitation Act. 125 Mr. Tatachari also argues that in applying Art. 144, we must assume  that the possession of the alienees was  adverse  to the temple from the respective dates of the alienations when they were put in possession of the properties covered by the transactions in question.  In support of this argument,  Mr. Tatachari has relied on the statement of the law made by Mr. Justice  Mukherjea  in  his lectures on. the  Hindu  Law  of Religious   and  Charitable  Trust.(1)  Says   Mr.   Justice Mukherjea,  "if the transfer (of debutter property)  is  not of’  particular  items  of  property,  but  of  the   entire endowment  with  all its properties, the possession  of  the transferee  is  unlawful  from  the  very  beginning.    The decisions in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandanam & Another(2)  and Damodar Das v. A dhikari Lakham Das(3) are illustrations  of  this type of cases." He also  added  that transfer  would similarly be void ’and limitation would  run from the date of the transfer, if the manager transfers  the property  as  his own prop" and not as the property  of  the deity.   The  same statement has been made  by  the  learned author in two other places in the course of his lectures. The argument is that in cases falling under Art. 134-B,  the transfer  made  by  the  manager of  a  Hindu  endowment  is challenged by his successor on the ground that it was beyond the   authority  of  the  manager;  and  such  a   challenge necessarily postulates that the transfer was effected by the manager  as manager purporting to deal with the property  as belonging  to the religious endowment.  Where, however,  the transfer  is made by the manager not as manager, but  as  an individual, and he deals with the property not on the  basis that it belongs to the religious endowment, but on the basis that  it  belongs  to himself,  considerations  which  would govern  the  application  of  limitation  are  substantially different;  and in such a case, the transfer being  void  ab initio, the possession of the transferee is adverse from the date  of  the  transfer.   That is  how  Mr.  Tatachari  has attempted  to  avoid the application of Art.  134-B  in  the present case.  There can be no doubt that if the  assumption made by Mr. Tatachari is well-founded, the appellants  title to  the  three  transactions in question would  have  to  be upheld. It  is  well-known that the law of limitation in  regard  to suits  instituted  to set aside unauthorised  alienation  of

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endowed property by a Shebait or a Mahant or a manager of  a Hindu  religious endowment was very uncertain prior  to  the decision of the Privy Council (1)  Mr. Justice B. K. Mukherjea on ’Hindu Law of  Religious and Charitable Trust’ II Edn. (1962) p. 282. (2)  L.R. 27 I.A. 69. (3) L.R. 37 I.A. 147. 126 in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar & Others.(1) That is why subsequent to the said decision, any discussion about the   question   of  limitation  relating  to   such   suits necessarily  begins with a reference to the principles  laid down by the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi’s case.  In  that case, the Privy Council held that the endowments of a  Hindu math  are  not "conveyed in trust", nor is the head  of  the math  a "trustee" with regard to them, save as  to  specific property  proved to have been vested in him for  a  specific object.   The  question  which  the  Privy  Council  had  to consider in that case was whether Art. 134 applied to a suit in  which the validity of a permanent lease of part  of  the math property granted by the head of a math was  challenged. Article  134  covers suits brought with a  view  to  recover possession  of immovable property conveyed or bequeathed  in trust or mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the trustee or mortgagee for a valuable consideration.  These words used in column 1 of Art. 134 necessarily raise the question as to whether  the  head  of  a math is  a  trustee  within  their meaning; and Mr. Justice Ameer Ali, who spoke for the  Privy Council,  answered that question in the negative.   In  con- sequence, the argument that Art. 134 applied, was  repelled, and it was held that Art. 144 would govern such a case. In  fact, it is substantially because of this decision  that Articles  134-A,  134-B and 134-C and Articles 48A  and  48B came to be inserted in the First Schedule to the  Limitation Act  by Amending Act 1 of 1929.  At the same time, s. 10  of the Limitation Act was amended by addition of an explanatory clause which provided, inter alia, that for the purposes  of s.  10,  any  property comprised in  a  Hindu  religious  or charitable  endowment shall be deemed to be property  vested in trust for a specific purpose, and the manager of any such property  shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.  As  we have  already noticed, these newly added provisions  in  the Limitation Act came into force on the 1st January, 1929. Reverting  then  to the question as to  whether  a  transfer effected by the manager of a temple in regard to  properties belonging  to the temple falls outside the purview  of  Art. 134-B if it is shown to have been made on the basis that the transferor treated the properties as his own, it does appear that   the   two  earlier  Privy   Council decisions   in Gnanasambanda’s(2)   and  Damodar Das’s(3) cases  lend  some support to the contention.  In Gnanasambanda’s case, it  was held by the Privy Council that where hereditary trustees  of a  re ligious  endowment  sold  their  hereditary  right  of management (1) L.R. 48 I.A. 3 2.                       (2) L.R. 27 I.A. 69. (3)  L.R. 37 I.A. 147. 127 and  transferred the endowed property, the sales  were  null and void, in the absence of a custom allowing them; and that the  possession  taken by the purchaser was adverse  to  the vendors and those claiming under them.  In appreciating  the effect  of  this decision, it is necessary to bear  in  mind that the plea of limitation with which the Privy Council was concerned  in  that  case  was based  on  Art.  124  of  the

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Limitation  Act.   Article 124 relates to  suits  filed  for possession  of  a  hereditary  office,  and  the  limitation prescribed  for such suits starts when the  defendant  takes possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff.  It  is clear  that  in  that  case, what  had  been  sold  was  the hereditary  office, as well as the properties  belonging  to the endowment; and so, it was plain that limitation began as soon  as the purchaser took possession of the  office  under Art. 124.  It is true that immovable properties belonging to the  temple  had  also  been sold;  but  the  Privy  Council expressly  ruled that there was no distinction  between  the office  and  the  property of the  endowment.   The  one  is attached to the other; but if there is, Art. 144 of the same Schedule  is applicable to the property; and that  bars  the suit  after  12  years’  adverse  possession.   It  may   be permissible  to state that this latter observation was  made in  1899 long before the Privy Council enunciated  the  true legal  position in regard to the status of the  managers  of Hindu religious endowments in Vidya Varuthi’s case(1). Similarly  in Damodar Das’s case(2), while dealing with  the validity of an ’ikrarnama’ of a debuttar property  executed by  the manager of the property, the Privy Council  observed that  from the date of the ikranama, the possession  of  the transferee was adverse to the right of the idol and that led to  the  conclusion  that the suit  instituted  against  the transferee was barred by limitation.  There is no discussion about  the  status and character of the Chela who  made  the transfer  nor  about the right of the  succeeding  Chela  to challenge  the  validity  of the transfer  effected  by  his predecessor  which was subsequently recognised by the  Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi’s case(1). These  two  judgments  have,  no  doubt  been   incidentally referred to by the Privy Council in Mahant Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal and Others(3), and in Mahadeo Prasad Singh  and Others  v. Karia Bharti(4) though the decision in  the  said two  cases  proceeded  in the light of  the  legal  position enunciated by the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi’s case(4). (1) L.R. 48 I.A. 302.            (2) L.R. 37 I.A. 147. (3) L.R. 60 I.A. 124.            (4) L.R. 62 I.A. 47. 128 It  would  thus be seen that the observations  made  by  Mr. Justice  Mukhejea  on  which Mr.  Tatachari  relies,  really purport  to extend the principle which has  apparently  been mentioned  by the Privy Council in Gnanasambanda’s  case(1). It does appear that Mr. Justice Mukhejea had expressed  this view  as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the  case  of Hemanta Kumari Basu v. Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jiu, (2) and  had relied   on   the   two   Privy   Council’s   decisions   in Gnanasambanda’s(1)  and Damodar Das’s cases In the  case  of Hemanta  Kumari Basa(2), the attention of Mukherjea  J.  was drawn  to  the  fact  that in an  earlier  decision  of  the Calcutta  High Court in Ronald Duncan Cromartic and  Francis Arthur  Shephard Sutherland, v. Sri Iswar Radha Damodar  few and  Others,  (4) D. N. Mitter, J.,  had  made  observations which were inconsistent with the view which Mukhejea, J. was disposed  to  take; but the learned Judge commented  on  the said   observations  by  saying  that  they  were  open   to criticism. Thus,  on  the question raised by Mr. Tatachari  before  us, there  does appear to be some divergence of opinion  in  the Calcutta High Court itself No other decision has been  cited before  us  which has accepted the proposition that  if  any part  of  the  property  belonging  to  a  Hindu   religious endowment  is  transferred by its manager, the  transfer  is void and the possession of the transferee becomes adverse to

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the endowment from the very beginning.  In fact, as we  have already indicated, in the case of Gnanasambanda(1) what  had been  transferred unauthorisedly, was the  religious  office itself  and all the properties appertaining thereto.  It  is open  to doubt whether the said decision could lead  to  the inference  that if a part of the property is transferred  by the  manager of a religious endowment on the basis  that  it belongs  to  him  and not to the  religious  endowment,  the transfer  is  void  ab  initio, with  the  result  that  the possession  of  the transferee is adverse to  the  religious endowment  from  the  very  beginning,  and  the  succeeding manager’s right to challenge the said transfer would be lost if his predecessor who made the transfer lives for more than 12 years after effecting the transfer. In  the  words  of Sir John Edge, who spoke  for  the  Privy Council  in Nainapillai Marakayar and of hers v.  Ramanathan Chettiar  and Others(5), " in the case of a Shebait a  grant by him (1) L.R. 27 I.A. 69.       (2) I.L.R. (1946) 11 Cal. 38. (3) L.R. 37 I.A. 147.      (4) (1935) 62 C.L.J. 10. (5)  L.R. 51 I.A. 83 at p. 97. 129 in  violation  of his duty of an interest in  endowed  lands which  he has no authority as Shebait to make  may  possibly under  some circumstances be good as against himself by  way of estoppel, but is not binding upon his successors." It  is not  easy to see why the successor’s right to  Challenge  an unauthorised  alienation made by his predecessor  should  be affected  adversely  if  the  alienation  is  made  by   his predecessor  on the basis that the property belonged to  him and not to the religious endowment. However,  we do not think it necessary to decide this  point in  the  present case, because, in our  opinion,  the  plain words of Art. 134-B do not permit such a plea to be  raised. Column  1  of Art. 134-B provides for suits  brought,  inter alia,  by  the manager of a Hindu  religious  or  charitable endowment  to  recover  possession  of  immovable   property comprised  in the endowment which has been transferred by  a previous  manager for a valuable consideration.  The  period prescribed  for  such suits is 12 years, and the  time  from which the period begins to run is the death, resignation  or removal of the transferor.  Confining ourselves to the first column  of Art. 134-B at this stage, the question  which  we have to decide is : does this article permit any distinction to be made between transfers effected by a previous  manager on  the basis that the property transferred belongs  to  the religious endowment, and those made by him on the basis that the  said  property  is his own private property  ?  If  the property is transferred by the manager on the basis that  it belongs  to the endowment, Art. 134-B clearly  applies;  but does it make any difference to the application of Art. 134-B if the transfer is made on the other basis that the property belongs  not to the endowment, but to the manager himself  ? In either case, the successor who challenges the alienation, will have to prove that the property in fact belongs to  the religious  endowment.  Once that is proved, is it  necessary for  him  also to show that the transfer was  made,  on  the basis that the property belonged to the religious  endowment ?  In our opinion, such a limitation cannot be read  in  the words  used by the said article.  Article 134-B  applies  to all cases where it is shown that the immovable property  was comprised in the endowment and that it has been  transferred by  a  previous manager for a valuable  consideration.   The successor  has to prove three facts : (1) that the  property belongs  to  the  religious  endowment;  (2)  that  it   was

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transferred by a previous manager; and (3) that the transfer was  for  a valuable consideration.  The  character  of  the representations  made by the previous manager in  regard  to his  relation with the property which is the  subject-matter of transfer, is irrelevant for the purpose of Art. 134-B. 130 All transfers made would fall within Art. 134-B if the three essential   facts  are  proved  by  the  successor  of   the transferor  manager of  the  Hindu  religious   endowment. Therefore,  we do not think that Mr. Tatachari is  justified in contending that the transfers with which we are concerned in the present appeal fall outside the purview of Art. 134-B inasmuch  as  they  are effected by  the  alienors,  on  the representations that the properties transferred belonged  to them as their separate properties.  On the findings recorded by the High Court, it is clear that the properties  belonged to  the temple; that they have been transferred  by  persons who  must  be  deemed to be the  previous  managers  of  the temple;  and  that they have been transferred  for  valuable consideration.   The present suit has been  brought  against respondents 1 to 3 who are appointed trustees of the  temple by respondent No. 4; and so, all the ingredients  prescribed by  the first column of Art. 134-B are satisfied.   That  is why we must reject the ingenious argument urged before us by Mr. Tatachari that Art. 134-B does not apply to the  present case. We  may,  in this connection, refer to the decision  of  the Privy  Council in Mahant Sudarsan Das v. Mahant  Ram  Kirpal Das, and Others. (1) In that case, the question which  arose for the decision of the Privy Council was whether Art. 134-B applied  to a case where debuttar property had been sold  in an  execution sale, and the Privy Council held that  it  did not.   "To apply Art. 134-B to an execution sale",  observed Lord  Radcliffe, "involves a reading of that article  which would construe the words "transferred by a previous  manager for a valuable consideration" as covering an execution  sale under court process, and the word "transferor" as  extending to  the judgment-debtor whose land is sold.  It is not  only that  the  words  themselves  do  not  properly  bear  that meaning.   Apart  from that, what is in all  essentials  the same question was considered on several occasions by  courts in  India before Art. 134A and 134B had been added to  Art. 134.    That   Article   contains   the   analogous   phrase "transferred  by  the trustee or mortgagee  for  a  valuable consideration", and there was a uniform current of  decision to the effect that these words were incapable of applying to an execution sale." What was said by the Privy Council about the  impropriety of including an execution sale  within  the meaning of Art. 134B can, with equal justification, be said about  introducing words of limitation in the  said  article which  alone  can  exclude transfers made  by  the  previous manager of the Hindu religious endowment on the basis  that the property transferred belonged to (1)  L.R. 77 I.A. 42 at pp. 49-50. 131 him.  Therefore, we must deal with the present appeal on the basis  that Art. 134-B applies to the facts of  the  present case. Mr. Tatachari then contends that even on the application  of Art.  134-B,  the decision of the High Court  is  erroneous, because  on  the facts proved in this case, the  High  Court should  have drawn the legal inference that  the  transferor had  been  removed more than 12 years before  the  suit  was filed.  He contends that the question as to whether on facts proved  in the present case, an inference can be drawn  that

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the previous manager or trustee had been removed, is a mixed question of fact and law, and the High Court was in error in reversing the decisions of the courts below by holding  that the  title  of  the  temple had not  been  lost  by  adverse possession  before  the suit was filed.  For  deciding  this question, it is necessary to refer to some material facts. The transferor is Pachaikandaswamiar.  The appellants’  case before  the  trial  Court was  that  Pachaikandaswamiar  had resigned  his position about 27 years ago, and that even  if Art.  134-B  applied,  limitation should  be  held  to  have commenced from the date when the alienor either resigned his office or was removed from it.  In dealing with this  aspect of the matter, the learned trial Judge has examined the oral evidence  led  on behalf of the parties.   He  assumed  that Pachaikandaswamiar and his son were alive at the date of the suit.  Even so, he found that they had left the village  and had taken no part whatever in the management of the  worship of the temple.  In fact, almost all the properties belonging to  the temple had in course of time, been a  alienated  and the alienors were no longer interested either in the  temple or  in  staying in the village itself.  Raju lyer,  who  was examined as a witness by the appellants, stated that he  and Amirthalinga  lyer  had been performing the worship  of  the temple for the past 27 years, and he added that the  alienor and his son had left the village more than 25 years ago, and but  for very casual visits to the village, they  had  never taken any interest in the temple or in the management of its affairs.  In fact, Ranga Raju Raddiar, whom the  respondents examined,  admitted  in reply to the questions  put  by  the Court  that since 25 years or so neither  Pachaikandaswamiar nor Chinnaswami lyer had performed any pooja in the  temple. He  substantially  corroborated the statement of  Raju  lyer that  Raju lyer and Amirthalinga lyer‘ had  been  performing the  worship of the temple.  Another witness,  Chandrasekara lyer  by name, whom the respondents examined, also  admitted that  Pachaikanda had sold away all his properties  and  had left  the  village.  Besides, when respondents 1 to  3  were appointed as trustees of the temple, a notice was issued  by the 132 office   of  Assistant  Commissioner  for  Hindu   Religious Endowments,  Tiruchirappalli,  on the 19th  June,  1948,  in which it was specifically averred that there were no legally constituted  trustees for Sri Pachaikantha Udayavar  Temple, Eragudi,  and it was mismanaged; and so, it was proposed  to appoint  legally constituted trustees for the  said  temple. This notice was served on witness Raju lyer and Amrithalinga lyer,  Chinnasamy  Iyer,  and Rangaraja  Reddiar,  who  were performing  the worship and acting as de facto  managers  of the  temple.   It is remarkable that this  notice  describes Amirthalinga  Iyer and Chinnasamy lyer as de facto  trustees of the temple. It is on these facts that the learned trial Judge held  that the  alienor must be deemed to have resigned his  office  or left it.  The lower appellate Court does not appear to  have considered  or  made any specific or clear finding  on  this aspect of the matter.  It, however, held that the transferor and his family had been claiming beneficial interest in  the properties all along and that they were not holding the same as  managers  of the trust.  That is why  he  confirmed  the finding  of  the  trial Judge on  the  question  of  adverse possession, though on a somewhat different ground. The  High Court has relied on the fact that the  alienor  is still  alive,  and so, it thought that the plea  of  adverse possession  could  not  be  sustained.   Unfortunately,  the

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question as to whether the facts proved in this case did not show that the alienor had been removed from office by  other persons  who were in management of the temple de facto,  has not  been discussed by the High Court.  In our opinion,  all the facts which have been brought on the record in  relation to this aspect of the matter, clearly show not only that the alienor  disposed of all the property and left the  village’ but  also that for the last 25 years or so,  the  management has  been taken over by other persons who are acting  as  de facto  managers of the temple.  This evidence appears to  us to  show that the alienors had been removed from  management of the temple, and other persons have taken up the  position as de facto managers, and this position has lasted for  more than  25 years.  If that be so, there is no escape from  the conclusion  that more than 12 years have elapsed  since  the date of the removal of the previous manager who  transferred the  properties in question; and so, if a suit were  brought by  respondents 1 to 3 on the date when they were  appointed trustees by respondent No. 4, it would be barred under  Art. 134-B.   On that view of the matter, we must hold  that  the trial Judge and 133 the  lower  appellate  Court were  right  in  decreeing  the appellants’  suit in its entirety.  We must accordingly  set aside  the decree passed by the High Court in regard to  the transfers  covered by Exts.  A-3, A-6 and A-12, and  restore that of the lower appellate Court.  In the circumstances  of this  case,  we direct that parties should  bear  their  own costs. Appeal allowed. 134