11 October 1995
Supreme Court
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SRI VARADARAJA PERUMAL TEMPLE Vs K. RAMACHANDRA (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.

Bench: PUNCHHI,M.M.
Case number: Appeal (civil) 968 of 1980


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PETITIONER: SRI VARADARAJA PERUMAL TEMPLE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K. RAMACHANDRA (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/10/1995

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  Supl.  (4)  87 1995 SCALE  (6)25

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This is  an appeal  by special  leave against  an order dated 14-9-1978  in S.T.A. 146 of 1975 passed by the Special Appellate Tribunal,  Madras, set  up under  the  Tamil  Nadu Minor Inams  (Abolition and  Conversion into Royatwari) Act, 1963. As statutorily required, the Tribunal is manned by two Hon’ble Judges  of the  Madras High  Court.  The  appellant- temple had  put to  challenge before  the Special  Appellate Tribunal an  order dated  February 22,  1971 passed  by  the Minor Inams Tribunal, Coimbatore on the merit of the matter. By means  of  the  appellate  order  afore-referred  to  the Tribunal dismissed  the said  appeal of the appellant-temple as time barred.      Under Section  30(1) of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Minor  Inams (Abolition and  Conversion into  Royatwari) Act,  1963,  the limitation for filing an appeal before the Special Appellate Tribunal is  three months  from the  date of the order. But, under the  proviso to  sub-section (1)  of Section  30,  the Special Appellate  Tribunal may,  in its  discretion,  allow further time  not exceeding  three months  for the filing of such appeal.  It is plain that the maximum time available to file an  appeal before the Special Appellate Tribunal is six months. The  appellant-temple’s appeal  before  the  Special Appellate Tribunal  was admittedly  filed beyond a period of six months.  The explanation for delay rendered by it became of no  avail.  It  is  to  challenge  that  order  that  the appellant-temple is before us.      The disputed  temple-property was  trust  property  and noticeably  it  was  a  trustee  who  was  following  it  to safeguard the  interests of  the temple against another set. The period  of limitation  for filing  an appeal  before the Special Appellate  Tribunal  may  have  been  three  months, extendible by  another three  months, but  in so  far as the trust properties  coming within  the sweep of the above-said Act were  concerned, a  way need  to have  been found out to prevent manipulations and grabbing of temple/trust property.

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Section 10  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1973  covers  certain situations. The said provision reads as follows:      "10. SUITS AGAINST  TRUSTEES  AND  THEIR      REPRESENTATIVES-      Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in      the foregoing provisions of this Act, no      suit against  a person  in whom property      has  become  vested  in  trust  for  any      specific purpose,  or against  his legal      representatives or  assigns  (not  being      assigns for  valuable consideration) for      the purpose of following in his or their      hands such  property,  or  the  proceeds      thereof,  or  for  an  account  of  such      property or proceeds, shall be barred by      any length of time.      Explanation -  For the  purposes of this      section  any  property  comprised  in  a      Hindu, Muslim  or Buddhist  religious or      charitable endowment  shall be deemed to      be  property   vested  in  trust  for  a      specific purpose  and the manager of the      property  shall  be  deemed  to  be  the      trustee thereof."      Though the  said provision cannot strictly apply to the facts of the case in hand, but the spirit and purpose behind Section 10  of the  Limitation Act would as it is reflective of  the   public  policy   to  protect   trust   properties. Notwithstanding the  provisions of  Sections 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act, and the limitation of six months provided in the aforesaid  Act, if, by interpretative process, such time is made  extendable, no  violation to  the statute  would be caused in  pursuing that  public policy  in reading down the provisions of Section 30(1) of the aforesaid Act, to promote justice and permit of trust/temple-properties, lest they get into the  hands of  property-grabbers and  be  subjected  to manipulations. With  this object  in view,  we come  to  the opinion that  for the recovery of trust property, the temple could approach  the Special  Appellate Tribunal  beyond  the period of  six months,  for the  delay of  which there was a reasonable explanation,  initially accepted  by the  Special Appellate  Tribunal.  It  should  have,  in  the  facts  and circumstances,  stuck   to  its   original  view   and  kept entertained the  appeal so  as to decide it on merit. We are therefore of  the view  that the delay in filing the appeal, it being  for the purpose of protecting temple property from the hands  of adversaries, should deserve condonation, as it did serve  a public  purpose,  deserving  reading  down  the provision, carving  an exception  in favour of temple/trust- properties. We hold accordingly.      We thus  set aside  the impugned  order of  the Special Appellate Tribunal dated 14-9-1978 and effect a remand to it for re-deciding  the matter on its own merits. The appeal is thus allowed in these terms. No costs.