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PETITIONER: SRI VENKATARAMANA DEVARUAND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS(with connected petition)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/11/1957

BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA BENCH: AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA BOSE, VIVIAN DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) IMAM, SYED JAFFER SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  255            1958 SCR  895

ACT:        Temple   Entry,  Authorisation  of-Validity  of   enactment-        Denominational  rights , if subject to general right of  the        Hindu Public-’Matters of religion’, Meaning of-Madras Temple        Entry   Authorisation  Act  (V  Of  1947),  ss.   2(2),   3-        Constitution of India, Arts. 25(2)(b), 26(b).

HEADNOTE:        This  was  an  appeal by the trustees  of  the  ancient  and        renowned  temple of Sri Venkataramana of Moolky  Petta,  who        were  managing the temple on behalf of the  Gowda  Saraswath        Brahmins in accordance with a Scheme framed in a suit  under        s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  After the passing  of        the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act (Madras V of 1947)        which  had for its object the removal of the  disability  of        Harijans  from  entering  into  Hindu  public  temples,  the        trustees  made a representation to the Government  that  the        temple  was  a  private one,  and,  therefore,  outside  the        operation  of  the Act.  But the Government did  not  accept        that  position and held that the Act applied to the  temple.        Thereupon  the trustees brought the suit, out of  which  the        appeal arises’ for a declaration that the temple was not one        as  defined by S. 2(2) of the Act but was  a  denominational        one having been founded exclusively for the Gowda  Saraswath        Brahmins.  It was contended that S. 3 of the Act was void as        being  repugnant  to Art. 26(b) of  the  Constitution  which        vouchsafed  to a religious denomination the right to  manage        its  own  affairs in matters of religion.  The  trial  court        found  against  the  appellants.  It held  that  matters  of        religion  did  not include rituals and ceremonies.   But  on        appeal  the  High Court while holding that the  public  were        entitled  to worship in the temple, passed a limited  decree        in  favour of the appellants by reserving to the latter  the        right   to  exclude  the  general  public   during   certain        ceremonies  in which the members of the  denomination  alone        were entitled to participate.  The question for decision was        whether the rights of a religious denomination to manage its        own  affairs in matters of religion under Art. 26(b) can  be        subjected  to,  and controlled by, a law protected  by  Art.

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      25(2)(b) of the Constitution.        Held,  that  the expression " religious  institutions  of  a        public  character  "  occurring in Art.  25(2)  (b)  of  the        Constitution  contemplates not merely temples  dedicated  to        the public as a whole but also those founded for the benefit        of sections thereof and includes        114        896        denominational temples as well.  While Art. 25(1) deals with        the  rights  of  individuals and Art. 26(b)  with  those  of        religious  2 denominations, Art. 25(2) covers a  much  wider        ground and controls both.  Article 26(b) must, therefore, be        read subject to Art. 25(2) (b) of the Constitution.        Although the right to enter a temple for purposes of worship        protected  by Art. 25(2) (b) must be construed liberally  in        favour of the public, that does not mean that that right  is        absolute and unlimited in character.  It must necessarily be        subject  to such limitation or regulation as arises  in  the        process  of harmonising it with the right protected by  Art.        26(b).  Where the denominational rights claimed are not such        as  can nullify or substantially reduce the right  conferred        by Art. 25(2) (b), that Article should be so construed as to        give  effect  to them, leaving the rights of the  public  in        other respects unaffected.         The  expression  ’matters of religion’  occurring  in  Art.        26(b)  of  the  Constitution includes  practices  which  are        regarded by the community as part of its religion and  under        the  ceremonial law pertaining to temples, who are  entitled        to  enter into them for worship and where they are  entitled        to stand for worship and how the worship is to be  conducted        are all matters of religion.        The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.  Sri        Lakshimindra  Thirtha  Swamiar of Sri  Shirur  Mutt,  (1954)        S.C.R. 1005; Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar, (1094)  27        M.L.J.  253 and Sankaralinga Nadan v. Raja Rajeswara  Dorai,        (1908) L.R. 35 I.A. 176, referred to.        Held  further,  that  it  is well  settled  that  where  the        original  dedication is proved to have been for the  benefit        of  a  particular community the fact that members  of  other        communities  were  allowed  to worship cannot  lead  to  the        inference that the dedication was also for their benefit.        Babu  Bhagwan  Din v. Gir Hay Saroop, (1939)  L.R.  67  I.A.        referred to.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 403 of 1956.        Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 11, 1956,  of        the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 145 of 1952, arising out        of the judgment and decree dated March 31, 1951 of the Court        of the Subordinate Judge, South Kanara in Original Suit  No.        24 of 1949.           M.K. Nambiyar, M. L. Naik, J. B. Dadachanji, S.N. Andley,        Rameshwar  Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant  in  C.A.        No.  403 of 1956 and respondents in special  leave  Petition        No. 327 of 57.                                    897        C.   K.  Daphtary,  Solicitor-General  of India,  B.  B.  L.        Iyengar and T. M. Sen, for the respondents in SI No. 403  of        56 and petitioner in special leave petition No. 327 of 1957.        1957.   November 8. The following Judgment of the Court  was        delivered by        VENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-The substantial question of law,  which        arises for decision in this appeal, is whether the right  of

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      a  religious  denomination  to manage  its  own  affairs  in        matters of religion guaranteed under Art. 26(b), is  subject        to,  and  can  be controlled by, a  law  protected  by  Art.        25(2)(b), throwing open a Hindu public temple to all classes        and sections of Hindus.        In the District of South Kanara which formed until  recently        part  of  the State of Madras and is now  comprised  in  the        State  of  Mysore,  there  is a  group  of  three  villages,        Mannampady, Bappanad and Karnad collectively known as Moolky        Petah; and in the village of Mannampady, there is an ancient        temple  dedicated  to Sri Venkataramana,  renowned  for  its        sanctity.  It is this institution and its trustees, who  are        the  appellants  before us.  The trustees are  all  of  them        members of a sect known as Gowda Saraswath Brahmins.  It  is        said that the home of this community in the distant past was        Kashmir, that the members thereof migrated thence to Mithila        and  Bihar, and finally moved southwards and settled in  the        region  around  Goa in sixty villages.   They  continued  to        retain their individuality in their new surroundings,  spoke        a language of their own called Konkani, married only amongst        themselves, and worshipped idols which they had brought with        them.  Subsequently, owing to persecution by the Portuguese,        they  migrated  further  south, some  of  them  settling  at        Bhatkal and others in Cochin.  Later on, a chieftain who was        ruling  over the Moolky area brought five of these  families        from  Bhatkal, settled them at Mannampady, erected a  temple        for  their benefit and installed their idol  therein,  which        came  to  be known as Tirumalaivaru  or  Venkataramana,  and        endowed  lands therefor.  In course of time, other  families        of Gowda        398        saraswath Brahmins would appear to have settled in the three        villages  constituting  Moolky, and the temple  came  to  be        managed  by  members  of this community  residing  in  those        villages.        In 1915, a suit, 0. S. No. 26 of 1915, was instituted in the        Court  of the Subordinate Judge of South Kanara under s.  92        of the Code of Civil Procedure for framing a scheme for this        temple.  Exhibit A-6 is the decree passed in that suit.   It        begins  by  declaring  that "Shri  Venkataramana  temple  of        Moolky  situated  in  the  village  of  Mannampadi,  Nadisal        Mangane, Mangalore taluk is an ancient institution belonging        to   the  Gowda  Saraswath  Brahmin  community,  i.e.,   the        Commudity  to which the parties to the suit belong  residing        in the Moolky Petah, i.e., the villages of Bappanad,  Karnad        and   Mannampadi   according   to   the   existing    survey        demarcation".   Clause  2 of the decree  vests  the  general        control  and management of the affairs of the  temple,  both        secular  and  religious, in the members of  that  community.        Clause  3 provides for the actual management being,  carried        on  by a Board of Trustees to be elected by the  members  of        the community aforesaid from among themselves.  Then  follow        elaborate provisions relating to preparation of register  of        electors,  convening  of meetings of the  general  body  and        holding of elections of trustees.  This decree was passed on        March  9, 1921, and it is common ground that the temple  has        ever since been managed in accordance with the provisions of        the scheme contained therein.        This   was  the  position  when  the  Madras  Temple   Entry        Authorisation  Act (Madras V of 1947), hereinafter  referred        to as the Act, was passed by the Legislature of the Province        of  Madras.  It will be useful at this stage to set out  the        relevant provisions of the Act, as it is the validity of  s.        3  thereof that is the main point for determination in  this        appeal.  The preamble to the Act recites that the policy  of

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      the  Provincial Government was "to remove  the  disabilities        imposed  by  custom or usage on certain  classes  of  Hindus        against  entry into Hindu temples in the Province which  are        open to the general Hindu public".                                    899        Section  2(2) defines ’temple’ as "a place by whatever  name        known, which is dedicated to or for the benefit, of or  used        as of right by the Hindu community in" general as a place of        public religious worship".  Section 3 (1) enacts that,        "Notwithstanding  any law, custom or usage to the  contrary,        persons belonging to the excluded classes shall be  entitled        to  enter any Hindu temple and offer worship therein in  the        same manner and to the same extent as Hindus in general; and        no  member  of any excluded class shall, by reason  only  of        such   entry  or  worship,  whether  before  or  after   the        commencement  of this Act, be deemed to have  committed  any        actionable  wrong  or  offence  or  be  sued  or  prosecuted        therefor.        Section 6 of the Act provides that,        "If any question arises as to whether a place is or is not a        temple  as  defined  in this Act,  the  question  should  be        referred  to  the Provincial Government and  their  decision        shall  be final, subject however to any decree passed  by  a        competent  civil court in a spit filed before it within  six        months  from  the  date of the decision  of  the  Provincial        Government".   It  is the contention of  the  appellants-and        that,  in our opinion, is well-founded-that the true  intent        of this enactment as manifest in the above provisions was to        remove the disability imposed on Harijans from entering into        temples, which were dedicated to the Hindu public generally.        Apprehending   that  action  might  be  taken  to  put   the        provisions  of this Act in operation with reference  to  the        suit  temple,  the trustees thereof sent a memorial  to  the        Government  of Madras claiming that it was a private  temple        belonging  exclusively to the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins,  and        that  it  therefore did not fall within the purview  of  the        Act.   On this, the Government passed an order on  June  25,        1948,  Exhibit B-13, that the temple was one which was  open        to  all  Hindus  generally,  and  that  the  Act  would   be        applicable  to it.  Thereupon, the trustees filed the  suit,        out  of which the present appeal arises, for  a  declaration        that the Sri Venkataramana temple at Moolky was not a        900        temple as defined in s. 2(2) of the Act.  It was alleged  in        the  plaint that the temple was founded for the  benefit  of        the  Gowda Saraswath Brahmins in Moolky Petah, that  it  had        been at all times under their management, that they were the        followers of the Kashi Mutt, and that it was the head of the        Mutt  that  performed various religious  ceremonies  in  the        temple, and that the other communities had no rights to wor-        ship therein.  The plaint was filed on February 8, 1949.  On        July  25,  1949,  the Province of  Madras  filed  a  written        statement  contesting the claim.  Between these  two  dates,        the  Madras Legislature had enacted the Madras Temple  Entry        Authorisation   (Amendment)  Act  (Madras  XIII  of   1949),        amending  the definition of ,temple’ in s. 2(2) of Act V  of        1947,  and making consequential amendments in  the  preamble        and  in the other provisions of the Act.  According  to  the        amended definition, a temple is "a place which is  dedicated        to or for the benefit of the Hindu community or any  section        thereof  as  a  place of public  religious  worship".   This        Amendment  Act  came into force on June 28,  1949.   In  the        written  statement  filed on July 25, 1949,  the  Government        denied  that  the  temple was founded  exclusively  for  the        benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, and contended  that

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      the  Hindu public generally had a right to worship  therein,        and that, therefore, it fell within the definition of temple        as  originally  enacted.  It further pleaded  that,  at  any        rate,  it was a temple within the definition as  amended  by        Act  XIII of 1949, even if it was dedicated for the  benefit        of  the  Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, inasmuch as they  were  a        section  of Hindu community, and that, in  consequence,  the        suit was liable to be dismissed.        On  January 26, 1950, the Constitution came into force,  and        thereafter, on February 11, 1950, the plaintiffs raised  the        further  contention by way of amendment of the plaint  that,        in  any event, as the temple was a denominational one,  they        were  entitled to the protection of Art. 26, that it  was  a        matter  of religion as to who were entitled to take part  in        worship in a temple, and that s. 3 of the Act, in so far  as        it provided for        901        the institution being thrown open to communities other  than        Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, was repugnant to Art. 26(b) of the        Constitution and was, in consequence,’ void.        On  these  pleadings,  the  parties  went  to  trial.    The        Subordinate Judge of South Kanara, who tried the suit,  held        that  though the temple had been originally founded for  the        benefit  of  certain immigrant families of  Gowda  Saraswath        Brahmins, in course of time it came to be resorted to by all        classes of Hindus for worship, and that accordingly it  must        be  held to be a temple even according to the definition  of        temple’  in  s.  2(2) of the Act, as  it  originally  stood.        Dealing  with  the contention that the  plaintiffs  had  the        right  under  Art. 26(b) to exclude all persons  other  than        Gowda Saraswath Brahmins from worshipping in the temple,  he        held  that  "  matters of religion "  in  that  Article  had        reference  to religious beliefs and doctrines, and  did  not        include  rituals  and ceremonies, and that,  in  any  event,        Arts. 17 and 25(2) which had been enacted on grounds of high        policy must prevail.  He accordingly dismissed the suit with        costs.   Against this decision, the plaintiffs preferred  an        appeal to the High Court of Madras, A. S. No. 145 of 1952.        It  is  now necessary to refer to another  litigation  inter        partes,  the result of which has a material bearing  on  the        issues  which arise for determination before us.   In  1951,        the  Madras Legislature enacted the Madras  Hindu  Religious        and Charitable Endowments Act, (Madras XIX of 1951)  vesting        in  the  State the power of superintendence and  control  of        temples and Mutts.  The Act created a hierarchy of officials        to be appointed by the State, and conferred on them enormous        powers  of  control  and even  management  of  institutions.        Consequent   on   this  legislation,  a   number   of   writ        applications  were  filed  in  the  High  Court  of   Madras        challenging  the  validity  of  the  provisions  therein  as        repugnant  to Arts. 19, 25 and 26 of the  Constitution,  and        one  of  them  was  Writ Petition No. 668  of  1951  by  the        trustees  of  Sri  Venkataramana  Temple  at  Moolky.   They        claimed that the institution being a denominational one,  it        had a right under        902        Art. 26(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion,        without  interference from any outside authority’  and  that        the  provisions  of the Act were bad as  violative  of  that        right.   By its judgment dated December 13, 1951,  the  High        Court held that the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community was  a        section  of the Hindu public, that the Venkataramana  Temple        at  Moolky  was  a denominational  temple  founded  for  its        benefit,  and  that  many  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act        infringed  the  right granted by Art. 26(b) and  were  void.

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      Vide  Devaraja Shenoy v. State of Madras (1).  Against  this        judgment,  the State of Madras preferred an appeal  to  this        Court,  Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1953, but ultimately, it  was        withdrawn  and dismissed on September 30, 1954.  It  is  the        contention of the appellants that by reason of the  decision        given in the above proceedings, which were inter partes, the        issue as to whether the temple is a denominational one  must        be held to have been concluded in their favour.        To resume the history of the present litigation:  Subsequent        to  the  dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 15 of  1953  by  this        Court,  the appeal of the plaintiffs, A.S. No. 145 of  1952,        was  taken  up for hearing, and on the  application  of  the        appellants,  the  proceedings  in  the  writ  petition  were        admitted as additional evidence.  On a review of the  entire        materials  on  record,  including  those  relating  to   the        proceedings  in Writ Petition No. 668 of 1951,  the  learned        Judges held it established that the Sri Venkataramana Temple        was  founded for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath  Brahmin        community’  and that it was therefore a denominational  one.        Then,  dealing with the contention that s. 3 of the Act  was        in  contravention  of  Art.  26(b),  they  held  that  as  a        denominational   institution   would  also   be   a   public        institution,  Art. 25(2)(b) applied, and  that,  thereunder,        all classes of Hindus were entitled to enter into the temple        for   worship.   But  they  also  held  that  the   evidence        established that there were certain religious ceremonies and        occasions  during which the Gowda Saraswath  Brahmins  alone        were  entitled  to  participate, and  that  that  right  was        protected by Art. 26(b).        (1)  (1952) 2 M.L.J. 481.        903        They  accordingly reserved the rights of the  appellants  to        exclude  all members of the public during  those  ceremonies        and  on  those occasions, and these were  specified  in  the        decree.   Subject to this modification, they  dismissed  the        appeal.  Against this judgment the plaintiffs have preferred        Civil Appeal No. 403 of 1956 on a certificate granted by the        High Court.        There  is also before us Petition No. 327 of 1957 for  leave        to  appeal  under  Art.  136.  That  has  reference  to  the        modifications introduced by the decree of the High Court  in        favour  of the appellants.  It must be mentioned that  while        the  appeal was pending, there was a reorganisation  of  the        States, and the District of South Kanara in which the temple        is situated, was included in the State of Mysore.  The State        of Mysore has accordingly come on record in the place of the        State  of Madras, and is contesting this appeal, and  it  is        that State that has now applied for leave to appeal  against        the  modifications.   The application is very  much  out  of        time,  and Mr. M. K. Nambiar for the  appellants  vehemently        opposes its being entertained at this stage.  It is  pointed        out  that not merely had the State of Madras not  filed  any        application  for leave to appeal to this Court  against  the        decision of the Madras High Court but that it accepted it as        correct  and  actually  opposed the grant of  leave  to  the        appellants on the ground that the points involved were  pure        questions  of fact, that no substantial question of law  was        involved,  and  that  the judgment of  the  High  Court  had        recognised  the rights of all sections of the Hindu  public.        It is argued that when a party acquiesces in a judgment  and        deliberately allows the time for filing an appeal to  lapse,        it  would  not be a sufficient ground to condone  the  delay        that  he  has subsequently changed his mind and  desires  to        prefer  an appeal.  The contention is clearly sound, and  we        should have given effect to it, were it not that the  result

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      of this litigation would affect the rights of members of the        public,  and we consider it just that the matter  should  be        decided  on the merits, so that the  controversies  involved        might be finally settled.  We have accordingly condoned  the        delay, and have heard counsel on this application.        115        904        In view of this, it is unnecessary to consider the questions        discussed  at the Bar as to the scope of Art. 132,  who  are        entitled to appeal on the strength of a certificate  granted        under  that  Article,  and the ,forum in  which  the  appeal        should be lodged.  It is sufficient to say that in this case        no appeal, was, in fact, filed by the respondent.        On   the  arguments  addressed  before  us,  the   following        questions fall to be decided :        (1)Is the Sri Venkataramana Temple at Moolky, a temple  as        defined in s. 2 (2) of Madras Act V of 1947 ?        (2)  If it is, is it a denominational temple ?        (3)  If it is a denominational temple, are the plain-        tiffs  entitled  to  exclude all  Hindus  other  than  Gowda        Saraswath Brahmins from entering into it for worship, on the        ground that it is a matter of religion within the protection        of Art. 26(b) of the Constitution ?        (4) If so, is s. 3 of the Act valid on the ground that it is        a  law  protected by Art. 25 (2) (b), and that  such  a  law        prevails against the right conferred by Art. 26 (b); and        (5)If  s. 3 of the Act is valid, are the modifications  in        favour  of the appellants made by the High Court  legal  and        proper ?        On  the first question, the contention of Mr. M. K.  Nambiar        for  the  appellants  is that the temple in  question  is  a        private one, and therefore falls outside the purview of  the        Act.   This  plea, however, was not taken  anywhere  in  the        pleadings.   The plaint merely alleges that the  temple  was        founded  for  the benefit of the  Gowda  Saraswath  Brahmins        residing in Moolky Petah.  There is no averment that it is a        private  temple.  It is true that at the time when the  suit        was instituted, the definition of ’temple’ as it then stood,        took in only institutions which were dedicated to or for the        benefit  of  the  Hindu  public  in  ’general,  and  it  was        therefore  sufficient  for the plaintiffs to aver  that  the        suit temple was not one of that character, and that it would        have  made no difference in the legal position  whether  the        temple was a private one, or whether it was intended for the        benefit  of  a  section  of  the  public.   But  then,  ,the        Legislature amended the definition of ’temple’        905        by Act XIII of 1949, and brought within it even institutions        dedicated to or for the benefit of a section, of the public;        and  that would have comprehended a temple founded  for  the        benefit  of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins but not  a  private        temple.   In  the written statement which was filed  by  the        Government, the amended definition of ’temple’ was in  terms        relied on in answer to the claim of the plaintiffs.  In that        situation,  it  was  necessary for the  plaintiffs  to  have        raised  the plea that the temple was a private one, if  they        intended  to  rely on it.  Par from putting forward  such  a        plea,  they  accepted the stand taken by the  Government  in        their  written statement, and simply contended that  as  the        temple  was a denominational one, they were entitled to  the        protection  of  Art. 26 (b).  Indeed the  Subordinate  Judge        states  in para. 19 of the judgment that it was admitted  by        the  plaintiffs that the temple came within the  purview  of        the definition as amended by Act XIII of 1949.        Mr.  M.  K. Nambiar invited our attention  to  Exhibit  A-2,

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      which is a copy of an award dated November 28, 1847, wherein        it is recited that the temple was originally founded for the        benefit  of five families of Gowda Saraswath  Brabmins.   He        also  referred us to Exhibit A-6, the decree in  the  scheme        suit, 0. S. No. 26 of 1915, wherein it was declared that the        institution belonged to that community.  He contended on the        basis  of these documents and of other evidence in the  case        that whether the temple was a private or public  institution        was purely a matter of legal inference to be drawn from  the        above  materials, and that, notwithstanding that  the  point        was  not taken in the pleadings, it could be allowed  to  be        raised  as a pure question of law.  We are unable  to  agree        with  this submission.  The object of requiring a  party  to        put  forward  his pleas in the pleadings is  to  enable  the        opposite party to controvert them and to adduce evidence  in        support of his case.  And it would be neither legal nor just        to  refer  to evidence adduced with reference  to  a  matter        which  was  actually  in  issue and on  the  basis  of  that        evidence, to come to a finding on a matter which was not  in        issue, and decide the rights of parties on the        906        basis  of  that finding.  We have accordingly  declined  ;to        entertain  this  contention.   We hold,  agreeing  with  the        Courts below, that the Sri Venkataramana Temple at Mookly is        a public temple, and that it is within the operation of  Act        V of 1947.        (2)The  next  question  is whether the suit  temple  is  a        denominational  institution.   Both the  Courts  below  have        concurrently  held  that  at the inception  the  temple  was        founded for the benefit of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins; but the        Subordinate  Judge  hold that as in course  of  time  public        endowments came to be made to the temple and all classes  of        Hindus were taking part freely in worship therein, it  might        be presumed that they did so as a matter of right, and that,        therefore, the temple must be held to have become  dedicated        to  the Hindu public generally.  The learned Judges  of  the        High  Court, however, came to a different conclusion.   They        followed the decision in Devaraja Shenoy v. State of  Madras        (supra), and hold that the temple was a denominational  one.        The learned SolicitorGeneral attacks the correctness of this        finding  on  two  grounds.  He firstly  contends  that  even        though  the  temple might have been dedicated to  the  Gowda        Saraswath  Brahmins, that would make it only a communal  and        not a denominational institution, unless it was  established        that  there were religious tenets and practices  special  to        the  community, and that that had not been done.   Now,  the        facts found are that the members of this community  migrated        from  Gowda  Desa first to the Goa region and  then  to  the        south,  that  they carried with them their idols,  and  that        when they were first settled in Moolky, a temple was founded        and these idols were installed therein.  We are there.  fore        concerned with the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins not as a section        of a community but as a sect associated with the  foundation        and  maintenance of the Sri Venkataramana Temple,  in  other        words,  not  as  a mere denomination,  but  as  a  religious        denomination.  From the evidence of P. W. 1, it appears that        the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins have three Gurus, that those in        Moolky  Petah are followers of the head of the  Kashi  Mutt,        and that it is he that performs some of the        907        important ceremonies in the temple.  Exhibit A is a document        of the year 1826-27.  That shows that the head of the  Kashi        Mutt settled the disputes among the Archakas, and that  they        agreed to do the puja under his orders.  The  uncontradicted        evidence of P. W. I also shows that during certain religious

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      ceremonies, persons other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins have        been  wholly excluded.  This evidence leads irresistibly  to        the  conclusion that the temple is a denominational one,  as        contended for by the appellants.        The second ground urged on behalf of the respondent is  that        the evidence discloses that all communities had been  freely        admitted  into  the temple, and that though P. W.  I  stated        that persons other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins could enter        only  with  the  permission of the trustees,  there  was  no        instance  in  which  such permission was  refused.   It  was        contended that the inference to be drawn from this was  that        the  Hindu  public generally had a right to worship  in  the        temple.  The law on the subject is well settled.  When there        is a question as to the nature and extent of a dedication of        a temple, that has to be determined on the terms of the deed        of  endowment if that is available, and where it is not,  on        other  materials legally admissible; and proof of  long  and        uninterrupted  user  would be cogent evidence of  the  terms        thereof.  Where, there. fore, the original deed of endowment        is not available and it is found that all persons are freely        worshipping in the temple without let or hindrance, it would        be a proper inference to make that they do so as a matter of        right,  and  that  the original  foundation  was  for  their        benefit  as well.  But where it is proved by  production  of        the  deed  of  endowment  or  otherwise  that  the  original        dedication  was for the benefit of a  particular  community,        the  fact  that members of other  communities  were  allowed        freely  to  worship cannot lead to the  inference  that  the        dedication was for their benefit as well.  For, as  observed        in Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroop (1), "it would not  in        general be consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice  that        worshippers should be turned away".  On the findings of  the        Court        (1) (1939) L. R. 67 I. A. 1.        908        below that the foundation was originally for the benefit  of        the  Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community, the fact that  other        classes of Hindus were admitted freely into the temple would        not have the effect of enlarging the scope of the dedication        into  one for the public generally.  On a  consideration  of        the  evidence,  we  see no grounds for  differing  from  the        finding given by the learned Judges in the court below  that        the  suit temple is a denominational temple founded for  the        benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, supported as it  is        by the conclusion reached by another Bench of learned Judges        in  Devaraja  Shenoy v. State of Madras  (supra).   In  this        view, there is no need to discuss whether this issue is  res        judicata by reason of the, decision in Writ Petition No. 668        of 1951.        (3)  On  the  finding that the Sri Venkataramana  Temple  at        Moolky  is  a  denominational institution  founded  for  the        benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, the question arises        whether  the  appellants  are  entitled  to  exclude   other        communities from entering into it for worship on the  ground        that  it  is a matter of religion within the  protection  of        Art.  26 (b). It is argued by the learned  Solicitor-General        that exclusion of persons from entering into a temple cannot        ipso facto be regarded as a matter of religion, that whether        it  is  so  must  depend on the  tenets  of  the  particular        religion  which the institution in question represents,  and        that there was no such proof in the present case.  Now,  the        precise connotation of the expression "matters of religion "        came up for consideration by this Court in The Commissioner,        Hindu  Religious  Endowments,  Madras  v.  Sri   Lakshmindra        Thirtha  Swamiar  of Sri Shirur Mutt (1), and  it  was  held

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      therein that it embraced not merely matters of doctrine  and        belief  pertaining to the religion but also the practice  of        it, or to put, it in terms of Hindu theology, not merely its        Gnana  but also its Bakti and Karma Kandas.   The  following        observations   of  Mukherjea  J.,  (as  he  then  was)   are        particularly apposite to the present discussion :        " in the first place, what constitutes the essential        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 1005.                                    909        part  of  a  religion is primarily to  be  ascertained  with        reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.  If  the        tenets  of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribe’  that        offerings of food should be given to the idol at  particular        hours  of  the  day, that periodical  ceremonies  should  be        performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or        that  there  should  be daily recital  of  sacred  texts  or        oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as        parts  of  religion  and the mere  fact  that  they  involve        expenditure  of money or employment of priests and  servants        or  the  use of marketable commodities would not  make  them        secular  activities  partaking of a commercial  or  economic        character; all of them are religious practices and should be        regarded  as  matters  of religion  within  the  meaning  of        article 26 (b)."        It  being thus settled that matters of religion in  Art.  26        (b)  include  even  practices  which  are  regarded  by  the        community  as part of its religion, we have now to  consider        whether  exclusion of a person from entering into  a  temple        for  worship  is  a matter of religion  according  to  Hindu        Ceremonial Law.  There has been difference of opinion  among        the  writers as to whether image worship had a place in  the        religion  of the Hindus, as revealed in the Vedas.   On  the        one hand, we have hymns in praise of Gods, and on the other,        we have highly philosophical passages in the Upanishads des-        cribing  the  Supreme  Being as  omnipotent,  omnicient  and        omnipresent  and transcending all names and forms.  When  we        come  to  the  Puranas,  we  find  a  marked  change.    The        conception  had  become  established  of  Trinity  of  Gods,        Brahma,  Vishnu  and  Siva as manifestations  of  the  three        aspects of creation, preservation and destruction attributed        to the Supreme Being in the Upanishads, as, for example,  in        the  following  passage in the Taittiriya  Upanishad,  Brigu        Valli, First Anuvaka:        "  That from which all beings are born, by which  they  live        and into which they enter and merge."         The  Gods have distinct  forms ascribed to them  and  their        worship at home and in temples is ordained as certain  means        of  attaining salvation.  These injunctions have had such  a        powerful hold over the minds of the        910        people that daily worship of the deity in temple came to  be        regarded  as one of the obligatory duties of a  Hindu.   ’It        was  during  this period that temples were  constructed  all        over  the country dedicated to Vishnu, Rudra, Devi,  Skanda,        Ganesha and so forth, and wor ship in the temple can be said        to have become the practical religion of all sections of the        Hindus ever since.  With the growth in importance of temples        and  of worship therein, more and more attention came to  be        devoted  to the ceremonial law relating to the  construction        of  temples,  installation of idols therein and  conduct  of        worship  of the deity. and numerous are the  treatises  that        came  to be written for its exposition.  These are known  as        Agamas, and there are as many as 28 of them relating to  the        Saiva  temples,  the  most  important  of  them  being   the        Kamikagama, the Karanagama and the Suprubedagama, while  the

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      Vikhanasa  and the Pancharatra are the chief Agamas  of  the        Vaishnavas.  These Agamas, contain elaborate rules as to how        the  temple is to be constructed, where the principal  deity        is to be consecrated, and where the other Devatas are to  be        installed  and where the several classes of worshippers  are        to  stand  and  worship.  The  following  passage  from  the        judgment  of  Sadasiva  Aiyar  J.  in  Gopala  Muppanar   v.        Subramania  Aiyar (1), gives a summary of  the  prescription        contained in one of the Agamas:        "  In  the Nirvachanapaddhathi it is  said  that  Sivadwijas        should  worship in the Garbagriham, Brahmins from  the  ante        chamber  or  Sabah Mantabam, Kshatriyas, Vysias  and  Sudras        from the Mahamantabham, the dancer and the musician from the        Nrithamantabham  east of the Mahamantabham and  that  castes        yet lower in scale should content themselves with the  sight        of the Gopuram."        The other Agamas also contain similar rules.        According  to the Agamas, an image becomes defiled if  there        is  any departure or violation of any of the rules  relating        to   worship,   and  purificatory   ceremonies   (known   as        Samprokshana)  have  to  be  performed  for  restoring   the        sanctity of the shrine.  Vide judgment of        (1)  (1914) 27 M.L.J. 253.        911        Sadasiva  Aiyar  J. in Gopala Muppanar v.  Subramania  Aiyar        (supra).  In Sankaralinga Nadan v. Raja Rajeswara  Dorai(1),        it was held by the Privy Council’ affirming the judgment  of        the  Madras  High Court that a trustee who agreed  to  admit        into  the  temple persons who were not entitled  to  worship        therein,  according  to  the Agamas and the  custom  of  the        temple  was  guilty  of breach of trust.   Thus,  under  the        ceremonial  law pertaining to temples, who are  entitled  to        enter  into them for worship and where they are entitled  to        stand and worship and how the worship is to be conducted are        all matters of religion.  The conclusion is also implicit in        Art. 25 which after declaring that all persons are  entitled        freely  to profess, practice and propagate religion,  enacts        that  this  should  not  affect the  operation  of  any  law        throwing  open  Hindu  religious institutions  of  a  public        character  to all classes and sections of Hindus.   We  have        dealt  with  this  question at some length in  view  of  the        argument of the learned Solicitor-General that exclusion  of        persons  from  temple has not been shown to be a  matter  of        religion with reference to the tenets of Hinduism.  We  must        accordingly  hold that if the rights of the appellants  have        to be determined solely with reference to Art. 26 (b),  then        s.  3.  of  Act  V of 1947, should be  held  to  be  bad  as        infringing it.        (4)  That  brings  us  on to the main  question  for  deter-        mination in this appeal, whether the right guaranteed  under        Art. 26 (b) is subject to a law protected by Art. 25 (2) (b)        throwing the suit temple open to all classes and sections of        Hindus.   We must now examine closely the terms of  the  two        articles.   Art.  25, omitting what is not material,  is  as        follows:        "  (1) Subject to public, order, morality and health and  to        the  other provisions of this Part, all persons are  equally        entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to     freely        profess, practise and propagate religion.        (2)  Nothing  in this article shall affect the operation  of        any existing law or prevent the State from making any law-         ................................................... .......        (1)  (1908) L.R. 35 I.A. 176.        116        912

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      (b)providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing        open  of Hindu religious institutions of a public  character        to  all classes and sections of Hindus". Article 26 runs  as        follows:        "Subject  to  public  order,  morality  and  health.   every        religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the        right-        (a)to  establish and maintain institutions  for  religious        and charitable purposes;        (b)  to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;        (c)  to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and        (d)  to administer such property in accordance with law."        We have held that matters of religion in Art. 26(b)  include        the  right  to  exclude  persons who  are  not  entitled  to        participate  in the worship according to the tenets  of  the        institution.  Under this Article, therefore, the  appellants        would  be entitled to exclude all persons other  than  Gowda        Saraswath  Brahmins  from  entering  into  the  temple   for        worship.   Article 25(2)(b) enacts that a law throwing  open        public temples to all classes of Hindus is valid.  The  word        ‘public’includes,  in its ordinary acceptation, any  section        of  the  public,  and  the suit temple  would  be  a  public        institution within Art. 25(2)(b), and s. 3 of the Act  would        therefore be within its protection.  Thus, the two  Articles        appear  to  be apparently in conflict.  Mr.  M.  K.  Nambiar        contends  that  this  conflict  could  be  avoided  if   the        expression "religious institutions of a public character" is        understood  as meaning institutions dedicated to  the  Hindu        community in general, though some sections thereof might  be        excluded  by  custom from entering into them, and  that,  in        that  view,  denominational  institutions  founded  for  the        benefit  of  a  section of Hindus  would  fall  outside  the        purview  of  Art. 25(2)(b) as not being  dedicated  for  the        Hindu  community  in general.  He sought  support  for  this        contention  in  the law relating to the  entry  of  excluded        classes into Hindu temples and in the history of legislation        with reference thereto, in Madras.         According to the Agamas, a public temple enures,        913        where it is not proved to have been founded for the  benefit        of  any particular community, for the benefit of all  Hindus        including  the excluded classes.  But the extent to which  a        person  might participate in the worship therein would  vary        with   the   community   in   which   he   was   born.    In        Venkatachalapathi   v.   Subbarayadu  (1),   the   following        statement  of the law was quoted by the learned Judges  with        apparent approval:,        "Temple,  of course, is intended for all castes,  but  there        are restrictions of entry.  Pariahs cannot go into the court        of the temple even.  Sudras and Baniyas can go into the hall        of  the  temple.   Brahmins  can go into  the  holy  of  the        holies."        In  Gopala  Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar  (Supra),  Sadasiva        Aiyar J. observed as follows at p. 258:        "It  is clear from the above that temples were intended  for        the  worship  of  people belonging to all  the  four  castes        without exception.  Even outcastes were not wholly left  out        of  the  benefits of temple worship, their mode  of  worship        being  however made subject to severe restrictions  as  they        could  not pass beyond the Dwajastambam (and some times  not        beyond  the  temple outer gate) and they could  not  have  a        sight of the images other than the procession images brought        out at the times of festivals."        The  true Position, therefore, is that the excluded  classes        were  all entitled to the benefit of the dedication,  though

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      their actual participation in the worship was insignificant.        It was to remove this anomaly that legislation in Madras was        directed  for near a decade.  First came the Malabar  Temple        Entry Act (Madras XX of 1938).  Its object was stated to  be        " to remove the disabilities imposed by custom and usage  on        certain  classes of Hindus in respect of their  entry  into,        and  offering  worship  in, Hindu  temples".   Section  2(4)        defined  ’temple’ as " a place which is used as a  place  of        public  worship  by  the Hindu  community  generally  except        excluded  classes............  Sections 4 and 5 of  the  Act        authorised  the  trustees  to throw  such  temples  open  to        persons belonging to the excluded classes under        (1)  (1890) I.L.R.113 Mad. 293.        914        certain conditions.  This Act extended only to the  District        of Malabar.  Next came the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation        and  Indemnity Act (Madras Act XXII of 1939).  The  preamble        to the Act states that " there has been a growing volume  of        public opinion demanding the removal of disabilities imposed        by custom and usage on certain classes of Hindus in  respect        of their entry into and offering worship in Hindu temples ",        and  that  "  it  is just and  desirable  to  authorize  the        trustees  in  charge  of such temples  to  throw  them  open        to...... the said classes ". Section 3 of the Act authorised        the  trustees to throw open the temples to them.   This  Act        extended  to the whole of the Province of Madras.   Then  we        come  to the Act, which has given rise to  this  litigation,        Act  V  of  1947.  It has been already  mentioned  that,  as        originally  passed,  its object was to lift the ban  on  the        entry  into  temples of communities which  are  excluded  by        custom  from  entering  into them, and I  temple’  was  also        defined as a place dedicated to the Hindus generally.        Now,  the  contention of Mr. Nambiar is that  Art.  25(2)(b)        must  be  interpreted in the background of the law  as  laid        down in Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar (supra) and  the        definition  of  ’temple’  given in  the  statutes  mentioned        above, and that the expression "  religious  institutions of        a  public  character  "  must  be  interpreted  as   meaning        institutions  which are dedicated for worship to  the  Hindu        community  in general, though certain sections thereof  were        prohibited  by custom from entering into them, and that,  in        that  view,  denominational temples will fall  outside  Art.        25(2)(b).   There  is considerable force in  this  argument.        One  of the problems which had been exercising the minds  of        the  Hindu social reformers during the period preceding  the        Constitution was the existence in their midst of communities        which  were classed as untouchables.  A custom which  denied        to  large sections of Hindus the right to use  public  roads        and  institutions to which all the other Hindus had a  right        of  access,  purely  on  grounds  of  birth  could  not   be        considered reasonable and defended on any sound democratic        915        principle,  and  efforts  were  being  made  to  secure  its        abolition by legislation.  This culminated in the  enactment        of Art. 17, which is as follows:        " Untouchability’ is abolished and its practice in any  form        is forbidden.  The enforcement of any disability arising out        of  ’  Untouchability’  shall be an  offence  punishable  in        accordance with law."        Construing  Art.  25(2)(b) in the light of Art.  17,  it  is        arguable  that  its object was only to permit entry  of  the        excluded  classes into temples which were open to all  other        classes   of  Hindus,  and  that  that  would  exclude   its        application to denominational temples.  Now,  denominational        temples  are  founded,  ex hypothesis  for  the  benefit  of

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      particular  sections  of  Hindus, and so  long  as  the  law        recognises them as valid-and Art. 26 clearly does  that-what        reason  can  there  be for permitting  entry  into  them  of        persons other than those for whose benefit they were founded        ?  If  a  trustee diverts trust funds  for  the  benefit  of        persons  who are not beneficiaries under the  endowment,  he        would  be  committing  a  breach  of  trust,  and  though  a        provision  of the Constitution is not open to attack on  the        ground  that it authorises such an act, is it to be  lightly        inferred  that Art. 25(2)(b) validates what would,  but  for        it,  be  a  breach of trust and for no  obvious  reasons  of        policy,  as in the case of Art. 17 ? There is, it should  be        noted,  a fundamental distinction between excluding  persons        from  temples  open  for purposes of worship  to  the  Hindu        public  in  general on the ground that they  belong  to  the        excluded    communities   and   excluding    persons    from        denominational  temples  on  the ground that  they  are  not        objects  within the benefit of the foundation.   The  former        will be hit by Art. 17 and the latter protected by Art.  26,        arid  it  is  the contention of  the  appellants  that  Art.        25(2)(b)  should  not be interpreted as applicable  to  both        these  categories  and  that it should  be  limited  to  the        former.    The  argument  was  also  advanced   as   further        supporting   this   view,  that  while  Art.   26   protects        denominational institutions of not merely Hindus but of  all        communities such as Muslims and Christians, Art. 25(2)(b) is        limited in its operation to Hindu temples, and that it could        916        not  have been intended that there should be  imported  into        Art. 26(b) a limitation which would apply to institutions of        one  community  and  not  of others.   Article  26,  it  was        contended,  should therefore be construed as falling  wholly        outside   Art.   25(2)(b),  which  should  be   limited   to        institutions other than denominational ones.        The  answer to this contention is that it is  impossible  to        read  any such limitation into the language of Art.  25  (2)        (b).  It applies in terms to all religious institutions of a        public  character  without  qualification  or  reserve.   As        already  stated, public institutions would mean  not  merely        temples  dedicated to the public as a whole but  also  those        founded   for   the  benefit  of   sections   thereof,   and        denominational  temples  would be  comprised  therein.   The        language  of the Article being plain and unambiguous, it  is        not  open  to us to read into it limitations which  are  not        there,  based  on  a priori reasoning  as  to  the  probable        intention  of  the  Legislature.   Such  intention  can   be        gathered  only from the words actually used in the  statute;        and  in  a Court of law, what is unexpressed  has  the  same        value  as what is unintended.  We must therefore  hold  that        denominational. institutions are within Art. 25 (2) (b).        It  is  then  said  that  if  the  expression  "   religious        institutions of a public character" in Art. 25 (2) (b) is to        be interpreted as including denominational institutions,  it        would  clearly  be in conflict with Art. 26 (b), and  it  is        argued that in that situation, Art. 26 (b) must, on its true        construction,  be held to override Art. 25 (2)  (b).   Three        grounds  were urged in support of this contention, and  they        must now be examined.  It was firstly argued that while Art.        25  was  stated to be " subject to the other  provisions  of        this  Part" (Part 111), there was no such limitation on  the        operation of Art. 26, and that, therefore, Art. 26 (b)  must        be  held to prevail over Art. 25 (2) (b).  But it has to  be        noticed   that  the  limitation  "  subject  to  the   other        provisions  of this Part" occurs only in cl. (1) of Art.  25        and  not in el. (2).  Clause (1) declares the rights of  all

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      persons  to  freedom of conscience and the right  freely  to        profess, practise and propagate religion.  It is t is  right        that        917        is subject to the other provisions in the Fundamental Rights        Chapter.  One of the provisions to which the right  declared        in Art. 25 (1) is subject is Art. 25 (2), A law,  therefore,        which  falls within Art. 25 (2) (b) will control  the  right        conferred by Art. 25 (1), and the limitation in Art. 25  (1)        does not apply to that law.        It  is next contended that while the right  conferred  under        Art.  26(d) is subject to any law which may be  passed  with        reference thereto, there is no such restriction on the right        conferred by Art. 26(b).  It is accordingly argued that  any        law which infringes the right under Art. 26 (b) is  invalid,        and  that s. 3 of Act V of 1947 must accordingly be held  to        have become void.  Reliance is placed on the observations of        this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious  Endowments,        Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt        (supra)  at page 1023, in support of this position.   It  is        undoubtedly  true that the right conferred under Art.  26(b)        cannot  be abridged by any legislation, but the validity  of        s.  3 of Act V of 1947 does not depend on its own force  but        on Art. 25(2)(b) of the Constitution.  The very Constitution        which  is  claimed to have rendered s. 3 of the  Madras  Act        void as being repugnant to Art. 26(b) has, in Art. 25(2)(b),        invested  it with validity, and, therefore,  the  appellants        can  succeed only by establishing that Art. 25(2)(b)  itself        is inoperative as against Art. 26(b)).        And lastly, it is argued that whereas Art. 25 deals with the        rights  of  individuals,  Art. 26  protects  the  rights  of        denominations, and that as what the appellants claim is  the        right  of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins to exclude those  who        do  not  belong  to that  denomination,  that  would  remain        unaffected  by Art. 25(2)(b).  This contention  ignores  the        true  nature of the right conferred by Art. 25(2)(b).   That        is a right conferred on "all classes and sections of Hindus"        to enter into a public temple, and on the unqualified  terms        of that Article, that right must be available, whether it is        sought  to  be exercised against an  individual  under  Art.        25(1) or against a denomination under Art. 26(b).  The  fact        is that though Art. 25(1) deals with rights of  individuals,        Art. 25(2) is much wider in        918        its contents and has reference to the rights of communities,        and controls both Art. 25(1) and Art. 26(b).        The  result then is that there are two provisions  of  equal        authority, neither of them being subject to the other.   The        question is how the apparent conflict between them is to  be        resolved.   The  rule of construction is well  settled  that        when  there are in an enactment two provisions which  cannot        be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted        that,  if possible, effect could be given to both.  This  is        what  is  known  as the  rule  of  harmonious  construction.        Applying  this rule, if the contention of the appellants  is        to  be  accepted,  then Art.  25(2)(b)  will  become  wholly        nugatory  in  its  application  to  denominational  temples,        though,  as  stated  above, the  language  of  that  Article        includes them.  On the other hand, if the contention of  the        respondents  is accepted, then full effect can be  given  to        Art. 26(b) in all matters of religion, subject only to  this        that as regards one aspect of them, entry into a temple  for        worship,  the  rights  declared  under  Art.  25(2)(b)  will        prevail.   While, in the former case, Art. 25(2)(b) will  be        put  wholly out of operation, in the latter, effect  can  be

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      given  to  both  that provision and  Art.  26(b).   We  must        accordingly  hold  that Art. 26(b) must be read  subject  to        Art. 25(2)(b).        (5)It  remains  to  deal with  the  question  whether  the        modifications made in the decree of the High Court in favour        of  the appellants are valid.  Those modifications refer  to        various  ceremonies relating to the worship of the deity  at        specified  times each day and on specified  occasions.   The        evidence of P. W. I establishes that on those occasions, all        persons  other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins  were  excluded        from  participation  thereof.  That  evidence,  remains  un-        contradicted,  and has been accepted by the learned  Judges,        and  the correctness of their finding on this point has  not        been  challenged before us.  It is not in dispute  that  the        modifications aforesaid relate, according to the view  taken        by   this  Court  in  The  Commisssioners  Hindu   Religious        Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri        Shirur Mutt        919        (supra), to matters of religion, being intimately  connected        with the worship of the deity.  On the finding that the suit        temple  is a denominational one, the modifications  made  in        the High Court decree would be within the protection of Art.        26(b).        The  learned Solicitor-General for the  respondents  assails        this  portion  of  the decree on two  grounds.   He  firstly        contends  that  the right to enter into a  temple  which  is        protected  by Art. 25(2)(b) is a right to enter into it  for        purposes  of  worship, that that right should  be  liberally        construed, and that the modifications in question constitute        a serious invasion of that right, and should be set aside as        unconstitutional.  We agree that the right protected by Art.        25(2)(b)  is a right to enter into a temple for purposes  of        worship,  and that further it should be construed  liberally        in  favour of the public.  But it does not follow from  this        that that right is absolute and unlimited in character.   No        member of the Hindu public could, for example, claim as part        of the rights protected by Art. 25(2)(b) that a temple  must        be kept open for worship at all hours of the day and  night,        or  that he should personally perform those services,  which        the Archakas alone could perform.  It is again a  well-known        practice  of religious institutions of all denominations  to        limit  some  of  its  services  to  persons  who  have  been        specially  initiated, though at other times, the  public  in        general  are free to participate in the worship.  Thus,  the        right  recognised  by  Art.  25(2)(b)  must  necessarily  be        subject  to  some limitations or regulations, and  one  such        limitation  or  regulation  must arise  in  the  process  of        harmonising  the right conferred by Art. 25(2)(b) with  that        protected by Art. 26(b).        We  have  held that the right of a  denomination  to  wholly        exclude  members  of  the public  from  worshipping  in  the        temple,  though comprised in Art. 26(b), must yield  to  the        overriding right declared by Art. 25(2)(b) in favour of  the        public  to enter into a temple for worship.  But  where  the        right  claimed is not one of general and total exclusion  of        the  public from worship in the temple at all times  but  of        exclusion  from  certain  religious  services,  they   being        limited by the rules of        117        920        the foundation to the members of the denomination, ,then the        question is not whether Art. 25(2)(b) over-rides      that        right so as to extinguish it, but whether it is  possible-so        to  regulate  the rights of the persons  protected  by  Art.

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      25(2)(b)  as  to  give effect to both the  rights.   If  the        denominational  rights are such that to give effect to  them        would  substantially  reduce  the right  conferred  by  Art.        25(2)(b),  then  of  course, on  our  conclusion  that  Art.        25(2)(b) prevails as against Art. 26(b), the  denominational        rights must vanish.  But where that is not the position, and        after  giving effect to the rights of the denomination  what        is  left to the public of the right of worship is  something        substantial  and  not  merely the husk of it,  there  is  no        reason  why  we should not so construe Art. 25(2)(b)  as  to        give  effect to Art. 26(b) and recognise the rights  of  the        denomination  in  respect  of  matters  which  are  strictly        denominational,  leaving the rights of the public  in  other        respects unaffected.        The  question then is one of fact as to whether  the  rights        claimed  by  the appellants are strictly  denominational  in        character, and whether after giving effect to them, what  is        left  to the public of the right of worship is  substantial,        That  the rights allowed by the High Court in favour of  the        appellants  are purely denominational clearly  appears  from        the  evidence  on record.  P.W. 1 put forward  two  distinct        rights  on  behalf  of the  Gowda  Saraswath  Brahmins.   He        firstly claimed that no one except members of his  community        had  at any time the right to worship in the  temple  except        with  their permission; but he admitted that the members  of        the  public were, in fact, worshipping and  that  permission        had  never been refused.  This right will be hit by Art.  25        (2)  (b),  and  cannot be recognised.  P.W.  I  put  forward        another  and  distinct right, namely,  that  during  certain        ceremonies and on special occasions, it was only members  of        the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community that had the right  to        take  part therein, and that on those occasions,  all  other        persons would be excluded.  This would clearly be a  denomi-        national right.  Then, the question is whether if this right        is recognised, what is left to the public of their        921        right  under  Art.  25(2)(b) is  substantial.   The  learned        Solicitor-General himself conceded that even apart from  the        special occasions reserved for the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins,        the  other occasions of worship were  sufficiently  numerous        and  substantial, and we are in agreement with him.  On  the        facts,  therefore, it is possible to protect the  rights  of        the appellants on those special occasions, without affecting        the substance of the right declared by Art. 25( 2)(b);  and,        in our judgment, the decree passed by the High Court strikes        a just balance between the rights of the Hindu public  under        Art.   25(2)(b)  and  those  of  the  denomination  of   the        appellants under Art. 26(b) and is not open to objection.        Then,  it  is said that the members of the  public  are  not        parties to the litigation, and that they may not be bound by        the result of it, and that, therefore, the matter should  be        set  at  large.   Even  if the members  of  the  public  are        necessary  parties to this litigation, that cannot stand  in        the  way of the rights of the appellants being  declared  as        against  the parties to the action.  Moreover, the suit  was        one  to challenge the order of the Government  holding  that        all  classes of Hindus are entitled to worship in  the  suit        temple.  While the action was pending, the Constitution came        into  force,  and  as  against  the  right  claimed  by  the        plaintiffs under Art. 26(b), the Government put forward  the        rights of the Hindu public under Art. 25 (2)(b).  There  has        been a full trial of the issues involved, and a decision has        been  given, declaring the rights of the appellants  and  of        the public.  When the appellants applied for leave to appeal        to  this  Court,  that  application  was  resisted  by   the

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      Government  inter alia on the ground that the decree of  the        High Court was a proper decree recognising the rights of all        sections of the public.  In view of this, there is no  force        in  the objection that the public are not, as such,  parties        to the suit.  It is their rights that have been agitated  by        the Government and not any of its rights.        In  the  result,  both the appeal and  the  application  for        special leave to appeal must be dismissed.        922        The  parties  will  bear their own  costs  throughout.   The        appellants will take their costs out of the temple funds.                             Appeals Dismissed.