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PETITIONER: SRI SRI KALIMATA THAKURANI & SRI SRI RAGHUNATH JEW & ORS.ETC

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/02/1981

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA VARADARAJAN, A. (J)

CITATION:  1981 AIR 1030            1981 SCR  (2) 950  1981 SCC  (2) 283        1981 SCALE  (1)391  CITATOR INFO :  O          1984 SC 374  (5,11,12,14,16,23)

ACT:      West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, S. 2(8) Proviso and Explanation, S.  20B(3),  (4)  and  (5);  West  Bengal  Land Reforms (Amendment)  Act, 1972  & West  Bengal Land  Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1977-Constitutional validity of.      Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 14, 19(1)(e), (g) and  Ninth  Schedule  Entry  Nos.  60  and  81-Violation  of Fundamental Rights  complaint of  court to determine whether restrictions contain quality of reasonableness.

HEADNOTE:      The West  Bengal Land  Reforms Act,  1955  permitted  a tenant  (land-holder)  to  get  the  land  cultivated  by  a bargadar, on  the basis  that the  bargadar would  share tho produce, and the Act contained provisions for enforcement of the right  of the  tenant to  get  such  share.  Section  17 permitted the  tenant to  terminate the  cultivation of  the land by  a  bargadar  and  resume  possession  for  his  own cultivation on certain contingencies, one of them being that he requires it bona fide for personal cultivation.      The West  Bengal Land  Reforms  (Amendment)  Act,  1972 provided for  the reduction  in  the  ceiling  area  of  the tenant, and  incorporated sub-sections  (3), (4)  and (5) of section 20B  of the  1955 Act, which provided that where the bargadar  had   voluntarily  surrendered  or  abandoned  the cultivation of  the land,  the facility  of cultivating  the land personally by the tenant should be denied to him.      The West  Bengal  Land  Reforms  (Amendment)  Act  1977 inserted a  Proviso and  an Explanation  to  clause  (8)  of section 2  of the  1955 Act, which provided that a person or member of  his family  should reside  in the greater part of the year  in the locality where the land is situated and the principal source of his in come is derived from the land and that ’family’  shall have  the same meaning as in clause (c) of section 14.      The petitioners  in their  writ petitions to this Court assailed: (1) The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 as also amendments made  to the  said Act upto 1977, contending that the 1955  Act was  constitutionally  invalid  and  that  the Amendment Act  of 1972  was in  the nature  of a Ceiling Act

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prescribing a  particular ceiling  for the  area of the land which should be retained by the tenant and that sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of s. 20B of the 1955 Act were violative of Article 14  of the Constitution, as being discriminatory and arbitrary Once  the tenant  was given  the right of personal cultivation and  was permitted to get the land cultivated by a bargadar  on the  basis that  the bargadar would share the produce, there was no warrant for not allowing the tenant to resume the land where a bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned  the land  and to deny the right of cultivating the land personally by the tenant, and (2) the Proviso 951 and the Explanation to section 2 of the 1955 Act deprive the petitioners  of   their  rights   guaranteed  under  Article 19(1)(e) and  (g) of  the constitution  in  as  much  as  it prevents them  from either going to or residing in any other place in  India and  places a serious curb on their right to carry on an occupation other than agriculture.      On behalf  of the respondents it was submitted that the rigour of sub-sections (3) and (4) can be softened if clause (d) of  section 17  is read down and interpreted in a way as to permit  a tenant  to resume  the land under clause (d) of section  17   if  the  bargadar  voluntarily  surrenders  or abandons the land.      Dismissing the writ petitions: ^      HELD: 1  (i). The  West Bengal  Land Reforms  Act, 1955 including  the   Amendment  Act  of  1972  and  the  proviso introduced by the Amendment Act of 1977 are constitutionally valid. [961 G]      In the  instant case the 1955 Act and the Amendment Act of 1972  having been  added to  the Ninth  Schedule as Entry Nos. 60  and 81  prior to  April 24,  1973, are  immune from challenge  as   being  violative   of  Part   III   of   the Constitution. [954 A]      Waman Rao  & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 271, referred to.      (ii) Clauses  (a), (b)  and (c)  of sub-section  (1) of section 17  of the  1955 Act are the only grounds on which a tenant can  get the  land back for his personal cultivation. The contingency where the bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the  land is  neither mentioned,  nor  directly  or indirectly contemplated  by  them.  The  contention  of  the respondent  cannot   be  accepted  for  it  would  introduce something into  section 17  which is  not there  and this is diametrically  opposed   to   the   well-known   canons   of interpretation. [956 D-E]      (iii)  There   is  no  logical  justification  for  the provisions of  sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 20B. When once the  cultivator chooses to bring a bargadar on the land the interest  of the bargadar is protected and has been made heritable.  But  when  the  bargadar  on  his  own  volition surrenders or  abandons the land, there is no reason why the tenant should  not be  allowed  to  resume  cultivation  and instead be  compelled to  get the  land cultivated  by  some other person  nominated by  the  authority  concerned  under section 49  of the  1955  Act.  This  provision,  therefore, appears to be extremely harsh and works serious injustice to the rights  of the  tenants particularly  after the  ceiling area of  the tenant  has been  considerably reduced  by  the Amendment Act of 1972. [956 E-G]      (iv) Though the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of  section 20B a perilously border on arbitrariness and amount to  serious curbs  on the  fundamental right  of  the cultivator to  pursue his  occupation, they cannot be struck

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down because they are contained in the Amendment Act of 1972 which has  been placed  in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 1973.  It will, however, be for the legislature which is the best  judge of  the needs  of  its  people  to  give,  a suitable relief  to the  tenant and  soften the  rigours  of these harsh provisions. [957 C-D]      (2) The  object of  the proviso  is  to  safeguard  the interest  of   the  tenant  himself  so  that  he  may  give wholehearted attention to the personal cultivation of 952 the land.  The proviso does not debar him from following any other occupation but once a tenant wants to have the land to himself for  personal cultivation  he must  elect whether to pursue  the   profession  of   cultivation  or   some  other occupation. Thus,  even  though  there  is  some  amount  of restriction both  on the  right of the petitioners to reside or follow any other occupation, such a restriction cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. [958 C, E-F]      In the  instant case the restriction does not amount to complete deprivation  of the  right of  the tenant to reside elsewhere because  the words  for the  greater part  of  the year’  leave  sufficient  scope  to  the  tenant  to  reside elsewhere for a part of the year if he so desires. It is not necessary that  the tenant  should  himself  reside  in  the village for  the greater  part of the year. It is sufficient if any  member  of  the  family  which  includes  his  wife, unmarried adult,  married adult, minor son and so on remains in the  village. This would amount to substantial compliance of  the   conditions  of   the  proviso.   The  restriction, therefore, is partial and in public interest. [958 G, 959 D]      (3) Whenever  a complaint  of violation  of fundamental rights is made the court has to determine whether or not the restrictions imposed  contain the quality of reasonableness. In assessing these factors a doctrinaire approach should not be made  but the  essential facts and realities of life have to be  duly considered. Our Constitution aims at building up a socialist  state and  the establishment  of an egalitarian society and  if reasonable  restrictions are  placed on  the fundamental rights  in public  interest, they  can be  fully justified in law. [959 F-G]      State of  Madras v.  V.G. Row, [1952] SCR 597, referred to.      (4) As  the proviso operates equally to all the tenants governed by it no question of discrimination arises. [961 F]

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:   Writ  Petition   Nos.   1345, 1635/79, 458, 935. 1418 and 1692/80.      Under Article 32 of the Constitution.      Sukumar Ghosh for the Petitioners in WP No. 1345/79.      S.N. Kacker,  Govinda Mukhoty  and Rathin  Das for  the Respondent in WP No. 1345/79.      P. Keshva Pillai for the Petitioner in WP No. 1635/79.      Rathin Das  for Respondent  No. 2  and Ors.  In WP  No. 1635/79.      Bimal Kumar  Datta, Mrs.  L. Arvind  and A.K. Sen Gupta for the Petitioner in WP No. 458/80.      S.N. Kacker  and Rathin  Das for  Respondent No.  2 and Ors. in WP No. 458/80.      S.C. Majumdar,  Bimal Kumar  Datta, Mrs.  L. Arvind and A.K. Sen for the Petitioner in WP No. 935/80. 953      Sripal Singh for the Petitioners in WP No. 1418 of 1980

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and  1692/80.      Rathin Das  for Respondent  Nos. 2  and Ors. in WP Nos. 935 1418 & 1692/80. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J These  petitions under  Article 32 of the Constitution have been filed in order to challenge the vires of the  West Bengal  Land  Reforms  Act,  1955  (hereinafter referred to  as the  ’1955 Act’)  as also various amendments made to  the said Act upto 1977. The first plank of argument related to  the constitutional validity of the 1955 Act. The second plank of argument was confined to the validity of the West Bengal  Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Amendment Act of 1972’) which was in the nature of  a ceiling Act prescribing a particular ceiling of the area  of land  which could be retained by the tenant. So far as  the Ceiling  Act, viz., the Amendment Act of 1972 is concerned, it is conceded by the counsel for the petitioners that the  constitutional validity  of the  aforesaid Act  is clearly concluded  by a  recent decision  of this  Court  in Waman  Rao  &  Ors.  v.  Union  of  India  &  Ors.  where  a Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  rejected  the  various grounds of  challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various ceiling Acts passed by the States concerned. In view of this decision the learned counsel for the petitioners was fair enough  to state  that he  does not  want to  press his contention regarding  the  constitutional  validity  of  the Ceiling  Act.   Similarly,  the   learned  counsel  for  the petitioners fairly  conceded that as the 1955 Act, alongwith its amendments  upto 1972,  has been  placed  in  the  Ninth Schedule of  the Constitution,  it was immune from challenge and was  saved by  the protective umbrella contained in Art. 31B of  the Constitution.  In this connection, this position was made  absolutely clear in Waman Rao’s case (supra) where this Court observed as follows :           "Thus, in  so far  as the  validity of Article 31B      read with the Ninth Schedule is concerned, we hold that      all Acts and Regulations included in the Ninth Schedule      prior  to   April  24,   1973  will  receive  the  full      protection of  Article 31B.  Those laws and regulations      will not  be open  to challenge on the ground that they      are inconsistent  with or  take away  or abridge any of      the rights  conferred by  any of the provisions of Part      III of the Constitution." 954      In the  instant case,  it is clear that the 1955 Act as also the  Amendment Act  of 1972  were added  to  the  Ninth Schedule, being  entry Nos.  60 and  81, prior  to April 24, 1973. In  these  circumstances,  it  is  manifest  that  the aforesaid Acts  ale completely  immune from challenge on the ground  that  they  are  violative  of  any  of  the  rights enshrined in  Part III  of  the  Constitution.  The  learned counsel for  the petitioners, therefore, was fully justified in making the concession before us.      The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.  No. 1345  of 1979,  which has  been adopted  by the counsel for  the petitioners  appearing in  other petitions, centres round  the validity  of-(1)  The  West  Bengal  Land Reforms (Amendment)  Act, 1977  (published  in  the  Gazette Extraordinary  on  3-2-1978),  and  (2)  Section  20B,  sub- sections (3),  (4) and  (5), of  the 1955 Act. So far as the challenge to the constitutional validity of this section was concerned, it  was confined only on the ground that the said sub-sections were  violative of  Art. 14 of the Constitution of India as being discriminatory and arbitrary.      It was  contended that  once the land holder, viz., the

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tenant was  given the  right of personal cultivation and was permitted to  get the  land cultivated  by a Bargadar on the basis that  the bargadar would share half the produce, there was no  warrant for  not allowing  the tenant  to resume the land where  the  bargadar  had  voluntarily  surrendered  or abandoned the  land. In  order to consider this argument, it may be necessary to examine the status of the bargadar under the 1955 Act. Section 2(2) defines bargadar thus           " ’Bargadar’  means a  person who under the system      generally known  as adhi,  barga or bhag cultivates the      land of  another person  on condition  of delivering  a      share of  the produce  of such  land to that person and      includes person who under the system generally known as      kisani  cultivates   the  land  of  another  person  on      condition of  receiving a  share of the produce of such      land from that person."      Section 16  of the  1955 Act  provides that  where  the tenant brings  in a bargadar on the land, the produce of the land may  be shared  in the  proportion of 50: 50 or 75; 25. There are also provisions in the 1955 Act for enforcement of the right of the tenant to get his share of the produce from the bargadar  which have  not been  challenged before us. It would be seen that s. 17 permits the cultivator to terminate the cultivation  of  the  land  by  a  bargadar  and  resume possession under  his  own  cultivation  if  the  conditions mentioned in clauses 955 (a), (b)  and (d) of sub-section (1) of s. 17 are satisfied. Clause (d) may be extracted thus:-           "That the person owning the land requires it bona-      fide for bringing it under personal cultivation."      Thus, the  cultivator has  a right to get back the land for personal cultivation if he requires it for his bona fide use and proves the same to the satisfaction of the authority appointed under s. 17(1).      It was  argued by  the counsel for the petitioners that on a  parity of  reasoning contained  in s. 17, there was no reason why-where the bargadar had voluntarily surrendered or abandoned the  land-the facility  of  cultivating  the  land personally by  the tenant  should be  denied  to  him.  Sub- sections (3), (4) and (5) of s 20B of the 1955 Act run thus:           "(3) If  such officer or authority determines that      the  bargadar   had  not   voluntarily  surrendered  or      abandoned the  cultivation of  the land which was being      cultivated  by  him  as  such  and  what  he  had  been      compelled by force or otherwise to surrender or abandon      the cultivation of such land, such officer or authority      shall restore  the bargadar  to the  cultivation of the      land, or  where the bargadar is not available or is not      willing to be restored to the cultivation of such land,      the person  whose land  was  so  cultivated  shall  not      resume personal  cultivation of  the land  but he  may,      with the  permission of  such officer or authority, get      the land  cultivated by  any  person,  referred  to  in      section 49,  who is  willing to cultivate the land as a      bargadar.           (4) If  such officer  or authority determines that      the bargadar  had voluntarily  surrendered or abandoned      the cultivation of the land which was cultivated by him      as such,  the person whose land was being so cultivated      shall not  resume personal cultivation of such land but      he  may,   with  the  permission  of  such  officer  or      authority, have  the land  cultivated  by  any  person,      referred to  in section 49, who is willing to cultivate      the land as a bargadar.

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         (5) Any  contravention of  the provisions  of sub-      section (3)  or sub-section  (4) shall  be  an  offence      punishable with  imprisonment  for  a  term  which  may      extend to  six months, or with fine which may extend to      one thousand rupees, or with both."      Sub-sections (3)  and (4) prescribe the procedure which is to  be adopted where a bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the 956 cultivation of  the land. Under these provisions, the tenant is not allowed to resume personal cultivation but has to get the land cultivated by some other person with the permission of the officer or authority concerned.      Realising the  force of the argument, Mr. S. N. Kacker, appearing for  the State  of West  Bengal,  with  his  usual persuasiveness submitted  that sub-sections  (3) and (4) are extremely harsh but the rigours of these sub-sections can be softened if we read down s. 17(d) and interpret it in such a way as  to permit  a tenant  to resume the land under clause (d) of  s. 17  if the  Bargadar  voluntarily  surrenders  or abandons the  land. We  are, however,  unable to  agree with this argument  because it will amount not only to distorting and misinterpreting  clause (d)  but also to causing serious violence to its plain language, which cannot be done      It would  appear that  clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub- section (1)  of s.  17 of  the 1955 Act are the only grounds given on  which a  tenant can  get the  land  back  for  his personal cultivation.  The contingency  where  the  bargadar voluntarily surrenders  or  abandons  the  land  is  neither mentioned in  clauses (a),  (b) and  (c) nor  is directly or indirectly contemplated  by them. In these circumstances. if we accept  the contention  of Mr.  Kacker it would amount to introducing something into s. 17 which is not there and this is  diametrically   opposed  to  the  well-known  canons  of interpretation      We are, however, constrained to observe that there does not  appear   to  be   any  logical  justification  for  the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of s. 20B.      It is  understandable that  when  once  the  cultivator chooses to bring a bargadar on the land, the interest of the bargadar  should   be  duly  protected  and  has  been  made heritable. So  far, there  can be  no objection  and such  a course is  in consonance with the object of the statute. But when the Bargadar on his own volition surrenders or abandons the land,  there is  no reason  why the tenant should not be allowed to  resume cultivation  and instead  be compelled to get the  land cultivated  by some  other person nominated by the authority  concerned under  s. 49  of the 1955 Act. This provision therefore  appears to us to be extremely harsh and works  serious  injustice  to  the  rights  of  the  tenants particularly after  the ceiling  area of the tenant has been considerably reduced by the Amendment Act of 1972. Thus, the tenant having  a small  area guaranteed to him for his unit, he should have at least fuller and 957 more effective  rights to get that area cultivated by him or even by  a bargadar  of his  choice subject  to resuming the same, if  the bargadar  surrenders or abandons the land. The amendment doubtless recognises the right of the ownership of the tenant  within the  ceiling area and yet to deny him the right of  resuming cultivation of the land from the bargadar inducted by him after the bargadar voluntarily surrenders or abandons the  same and  forcing or  imposing someone else to cultivate the  land on  behalf of  the tenant  appears to be contrary to  the very tenor and spirit which sections 17 and

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20B of the 1955 Act seem to subserve Unfortunately, however, though the  provisions of  sub-sections (3), (4) [and (5) of s. 20B,  which is only a penal section] perilously border on arbitrariness  and   amounts  to   serious  curbs   on   the fundamental  right   of  the   cultivator  to   pursue   his occupation, we  cannot however  strike down these provisions because they  are contained  in the  Amendment Act  of  1972 which has  been placed  in the Ninth Schedule prior to April 24, 1973,  and therefore fall within the protective umbrella and are  immune from challenge. It will, however, be for the legislature which  is the  best judge  of the  needs of  its people to  give a  suitable relief  to the tenant and soften the rigours of the harsh provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5)  of s.  20B on the lines indicated by us. With these observations, the  arguments of  the learned counsel for the petitioners on this ground are overruled.      We now  come to  the second plank of the argument which comprises the  challenge to  the proviso and the Explanation to s.  2 of the 1955 Act. This provision having been brought into force  after the  24th of April, 1973, falls beyond the ambit of  Art. 31B  and is  not covered  by  the  protective umbrella  of  that  Article.  In  these  circumstances,  the challenge to  the constitutionality  of this provision could be entertained  by us.  Mr. Kacker  did not  controvert this position. The  impugned proviso  and the  Explanation  which were added  to clause  (8) of  s. 2  by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment Act, 1977, may be extracted thus:-      "Provided that  such person  or member  of  his  family      resides for  the  greater  part  of  the  year  in  the      locality where  the land  is situated and the principal      source of his income is produced from such land.      Explanation-The  term  "family"  shall  have  the  same      meaning as in clause (c) of section 14K"      It was  submitted that  the proviso  insists  that  the cultivator or  member of  his  family  must  reside  in  the locality where the land is 958 situate for  the greater  part of the year and thus deprives the petitioners  of their right guaranteed to them under Art 19(1) (e) and (g) of the Constitution inasmuch as it compels the petitioner  to reside  in the  village and prevents them from either  going to  or residing  in any  other  place  in India.   The    second   ground    of   challenge   to   the constitutionality of  the  proviso  was  that  it  places  a serious curb  on the  right of  the petitioners  to carry on their occupation other than agriculture.      As regards  the first  argument, we are unable to agree with the  learned counsel  because the object of the proviso is to  safeguard the  interest of the tenant himself so that he  may   give  whole-hearted   attention  to  the  personal cultivation of  the land  which has  been secured for him by virtue of a valuable piece of agrarian reform. If the tenant is allowed  to go  out of  the village  and reside  at other places then  the benefit conferred by the 1955 Act cannot be fully utilised  by the  tenant and  would frustrate the very purpose for  which agrarian reforms are meant. Moreover, the land is  given to  the tenant  as the  tiller  of  the  soil fundamentally for  the reason  that cultivation  is his main source of  sustenance as is mentioned in the proviso itself. If, therefore,  the principal  source of  sustenance of  the tenant is  agriculture it  would be futile for the tenant to say that  he should  be permitted to follow other avocations or occupations  in the  main  which  will  defeat  the  very purpose for  which the proviso has been enacted. The proviso does not  debar him  from following any other occupation but

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once a tenant wants to have the land to himself for personal cultivation he  must elect  whether to pursue the profession of cultivation  or some  other occupation. Thus, even though there is some amount of restriction both on the right of the petitioners to reside or follow any other occupation, such a restriction cannot  be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. It is  well settled  that where  a restriction is imposed by the legislature  in public  interest in  order to  advance a particular purpose  or carry out the dominant object. such a restriction is  undoubtedly  a  reasonable  one  within  the meaning  of   clauses  (4)   and  (5)  of  Art.  19  of  the Constitution. Moreover, in the instant cast, the restriction does not  amount to complete deprivation of the right of the tenant to  reside  elsewhere  because  the  words  ’for  the greater part  of the  year’ leave  sufficient scope  to  the tenant to  reside elsewhere  for a part of the year if he so desires. Furthermore,  the Explanation adopts the definition of "family"  which is  the same  as defined in s. 14K of the 1955 Act which runs thus:           "(i) himself  and his  wife, minor sons, unmarried      daughters, if any, 959           (ii) his unmarried adult son, if any, who does not      hold any land as a raiyat,           (iii) his married adult son, if any, where neither      such adult  son nor  the wife  nor  any  minor  son  or      unmarried daughter  of such adult son holds any land as      a raiyat,           (iv) widow  of his  predeceased son, if any, where      neither such  widow, nor  any minor  son  or  unmarried      daughter of such widow holds any land as a raiyat,           (v) minor son or unmarried daughter, if any of his      pre deceased  son, where  the widow of such predeceased      son is dead any minor son or unmarried daughter of such      predeceased son does not hold any land as a raiyat,      but shall not include any other person."      Thus, it  is  not  necessary  that  the  tenant  should himself reside  in the  village for  the greater part of the year and  it is sufficient if any member of the family which includes his wife, unmarried adult, married adult, minor son and so  on, remains  in the village and this would amount to substantial compliance of the conditions of the proviso. The restriction, therefore,  is partial  and in  public interest and bears  a close  nexus with  the object  of the 1955 Act, viz, to achieve agrarian reforms.      The fundamental  rights enshrined  in Art.  19  of  the Constitution  are  not  absolute  and  unqualified  but  are subject to  reasonable restrictions  which  may  be  imposed under sub-clauses  (4)  and  (5)  of  Art.  19.  Whenever  a complaint of  violation of  fundamental rights  is made  the Court has  to determine  whether  or  not  the  restrictions imposed contain  the quality of reasonableness. In assessing these factors  a doctrinaire approach should not be made but the essential  facts and  realities of  life have to be duly considered. Our Constitution aims at building up a socialist state and the establishment of an egalitarian society and if reasonable restrictions are placed on the fundamental rights in public  interest, they can be fully justified in law. The principles laying  down the  various tests of reasonableness have been  very aptly  enunciated in  the case  of State  of Madras v.  V.G. Row  which is  almost the locus classicus on the subject in question. In that case Shastri, C.J, speaking for the Court observed as follows :-      "It is  important in  this context to bear in mind that      the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should

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    be 960      applied to  each individual  statute impugned,  and  no      abstract   standard,    or    general    pattern,    of      reasonableness can  be laid  down as  applicable to all      cases. The  nature of  the right  alleged to  have been      infringed, the  underlying purpose  of the restrictions      imposed, the  extent and  urgency of the evil sought to      be  remedied   thereby,  the   disproportion   of   the      imposition, the  prevailing  conditions  at  the  time,      should all enter into the judicial verdict."      The  case  has  been  consistently  followed  by  later decisions of this Court right uptodate      Another important factor to consider the reasonableness of restrictions is if the restrictions imposed are excessive or dispreportionate  to the needs of a particular situation. Further, if  the restrictions  are in  implementation of the directive principles  of the  Constitution the same would be upheld as  being in  public interest  because the individual interest must  yield to  the interest  of the  community  at large for only then a welfare state can flourish.      Applying these  tests to  the facts of the present case we are  satisfied that  the restrictions  contained  in  the impugned proviso  cannot be  said to be unreasonable for the following reasons:      The dominant  object of  the proviso  is to abolish the      age-old  institutions   of  absentee   land-holders  by      insisting that  the cultivator to whom land is allotted      must give  full and  complete attention to the soil and      as  a   result  of   which  there  will  be  a  maximum      utilisation of  the agricultural  resources which would      increase production. Under the Amendment Act of 1972 an      adult unmarried  person is  entitled to hold an area up      to 2.50 hectares which is equal to 6.72 acres, a tenant      with a  family of two or more is entitled to hold 12.36      hectares and  a tenant  having a family of five or more      is entitled  to hold 7 hectares which is equal to 12.23      acres being  the maximum  area permissible.  Thus,  the      area left  to the  tenant is quite vast and appreciable      and if  the tenant  wants  to  bring  this  area  under      cultivation in  right earnest it would hardly leave him      time to quit the village and pursue other avocations of      life. It  is obvious  that the  tenant has to remain in      the village  for the  purpose of cultivating the lands,      sowing the  seeds, growing  it and harvesting it. These      processes would  doubt less require the presence of the      tenant for a greater part of the year which is what the      proviso predicates. If the 961      tenant is  permitted to leave the village for more than      half   the year  then the very purpose of giving such a      vast area  for cultivation  to a tenant will be foiled.      Moreover, the  proviso merely  insists that  the tenant      should remain  in the  village  or  its  periphery  for      "greater part of the year" which appears to be not only      reasonable but  absolutely essential if the land has to      be cultivated  in a scientific manner in order to yield      the maximum  possible production, which would result in      better  and   equitable  distribution  of  agricultural      products for the use of the people of the country.      Another aspect of the proviso is that the land is given to the  tenant only if his main source of sustenance is from agriculture so  that the  land may  be reserved only for the tiller of  the soil  and none  else. Hence, the restrictions imposed, therefore, by the proviso are undoubtedly in public

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interest and in consonance with the concept of promoting and accelerating agrarian reforms which is the prime need of the hour.      For these  reasons, therefore,  the challenge  that the proviso violates Art. 19 (1) (e) and (g) must fail.      The last  contention put forward by the petitioners was that the proviso is also violative of Art. 14 inasmuch as it is extremely  arbitrary and discriminatory. We are unable to uphold the challenge on the ground that the proviso violates Art. 14  because we do not find any element of arbitrariness in the  proviso. If  the statute  insists that the tiller of the soil  must remain  in the  village for a greater part of the year in order to cultivate the land which has been given to him  and thereby  increase the  produce. Of  the land, no serious prejudice  is caused  to the  tenant because that is the purpose  for which  he has  himself  secured  the  land. Secondly, as the proviso operates equally to all the tenants governed by  it no question of discrimination at all arises. Thus, this argument also is wholly untenable and must fail.      For the  reasons given above, we hold that both the Act of 1955,  including the  Amendment  Act  of  1972,  and  the proviso introduced  a by  the  Amendment  Act  of  1977  are constitutionally valid. As we have made certain observations regarding the  harshness of  the provisions  of sub-sections (3), (4)  and (5)  of s.  20B of the 1955 Act, let a copy of this judgment  be sent to the Hon’ble Chief Minister of West Bengal. The  petitions are dismissed without any order as to costs. N.V.K.                                  Petitions dismissed, 962